Posts by Cassius

Quote from Titus

while also granting enjoyment of pleasure as long as the enjoyment doesn't collide with freedom from pain

Looking at that from Torquatus' perspective, that is like saying "as long as the enjoyment of pleasure doesn't collide with pleasure."

And that's the problem with those who aren't willing to straightforwardly identify freedom from pain as pleasure and see that the overall goal is not some kind of definition of "freedom from pain" that conflicts with or is superior to pleasure, but "pleasure" itself.

Deferring to Cicero and Plutarch and others who insist that "freedom from pain" is not a term that is identical to "pleasure" makes this paradox forever unintelligible. But I wager that is what the "humanists" will always do, because like Cicero they insist on seeing "being human" as something higher than pleasure. They refuse to take the next step andsay that "being human in the absence of pain" IS pleasure.

We may have a little "live-action" reporting in this episode. Martin will be calling in today live from the Gottingen Architectual Museum where he is visiting the artifacts relating to Epicurus. Anyone who is reading this shortly after I am posting it is welcome to post questions or picture requests to Martin!

Quote from Kalosyni

Regarding "freedom from pain is the height of pleasure" - I would say this is a kind of remedy which is similar to "death is nothing to us". Without a thorough contemplation and using the mind to reason through them, then both of these do not appear to make sense - so it takes thinking in order to see the application of these two points.

YES that is the key part. It takes proper thinking to recognize this pleasure. Maybe that is similar to how it takes a movement of the will to summon up a happy memory, which is there and is always pleasurable when you reflect on it, but which requires that act of reflection to experience. You have to practice this perspective or you don't profit from it and if you don't the competing pains can override it.

PD18. The pleasure in the flesh is not increased when once the pain due to want is removed, but is only varied: and the limit as regards pleasure in the mind is begotten by the reasoned understanding of these very pleasures, and of the emotions akin to them, which used to cause the greatest fear to the mind.

PD19. Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures, by reason, the limits of pleasure.

Welcome to Episode 197 of the Lucretius Today Podcast. Today we are very privileged to present to you an interview with Dr. Marcelo Boeri, Professor of Ancient Philosophy at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile. Dr. Boeri is originally from Buenos Aires, and after receiving his Ph.D. from the University of Salvador in 1995, he has worked extensively in the field of Ancient Greek philosophy ever since, lecturing at many distinguished universities around the world.

We are greatly appreciative of Dr. Boeri taking time from his busy schedule to talk with us today about his excellent new book, co-written with Javier Aoiz, entitled Theory and Practice In Epicurean Political Philosophy - Security, Justice, and Tranquility. This book is an excellent addition to the field of Epicurean studies, and I would encourage everyone who has any interest in Epicurus' views on engagement with society to be sure to check out this extensively researched and very well argued book.

Dr. Boeri's academic background and contact information: https://filosofia.uc.cl/academicos-2/5…7-boeri-marcelo

To the extent a diagram like that is showing pleasure and pain to be on an opposite axis then it would be consistent and helpful to explain that the presence of one is the absence of the other.

However to the extent that the diagram implies that "excitement" is on a scale of its own that is unrelated to describing pleasure and pain, it probably detracts from the ultimate philosophical point that if a person is conscious and aware at all, he is feeling either pleasure or pain with no zero / neutral point.

Of course if you follow the descriptions around the circle the point is to read them together and you don't get confused.

I'd say that there's not only no 0,0 point, but none of the points at all marked by the vertical line. If the two lines are "X" and "Y" there's no 0,Y point up and down the circle.

Quote from Godfrey

This aligns with my intuition. But it's difficult to intuit the idea that the absence of pain is the greatest pleasure. It’s logically correct, but when I really dig into it, it's hard to wrap my head around. At first it makes sense at the macro level, but Eoghan Gardiner 's anecdote is at the macro level. After a while it makes my head spin!

Of course, what Cicero loved to do was to find rabbit holes and dig away...

And yep this is the issue, but (1) there is good reason to believe that the Torquatus portion was coming straight from Epicurean textbooks, and (2) it's essential to point out that the criticism that this perspective is a rabbit hole is the Ciceronian anti-Epicurean position.

It seems to me the key decision that every reader has to make is to choose from one of these two positions. Either: (1) Torquatus' formulation is a thorough misstatement of Epicurean philosophy, or (2) Torquatus' formulation is correct but appears foreign to our ears because Cicero does not allow Torquatus to include the full explanation of how "absence of pain is the greatest pleasure" arises from a necessary logical deduction, given the inverse relationship of pleasure and pain.

Somebody's going to do a better job than my chart here, but hammering this point is going to be necessary to stop one's head from spinning on what Torquatus is saying.

Words mean something. When you accept (1) that if you are aware of anything at all then what you are aware of is either pleasure or pain, and (2) someone has said that their life is "free from pain," then (3) the realization that what they have said is that they are at maximum pleasure follows like night follows day.

In Eoghan's case I see him following Cicero's wording, which I would discourage, if the implication is that pleasure is associated with excitement / stimulation alone. The wider perspective is that excitement / stimulation is not a required component of pleasure, so it is an incorrect deduction to hold that the level of excitement/stimulation has any relationship to the total percentage of pleasure being experienced.

Quote from Pacatus

I remain unconvinced that Epicurus thought that being a good Epicurean meant always refraining from political activity, or that he did not recognize the dependency of a society (the polis; Latin civitas) in which the Garden could flourish on politics. Although, Kalosyni's cautions on the matter are well-taken.

Pacatus I think you will be very pleased with the vigorous way Dr. Boeri argues the thesis of his book in our upcoming podcast with him. May be a few more days but should be released "soon."

Quote from Eoghan Gardiner

I had this acutely after having a small procedure I was in basically a non state but then I remembered there is no non state it's always either pleasure or pain so the very absence of any pleasure DESPITE being completely pain free ended up being painful to me.

Eoghan I think I understand what you are saying, and I agree with your ultimate conclusion, but I wanted to throw this out there fore consideration: As I am reading Torquatus now, unless you are saying that you were "unconcious" in the condition you were in, I don't think the Torquatus interpretation of pleasure would allow someone to say that they were "completely free of pain" and not then - by virtue of those words - concluding that such a person was in a state of pleasure -- in fact, the highest state. Maybe you are saying you were unconscious, or numb (which is painful) but as I am reading the words now -- such as the quote which is currently at the top of the forum - it seems to me that the Epicureans were being rigorously logical in their word use: IF it is stated that a person is painfree, THEN - without any further need for information or deliberation - then that person is defined to be in pleasure, and in fact the greatest pleasure possible, since you are stating that they are "pain free."

I know this type of analysis is striking some people as impractical and unusual, and that's in fact exactly how Cicero was describing it to Torquatus. But if we take Torquatus at his word, and I think we can, then this seems to be the way the Epicureans were thinking. Cicero's crimes against Epicurus come mostly in the omission of important explanations, but in my view when he places a clear statement in the mouth of an Epicurean - and in this case he does this with Torquatus over and over and over again - I think it can be trusted that this in fact was the Epicurean position.

Not too bad an intro, and in my experience if they indeed have an interest in Nietzsche they will not go too far astray toward excessive asceticism (but that's the direction I would expect them to take anyway). Will be interesting to hear your take on the program.

Welcome to Episode 198 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

This week we continue our discussion of Books One and Two of Cicero's On Ends, which are largely devoted to Epicurean Philosophy. "On Ends" contains important criticisms of Epicurus that have set the tone for standard analysis of his philosophy for the last 2000 years. Going through this book gives us the opportunity to review those attacks, take them apart, and respond to them as an ancient Epicurean might have done, and much more fully than Cicero allowed Torquatus, his Epicurean spokesman, to do.

Follow along with us here: Cicero's On Ends - Complete Reid Edition

We are using the Reid edition, so check any typos or other questions against the original PDF which can be found here.

As we proceed we will keep track of Cicero's arguments and outline them here:

Cicero's Objections to Epicurean Philosophy

Last week we continued in Book 2 at Section IV and this week we will pick up at the same place.

Tonight at 8pm, we will cover Vatican Saying 38 and 39.

Please join us. (Post here in this thread if you have never attended one of these sessions as we do have a vetting process for new participants.)

VS38. He is a little man in all respects who has many good reasons for quitting life.

VS39. He is no friend who is continually asking for help, nor he who never associates help with friendship. For the former barters kindly feeling for a practical return, and the latter destroys the hope of good in the future.

Tonight at 8pm, we will cover Vatican Saying 36 and 37. We will also have a special discussion led by Fernando on our upcoming interview of Dr. Boeri from South America.

Please join us. (Post here in this thread if you have never attended one of these sessions as we do have a vetting process for new participants.)

VS36. Epicurus’ life, when compared to other men’s in respect of gentleness and self-sufficiency, might be thought a mere legend.

VS37. Nature is weak toward evil, not toward good: because it is saved by pleasures, but destroyed by pains.

Quote from Cassius

Not only does "static" imply absolutely unmoving, it's also in the modern world a synonym for "interference" or "disrupted receipt of a signal " or "no signal" - all of which are the opposite of what should be the focus as smooth operation or smooth signal.

It occurs to me to say this too, in fairness to Sedley and "the academics." The academics aren't in the business of trying to explain how to put Epicurean philosophy to practical use for normal people. The academic writers are often just talking to each other. We have a different goal here, and so we don't have to stick to the academic wording. We have to be accurate and fair to the texts and the overall situation but we aren't bound by established usages any more than Epicurus was required to use terms in the same was as Plato or the others.

Not only does "static" imply absolutely unmoving, it's also in the modern world a synonym for "interference" or "disrupted receipt of a signal " or "no signal" - all of which are the opposite of what should be the focus as smooth operation or smooth signal.

[I will probably re-edit the title of this thread much of the rest of it too, but Kalosyni's post on mixed feelings makes me think I need to work on this point further.]

I would suggest that we can usefully apply David Sedley's comment about Epicurus being opposed to atomic reductionism to our discussion of pleasure. His statement was: "that there are truths at the microscopic level of elementary particles, and further very different truths at the phenomenal level; that the former must be capable of explaining the latter, but that neither level of description has a monopoly of truth.'

I would apply Sedley's perspective to discussion of key issues in pleasure this way:

So it seems to me essential to point out these differing perspectives are both "true," just as in regard to the atomic level.

"Nothing exists except atoms and void" becomes skepticism and nihilism in Democritus' hands, but in Epicurus' hands when seen in its proper context it supports confidence and enthusiasm for life, because: "there are truths at the microscopic level of elementary particles, and further very different truths at the phenomenal level; [and] the former must be capable of explaining the latter, but ...neither level of description has a monopoly of truth.'

The same is true in the discussion of pleasure. Unless you keep both perspectives in focus and remember that both are true, it is easy to get confused and think "absence of pain" means nothingness and that variation is totally undesirable. In truth the case is very different: "absence of pain" really just means "every experience/feeling in life that is not painful" (which means "pleasure"), and "variation" is seen to refer to pleasures of day to day life are not only desirable but essential.

In a very general way it seems to me that these separate contexts are what Cicero is using to make his argument effective. He is switching contexts back and forth, and he is not allowing Torquatus to explain how these contexts are different and how they interrelate.

I would suggest that we can usefully apply David Sedley's comment about Epicurus being opposed to atomic reductionism to our discussion of pleasure. His statement was: "that there are truths at the microscopic level of elementary particles, and further very different truths at the phenomenal level; that the former must be capable of explaining the latter, but that neither level of description has a monopoly of truth.'

I would apply Sedley's perspective to discussion of key issues in pleasure this way:

So it seems to me essential to point out these differing perspectives are both "true," just as in regard to the atomic level.

"Nothing exists except atoms and void" becomes skepticism and nihilism in Democritus' hands, but in Epicurus' hands when seen in its proper context it supports confidence and enthusiasm for life, because: "there are truths at the microscopic level of elementary particles, and further very different truths at the phenomenal level; [and] the former must be capable of explaining the latter, but ...neither level of description has a monopoly of truth.'

The same is true in the discussion of pleasure. Unless you keep both perspectives in focus and remember that both are true, it is easy to get confused and think "absence of pain" means nothingness and that variation is totally undesirable. In truth the case is very different: "absence of pain" really just means "every experience/feeling in life that is not painful" (which means "pleasure"), and "variation" is seen to refer to pleasures of day to day life are not only desirable but essential.

In a very general way it seems to me that these separate contexts are what Cicero is using to make his argument effective. He is switching contexts back and forth, and he is not allowing Torquatus to explain how these contexts are different and how they interrelate.

This is a good line and is consistent with pleasure and absence of pain being interchangeable terms:

Quote

Pleasure, that is, consists not in mere lack of pain, but in perceiving in a painless way.

I would say also that "absence of pain" requires "perceiving"

Ok as much as I like Sedley let me comment on one of the early paragraphs:

Quote

In Epicurean doctrine pleasures are divided into two kinds, the bodily and the mental; and within each of those two domains there are short-term “kinetic” pleasures, which lie primarily in hedonic processes such as eating or learning, and static (or “katastematic”) pleasures, which consist in the longer-term state of painlessness. Counter-intuitively, and notoriously, Epicureans insist that when all pain has gone and static pleasure has replaced it, the height of pleasure has already been reached. The added kinetic pleasures typically associated with luxurious living can, as they put it, ‘vary’ the static pleasure, but cannot increase it.

As Lucretius says in his second proem (2.16–19), “there is nothing else that nature barks out for than that pain should be absent from the body, and that the mind should enjoy pleasurable sensation while insulated from anxiety and fear.”

The heart of our recent discussions is the probability that "pleasure" and "painlessness" are being used by the Epicureans interchangeably, with no difference in meaning other than when referencing the situation that when all pain is gone then you are at 100% pleasure. The second sentence of PD03 confirms the basic point that when you have "absence of one" you have "presence of the other," and Torquatus hammers this point unmistakeably.

If so there is no reason to switch words from pleasure to painlessness in the first sentence quoted above. Even under Sedley's terms, kinetic refers to short-term pleasures, while katastematic refers to long-term pleasures, and the issue is duration, not a difference between "pleasure" and "something else."

Then Sedley uses "static" which most all of us agree is a poor choice of words to refer to normal healthy operation of body and mind.

It's this switching of words without being absolutely clear about the context that creates the ambiguity and resulting confusion.

I would suggest the paragraph would be more clear and correct worded this way:

In Epicurean doctrine pleasures are divided into two kinds, the bodily and the mental; and within each of those two domains there are short-term “kinetic” pleasures, which lie primarily in processes of stimulation such as eating or learning, and longer-term (or “katastematic”) pleasures which lie primarily in operation of the organism not involving short-term stimulation, such as regular healthy operation of body or mind. In a very logical and common sense way, Epicureans insist that when all pain has gone and been replaced by pleasure, the full and complete pleasure of the organism (the height of pleasure) has been reached. The added kinetic pleasures typically associated with luxurious living can, as they put it, ‘vary’ the condition of full and complete pleasure, but cannot increase it.

Quote from Godfrey

VS11: For most people, to be quiet is to be numb and to be active is to be frenzied.

I agree that this sounds like it could be related to the same topic in which the wise man can find pleasure in varying speeds of activity.

The overriding goal here ought to be to understand first what Epicurus is advising and then we will have plenty of time to decide how or if it helps to talk in terms of K/K distinctions.

I post this almost as an aside rather than for the K/K reference: I am just not familiar enough with Plutarch but the name "Theon" jumps out. I guess this may well relate to the name Theon in "A Few Days In Athens...."

Last excerpt: As I read it, this is as close as Gosling & Taylor get to a clear conclusion:

While I think Gosling & Taylor are the gold standard on this question, they have a habit of writing in ways that require care. For example it appears that they write a long paragraph about views with which they disagree and expect the reader to understand that they disagree solely because they start the paragraph off with "Notoriously."

After a page they do get around to describing the kind of view that they "oppose," and their position becomes more clear because they have described the "notorious" view as "awkward," and in the end they become much more clear. But it takes dedicated reading to pull out their conclusion.