Posts by Cassius

I expect this book to generate discussion for years to come, and I expect to cite it as the preferred interpretation of Epicurean engagement in society. That means it deserves a forum of its own, so some of the posts about the book (but not this thread in its entirety, as it applies to the podcast) will be moved here:

Theory And Practice In Epicurean Political Philosophy - Javier Aoiz and Marcelo Boeri

Quote from burninglights

But, since I do tend to take the distinction as legitimate, it does make me wonder what, exactly, it means though!

Someone is eventually going to wade through the texts and the scholarly commentaries that parse the vocabularies and give examples of how all these words are used. I tend to think that the Gosling & Taylor book is exhaustive, but there are many many more.

As for here on the forum, I tend to think Don is your man who will eventually do that!

In the meantime I would just advise caution in getting too wedded to a particular position, along the lines of the "waiting" idea in Diogenes Laertius.

And part of the reason I advise that caution is that if someone gets too caught up in the wording, that focus could tend to distract away from more common sense analysis you are trying to pursue. I think you are right in your direction, and that's all there is too it. On the other hand, *many* people seem to have decided to themselves: "Epicureans were constantly dropping the name "katastematic" as a synonym for "absence of pain," and so therefore I will set my sights on "katastematic pleasure" as "absence of pain," and I'll write the whole world of kinetic pleasure out of the equation."

"Absence of pain" is the key to the analysis. If you conclude that "absence of pain" means "pleasure" then you will conclude that "absence of pain" can refer to **any** kind of pleasure, meaning **any** kind of mental or physical activity which is not painful. And that opens up the full spectrum of non-painful human activity as being desirable, which is a great deal more liberating than thinking that you need to go back to graduate school and learn detailed Greek vocabulary before you can understand Epicurus.

If you conclude that absence of pain means "katastematic pleasure," then I think you lose the benefit of what is being said on very face of the quotes I included above. You then turn against not only what Cicero's Epicurean speaker insists on repeatedly, but you turn against Epicurus himself "By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul.") and what Diogenes Laertius said that Epicurus valued "both" types of pleasure.

If you suspend this analysis until you get a graduate degree to unwind the Greek, you'll lose appreciation for the pleasure-maximizing viewpoint that "if I am not in pain I am in pleasure," and you'll constantly go looking for something else (probably through asceticism).

To repeat I am not saying that you personally are running afoul of that problem, but I would wager a lot of money that many of the commentaries are doing exactly that, and that is what leads to a lot of confusion.

Quote from Kalosyni

Here is a tough question: Can the killing of a another human being ever be justified under Epicurean philosophy? Thoughts?

Quote from Don

It's all about context. Self-defense? To prevent them from killing others? Etc etc etc.

Don gives a very short answer - almost as if he is implying that the question isn't "tough" at all!

Actually I agree that the question as worded is not very difficult, and the answer is "yes," as illustrated by Cassius Longinus' decision to act in regard to Julius Caesar even as an avowed Epicurean.

But there is a lot of toughness that comes in as Don says when he says "it's all about context." And also that's another way of saying "Justified to whom?" Justified to the police or the courts? Justified to the dead man's family? Justified to god? Justified as not being a breach of some contention of absolute justice? Justified to Epicurus as a person? You'd have to know more facts to be able to give a thorough opinion on whether the deed was "justified" in the sense that you will reward and honor and respect the killer in the future, or whether you will hold him in disrepute and disrespect and want nothing to do with the killer in the future.

And I think that's the real question Kalosyni is asking. If we reword it as "Is there a "flat" rule against killing another human being in all circumstances?" It seems to me that that pretty clearly is answerable under Epicurean philosophy as "No - there is no flat absolute rule against all killing of human beings in all circumstances." Then you have to get into all the details of the repercussions in terms of punishment and regret and remorse (if any) after that, where the issues are very tough.

Quote from burninglights

Here, he seems to expresses the idea that grateful recollections have played an important role in the old man having 'come to anchor' in life, suggesting again that by way of gratitude one can find peace of mind.

But before I go off to much further on the details, re-reading your original post I presume what you are doing is looking to identify pleasures that are accessible and longer-lasting and looking at ways to cultivate those rather than moment to moment stimulations and excitements. Just thought again I would be clear and say that that is a very desirable search and something to explore and write at length about, no matter what labels we put on it.

Quote from Don

PS. I should have read further down before replying You raise some interesting points.

Another part of the problem is that "stable" implies "good" while "transitory" implies "less good than stable."

But if the word kinetic means anything at all, is it not associated with "motion" or "moveo" / movement in Cicero's wording? Yes you can have motion that is "smooth," and long-lasting, and surely that is a more desirable kind of pleasure than a pleasure that last less long and is more "rough." I would think all of us probably agree that a pleasure that is smooth and longer-lasting is more desirable than a pleasure that is not.

Is that all that is in issue? Then we could just say "a pleasure that is smooth and longer-lasting is more desirable than a pleasure that is not."

Is something else in issue? If it is, then I'm not yet convinced I have a clue as to what that issue is, because it's surely not a distinction between mental vs physical, which is another point on which I think all of us agree. Maybe there is some issue of "confidence" that is "unshakeable" and stays with us for a really long time due to our philosophical conclusions, but if so, again, I'd assert that everyone would be better off being clear about that in one's own language.

Emily Austin, Chapter 4 Footnote 8:

Quote

This is a non-specialist text, so I have chosen not to wade into the dispute about katastematic and kinetic pleasures in the body of the text. A specialist will recognize that I am adopting a view roughly in line with Gosling and Taylor (1982) and Arenson (2019). On my reading, katastematic pleasures are sensory pleasures that issue from confidence in one’s ability to satisfy one’s necessary desires and an awareness of one’s healthy psychological functioning; choice-worthy kinetic pleasures are the various pleasures consistent with maintaining healthy functioning, and those pleasures vary, but do not increase healthy psychological functioning.

You'll note that Dr. Austin is saying that katastematic pleasures are also "sensory," which is in itself a sort of wading into the issue, as many of the writers who advocate katastematic pleasures as better than kinetic either expressly or implicitly take the position that katastematic pleasures are not "sensory" at all.

There's that same problem again -- sensation would appear to go along with kinetic, and yet if katastematic pleasures are non-sensory, as some advocate, then what's the use of something you can't sense? The real problem in my view is that a lot of people want to overaly "absence of pain" as meaning "katastematic pleasure" rather than accepting the repeatedly asserted position that "absence of pain" is just another term for "pleasure" of any type.

And thus you trigger my latest list of cites:

1. Epicurus PD03 : ”The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once .“
2. Epicurus Letter to Menoeceus : ”By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul.“
3. Diogenes Laertius X-34 : ”The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined.“
4. On Ends Book One, 30 : ”Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?
5. On Ends Book One, 38 : Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“
6. On Ends Book One, 39 : For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.
7. On Ends Book One, 56 : By this time so much at least is plain, that the intensest pleasure or the intensest annoyance felt in the mind exerts more influence on the happiness or wretchedness of life than either feeling, when present for an equal space of time in the body. We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain. [57] But as we are elated by the blessings to which we look forward, so we delight in those which we call to memory. Fools however are tormented by the recollection of misfortunes; wise men rejoice in keeping fresh the thankful recollection of their past blessings. Now it is in the power of our wills to bury our adversity in almost unbroken forgetfulness, and to agreeably and sweetly remind ourselves of our prosperity. But when we look with penetration and concentration of thought upon things that are past, then, if those things are bad, grief usually ensues, if good, joy.
8. On Ends Book One, 62 : But these doctrines may be stated in a certain manner so as not merely to disarm our criticism, but actually to secure our sanction. For this is the way in which Epicurus represents the wise man as continually happy; he keeps his passions within bounds; about death he is indifferent; he holds true views concerning the eternal gods apart from all dread; he has no hesitation in crossing the boundary of life, if that be the better course. Furnished with these advantages he is continually in a state of pleasure, and there is in truth no moment at which he does not experience more pleasures than pains. For he remembers the past with thankfulness, and the present is so much his own that he is aware of its importance and its agreeableness, nor is he in dependence on the future, but awaits it while enjoying the present; he is also very far removed from those defects of character which I quoted a little time ago, and when he compares the fool’s life with his own, he feels great pleasure. And pains, if any befall him, have never power enough to prevent the wise man from finding more reasons for joy than for vexation.
9. On Ends Book Two, 9 : Cicero: “…[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same thing as 'pleasure.'” Torquatus: “Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be.”
10. On Ends, Book Two, 11: Cicero: Still, I replied, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for he moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?” Torquatus: “Absolutely the same, indeed the negation of pain is a very intense pleasure, he most intense pleasure possible.”
11. On Ends Book Two, 16 : “This, O Torquatus, is doing violence to one's senses; it is wresting out of our minds the understanding of words with which we are imbued; for who can avoid seeing that these three states exist in the nature of things: first, the state of being in pleasure; secondly, that of being in pain; thirdly, that of being in such a condition as we are at this moment, and you too, I imagine, that is to say, neither in pleasure nor in pain; in such pleasure, I mean, as a man who is at a banquet, or in such pain as a man who is being tortured. What! do you not see a vast multitude of men who are neither rejoicing nor suffering, but in an intermediate state between these two conditions? No, indeed, said he; I say that all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too. Do you, then, say that the man who, not being thirsty himself, mingles some wine for another, and the thirsty man who drinks it when mixed, are both enjoying the same pleasure?”

As to how the fact of coexistence of pleasure and pain existing in different parts of experience do no contradict PD03:

1. Epicurus to Idomeneus, Diogenes Laertius: On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could increase them; but I set above them all the gladness of mind at the memory of our past conversations. But I would have you, as becomes your lifelong attitude to me and to philosophy, watch over the children of Metrodorus.
2. Lucretius Book 3 line 98: “Thus often the body, which is clear to see, is sick, when, all the same we feel pleasure in some other hidden part; and contrariwise it happens that the reverse often comes to be in turn, when one wretched in mind feels pleasure in all his body; in no other wise than if, when a sick man’s foot is painful, all the while, may be, his head is in no pain. Moreover, when the limbs are given up to soft sleep, and the heavy body lies slack and senseless, yet there is something else in us, which at that very time is stirred in many ways, and admits within itself all the motions of joy and baseless cares of heart.”

Quote from burninglights

I'll offer up an example: a guy goes to a football game and cheers with glee when his team scores the touchdown, only to sulk minutes later when the other team scores the touchdown. This is kinetic pleasure: externally generated and (relatively) unstable.

Later he writes gratefully about his fun experience at the game in his journal, which generates a warm glow within that stays with him the rest of the night. This is katastematic pleasure: internally generated and (relatively) stable.

My guess, anyway.

This is where Don't research into the Greek is eventually going to help us out of this cave, in my view, because we are eventually going to latch on to what "kinetic" really includes (almost every kind of mental and physical pleasure) and then it will be easier to decide whether what's left is in fact usefully described as "katastematic."

It has been too long since I read the Gosling & Taylor "The Greeks on Pleasure" but they spilled a *lot* of ink on this issue. The trouble is that *kinetic* does tend to imply "in motion" and *katastematic* implies .... something else.

The distinction you raise in your example between the two types of pleasurable experiences - "touchdowns vs gratefulness" - certainly exists. No one in his right mind would say that they are exactly the same, or that both are not enjoyable.

Part of the problem is that *duration* alone does not appear to be the distinction implied in K/K discussions, nor is duration the deciding factor in which pleasures to value. Epicurus says explicitly we do NOT value exclusively by duration in the letter to Menoeceus as to the food we choose at a banquet and the type of life we should seek. We want the "most pleasant" and not the "longest."

And for someone who might want to assert that duration is the key, I would ask them - What is the magic line between stable and unstable? Does a minute or an hour or a day or a week or a year qualify as "stable"?

You will see in Emily Austin's footnote on this topic that she goes with Gosling & Taylor that this issue may be interesting but not crucial to analysis (I will see if I can find her exact wording).

Definitely there are many types of pleasures, and definitely some last longer than others, and definitely some are mental and some are physical, and definitely some are easier to access than others. All those factors seem indisputably important. But is it correct to overlay the word "kastematic" over some rather than others? That's a much tougher question.

I am on my phone and have to be brief in this post but aside from my views on the K/ K issue as a whole, it is my understanding that any pleasure which involves starting and stopping (summoning up a memory, or thinking of gratitude or anything else at a particular moment) is considered kinetic because it involves change. This is one of the difficulties of the k/k distinction.

Dr Boeri has provided us with two reviews of his book - one here

The Epicurean Life Revealed: Politics and Security – SUN NEWS AUSTIN

Unfortunately there was a second "golden" reference that I wanted but could not find quickly enough - the one in which Cicero describes the canon - if I recall correctly - as if let down from heaven on a golden rope. But I may be wrong about that one, and its context may have been sarcastic.

EDIT: OOPS SORRY = it fell from heaven, not let down on a golden rope!

[63] It was indeed excellently said by Epicurus that fortune only in a small degree crosses the wise man’s path, and that his greatest and most important undertakings are executed in accordance with his own design and his own principles, and that no greater pleasure can be reaped from a life which is without end in time, than is reaped from this which we know to have its allotted end. He judged that the logic of your school possesses no efficacy either for the amelioration of life or for the facilitation of debate. He laid the greatest stress on natural science. That branch of knowledge enables us to realize clearly the force of words and the natural conditions of speech and the theory of consistent and contradictory expressions; and when we have learned the constitution of the universe we are relieved of superstition, are emancipated from the dread of death, are not agitated through ignorance of phenomena, from which ignorance, more than any thing else, terrible panics often arise ; finally, our characters will also be improved when we have learned what it is that nature craves. Then again if we grasp a firm knowledge of phenomena, and uphold that canon, which almost fell from heaven into human ken, that test to which we are to bring all our judgments concerning things, we shall never succumb to any man’s eloquence and abandon our opinions.

HA! Not ONLY of Plato:

Lucretius Book Three¶

O Epicurus, who could first strike so clear a light from so great darkness, and direct us in the proper advantages of life, Thee, the glory of the Grecian name, I follow. Thy steps I closely trace with mine, not so much from a desire to rival thee, as from the love I bear, and the ardent passion I profess to imitate thee. For how can the swallow contend in singing with the swan? Or what can kids, with feeble limbs, perform in running with the noble horse's speed?

Thou great Father, founder of philosophy! Thou with paternal precepts dost inspire thy sons, and from thy writings, most illustrious chief, as bees such honey from the flowery fields, we feed upon thy golden sentences - golden, and fit eternally to live. For when thy reason first began to prove that Nature was not formed by powers divine, the terrors of the mind all fled, the walls of this great world lie open, and I see how things are managed through the mighty void. The deity of the gods, their calm abodes appear, which neither winds disturb, nor clouds overflow with showers, nor the white-falling snow, congealed by sharpest frost, does spoil; but the unclouded air surrounds them always, and smiles on them fully with diffused light. Nature in every thing supplies their wants; nothing at any time destroys their peace. But the wide tracts of Hell are nowhere seen, nor does the interposing Earth prevent our sight, but we discover what beneath our feet is doing in the space below. In these pursuits a certain divine pleasure spreads round me, and I stand amazed, that by thy strength of mind, all nature every way lies naked to our view.

Happy birthday both to Joshua and also (if I understand correctly) Kalosyni! Two important figures for our forum in one day!

Quote from Don

Seems to me this would be talking about epitomes and summaries vs full lectures and books, e.g., letter to Herodotus vs the books of On Nature.

Yes I'd say it "could," but if I were collecting maxims of the golden words of Epicurus I suspect I would have found one a little more useful about pleasure or death or the gods to include, and left that one out

Quote from Titus

One could also think of it as a critique of the argument: "This is science!" (and therefore truth - trust me, not your senses). Do you think this is appropriate or does it overstretch the argument?

At first thought i don't have much info to offer on the other points but I definitely agree that this is part of Epicurus' attitude. Any kind of argument from "authority" where people are supposed to accept a conclusion that they cannot themselves understand as opposed to what their own senses tell them is going to be highly scrutinized. The Epicureans were confronting their own contemporary arguments about the application of "science" and "mathematics" on the implications of issues such as the size of the sun and the nature of the stars, and separating what can be proved from what goes too far is always tricky.

Happy Birthday to Joshua! Learn more about Joshua and say happy birthday on Joshua's timeline: Joshua

I agree there is probably more going on here too. Isn't there a parallel reference somewhere (Lucretius?) to different birds using different types of calls? I could see potentially some context of discussion of language or even the "frank speech" issue being involved here too. I would generally expect a deeper philosophic point than Bailey seems to be accepting in order for a passage to make the cut into a collection.

Yes Don it sure looks like Bailey is trying to claim a higher status for philosophy because he is disposed in that direction.

It in fact looks at least as much that they were concerned about asserting how some pleasures come as a result of excitement or stimulation (eat and drink and sex) while others accompany the natural functioning (of body or in this case the mind) even when stimulation or excitement is absent.

Given the nonstandard manner of speaking I could well imagine that from start to finish the Epicureans were regularly coming up with illustrations of how to think of pleasure as *every* experience of life which is not painful. That's not the normal way of thinking, but if you do take that attitude then it transforms the vocabulary and leads to all sorts of new constructions.

It's pretty easy to see that pleasure has to arise coincidentally with the activity in many cases (but not all) for this approach to work.

Quote from Kalosyni

Perhaps this list could be made into a pamplet, or something good for new forum members to read.

Yes I suspect that ww have earlier threads on this, perhaps linked in the FAQ, so the challenge here is not only to come up with a list but make it findable and curated with new additions over time.

Thank you for these commentaries Don!

Pacatus in the book Dr. Boeri and Dr Aioz go into detail analogizing the development of justice and the development of language, which they believe (I think correctly) are both related to prolepsis. I don't recall a lot of detail to offer more than that, but what I think is a part of their analysis is that justice and language emerge naturally, without being handed down by gods or dictated by a few "great men," or existing as a result of Platonic ideals, and so there are going to be differences in conceptions of justice just as there are differences in language.

I am not exactly sure if or how that relates to your second paragraph but I think it probably does.