Posts by Cassius

I don't know why Bailey didn't follow Hicks' construction and I am tempted just to replace Bailey's with Hicks, since Hicks is so much more clear, but for now I added Hicks as a footnote on our page here of the PD's. We have a lot of Bailey's critical apparatus so maybe there is an answer.

(But I see that the guys at the Epicurus Wiki did not follow hicks) http://wiki.epicurism.info/Principal_Doctrine_9/

(All of which reminds me to get back to that project of reviewing each one for changes to our list - We stopped right before we got to 9!)

Principal Doctrines

Edit: I now see NONE of the other translators Nate collected follow Hicks. Are they all presuming that we know that this construction implies the added "but it doesn't"? Or is there possibility of error in the WIkipedia analysis?

To make the podcast more visible and easier to find we will upload select episodes and series to YouTube. If you get a chance a "like" will be appreciated and should contribute to visibility.

With an assist from TauPhi I have started with posting the series we did on the Letter To Menoeceus, and we will follow with others.

With the format we will probably continue to use, the viewer on Youtube can go directly to any episode in the playlist by clicking on the start time in the description. (That navigation is not visible here at EF as it is necessary to open the comments to see the list.)

Let us know if you have suggestions or comments, and thanks to the podcasters for their contributions.

Thanks for writing Rocco! I suspect based on what you've written I can predict somewhat what you will like and what you will dislike as you read into Epicurus, but it's better to let things develop over time. We have a lot of people here with backgrounds similar to yours so you'll get lots of opinions!

While you correctly detect that the purpose of the forum is focused on rediscovering the core teachings of Epicurus, which can be surprisingly difficult to determine, we are first and foremost a discussion forum, so take your time and comment as you see fit.

Good to have you.

Quote from Don

I still have problems with the assumption of the "uneducated" shepherd. It makes them sound ignorant. They may not be formally educated, but that doesn't mean they weren't knowledgeable about their craft.

But is he knowledgeable about philosophy? Can someone be happy without philosophy? Is happiness also relative? As the saying goes, "If ignorance is bliss is the shepherd living in a constant state of ecstacy?"

Quote

Wherefore both when young and old a man must study philosophy, that as he grows old he may be young in blessings through the grateful recollection of what has been, and that in youth he may be old as well, since he will know no fear of what is to come. We must then meditate on the things that make our happiness, seeing that when that is with us we have all, but when it is absent we do all to win it.

Quote

PD12. A man cannot dispel his fear about the most important matters if he does not know what is the nature of the universe, but suspects the truth of some mythical story. So that, without natural science, it is not possible to attain our pleasures unalloyed.

Today we updated the Archive.org listing so that all episodes from 1 to 190 are now available there.

The Lucretius Today Podcast : EpicureanFriends.com : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

The Lucretius Today Podcast, sponsored by EpicureanFriends.com

archive.org

It's quite large (9 GB download), but Archive.org makes it possible to download the full set of episodes in a single zip file, so feel free to download your own set for backup purposes.

The "die" has been cast into the river of Facebook:

I see for the literate among us I should have written " Alea iacta est"

Quote from Don

It's always tricky when trying to compare what texts mean when different words are used: pleasure vs happiness.

Tricky and a major hazard. Understandably, people at different levels of perspective on Epicurus tend to use the word that they "think" should fit best, and that breaks the chain of accuracy.

Optimum is to learn the Greek like Don or the Latin, but that's not going to happen for most people. Over time I'd like to see us able to access the line-by-line Greek much more easily, because then we can at least be aware of word switches so as a person has the time they can dig deeper. As it is, without easy access to compare the Greek word when reading a translation, you're flying blind with the translators.

That's a major benefit of the epicurism.info format for the key texts:

I'd like to see our format in the "Texts" section here at Epicureanfriends become more like that in the future.

As to CIcero's reasoning, here are some relevant references:

Cicero, Fin. 2.109

Quare aliud aliquod,Torquate, hominis summum bonum reperiendum est, voluptatem bestiis

concedamus.

Therefore,Torquatus, some other supreme good must be found for a human being. Let

us leave pleasure to the nonhuman animals.

T2 Cicero, Fin. 2.111

Nec tamen ullo modo summum pecudis bonum et hominis idem mihi videri potest.

I cannot in any way think that humans and livestock have the same supreme good.

T3 Aristotle, EN I .5 I 095bI9-20 (Cf. Heraclitus frr. 4 and 29, and Plato, flej?_. 586a-b)

oi piv oov 110XX01 TIONTEXCOc Co.lOpomoOthbEtc tpocivorrat 1300"Kilp&TWV rov

irpooupoOpEvot...

Most entirely slavish people clearly choose the life of cattle...

Cicero, Fin. 2.40

Animality Hi non viderunt, ut ad cursum equum, ad arandum bovem, ad indagandum canem, sic hominem

Objection ad duos res, ut ait Aristoteles, ad intellegendum et <ad> agendum esse natum quasi mortalem

deum, controque ut tardam aliquam et languidam pecudem ad pastum et ad procreandi

voluptatem hoc divinum animal ortum esse voluerunt, quo nihil mihi videtur absurdius.

They [viz.,Aristippus and the Cyrenaics] did not see that just as a horse is born for

running, an ox for ploughing, and a dog for hunting, so a human is born for two things, as

Aristotle says, for thinking and for acting, as if a mortal god.They, by contrast, wanted this

divine animal to be born for grazing and the pleasure of procreating, like a slow and lazy

sheep. Nothing seems to me more absurd than this.

Cicero, Fin. 2.110-1 I I

Et homini, qui ceteris animantibus plurimum proestot, praecipui a nature nihil datum esse

dicemus? Nos vero, si quidem in voluptate sunt omnia, lenge multumque superomur a bestiis,

quibus ipso terra Pundit ex sese pastus varies atque abundantes nihil laborantibus, nobis autem

out vix out ne vix quidem suppetunt multo labore quaerentibus. Nec tamen ullo modo summum

pecudis bonum et hominis idem mihi videri potest.

Shall we say that the human being, which far surpasses other living things, has been

endowed by nature with no preferred thing? In truth, if everything is in pleasure, then we

are far and away surpassed by the nonhuman animals, for whom the earth itself pours

out various and abundant provisions, with no work on their part, whereas we are able to

supply our wants scarcely or not at all, and with great difficulty. However, I cannot in any

way think that humans and livestock have the same supreme good.

Quote from Onenski

I mean, possibly there's not a specific and universal activity or object to pursue that brings pleasure in general, but there's a way to do it or to get it: the virtuous one.

I think most all of us will agree on that. Even eating ice cream is not guaranteed pleasureable, if you have just eaten a gallon and are stuffed.

Quote from Onenski

I really hope this answer have some sense, because I'm not sure if I understood completely the question in dispute.

I think the question is more addressed to this: "Are all pleasures really interchangeable to a person, or or some pleasures more to be chosen than others?" Maybe the answer is obviously "Yes, some are to be chosen before others," but what is the best way to explain that to yourself, or to (for example) your child.

Cicero and others seem to infer that all true Epicureans will choose to spend their lives laying on the beach without a thought to (for example) a life as an artist or a scientist or a policeman or fireman.

Is Cicero correct? If not, why not, and how do you explain the Epicurean analysis of choosing some pleasures over others in Epicurean terms without reference to nobility or other outside standards? Is the only thing that can be said is "choose the most pleasant?"

Episode 190 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available!

Quote from Onenski

For Mill there are special pleasures, like reading philosophy, listening to music, contemplate art, etc., that are superior to other pleasures (accesible only for animals). I understand his idea, but I reject it for similar reasons why I reject stoicism: I don't think there are intrinsically nobler people, nobler activities or nobler ways to live (or intrinsically pleasurable).

I think most Epicureans would probably agree that there are no "nobler" people, activities, or ways to live, if "nobler" implies an absolute ranking of value. But would Epicureans agree that there are no "preferable" people, activities, or ways to live, that we we ourselves can decide to be preferable? The word "special" in Mill's wording is a little ambiguous reading it from your excerpt, but once we read out the "absolute for everyone standard," can we not - and should we not - establish for ourselves which are better and pursue those?

Is the entire question one of absolute vs subjective definition of the scale?

Quote from Plantpierogi

If I wanted to be a lay in the grass in the summertime for a week, I would simply wait 9 months. Besides, a shepherd's life never appealed to me, anyway.

Great thoughts in that post Plantpierogi and good to see back you on the forum again!

It should not have! does it appear to you that it did?

Quote from Don

See my addendum edit to post 35. I'm not convinced PD09 says pleasures are the same.

Right - I intended my comment to mean that I was agreeing with you, and I was just looking for more support against the opposite position. It doesn't make sense to me that someone would hold different types of pleasures (taste, smell) to be the same except from certain limited perspectives. One might say that they "are all the same in that they feel pleasurable" but that approaches being very high level wordplay that is of limited usefulness. One could also talk about the "quantity" (I think) in terms of coming up with a general measurement of "intensity" or "amount of attention you pay to that feeling" but the benefit of that too would be pretty limited.

So I agree with you that PD09 doesn't imply that all pleasures are the same except (at most) from some very high level perspective. Pleasures can differ very significantly from one another, and the question that each of us faces is WHICH pleasure to pursue at a particular moment.

Other than PD09 does Epicurus say anything anywhere that might support the idea that pleasures are "the same"? I am not thinking that he does and so I wonder if that is not also intended to reference "Quantity" as in PD03.

Other than in quantity I cannot see much similarity in pleasures as a whole other than that the feeling of pleasure tells us it is pleasurable, which is more of a generalization than a statement of a specific feeling.

Times like this I doubt that Epicurus put together this list and ordering himself.

Quote from Don

The feeling of pleasure is personal and subjective.

So "the height of pleasure" or "the highest pleasure" or "the greatest pleasure" or similar terms can never be measured on an absolute scale or even compared from person to person based on any outside authority or measurement, but are terms that are always relative to the person under discussion at a particular moment?

Does that apply too to "the limit of quantity of pleasure" as referenced in PD03? If so, the PD03 is intended to mean the "limit of quantity of pleasure for YOU" or "for a particular person" is the absence of pain, rather than referring to a particular activity? And that therefore different people are going to be doing different things when they are at this limit referenced in PD03?

If these are correct, then the shepherd out with the flock might be at his or her height of pleasure while Epicurus with his school could be at his height of pleasure and be doing absolutely different things, and therefore:

- It makes no sense to try to define any particular activity or state as the "height of pleasure" for people in general?

- The choice to live as a shepherd for your final week or Epicurus at the end for your final week says everything about your personal preference but nothing that can be generally praised or condemned by any general rule ... purely a personal preference?

{ I am not asking these totally rhetorically and if Don or anyone else disagrees with the perspective please say so! }

Quote from Don

PS. (Edit) Everything is contextual! The same pleasure in different contexts coming from different desires may lead to completely different decisions on whether one selects or flees from that pleasure.

So "pleasure" is itself contextual and there is absolutely no Platonic ideal or Aristotelian essence of "Pleasure"?

Quote from Don

That sounds horrific, but I'm also not an ancient Roman general commanding a legion. The fruits of his decision were strict discipline under his command. Was it worth it? Did it provide well-being? You'd have to ask Titus Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus

The presumption there seems to be that the choice of greatest pleasure is entirely personal. For the present rather than agree or disagree I would just say that --- if true --- that too (in addition to "sharing" and "length of time") would be major factors to consider in this hypothetical.

Quote from Don

whether or not I'm imbued with the knowledge of Epicurus or surrounded by his friends, doesn't sound "fruitful" to me, to riff on καρπίζεται. One, by definition of the hypothetical, couldn't "come back" and share that knowledge.

Quote from Don

What good would it serve to know everything and not be able to share it?

Yes we are making progress!

So if I read you correctly, from your perspective, the "ability to share" seems to be perhaps the paramount consideration in fruitfulness and enjoyability.

As you indicate (..."for me! someone else's mileage may vary"...) that may be a personal choice, but it's clearly understandable, and definitely advances the conversation to suggest something as a criteria.

One would then have to contemplate "sharing" as a companion to "length of time" in consideration of pleasure.

(we crossposted and I had not seen post 24 before writing that)

Is not judging pleasure by length of time specifically denied to be a good idea by Epicurus?

Letter to Menoeceus:

"And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant.".

As for the hypo I will specify for the Facebook version that "for a week" means that you only have one week to live in either scenario at the end of which your life is over. That makes it easier to see that the choice involves "how does one spend the time that one has."

The alternative of "for a week" meaning the equivalent of a trip to the beach after which you return to your present self might also be useful as a warmup to consider first, but would not frame the question so starkly.

And of course in life we have a lot more choices than these two to choose from, just as we have many pleasures to choose from, but the point of a hypothetical is to focus on a key issue for purposes of understanding a deeper lesson.

In this case: Are all pleasures equally to be chosen? If so, how do we choose among them? If not, why not?

Simply saying "Choose pleasure and avoid pain, while sometimee choosing pain to avoid a worse pain or get greater pleasure" answers that question generally, but is that all there is to be said about the nature of the choice of pleasure to seek? If that is all that can be said philosophically then that itself is important to know. If we think Epicurus said more, what else as a key philosophical rule that would apply here?

Another warmup question might be: "A former Torquatus put his son to death for violating a military rule, and our Torquatus justified that as a decision consistent in nature with an Epicurean perspective. This despite the other Epicurean rule that we sometimes die for a friend. Does that tell us anything about the Epicurean position for choosing among pleasures and pains?"