Posts by Cassius

Quote from Godfrey

is in many ways a matter of materialism v idealism.

Another point:

While I personally am quick to throw around the "materialism" vs "idealism" contrast, I think we need to be clear what it means. Epicurus doesn't hold that things need to be "material" in order to be felt -- he says mental feelings are stronger than physical ones. So "idealism" can certainly cause pleasure and pain, I would presume, and that makes idealism at least as "real" as dreams in that idealism can affect us.

This gets blurry as well in asking "are we talking about concepts vs things that have a material existence?

I think we need to be clear in what respect saying that something is "idealism" means something. "Capitalism" and "communism" may not exist as independent entities, but they do exist as "concepts" or "ideals," and a lot of tears have been shed over "capitalism" and "communism" just the same, so they are certainly "real" in that they can cause pain or pleasure.

Quote from Godfrey

So one's goal is to prudently maximize one's pleasure, which is limited by one's lifespan. Cicero's argument is about the larger issue of materialism v idealism.

I think this is a helpful direction, Godfrey, but I think it will need further explanation to be clearly understandable.

Is Epicurus in fact saying that a longer life is not more pleasant than a shorter life, or is he only comparing the limited human span (whatever it is ) to an unlimited span? Cicero is arguing that Epicurus said that length of time adds nothing to pleasure. Did Epicurus in fact say that? If that is the case, then the position applies to no matter how long or short that the human life is, not just that it is "limited." If complete pleasure can be experienced the first day we are born, and nothing more is needed and we are indifferent to living longer, than we should say so explicitly. I do not think that is what Epicurus meant.

As to materialism vs idealism, I suppose I am not sure that materialism is the opposite of idealism. Maybe it's the opposite of spiritualism or supernaturalism, but is "idealism" the same thing as those two? Were the Stoics really that obtuse as to think that there is something called "virtue" that if grasped only for a moment is all that one needs to be satisfied? It seems they said so, but I don't think we can clearly discuss what they were saying without more reference material / citations that establish what they were thinking.

As we asked in the episode, is it not clear to anyone that it would be "better" to be virtuous for a year than for a day? Maybe the question is defining "better," but if some limited or special definition of "better" is the issue, then we need to know what that is so that we can see if Epicurus was applying that same definition to pleasure.

This is a good time to try to hash through some of these questions so we can add a substantive entry to the FAQ and/or other places on the website, because I don't think we are anywhere close to a persuasive explanation of what Epicurus was really saying.

Of course I invite anyone to propose a full statement reconciling these issues including the contrast with the Stoics!

I posted this following quote over in another recent thread but it also belongs here. I am strongly dissatisfied with how hard it seems to be to balance this time issue in many of our discussions. Yes, it's not necessary to live a longer time in order to experience "complete pleasure," because once you are complete it never gets more complete. But if life is desirable, as Epicurus also says, then "living" contains a time element, and so a longer pleasant life is still more desirable than a shorter pleasant life, even though the pleasure never gets more "complete," it only varies.

Both are true - the pleasure never gets more complete, but a longer time is also desirable. This language in Menoeceus needs to be parsed closely: "And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant." I will leave it to the Greek experts to expound on the Greek, but to be consistent with the rest of what he is saying it seems to me that Epicurus has to be saying that both points are true -- length of time experiencing pleasure is in fact an aspect of experiencing pleasure (it is one among many, but the three primary are time, intensity, and part of the organism involved, per PD09), but another aspect of experiencing pleasure is that once you experience "complete" pleasure then pleasure never gets more "complete."

We're seeing in many discussions strong implication that length of time is not relevant to pleasure at all, and to me that would be like saying that manner of death or time of death is not relevant at all. That's patently not true - it is preferable to die a painless death rather than painful death, and it is preferable to live a longer happy life than a shorter happy life.

The need to work further on expressing this better, including finding the sources that explain the warped Stoic view that Lucian is ridiculing here, and this is a much more important issue than many that we often discuss.

Quote from Lucian's Hermotimus

Lycinus. You must be of good cheer and keep a stout heart; gaze at the end of your climb and the Happiness at the top, and remember that he is working with you. What prospect does he hold out? when are you to be up? does he think you will be on the top next year—by the Great Mysteries, or the Panathenaea, say?

Hermotimus. Too soon, Lycinus.

Lycinus. By next Olympiad, then?

Hermotimus. All too short a time, even that, for habituation to Virtue and attainment of Happiness.

Lycinus. Say two Olympiads, then, for an outside estimate. You may fairly be found guilty of laziness, if you cannot get it done by then; the time would allow you three return trips from the Pillars of Heracles to India, with a margin for exploring the tribes on the way instead of sailing straight and never stopping. How much higher and more slippery, pray, is the peak on which your Virtue dwells than that Aornos crag which Alexander stormed in a few days?

Hermotimus. There is no resemblance, Lycinus; this is not a thing, as you conceive it, to be compassed and captured quickly, though ten thousand Alexanders were to assault it; in that case, the sealers would have been legion. As it is, a good number begin the climb with great confidence, and do make progress, some very little indeed, others more; but when they get half-way, they find endless difficulties and discomforts, lose heart, and turn back, panting, dripping, and exhausted. But those who endure to the end reach the top, to be blessed thenceforth with wondrous days, looking down from their height upon the ants which are the rest of mankind.

Lycinus. Dear me, what tiny things you make us out—not so big as the Pygmies even, but positively groveling on the face of the earth. I quite understand it; your thoughts are up aloft already. And we, the common men that walk the earth, shall mingle you with the Gods in our prayers; for you are translated above the clouds, and gone up whither you have so long striven.

Hermotimus. If but that ascent might be, Lycinus! but it is far yet.

Lycinus. But you have never told me how far, in terms of time.

Hermotimus. No; for I know not precisely myself. My guess is that it will not be more than twenty years; by that time I shall surely be on the summit.

Lycinus. Mercy upon us, you take long views!

Hermotimus. Ay; but, as the toil, so is the reward.

Lycinus. That may be; but about these twenty years—have you your master's promise that you will live so long? Is he prophet as well as philosopher? Or is it a soothsayer or Chaldean expert that you trust? Such things are known to them, I understand. You would never, of course, if there were any uncertainty of your life's lasting to the Virtue-point, slave and toil night and day like this; why, just as you were close to the top, your fate might come upon you, lay hold of you by the heel, and lug you down with your hopes unfulfilled.

Hermotimus. God forbid! these are words of ill omen, Lycinus; may life be granted me, that I may grow wise, and have if it be but one day of Happiness!

Lycinus. For all these toils will you be content with your one day?

Hermotimus. Content? Yes, or with the briefest moment of it.

Lycinus. But is there indeed Happiness up there—and worth all the pains? How can you tell? You have never been up yourself.

Hermotimus. I trust my master's word; and he knows well; is he not on the topmost height?

Lycinus. Oh, do tell me what he says about it; what is Happiness like? wealth, glory, pleasures incomparable?

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Quote from Titus

In this episode I learnt that I don't have to listen to the approximately 200 episodes I've missed so far to experience the maximum of this pleasurable podcast

You don't have to listen to the old episodes to experience "maximum pleasure" from the podcast, but since he who counsels the old man to make a good end is foolish ... because of the desirability of life, and also because ... much worse still is the man who says it is good not to be born but ‘once born make haste to pass the gates of Death’.... it will be pleasant and desirable also if you end up having the time to listen to the previous 200!

DavidN it appears to me that your wording that Nate quoted might be a little unclear, and not just as to needing "their" rather than "there" and lack of an apostrophe. I think your point is understandable but for others reading could you check that wording?

(I say this as the King of Typos myself but this is important enough to be clear on )

I am thinking the sense of what you are saying is something like:

If gods are supposed to be perfect, as an Epicurean should you not look to the Epicurean gods for their utility in steering your own movement towards perfection?

I am posting this as a forum thread to be sure it gets the attention it deserves, as posts in the "Files" section don't always come up in regular searches. Also, I am including in this post Elli's initial comments on some of the names mentioned:

"First Generation" Epicureans - Epicureanfriends.com

Greetings, all! I created a document that organizes a list of "First Generation" Epicureans (with citations). As always, I hope you find it to be useful. Let…

www.epicureanfriends.com

Elli Pensa wrote:

This is an outstanding work. Bravo, my friend Nathan!

Nathan wrote [...Khairédēmos of Sámos - Kathēgētḗs; Brother of Epíkouros; named for their mother (DL X.3, 27)...]

Τhe name of Epicurus' mother was "Khairestráte" and thanks to the name of mother, her son would be named as "Khairéstratos".

Since, another name is Khairédēmos and another name is Khairéstratos.

- Khairéstratos means the joy of army or the greetings to the army.

- And Khairédemos means the joy of démos or the greetings to démos.

- We have the epicurean Philódemos that means the friend of démos. From the word Dēmos comes the word "Demokratēa"(Democracy) and the word "demṓtis" that means the one who was registered in the registers of a démos (municipality) of ancient Athens.

And as the ancient greek names have a meaning thas is connected with the characteristics/character of a man/woman that are following all of his/her life, and till the end. Since we see what is the end of someone to understand how all of his/her life was. Because we (epicureans) say it is the same training which teaches to live well and to die well.

Thus now, we have to examine the names of "the three caballeros" and "Saludos ex Amigos"

Nathan wrote: [..."Ex-Phíloi" (φίλοι) or Ex-“Friends” / Former Associates of Epíkouros.

*Hēródotos of Lampsakós - Recipient of the famous letter; left for Platonism (DL X.4-5)

Metródōros of Stratoníkeia - A disciple of Epíkouros who “went over” to Karneádēs (DL X.9)

*Timokrátēs of Lampsakós - Brother of Metród., Batís, and Mento.; left for Platonism (DL X.4-5)...]

- Hēródotos means the one that is given or assigned to the goddess Hera...but after Herodotus rejected the epicurean philosophy and left for platonism, he remains as a given/assigned to the goddess Hera. And in the end what does his name mean? Stupid!

- Metródōros means the one that is a gift to his mother... but after he rejected epicurean philosophy and left to Karneades, he remains a gift that is under the skirts of his mother. And in the end what does his name mean? Stupid!

- Timokrátēs means the power of honor or simply to hold your honor...but, after he rejected the epicurean philosophy and left to Platonism, he remains just to hold his honor... but honor - without prudence and justice - does not lead to a pleasant life. And in the end what does his name mean? Stupid!

If you have problems finding this in the future you can also find it in the List of Special Resources page here:

- Epicureanfriends.com

www.epicureanfriends.com

Happy Birthday to Mike Anyayahan! Learn more about Mike Anyayahan and say happy birthday on Mike Anyayahan's timeline: Mike Anyayahan

Episode 216 of the Lucretius Today Podcast Is Now Available. Today we address an important but frequently questioned doctrine of Epicurus - Why did he seem to say that length of time does not contribute to pleasure? (PD19. Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures, by reason, the limits of pleasure.)

Gonna be out soon later tonight, but one comment first - as sometimes is the case you may need a dictionary for some of Joshua's comments -- unless you are familiar with the word "mickle" already!

Referring over to the new thread on the perfect not being the enemy of the good, especially as to a comment Pacatus made, I wish I could put a slightly different spin on my comments in the episode in particular and on some of my past comments on "idealism" in general.

As some are pointing out there, an "ideal" can certainly have a beneficial use, so it's going to be necessary to be clear what we mean in attacking "idealism." Some people already refer to the Epicurean view of the gods as an "idealist" view, and even though i think Epicurus held his gods to be real too, I've always tried to maintain that in addition to their reality, they serve as an example of an "ideal" life that helps us target ours.

So part of the issue with "idealism" that needs stressing is that there's nothing wrong with having and using "ideals," but you darn better be sure that you generate your ideals through the sensations, anticipations, and feelings, and that you don't let your "syllogistic logic" run unrestrained and create totally "unreal" ideals that are *in fact* the enemy of "the good."

The point in the episode i am referring to is where I say that the error of plato et al was in idealizing virtue as an absolute form in another dimension. That's the part I think is the heart of the issue, not that they are "idealizing virtue" by generating a realistic picture, that would in fact be useful, as Epicurus does, but that they are departing from the senses, anticipations, and feeling by creating an abstracted incorrect ideal that is unreal and can never be real and is in fact harmful to the realistic ideal (a direct parallel to what the crowd does in creating false anticipations of the gods.)

This is a shorter note: Around the 36 minute mark will appear Joshua explaining the origin of "discretion is the better part of valor." I never thought of that in an Epicurean context before, but now that I do think about it, it's the kind of comment that goes right to the Epicurean perspective on the proper use of any virtue.

We don't discuss it for long, and Joshua makes the point that Falstaff wasn't necessarily right in a way that would apply to all circumstances, but it's interesting to think about how the quote applies to the contextual analysis of virtue.

Quote from Joshua

My personal opinion; the desire for the perfection of virtue is both unnatural and unnecessary. It is in the same class as the desires for power, fame, luxurious riches, and eternal life.

Yes that is exactly the direction I would take this. And to the extent that Epicurus might have been saying this in the context of deep philosophical discussion, such as the letter to Menoeceus, rather than in the context of a "here's how you should choose your career" discussion, then the target of these comments might have been at least as much his philosophical opponents as it was those who couldn't control their urges for sex or food.

Quote from Bryan

the perfect is not *always* attainable for us

Absolutely right and very important as a part of the puzzle.

Maybe we should add the corollary:

...And the good is not the enemy of the perfect, either, if the limits of the idea of perfection are properly understood....

This post is to discuss the question in the title. As we have been seeing in Book Two of On Ends, Cicero (relying on the Platonist tradition, which appears to have been amplified by the Stoics), considered Virtue to be an end that is absolutely complete in itself.

It seems possible that one objection that Epicurus would have had to this approach (and I think we can see this illustrated in Lucian's "Hermotimus" dialogue, is that such perfection is unattainable and damaging to consider as the goal in place of "pleasure."

Therefore I think it is legitimate to ask, when Epicurus or the Epicureans talked about avoiding the pursuit of unnatural and unnecessary desires, whether this category of desires includes the pursuit of Platonic ideals of "Virtue" which are absolute and complete in themselves? Is it possible that this category includes more than just the things we normally discuss, such as fame and money and power, but also the extreme pursuit of "virtue" as mesmerized those who eventually emphasized that approach to an extreme in Stoicism?

Here are some cites:

Quote from Letter to Menoeceus

[127] For if he says this from conviction why does he not pass away out of life? For it is open to him to do so, if he had firmly made up his mind to this. But if he speaks in jest, his words are idle among men who cannot receive them.

We must then bear in mind that the future is neither ours, nor yet wholly not ours, so that we may not altogether expect it as sure to come, nor abandon hope of it, as if it will certainly not come.

We must consider that of desires some are natural, others vain, and of the natural some are necessary and others merely natural; and of the necessary some are necessary for happiness, others for the repose of the body, and others for very life.

[128] The right understanding of these facts enables us to refer all choice and avoidance to the health of the body and (the soul’s) freedom from disturbance, since this is the aim of the life of blessedness.

Quote from On Ends Book One - Torquatus

The great disturbing factor in a man's life is ignorance of good and evil; mistaken ideas about these frequently rob us of our greatest pleasures, and torment us with the most cruel pain of mind. Hence we need the aid of Wisdom, to rid us of our fears and appetites, to root out all our errors and prejudices, and to serve as our infallible guide to the attainment of pleasure. Wisdom alone can banish sorrow from our hearts and protect its front alarm and apprehension; put yourself to school with her, and you may live in peace, and quench the glowing flames of desire. For the desires are incapable of satisfaction; they ruin not individuals only but whole families, nay often shake the very foundations of the state. It is they that are the source of hatred, quarreling, and strife, of sedition and of war.

Nor do they only flaunt themselves abroad, or turn their blind onslaughts solely against others; even when prisoned within the heart they quarrel and fall out among themselves; and this cannot but render the whole of life embittered. Hence only the Wise Man, who prunes away all the rank growth of vanity and error, can possibly live untroubled by sorrow and by fear, content within the bounds that nature has set. Nothing could be more useful or more conducive to well-being than Epicurus's doctrine as to the different classes of the desires. One kind he classified as both natural and necessary, a second as natural without being necessary, and a third as neither natural nor necessary; the principle of classification being that the necessary desires are gratified with little trouble or expense; the natural desires also require but little, since nature's own riches, which suffice to content her, are both easily procured and limited in amount; but for the imaginary desires no bound or limit can be discovered.

Quote from Lucian's Hermotimus

Lycinus. You must be of good cheer and keep a stout heart; gaze at the end of your climb and the Happiness at the top, and remember that he is working with you. What prospect does he hold out? when are you to be up? does he think you will be on the top next year—by the Great Mysteries, or the Panathenaea, say?

Hermotimus. Too soon, Lycinus.

Lycinus. By next Olympiad, then?

Hermotimus. All too short a time, even that, for habituation to Virtue and attainment of Happiness.

Lycinus. Say two Olympiads, then, for an outside estimate. You may fairly be found guilty of laziness, if you cannot get it done by then; the time would allow you three return trips from the Pillars of Heracles to India, with a margin for exploring the tribes on the way instead of sailing straight and never stopping. How much higher and more slippery, pray, is the peak on which your Virtue dwells than that Aornos crag which Alexander stormed in a few days?

Hermotimus. There is no resemblance, Lycinus; this is not a thing, as you conceive it, to be compassed and captured quickly, though ten thousand Alexanders were to assault it; in that case, the sealers would have been legion. As it is, a good number begin the climb with great confidence, and do make progress, some very little indeed, others more; but when they get half-way, they find endless difficulties and discomforts, lose heart, and turn back, panting, dripping, and exhausted. But those who endure to the end reach the top, to be blessed thenceforth with wondrous days, looking down from their height upon the ants which are the rest of mankind.

Lycinus. Dear me, what tiny things you make us out—not so big as the Pygmies even, but positively groveling on the face of the earth. I quite understand it; your thoughts are up aloft already. And we, the common men that walk the earth, shall mingle you with the Gods in our prayers; for you are translated above the clouds, and gone up whither you have so long striven.

Hermotimus. If but that ascent might be, Lycinus! but it is far yet.

Lycinus. But you have never told me how far, in terms of time.

Hermotimus. No; for I know not precisely myself. My guess is that it will not be more than twenty years; by that time I shall surely be on the summit.

Lycinus. Mercy upon us, you take long views!

Hermotimus. Ay; but, as the toil, so is the reward.

Lycinus. That may be; but about these twenty years—have you your master's promise that you will live so long? Is he prophet as well as philosopher? Or is it a soothsayer or Chaldean expert that you trust? Such things are known to them, I understand. You would never, of course, if there were any uncertainty of your life's lasting to the Virtue-point, slave and toil night and day like this; why, just as you were close to the top, your fate might come upon you, lay hold of you by the heel, and lug you down with your hopes unfulfilled.

Hermotimus. God forbid! these are words of ill omen, Lycinus; may life be granted me, that I may grow wise, and have if it be but one day of Happiness!

Lycinus. For all these toils will you be content with your one day?

Hermotimus. Content? Yes, or with the briefest moment of it.

Lycinus. But is there indeed Happiness up there—and worth all the pains? How can you tell? You have never been up yourself.

Hermotimus. I trust my master's word; and he knows well; is he not on the topmost height?

Lycinus. Oh, do tell me what he says about it; what is Happiness like? wealth, glory, pleasures incomparable?

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I don't want to raise any expectations that this is going to be a particularly "good" episode, but I do think it will cover some "important topics."

Two of them deserve threads of their own:

Thread

If We Agree For The Sake of Argument That "The Perfect Should Not Be The Enemy of The Good," then let's ask "What *Should* We Consider To Be The Proper Relationship Between The Perfect And The Good?"

This thread is to discuss the question in the title.

It seems to me that this aphorism, which most of us seem to agree is a good one, needs to be followed up with more explanation of what exactly *is* the proper way for us to view the "perfect" in relationship to "the good?"

Let's also presume that we don't immediately jump to the reductionist "there is no perfect" and "there is no good," although that may be a perfectly reasonable option that we can include in the discussion.

Presuming we are…

Cassius

February 26, 2024 at 4:43 PM

Post

RE: Given The Stress That Many Greek Philosophers' Placed On "Virtue" or a perfect view of "The Good" As The Ultimate Goal, To What Extent Would An Epicurus Have Considered That Approach An "Unnatural and Unnecessary Desire?"

[…]

Yes that is exactly the direction I would take this. And to the extent that Epicurus might have been saying this in the context of deep philosophical discussion, such as the letter to Menoeceus, rather than in the context of a "here's how you should choose your career" discussion, then the target of these comments might have been at least as much his philosophical opponents as it was those who couldn't control their urges for sex or food.

Cassius

February 26, 2024 at 6:45 PM

This thread is to discuss the question in the title.

It seems to me that this aphorism, which most of us seem to agree is a good one, needs to be followed up with more explanation of what exactly *is* the proper way for us to view the "perfect" in relationship to "the good?"

Let's also presume that we don't immediately jump to the reductionist "there is no perfect" and "there is no good," although that may be a perfectly reasonable option that we can include in the discussion.

Presuming we are talking to non-philosophers and want to give people practical advice, would we start with something like:

"The 'perfect' of a thing is a concept that we use to visualize what the 'best' of that thing would be, and by visualizing that concept of the 'best' of that thing, we can more easily work toward our target of approximating it. And even though we know from the start that the 'perfect' is not attainable for us, it still serves as a very valuable tool for us in calculating out actions, because there is no way we can hope to come close to a goal unless we start out knowing what the goal is."

I think we will see in discussing Cicero's objections to Epicurean philosophy that a lot of it amounts to stressing "the perfect" in a way most of us will consider to be unattainable. What then would we expect the ancient Epicureans to have said about this topic?

As long as several of our regular people remain engaged I am not inclined at all to see the conversation stop, so don't worry about that.

In my own case I am trying to edit the podcast we recorded yesterday as I think it contains some pressing material we also need to deal with, so I better work to keep Joshua in line over there while you guys tend to this.

Just keeping Joshua in line is a full time job so you guess tend to things so we don't need to many planks!!

We can go round and round quoting Richard Dawkins vs Sam Harris til the end of time, but if doing so causes us to lose sight of the larger goal of living happily through Epicurean philosophy, then we are not doing justice to the reason we are here in the first place.

Not everyone is going to agree with the way we implement that balance, but I think the best we can do is to try to accommodate "privately" those who have the time and interest to pursue the Harris road, while at the same time acknowledging that the Harris view is contrary to Epicurus and therefore not something to be promoted in public on this website.

As Dawkins says "we feel as if we are not deterministic -- and that's all that matters."

Now if someone wants to argue that that is not the position Epicurus took, or that he was wrong to do so, then *that also, or in fact even more* would be a point of productive discussion, because that would implicate the feelings anticipations and senses as the canon of truth. As Sedley says, the swerve itself may well have been an afterthought, as it certainly did not even make the letter to Menoeceus. We aren't required to ground the significance and importance of freedom of will on the swerve by a long shot, any more than we are tied to supporting every one of Epicurus' multiple possibilities for eclipses.

Which leads me to repeat again - if these discussions lead someone to think that Epicurus was so far off on basic issues that they want to drop major parts of his philosophy and refrain from representing themselves to be Epicurean, then we are all better off if that person pursues that result to their satisfaction. But those deviations aren't proper for extended development on this forum.

We do allow people here at the forum - even as Level 3 - who are clearly stating that they do not consider themselves to be "fully Epicurean." We can work with that so long as we do not have long and regular and unbalanced campaigns in public against core Epicurean positions. People who have agency can in fact change their minds, and working through defenses against attacks on Epicurean positions has extremely helpful results, exactly as we are doing in going through Book 2 of Cicero's On Ends in the Lucretius Today podcast.

But I think we owe it to those who are here to study Epicurus to keep the focus on explaining and defending Epicurean positions, and to conduct plank-walking episodes as privately as possible. In general and for the public, we should provide an Epicurean support group and not just another general philosophy forum where the only firm positon is that all firm positions are wrong. There are plenty of those on the internet where hard determinism is welcome. The "articles of faith" at such places are that all knowledge is impossible and that no one has any freedom of will whatsoever. That's exactly the kind of thing that Epicurus fought against, and we need to continue that tradition here if we expect to have an "Epicurean" community.

Interview: Richard Dawkins

QUESTION: Now, if we are gene machines, presumably then our behavior is also programmed by genes -- you have made that case. But Christians would say that there is a thing called free will, and that free will gives us a genuine choice about our actions, that effectively free will allows us to override biology. What is your response to that as a scientist?

MR. DAWKINS: I am very comfortable with the idea that we can override biology with free will. Indeed, I encourage people all the time to do it. Much of the message of my first book, "The Selfish Gene," was that we must understand what it means to be a gene machine, what it means to be programmed by genes, so that we are better equipped to escape, so that we are better equipped to use our big brains, use our conscience intelligence, to depart from the dictates of the selfish genes and to build for ourselves a new kind of life which as far as I am concerned the more un-Darwinian it is the better, because the Darwinian world in which our ancestors were selected is a very unpleasant world. Nature really is red in tooth and claw. And when we sit down together to argue out and discuss and decide upon how we want to run our societies, I think we should hold up Darwinism as an awful warning for how we should not organize our societies.

QUESTION: So you are not saying then that our genetic programming is fully deterministic?

MR. DAWKINS: It's an important point to realize that the genetic programming of our lives is not fully deterministic. It is statistical -- it is in any animal merely statistical -- not deterministic. Even if you are in some sense a determinist -- and philosophically speaking many of us may be -- that doesn't mean we have to behave as if we are determinists, because the world is so complicated, and especially human brains are so complicated, that we behave as if we are not deterministic, and we feel as if we are not deterministic -- and that's all that matters. In any case, adding the word "genetic" to deterministic doesn't make it any more deterministic. If you are a philosophical determinist, then adding the word "gene" doesn't increase the effect.

Richard Dawkins On Free Will

I posted this a couple years ago on one of my past blogs. I always find the topic worth revisiting. The following is a transcript of a question posed to and…

notesfrombabel.wordpress.com

Richard Dawkins at Politics and Prose .. The God Delusion
Question and Answer

Questioner: Dr. Dawkins thank you for your comments. The thing I have appreciated most about your comments is your consistency in the things I’ve seen you written. One of the areas that I wanted to ask you about and the places where I think there is an inconsistency and I hoped you would clarify it is that in what I’ve read you seem to take a position of a strong determinist who says that what we see around us is the product of physical laws playing themselves out but on the other hand it would seem that you would do things like taking credit for writing this book and things like that. But it would seem, and this isn’t to be funny, that the consistent position would be that necessarily the authoring of this book from the initial condition of the big bang it was set that this would be the product of what we see today. I would take it that that would be the consistent position but I wanted to know what you thought about that.

Dawkins: The philosophical question of determinism is a very difficult question. It’s not one I discuss in this book, indeed in any other book that I’ve ever talked about. Now an extreme determinist, as the questioner says, might say that everything we do, everything we think, everything that we write, has been determined from the beginning of time in which case the very idea of taking credit for anything doesn’t seem to make any sense. Now I don’t actually know what I actually think about that, I haven’t taken up a position about that, it’s not part of my remit to talk about the philosophical issue of determinism. What I do know is that what it feels like to me, and I think to all of us, we don’t feel determined. We feel like blaming people for what they do or giving people the credit for what they do. We feel like admiring people for what they do. None of us ever actually as a matter of fact says, “Oh well he couldn’t help doing it, he was determined by his molecules.” Maybe we should.. I sometimes.. Um.. You probably remember many of you would have seen Fawlty Towers. The episode where Basil where his car won’t start and he gives it fair warning, counts up to three, and then gets out of the car and picks up a tree branch and thrashes it within an edge of his life. Maybe that’s what we all ought to… Maybe the way we laugh at Basil Fawlty, we ought to laugh in the same way at people who blame humans. I mean when we punish people for doing the most horrible murders, maybe the attitude we should take is “Oh they were just determined by their molecules.” It’s stupid to punish them. What we should do is say “This unit has a faulty motherboard which needs to be replaced.” I can’t bring myself to do that. I actually do respond in an emotional way and I blame people, I give people credit, or I might be more charitable and say this individual who has committed murders or child abuse of whatever it is was really abused in his own childhood. And so again I might take a ..

Questioner: But do you personally see that as an inconsistency in your views?

Dawkins: I sort of do. Yes. But it is an inconsistency that we sort of have to live with otherwise life would be intolerable. But it has nothing to do with my views on religion it is an entirely separate issue.

Questioner: Thank you.