Quote from Don

Agreed... But have we answered your question about Epicurus?

In terms of the original hypothetical question, I don't think we have answered that. I don't think there is an answer that applies to everyone except in general terms, but thinking through the problem does - in my view - help focus the mind.

I would think it is crucial for people to realize that the pleasures of the body (the shepherd in the field) don't always or even most of the time trump the pleasures of the mind (Epicurus). The difficult aspect is the amount of physical pain Epicurus was in, and that leads us to examine how we personally want to measure physical vs mental pains and pleasures.

The development of exercises to encourage people to focus on seeing how mental pleasures and physical pleasures combine to constitute the full goal of "pleasure" is probably a good idea. And in the meantime we can explain that, given there is no neutral state, if you are not in pain you are feeling pleasure, and if you truly are feeling "no" pain then you are feeling the most pleasure that is possible for you to feel.

So the sentence I included above about the dentist needs to be seen as not a word game, but indicative of an organizing perspective on everything in life:

Quote from Cassius

I think one of the real challenges is how to convey a mindset such that it isn't shocking to think that if you tell your dentist: "Doctor my tooth does not hurt," then your dentist should justifiably say in return: "Then your tooth is at the height of pleasure!"

Since "Pleasure'" is the flag that stands against religious superstition, idealism, nihilism, and the rest, it's important to think clearly about how sweeping a term pleasure is, and to then realize exactly how, and in what respect, "the absence of pain is pleasure." The wording is very defensible but cries out for further explanation, and if that explanation is not provided then under current circumstances very little is gained and even worse much is lost given the background static that distorts the message.

Once that perspective becomes understandable and not seen as a call to ascetic transcendentalism, then the common sense application of the desires and pursuing those that are natural and necessary and looking to what will happen to us as a result of our choices and all the other advice falls into perfect consistency and common sense.

Quote from Don

I would agree that the common knowledge has become ataraxia is a special unique mystical state etc. Syncretism and conflation with other traditions is at play in my opinion. Additionally, I think Epicurus's philosophy is very practical and down to earth and open to all. People/academics don't want practical, down to earth. They want Ideal Forms, Essences, Prime Movers, the Logos, mystery, mysticism, and so on.

Yes - very well stated. This is the foundation on which we move forward, and it needs to be understood as pretty much the "theme" of everything we are doing with EpicureanFriends.com. You've stated both sides that I think are important: (1) the common sense understanding that any person of normal intelligence can grasp Epicurean philosophy as a way of organizing the universe, and (2) the unpleasant fact that we're not just facing internal fears, anxieties, and understandings, but we're also facing an active, organized, opposition of which Cicero was not the first and definitely not the last. Cicero's opinion dominates today - maybe it always dominated, even in Epicurus's day. And today's Cicero's don't just have a limited audience of rich people for their opinions, they can broadcast them to everyone in seconds on Twitter and the like.

So in the modern world Cicero's perspective is probably even more dominant and more dangerous. Another example is that in this week's podcast Joshua makes the point that to the extent that people today no longer have the same familiarity with death in our daily lives, we are worse off than in the past in the amount of knowledge most people have.

Even though today most people have some basic knowledge of natural science, I don't believe that has translated at a mass scale into the fading away of religious superstition and fears of heaven and hell. The adoption of the position "God created the atoms" has anesthetized the majority into thinking they can have their cake and eat it too by blending superstition with "science." I think the key to counterattacking on that issue is already contained in the arguments in Herodotus and Lucretius, so we have plenty with which to work. That means not slighting the "physics" side of things on the mistaken idea that everyone understands atoms and void and that solves the problem.

So in general I'd say that the circumstances of today with technology and social media making it easier for peer pressure to suppress unwanted ideas require creative responses -- analogous to Lucretius stepping "out of the box" to produce his poem. With the two points you raised and I quoted above being central to moving forward.

Thanks Don. Possibly for present purposes we are coming near to exhausting the ataraxia angle, with the immediate issue of ataraxia not being a transcendant state of epiphany or a final destination that once achieved either justifies the effort to that point or describes a particular experience of a particular activity which can be equated to "seeing the Mona Lisa before you die" or something specific like that. i am gathering that we both agree with this formulation from Massie:

Quote

the little clause “as long as it is present” indicates that Epicurus does not posit the stability

of katastematic pleasures as everlasting; for this reason the pursuit of ataraxia does not aim

at a beatitude that would transcend our mortal condition. A state of supernatural

blessedness is not an option. It is true that Epicurean texts often invoke the calm bliss the

gods are said to enjoy, but for us the divine is a model, not a destination.

Quote from Don

I like that idea, and it bumps up against or is adjacent to DeWitt's "the greatest good is life itself" but avoids DeWitt's tautological conundrum since "If life is the greatest good, but the greatest good is that to which everything else points to, so life points to living,, etc."

And yes I agree too. I think Dewitt would have been better off saying 'life in the absence of pain is the greatest good" if he wanted to make a point that "pleasure" isn't the only way to describe the greatest good. If we are rigorously clear in defining and explaining how "life in the absence of pain" is pleasure, then we're all saying much the same thing.

However the ones who *aren't* saying the same thing are the ones - I would think - who imply that "life in the absence of pain" is some specific esoteric and unique experience (like seeing the Mona Lisa) which requires some kind of higher plane of consciousness to understand and does not fall under the umbrella of the term "pleasure" as ordinary people can understand it. And there I would criticize those who simply say "pleasure is the absence of pain" without explaining the issue that we are discussing. I don't fault Epicurus in the letter to Menoeceus because I think his readers of the time would have had reams of other material which make the point clear. And I now think that the point remained clear through Cicero's time given a full reading of what is included in "On Ends."

But over the last 2000 years Cicero's refusal to accept the terminology and his resulting argument that the framework makes no sense has won the day. The real fault is in us because we are so indoctrinated in a restrictive definition of pleasure that we can't see the wider point. So now we have to go back and explain how we got to where we are today and how everything fits together under an expansive definition of pleasure that is more than just "sex, drugs, and rock and roll."

(Which come to think of it is what Torquatus spends so much time doing in his narrative in on ends where he links the virtues to being productive of pleasure.)

I think one of the real challenges is how to convey a mindset such that it isn't shocking to think that if you tell your dentist: "Doctor my tooth does not hurt," then your dentist should justifiably say in return: "Then your tooth is at the height of pleasure!"

Yes it's true that most people don't ordinarily think that way, but that doesn't mean that they can't think that way, or that they wouldn't be better off if they did so.

To use a religious analogy, talking about "pleasure" in a truncated, restricted, narrow, and incomplete form (such as Cicero insists on doing) would be like a Christian talking about Jesus as a good carpenter.

Welcome to Episode 192 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

This week most of our podcasters are unavailable, so to prevent there being a gap in our release schedule, we are releasing this week a special reading of Frances Wright's Chapter 16, her concluding address (as a fictional statement by Epicurus) about the damage that arises from supernatural religion.

This episode comes with a caution: Frances Wright does not seem to agree with Epicurus' view of the benefits of thinking about how we are not alone in the universe, and how we benefit from the thought that there are indeed natural beings -- living deathless and painless but not supernatural lives -- not here, but far out in space. Epicurus states clearly in the letter to Menoeceus that non-supernatural beings do exist somewhere in the universe, but Frances Wright downplays this, and she instead focuses her attention almost exclusively on Epicurus' rejection of supernatural gods.

Most of the divergence I am describing can be reconciled, but everyone should read Epicurus and Lucretius and Philodemus for themselves to find out what the ancient Epicureans had to say about non-supernatural gods.

The main thrust of what Wright says about the damage that arises from supernatural religion seems entirely consistent with Epicurus' own views, and I hope this chapter spurs you to further reading yourself from the ancient Epicurean sources.

We are still several days from release of this episode but in early editing I see a comment I need to add:

On the issue of whether philosophy is "necessary" I talked about Frances Wright's character Hedea and how she seems to stand for the proposition that someone can possibly get along quite well without focusing a lot of time on the study of philosophy. I should have hedged a little on that, because now as I think about it, Hedea is the only character in the book who just about gets herself drowned, and maybe that in itself is an example that she might have profited from more study of "natural science."

My comment here will make more sense when the episode is released.

An additional benefit of Joshua's post, over and above its own merit, is that if gives me a new resource. The next time someone complains: "Cassius your posts are always too technical - I just want advice on being happy." I will say in response, "Check out the post entitled "Potential Hydrocarbons in the Constellation Leo."

And I will say: Man, you don't know what it means to be truly happy unless you understand the implications of hydrocarbons on other planets!"

PD12. A man cannot dispel his fear about the most important matters if he does not know what is the nature of the universe, but suspects the truth of some mythical story. So that, without natural science, it is not possible to attain our pleasures unalloyed.

And I will remind them too that Cicero writes that nature was Epicurus' "chief boast" ("‘At the outset, said I, ‘in natural science, which is his chief boast, he is in the first place altogether unoriginal...)

Here's a particularly interesting passage comparing ataraxia to be a model, not a condition:

Kinetic pleasures for their part remain by definition incomplete for so long as the animal keeps drinking it is still thirsty. In kinetic pleasures one experiences the progressive lessening of pain - which presupposes that some form of pain or discomfort is still there in the first place. By contrast, katastematic pleasures are stable and they are so because they are fundamentally finite in the sense that they repel the infinite frustration of ordinary kinetic desires. “The removal of all pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. Wherever pleasure is present, and as long as it is present, a
feeling of pain, a feeling of distress, or their combination is absent.” (D L 10, Maxim 3).
The little clause “as long as it is present” indicates that Epicurus does not posit the stability
of katastematic pleasures as everlasting; for this reason the pursuit of ataraxia does not aim
at a beatitude that would transcend our mortal condition. A state of supernatural
blessedness is not an option. It is true that Epicurean texts often invoke the calm bliss the
gods are said to enjoy, but for us the divine is a model, not a destination. The end of human
life must be compatible with the human condition but this condition entails being subjected
to needs and lacks, the awareness of which constitutes an experience of pain and their
satisfaction an experience of kinetic pleasure.

---

But first what could it be to experience ataraxia? The Epicurean ataraxia is not simply a
“state of mind” (pace Striker); it is a state of being that depends on the discovery of
another form of pleasure, the pleasure of being rather than the pleasure of possessing or
consuming. To pursue the arithmetical analogy, once could say that for all positive
numbers there corresponds a negative number; 0 however admits of no opposite. Of
course ataraxia is not a degree zero since, as we saw earlier, it is already pleasure and
Epicurus’ insistence on the idea that ataraxia is a form of pleasure rules out a common
objection according to which one who follows such an ethics would live a life of
indifference. Instead, ataraxia corresponds to the pleasure of being that comes from
knowing one’s limits.

----

(Unfortunately there is no real concluding paragraph that summarizes the entire article.)

Note: A very good line:

Quote from Article

but for us the divine is a model, not a destination.

Just by coincidence I see this article in my daily blast from Academia:

Ataraxia: Tranquility at the End

Pascal Massie

In their investigation of “eudaimonia” (happiness, human flourishing) Hellenistic
philosophers (i.e., members of the Epicurean, the Stoic, and the Skeptic schools) made
frequent use of terms that were relatively new in the philosophical lexicon; among others:
ataraxia (freedom from disturbance), hēsychia (serenity), tranquillitas and securitas
(Seneca and Cicero’s Latin translation of euthymia), eustatheia (stability), athambia
(quietness), adiaphora (indifference), and apatheia (the condition of being unmoved).

Even though most of them did not simply identify eudaimonia with ataraxia, it still remains
that the notion of happiness they proposed took on a new significance because of this
emphasis on ataraxia and related notions. At stake is not simply a particular development in
the history of ancient philosophy; the issue runs much deeper. It entails a transformation of
the very meaning of philosophy. When eudaimonia is determined in terms of ataraxia the
very purpose and meaning of philosophy also changes. To be a philosopher is first and
foremost a matter of conquering fears and desires and the esteem one should bestow upon
a philosophical school depends primarily on its ability to lead us to such an end. In other
words, the emergence of ataraxia at the core of ethical discourse is deeply rooted in a
renewed understanding of philosophy itself.

...

However, during the Hellenistic era three new developments occurred: (a) It is
argued that one can measure a philosophical system by its ability to lead its disciples to
happiness. Thus, eudaimonia becomes a meta-philosophical criterion. Philosophy is
instrumental to happiness just as medicine is instrumental to health. But on this count (b)
both Plato and Aristotle have failed. Their followers are no closer to happiness than nonphilosophers. (c) The solution (if not in full, at least in a significant part) demands that the
requirements for happiness be reevaluated. For the Epicureans and the Skeptics
eudaimonia calls for the attainment of ataraxia. The Stoics held a rather similar view,
although they prefer the term apatheia.

568 What is striking in all these new terms (althoughnot perceptible in most translations) is that the determination of this requirement is, in its linguistic form, mostly negative (a-taraxia, a-patheia, a-diaphora). Happiness is not the achievement or the attainment of a human potential; rather, it is a release from worry, anxiety, and disturbance; a liberation that results from the therapeutic examination of our belief569. This new focus reveals that the inner conflicts of the soul have become the chief concern since they are now identified as the main obstacle to happiness. Thus, ataraxia seems to name an absence, a lack. Many, following Hegel’s pronouncement, have
diagnosed this aim of life as a sheer renunciation of the world and a withdrawal into selfsatisfaction.

So that would be an example of someone using ataraxia in a general sense, because he is saying that the Stoics could achieve their tranquility better through Epicurean views than through their own views. But doesn't that mean that ataraxia is being used as a generic term to refer to a general "peace of mind" rather than to a term that is uniquely Epicurean?

The point of my question here is that I can see a lot of reason why "ataraxia" can be translated into a generic "peace of mind" or "absence of disturbance" that could apply to most anyone of any philosophy or religion at any particular moment. In contrast, I don't see it to be a good idea to consider that "ataraxia" has a specifically Epicurean meaning that justifies elevating it in the way that many writers today tend to elevate it. It's that elevation that I think we see over and over and is what I would expect would be behind the statement by Luc Schneider:

In fairness to Luc I think this is the way you will often see the term ataraxia used, which would be consistent with the analogy you used to the effect of "once wise always wise." Is ataraxia something that which, once achieved, is not lost?

Or is ataraxia some particular point of achievement, like snatching a prize at the end of the race, that if achieved for a single moment, is worth all the other time and effort spent pursuing it?

I would see Epicurus' statement as targeted toward those such as Socrates who effect to be unwise in their discussion and I would not see wisdom as something that "once achieved" cannot be lost. Do not wise men often act unwisely, even if only by mistake?

And of course to bring this back to topic, I wouldn't think I would judge whether I wanted to be Epicurus or the shepherd for a week according to whether either one of them "had achieved ataraxia." Would you see that (whether the person as "achieved ataraxia" as a reasonable way to make that decision?

Edit: "Or is ataraxia some particular point of achievement, like snatching a prize at the end of the race, that if achieved for a single moment, is worth all the other time and effort spent pursuing it?" << I like this way of framing the question as I think this presumption is getting closer to the real issue.

Quote from Don

Ataraxia is experienced as a mind untroubled by fear of the gods, anxiety about death, trust in that you are treating people justly and can expect the same in return.

Ok so it does in fact seem you are using ataraxia to describe a specific type of being untroubled (about gods and death primarily, but maybe including a few other things), and that you don't include the trouble of the sharp pain of advanced kidney disease to be within the scope of the word.

Are you saying also that this was specifically Epicurus' use of the word, or that this use applies every time the word ataraxia occurs in ancient Greek?

In the case of the gods it seems we have specific statements from Epicurus that show he was using a modified definition of a common term. Do we have similar statements in ancient Greek? I gather that there is evidence the word was used by the Stoics and perhaps Pyrrhonists, so this would be another word where Epicurus had a specific definition?

It would be helpful if it were but I gather that ataraxia is not the word used here(?)

[22] When he was on the point of death he wrote the following letter to Idomeneus: ‘On this truly happy day of my life, as I am at the point of death, I write this to you. The disease in my bladder and stomach are pursuing their course, lacking nothing of their natural severity: but against all this is the joy in my heart at the recollection of my conversations with you. Do you, as I might expect from your devotion from boyhood to me and to philosophy, take good care of the children of Metrodorus.’ Such then was his will.

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Ι, ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΟΣ

What is the difference between a remedy and a truth? Are there untrue remedies? Or unremedial truths?

Well I was about to say a separate thread, but as I think about it (and as the Facebook comment implies) the question is probably tightly tied to ones idea of how to spend ones time in the best way, so let's say here.

Godfrey: I would think the part of bady affected is a distinguishing factors in pleasures so I am not sure how long the list of differences should be.

Don: unless ataraxia is limited to "mental" disturbance I cannot see how Epicurus experienced ataraxia during his last week, given his pain , and I am not sure I would say he did experience ataraxia at that time even if the definition of ataraxia were limited to mental issues, just as I think aponia is not limited to bodily pains.

This would be an important part of the discussion to develop.

I would see human ataraxia as denoting real experience delimited in time and not a lifetime sum.

Quote from Don

Given that definition, Epicurus undoubtedly experienced ataraxia.

To drill down on this, was Epicurus experiencing ataraxia during that last week of his life?

Back to the topic for a moment for a post at Facebook:

"As Epicurus, because we don't know whether the uneducated shepherd has achieved ataraxia."

My responsive question:

Just asking out loud as to this comment: My question would be "Was Epicurus experiencing ataraxia during his last week?"

What do you guys think about this?

As we begin today's episode we can review the objections raised by Cicero in the opening. They get much more elaborate after Torquatus speaks, but for the time being this is what Cicero has set up as objections for Torquatus to discuss:

1. As To Physics:
   1. Epicurus Borrowed from Democritus while at the same time reviling him;
   2. I:VI:20 As to the swerve and downward movement of atoms (which leads to Democritus' determinism);
   3. I:VI:20 As to Epicurus' rejection of infinite divisibility;
   4. I:VI:20 As to Democritus' view of the size of the sun (which leads to Democritus' skepticism) [Note: Cicero notes that the issue of images by which we see but also think comes from Democritus];
2. As To Canonics / Epistemology / Logic:
   1. Epicurus does away with the process of division;
   2. Epicurus says nothing about subdivision and partition;
   3. Epiciurus gives no method for constructing an argument;
   4. Epicurus does not show how to unriddle fallacies or clarify ambiguities;
   5. Epicurus places his criteria of objective truth in the senses and thinks that it destroys the senses to admit for a moment that they might err in any way;
3. As to Ethics:
   1. The pursuit of pleasure as the goal belongs to Aristippus and was better and more frankly advocated by the Cyreniacs
   2. The Epicurean system is of such a character that no system is more unworthy of the human race, as “Nature has created and shaped us for higher aims.”
   3. The Torquatii did not look for bodily enjoyment or any pleasure when the ancestor wrenched the necklet from his foe, or punished his son.
   4. Cicero alleges that Epicureans do not value mental pleasure. [“What pleasure do you, Torquatus, or what does our friend Triarius here derive from literature, from records and the investigation of historical facts, from conning the poets, from learning by heart so laboriously so many lines? And do not say to me “Why, these very actions bring me pleasure, as theirs did to the Torquati." Never indeed did Epicurus or Metrodorus or any one possessed of any wisdom or any knowledge of the tenets of your school ever maintain such a position by such arguments. And when the question is asked, as it often is, why Epicureans are so numerous, I answer that there are no doubt other motives, but the motive which especially fascinates the crowd is this; they believe their chief to declare that all upright and honorable actions are in themselves productive of delight, or rather pleasure.”]

This post by Don and the exchange there with Nate is of significance to this thread:

Post

RE: Would You Rather Live For A Week As (1) Epicurus During the Last Week of His Life or (2) An Anonymous Shepherd Laying In The Grass In The Summertime With No Pain At All?

In going back to @Nate 's compilation and looking at the Greek construction of the "if" clauses, I think Hicks gives the proper paraphrase:

[…]

It seems to me (check my Greek, please!) that the specific construction of PD09 falls under the unreal present as defined in that Wikipedia article and elsewhere:

Present unreal conditions

Unreal (counterfactual) conditions referring to present time are made with εἰ (ei) followed by the imperfect indicative in the protasis, and the imperfect…

Don

September 10, 2023 at 5:25 AM

I think everyone here is aware of this passage but I posted it over at Facebook this morning and will repeat that post here for consistency as people read this thread in the future:

---

I am not posting this to imply that it provides a "best" answer to the hypothetical, but because a significant number of readers don't know that the Epicurean spokesman in Cicero's 'On Ends" had this to say about Epicurus' views:

[55] XVII. I will concisely explain what are the corollaries of these sure and well grounded opinions. People make no mistake about the standards of good and evil themselves, that is about pleasure or pain, but err in these matters through ignorance of the means by which these results are to be brought about. Now we admit that mental pleasures and pains spring from bodily pleasures and pains; so I allow what you alleged just now, that any of our school who differ from this opinion are out of court; and indeed I see there are many such, but unskilled thinkers. I grant that although mental pleasure brings us joy and mental pain brings us trouble, yet each feeling takes its rise in the body and is dependent on the body, though it does not follow that the pleasures and pains of the mind do not greatly surpass those of the body. With the body indeed we can perceive only what is present to us at the moment, but with the mind the past and future also. For granting that we feel just as great pain when our body is in pain, still mental pain may be very greatly intensified if we imagine some everlasting and unbounded evil to be menacing us. And we may apply the same argument to pleasure, so that it is increased by the absence of such fears.

[56] By this time so much at least is plain, that the intensest pleasure or the intensest annoyance felt in the mind exerts more influence on the happiness or wretchedness of life than either feeling, when present for an equal space of time in the body. We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain.

[57] But as we are elated by the blessings to which we look forward, so we delight in those which we call to memory.

Poll Question

The following post is one of a series so that we can get our collection of the main list of Principal Doctrines under the "Texts" section in better shape. Although this thread will include a "poll" in the next post, what we are really looking for is the "best" combination of faithfulness to the original combined with clarity in modern English. I will get with a collection of the Level 3 participants here to work on editing the final list, but the full discussion should be open to everyone to consider, so that's what we will do here. The results of the poll won't control what is featured on the text page but will definitely influence in and probably at least result in a footnote to this thread.

The English translation of PD09 currently featured here in our Texts section is our normal Cyril Bailey from his Extant Remains:

PD09. If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted, and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another. ^[3]

We have access (thanks to Nate's full collection) to many different variations including:

EΙ ΚATEΠΥΚΝΟΥTΟ ΠAΣA ΗΔΟΝΗ ΚAΙ ΧΡΟΝῼ ΚAΙ ΠEΡΙ ΟΛΟΝ TΟ AΘΡΟΙΣΜA ΥΠΗΡΧEΝ Η TA ΚΥΡΙΩTATA ΜEΡΗ TΗΣ ΦΥΣEΩΣ ΟΥΚ AΝ ΠΟTE ΔΙEΦEΡΟΝ AΛΛΗΛΩΝ AΙ ΗΔΟΝAΙ.

“If every pleasure were condensed, if one may so say, and if each lasted long, and affected the whole body, or the essential parts of it, then there would be no difference between one pleasure and another.” Yonge (1853)

“If all pleasure had been capable of accumulation, if this had gone on not only in time, but all over the frame or, at any rate, the principal parts of man's nature, there would not have been any difference between one pleasure and another as, in fact, there now is.” Hicks (1910)

“If all pleasure had been capable of accumulation,—if this had gone on not only by recurrence in time, but all over the frame or, at any rate, over the principal parts of man's nature, there would never have been any difference between one pleasure and another, as in fact there is.” Hicks (1925)

“If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.” Bailey (1926)

“If every pleasure were alike condensed in duration and associated with the whole organism or the dominant parts of it, pleasures would never differ from one another." De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 235 (1954)

“If every pleasure were cumulative, and if this were the case both in time and in regard to the whole or the most important parts of our nature, then pleasures would not differ from each other.” Geer (1964)

“If every pleasure were condensed in <location> and duration and distributed all over the structure or the dominant parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115 (1987)

“If every pleasure were condensed and existed for a long time throughout the entire organism or its most important parts, pleasures would never differ from one another.” O'Connor (1993)

“If every pleasure were condensed and were present, both in time and in the whole compound [body and soul] or in the most important parts of our nature, then pleasures would never differ from one another.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“If every pleasure could be prolonged to endure in both body or mind, pleasures would never differ from one another.” Anderson (2004)

“If all pleasures could be added together consecutively with respect to space and duration, and across the entire span over which they had all existed, or at least across the principal parts of human nature <which are naturally susceptible to pleasures:> then, pleasures would not be different from each other in any respect.” Makridis (2005)

“If every pleasure were condensed and were present at the same time and in the whole of one's nature or its primary parts, then the pleasures would never differ from one another.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“If all pleasures could be compressed in time and intensity, and were characteristic of the whole man or his more important aspects, the various pleasures would not differ from each other.” Strodach (2012)

“If all pleasure were condensed in space and time, and pervaded the whole aggregate, or the most important parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ, one from another.” Mensch (2018)

“If every pleasure were concentrated in place and time and affected our whole aggregate or the most important parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.” White (2021)

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Which of the above, or which with changes you would suggest, should be featured here in the main list? In the interest of space the poll will not include every option, so please add a comment in the thread if you would suggest a variation not listed.