Posts by Cassius

Quote from Don

Your hand doesn't "feel" anything. You may sense something with your hand, on your hand, in your hand, and so on; but your hand, in its present condition, is merely a part of your sensory apparatus. If you feel that your hand doesn't lack anything, it's in homeostasis. It is in balance.

While I think this angle of approach is true, I don't think it meets directly what Chrysippus was saying so I wouldn't start with this one. I don't see any reason why he could not have picked out any other part of the body, or even a total person, and made the same point, just so long as that person was sitting quietly and not being stimulated from the outside.

Quote from Godfrey

Very well said. So another mistake by Chryssipus is that according to his argument, virtue can't be the supreme good. For that matter, nothing can be. But I may be missing something: it's been a long day.

That's the feeling I have - that we are missing something that from Chrysippus' point of view is vital.

Referring to Joshua's list:

Quote from Joshua

1. The hand either feels pleasure, or it feels pain, or it feels neither pleasure nor pain.
2. If pleasure is the highest good, then the absence of pleasure would feel like a lack of pleasure.
3. This lack of pleasure would be felt in every member of the body.
4. My hand does not feel pleasure or pain.
5. My hand does not feel a lack of pleasure.

1 - Don's comment goes to 1, but I think that to be fair to Chrysippus that 1 is a reasonable premise that most people would accept under normal discussion. Now Epicurus would not accept the last phrase "or it feels neither pleasure nor pain" but that's the subject in question that we're trying to prove, so I don't know we can object to it here at this point in the argument.

2- I am thinking that 2 is the missing link in our comprehension. WHY would this be the case? As Don asks why would the highest good necessarily be present at all times? What gives Chrysippus the right to presume that? At the moment the main thing that occurs to me is that rather than highest good the operative perspective is more "guide" than "highest good" and we would want our "guide" to be always present in order for it to truly be our ultimate guide. But that may not be the point or it may be only a part of the point. But SOMEHOW there is a reason behind this presumption that Chrysippus thought that we would accept, and quite possibly that we would accept it even as Cyreniacs or Epicureans devoted to he central role of pleasure.

3 - I am not sure about that one, but yes I can see that being presumed, in order to pick out the hand.

4 - Yes he's presuming a state of inactivity does not involve pleasure or pain.

5 - Yes he's presuming that too, and that is something that we would probably accept.

Earlier today, after revisiting the "Chrysippus hand argument" from Torquatus' "On Ends" speech, I am convinced that we - unlike Chrysippus' hand - have a lack for something - and that something is a Definitive Thread on the topic. I would like to eventually make a graphic for the front page of the website that highlights this episode in the Epicurean texts because I think it is a good way to focus on a critical issue. We have discussed the issue previously a number of times, probably more than the two threads listed below, and I know we discussed it in the Lucretius Today podcast when we went through the Torquatus material.

But I am convinced from my own lack of comfort with this passage that there is a lot more to be learned. Chrysippus and/or the Stoics seemed to think that this argument against pleasure as the good was a killer, significant enough to be featured in the statue dedicated to his memory - at least if Torquatus's story can be credited as supporting that conclusion.

So the first thing I will do in this thread is to quote again the Reid translation of the relevant passage, and before going further, I would like to challenge anyone who has the time to contribute - before we go much further - their explanation of what he is arguing. Before we can deal with whether he is right or wrong, we first have to understand what he is saying, and it seems clear that there are some underlying and unstated presumptions behind his framing of the question that have to be brought to the surface.

First, here is the quote:

Quote

[38] Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.

[39] But actually at Athens, as my father used to tell me, when he wittily and humorously ridiculed the Stoics, there is in the Ceramicus a statue of Chrysippus, sitting with his hand extended, which hand indicates that he was fond of the following little argument: Does your hand, being in its present condition, feel the lack of anything at all? Certainly of nothing. But if pleasure were the supreme good, it would feel a lack. I agree. Pleasure then is not the supreme good. My father used to say that even a statue would not talk in that way, if it had power of speech. The inference is shrewd enough as against the Cyrenaics, but does not touch Epicurus. For if the only pleasure were that which, as it were, tickles the senses, if I may say so, and attended by sweetness overflows them and insinuates itself into them, neither the hand nor any other member would be able to rest satisfied with the absence of pain apart from a joyous activity of pleasure. But if it is the highest pleasure, as Epicurus believes, to be in no pain, then the first admission, that the hand in its then existing condition felt no lack, was properly made to you, Chrysippus, but the second improperly, I mean that it would have felt a lack had pleasure been the supreme good. It would certainly feel no lack, and on this ground, that anything which is cut off from the state of pain is in the state of pleasure.

As to underlying but unstated presumptions, there seems to be something going on in the assertion: "But if pleasure were the supreme good, it would feel a lack."

Chrysippus seems to expect us to take as a given that hand would feel the absence of the supreme good at that moment if the supreme good were pleasure. Is that an assertion with which everyone would agree? What is it presuming that might need to be brought to the surface? That one characteristic of the supreme good is that it is always present and - if absent - that the presence would be felt immediately? Why would that be so and what is the implication of it?

I don't think we can understand Chrysippus' assertion, or Torquatus' explanation of why it is wrong, if we don't understand that point.

Anyone want to try to explain in their own words what Chrysippus is saying and why?

Prior Threads:

1 - Starting here in a thread from 2021 (probably the best existing thread)

2 -Comments in Kalosyni's "Slider" thread of 2023

#HighestGood

James Warren raised the issue, but did not write much about it, here:

Chrysippus' hand

I gave a short paper today to the 1st c. BC philosophy research group on this chapter from Cicero's De Finibus (1.39). It's part of a long...

kenodoxia.blogspot.com

as to Martin's comment

Quote

Regarding Comment #2, attributing pleasure and pain to sub-pleasures and sub-pains is an auxiliary construction which may help understanding. However, it is the total effect of external and inner sensations which creates the feeling of pleasure/pain. There are no intermediate subsystems which have their own feelings of pleasure/pain.

The reference to "intermediate subsystems" seems to me to be related to the issues raised by Chrysippus' "hand question." Atoms don't feel pleasure and pain, and it's not at all clear that we would say that individual cells do - it takes more organization and up the system before pain and pleasure register. By the time you get to a hand it definitely feels pleasure and pain, but so do lots of other parts of the body at the same time, and you have to consider as Martin says "the total effect."

I think it would be excellent to set as a goal for both the book review and the forum to turn that example cited by Torquatus inside out until we are comfortable that we completely understand what is meant by Chryssipus' argument and why it is wrong.

We've left it floating out there ambiguously far too long, and I think the source Cicero was borrowing from to write Torquatus was right to think that it is an example that is critical to understand so we can overcome the Stoic argument.

"Pleasure" does not only refer to overt active stimulation. The act of experiencing any part of life without pain should be considered to be an act of experiencing pleasure. That's the only way the logic-chopping arguments against Epicurus and pleasure can be defeated. Anytime "absence of pain" is stated we should immediately infer and treat it the same as if "presence of pleasure" had been stated.

And the difficulties in making that point clear would appear to be why Chrysippis used the argument and Torquatus brings it up to ridicule it. Leaving the issue ambiguous leads to all sorts of difficulties. People normally don't refer to absence of pain as a pleasure, and those who don't know Epicurus' philosophical context think is wording is ridiculous or that he is saying something mysterious. Worse, it opens the door to argue that "absence of pain" really means "tranquility," which improperly elevates tranquility to something more than simply one among many important pleasures. And that improper elevation makes it easy to think that tranquility is all we need, that tranquility is outside of and higher than pleasure itself, and that we don't really need or want pleasure at all. Stoics and Buddhists and all sorts of other "spiritualists" jump all over this to make Epicurus seem like one of them.

Saying that the goal is to rid one's experience from pains is exactly the same thing as saying that the goal is filling one's experience with pleasures.

And that's the same as saying that the goal of "Absence of Pain" is exactly the same as the goal of "Presence of Pleasure."

And that equivalence is why - and only why - it is appropriate to say that "the greatest pleasure" is "the absence of pain." As PD03 says, "the limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once."

All this works because we have ascertained that there's no true middle ground between pleasure and pain. Once we've ascertained that, we can see that it's totally inappropriate to think that this middle ground (which does not exist) is "tranquility." But that's exactly the incorrect deduction that a lot of people (especially those of Buddhist or Stoic bent) are reading into Epicurus.

Again, the cite:

Quote from Torquatus from On Ends

"[38] Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension."

"[39] But actually at Athens, as my father used to tell me, when he wittily and humorously ridiculed the Stoics, there is in the Ceramicus a statue of Chrysippus, sitting with his hand extended, which hand indicates that he was fond of the following little argument: Does your hand, being in its present condition, feel the lack of anything at all? Certainly of nothing. But if pleasure were the supreme good, it would feel a lack. I agree. Pleasure then is not the supreme good. My father used to say that even a statue would not talk in that way, if it had power of speech. The inference is shrewd enough as against the Cyrenaics, but does not touch Epicurus. For if the only pleasure were that which, as it were, tickles the senses, if I may say so, and attended by sweetness overows them and insinuates itself into them, neither the hand nor any other member would be able to rest satised with the absence of pain apart from a joyous activity of pleasure. But if it is the highest pleasure, as Epicurus believes, to be in no pain, then the rst admission, that the hand in its then existing condition felt no lack, was properly made to you, Chrysippus, but the second improperly, I mean that it would have felt a lack had pleasure been the supreme good. It would certainly feel no lack, and on this ground, that anything which is cut off from the state of pain is in the state of pleasure."

That's the Reid translation and it's worth emphasizing the final line:

"Anything which is cut off from the state of pain is in the state of pleasure."

Any full presentation of Epicurean philosophy has to incorporate the issue being discussed here. Chrysippus and his Stoics may have made this confusion worse through their arguments, but we can use the fact that Cicero / Torquatus preserved those arguments to illustrate why they are wrong and what Epicurus really meant.

Quote from Godfrey

At first blush that sounds quite good, but I'm beginning to wonder if, to some, that might imply a limit that is the same for everybody. With all due respect to Diogenes, would a better phrasing be "desires that outrun the limits fixed by one's nature"?

I agree that the standard is one's own circumstances and what Nature has provided in those circumstances. There's no wider intent or absolute standard other than what nature has provided. If you're from a family where everyone lives to 100 then you're reasonable in desiring to live to 100. If you're from a family where everyone has physical issues that causes death at 30 then it's less likely to be a good bet to worry about living to 100.

So I agree, but I am not sure that it theoretically even makes sense to consider the implication that you are questioning - maybe it should be so clear to us that Nature works through particulars, and not through ideal patterns, that we should never use ideal patterns as a starting point for consideration.

Relevant citations to incorporate in this analysis:

PD02. Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved is without sensation; and that which lacks sensation is nothing to us.

PD03. The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once."

PD18. The pleasure in the flesh is not increased when once the pain due to want is removed, but is only varied: and the limit as regards pleasure in the mind is begotten by the reasoned understanding of these very pleasures, and of the emotions akin to them, which used to cause the greatest fear to the mind.

Diogenes Laertius Biography of Epicurus: "The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined. "

Torquatus in On Ends:

"Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?"

"[38] Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension."

"[39] But actually at Athens, as my father used to tell me, when he wittily and humorously ridiculed the Stoics, there is in the Ceramicus a statue of Chrysippus, sitting with his hand extended, which hand indicates that he was fond of the following little argument: Does your hand, being in its present condition, feel the lack of anything at all? Certainly of nothing. But if pleasure were the supreme good, it would feel a lack. I agree. Pleasure then is not the supreme good. My father used to say that even a statue would not talk in that way, if it had power of speech. The inference is shrewd enough as against the Cyrenaics, but does not touch Epicurus. For if the only pleasure were that which, as it were, tickles the senses, if I may say so, and attended by sweetness overows them and insinuates itself into them, neither the hand nor any other member would be able to rest satised with the absence of pain apart from a joyous activity of pleasure. But if it is the highest pleasure, as Epicurus believes, to be in no pain, then the rst admission, that the hand in its then existing condition felt no lack, was properly made to you, Chrysippus, but the second improperly, I mean that it would have felt a lack had pleasure been the supreme good. It would certainly feel no lack, and on this ground, that anything which is cut off from the state of pain is in the state of pleasure."

"Now we admit that mental pleasures and pains spring from bodily pleasures and pains; so I allow what you alleged just now, that any of our school who differ from this opinion are out of court; and indeed I see there are many such, but unskilled thinkers. I grant that although mental pleasure brings us joy and mental pain brings us trouble, yet each feeling takes its rise in the body and is dependent on the body, though it does not follow that the pleasures and pains of the mind do not greatly surpass those of the body. With the body indeed we can perceive only what is present to us at the moment, but with the mind the past and future also. For granting that we feel just as great pain when our body is in pain, still mental pain may be very greatly intensified if we imagine some everlasting and unbounded evil to be menacing us. And we may apply the same argument to pleasure, so that it is increased by the absence of such fears. [56] By this time so much at least is plain, that the intensest pleasure or the intensest annoyance felt in the mind exerts more influence on the happiness or wretchedness of life than either feeling, when present for an equal space of time in the body. We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain."

Diogenes of Oinoanda

Fragment 34:

Let us first discuss states, keeping an eye on the point that, when the emotions which disturb the soul are removed, those which produce pleasure enter into it to take their place. Well, what are the disturbing emotions? [They are] fears —of the gods, of death, and of [pains]— and, besides [these], desires that [outrun] the limits fixed by nature. These are the roots of all evils, and, [unless] we cut them off, [a multitude] of evils will grow [upon] us.

(I put that "desires that outrun the limits fixed by nature" in red not because it is related to the current topic, but because that seems to me to be a good choice of words to describe something we often struggle with as "neither natural nor necessary" or all sorts of other adjectives." Seems to me that the factor that unites them all is that they "outrun the limits fixed by nature.")

Wecome @PrudentPleasure !

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This forum is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt
2. The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.
3. "On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"
4. "Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky
5. The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."
6. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
7. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
8. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
9. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
10. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
11. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
12. "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).

Welcome to the forum!

Here's the old discussion with Elli about Cyprus - it seems it was started by an engraving in a copy of Lucretius.

Post

RE: Versions of the Text of Lucretius - 1743 Daniel Browne Edition - Unknown Translator

This question isn't chargeable to Epicurus or Lucretius, certainly, because the engraving in this photo is only a couple of hundred years old. But I wonder why, in this portrayal made for the opening of Lucretius Book One, the artist decided to feature a map of CYPRUS at the bottom left of the drawing. And specifically - it says Cyprus - in case anyone didn't recognize the shape. Is Cyprus a particularly delightful place, or something? Or thought to be so in old England? Or is there in fact a…

Cassius

October 11, 2019 at 11:25 AM

And I added an edit note above - we are talking about Aphrodite and not Athena.

Welcome to Episode 170 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

We are now in the process of a series of podcasts intended to provide a general overview of Epicurean philosophy based on the organizational structure employed by Norman DeWitt in his book "Epicurus and His Philosophy."

This week we continue our discussion of Chapter 10, entitled "The New Freedom."

• The Necessity of Death
• Freedom, Government, And Law
• Freedom And Public Careers
• Control of Environment
• Freedom And The Simple Life
• Control Of Desires

Or is it that Athena was BORN on Cyprus? I seem to remember having that discussion with Elli in the distant past.

Edit:. Sorry for the error there - we are talking about Venus Aphrodite and not Athena!

From the wikipedia link

So Leontion wrote something against Theophrastus I believe we have heard -- do we know anything in particular associated with Themista (or as to specifically why Epicurus was praising her?)

Themista of Lampsacus - Wikipedia

Themista of Lampsacus (Greek: Θεμίστη), the wife of Leonteus, was a student of Epicurus, early in the 3rd century BC.^[1] Epicurus' school was unusual in the 3rd century, in that it allowed women to attend, and we also hear of Leontion attending Epicurus' school around the same time. Cicero ridicules Epicurus for writing "countless volumes in praise of Themista," instead of more worthy men such as Miltiades, Themistocles or Epaminondas.^[2] Themista and Leonteus named their son Epicurus.^[3]

Notes[edit]

1. ^ Diogenes Laertius, x. 25, 26
2. ^ Cicero, De Finibus, 2. 21. 68
3. ^ Diogenes Laertius, x. 26

Started April 14, 2023:

Destiny, which some introduce as sovereign over all things, he [the wise man] laughs to scorn, affirming rather that some things happen of necessity, others by chance, others through our own agency. For he sees that necessity destroys responsibility and that chance or fortune is inconstant; whereas our own actions are free, and it is to them that praise and blame naturally attach. It were better, indeed, to accept the legends of the gods than to bow beneath that yoke of destiny which the natural philosophers have imposed. ... He believes that the misfortune of the wise is better than the prosperity of the fool. It is better, in short, that what is well judged in action should not owe its successful issue to the aid of chance. - Epicurus Letter to Menoeceus (Hicks translation)

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Note: In order to minimize spam registrations, all new registrants must respond in this thread to this welcome message within 72 hours of its posting, or their account is subject to deletion. All that is required is a "Hello!" but of course we hope you will introduce yourself -- tell us a little about yourself and what prompted your interest in Epicureanism -- and/or post a question.

This forum is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt
2. The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.
3. "On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"
4. "Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky
5. The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."
6. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
7. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
8. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
9. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
10. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
11. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
12. "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).

Welcome to the forum!

Happy Birthday to Hermitage! Learn more about Hermitage and say happy birthday on Hermitage's timeline: Hermitage

Thanks for letting us know TAC.

I do not think it would be going too far to assert that in fighting against skepticism and determinism Epicurus realized those doctrines ultimately deny the validity - the reality - of the world revealed to us by our senses (and our feelings and prolepsis).

Since the world revealed to us by our senses / feelings / prolepsis is the only one we have, and the only one we are ever going to have, few doctrines could be so destructive of human happiness than these.

They can't be left in the category of "Too complicated - I don't know."

It seems to me that Epicurus was emphasizing that we should place them in the category of "incorrect - wrong" - and that given the arguments we already have, no "waiting" is required for us to consider those theories as invalid and harmful.

And as we mentioned in the most recent podcast, given how many times this issue is hammered over and over in the letter to Menoeceus, in Lucretius, in Diogenes of Oinoanda, and in other places in the texts we still have, it seems a reasonable conclusion that refutation of determinism and skepticism deserves to be considered at the very core of Epicurean philosophy.

While mentioning Diogenes of Oinoanda, here is the fragment that includes the "Who will choose to seek what he can never find?" argument that to me seems very powerful in the context of this discussion.

Who will seek knowledge of any kind if he is convinced that knowledge is impossible?

Who will seek to be free of the supernatural gods or of fear of death or pain of any kind if he is convinced that everything happens by necessity?

Here's the fragment:

Fr. 5

[Others do not] explicitly [stigmatise] natural science as unnecessary, being ashamed to acknowledge [this], but use another means of discarding it. For, when they assert that things are inapprehensible, what else are they saying than that there is no need for us to pursue natural science? After all, who will choose to seek what he can never find?

Now Aristotle and those who hold the same Peripatetic views as Aristotle say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are continually in flux and, on account of the rapidity of the flux, evade our apprehension. We on the other hand acknowledge their flux, but not its being so rapid that the nature of each thing [is] at no time apprehensible by sense-perception. And indeed [in no way would the upholders of] the view under discussion have been able to say (and this is just what they do [maintain] that [at one time] this is [white] and this black, while [at another time] neither this is [white nor] that black, [if] they had not had [previous] knowledge of the nature of both white and black.

From the inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda:

Fr. 54

...

If anyone adopts Democritus’ theory and asserts that because of their collisions with one another the atoms have no free movement, and that consequently it appears that all motions are determined by necessity, we shall say to him: «Do you [not] know, whoever you are, that there is actually a free movement in the atoms, which Democritus failed to discover, but Epicurus brought to light, —a swerving movement, as he proves from phenomena?» The most important consideration is this: if fate is believed in, all admonition and censure are nullified, and not even the wicked [can be justly punished, since they are not responsible for their sins.]

The similar point from the Torquatus section of "On Ends" -   (Rackham)

XVII. The doctrine thus firmly established has corollaries which I will briefly expound.

(1)The Ends of Goods and Evils themselves, that is, pleasure and pain, are not open to mistake; where people go wrong is in not knowing what things are productive of pleasure and pain.

(2) Again, we aver that mental pleasures and pains arise out of bodily ones (and therefore I allow your contention that any Epicureans who think otherwise put themselves out of court; and I am aware that many do, though not those who can speak with authority); but although men do experience mental pleasure that is agreeable and mental pain that is annoying, yet both of these we assert arise out of and are based upon bodily sensations.

(3) Yet we maintain that this does not preclude mental pleasures and pains from being much more intense than those of the body; since the body can feel only what is present to it at the moment, whereas the mind is also cognizant of the past and of the future. For granting that pain of body is equally painful, yet our sensation of pain can be enormously increased by the belief that some evil of unlimited magnitude and duration threatens to befall us hereafter. And the same consideration may be transferred to pleasure: a pleasure is greater if not accompanied by any apprehension of evil. This therefore clearly appears, that intense mental pleasure or distress contributes more to our happiness or misery than a bodily pleasure or pain of equal duration.

(4) But we do not agree that when pleasure is withdrawn uneasiness at once ensues, unless the pleasure happens to have been replaced by a pain: while on the other hand one is glad to lose a pain even though no active sensation of pleasure comes in its place: a fact that serves to show how great a pleasure is the mere absence of pain.

(5) But just as we are elated by the anticipation of good things, so we are delighted by their recollection. Fools are tormented by the memory of former evils; wise men have the delight of renewing in grateful remembrance the blessings of the past. We have the power both to obliterate our misfortunes in an almost perpetual forgetfulness and to summon up pleasant and agreeable memories of our successes. But when we fix our mental vision closely on the events of the past, then sorrow or gladness ensues according as these were evil or good.