Welcome to Episode 199 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.
This week we continue our discussion of Books Two of Cicero's On Ends, which are largely devoted Cicero's attack on Epicurean Philosophy. "On Ends" contains important criticisms of Epicurus that have set the tone for standard analysis of his philosophy for the last 2000 years. Going through this book gives us the opportunity to review those attacks, take them apart, and respond to them as an ancient Epicurean might have done, and much more fully than Cicero allowed Torquatus, his Epicurean spokesman, to do.
Follow along with us here: Cicero's On Ends - Complete Reid Edition
We are using the Reid edition, so check any typos or other questions against the original PDF which can be found here.
As we proceed we will keep track of Cicero's arguments and outline them here:
Cicero's Objections to Epicurean Philosophy
This week we continue in Book 2 at Section VII, with Cicero continuing to insist that "Freedom From Pain" is something different from Pleasure, with Torquatus responding again and again that they are the same.
VII. Lest you should suppose that the words only differ, I say that the things denoted are also two. Freedom from pain is one thing, possession of pleasure another; you attempt not merely to compound out of these two things, diverse as they are, one single term (for I should find that easier to endure) but to roll the two things into one, which cannot possibly be done. Your philosopher, who approves both things, was bound formally to adopt both, as he does in fact, without distinguishing them in words.
I don’t have any social media or many online accounts in general.
I totally respect that - and makes me remember to say we appreciate your making an exception for this forum!
I think it's really important to acknowledge how good people are going to differ on this, and that this decision doesn't have a right or wrong answer that fits everyone.
One thing I'm not clear on with katastematic pleasure being "a permanent condition as produced by practice" is whether this implies that the practice must be ongoing for the permanence to remain.
Is Don or anyone saying that Epicurus classified katastematic pleasure as "permanent?" Are we beginning to tread on "once saved always saved" theology?
Is there a neutral state allowed in this poll?
If you mean is it allowed to say that you have a perfectly balanced overall sum, in which the net pains vs net pleasures seem to perfectly offset each other? - YES that's allowable, because in that case your overall opinion about a situation is like a pair of scales perfectly balanced between pleasure and pain.
If you mean is it allowed to say that you have no feeling about some individual aspect of social media that has been brought to your attention but that you feel neither pain nor pleasure about it? NO. 
Because if you admit to an awareness of some aspect of it in particular, and that awareness of that aspect is not painful to you, then by saying "that awareness of that aspect is not painful," you are saying it is pleasant.
What say you to that? 
I answered "yes" because on balance the pleasure it brings outweighs the pain that it brings. There are certainly pains involved, but I find them worth it given that I am convinced engagement (especially with friends) is necessary at least for me in my own circumstances. I talk to people at times in "real life" who would definitely not fit the same profile, and for whom it's a net negative, but it seems to me that the inability to manage one's experience is a strong limiting factor on the likelihood of being secure and happy in the world today.
In any case, just saying "kinetic vs katastematic" masks a whole lot of stuff going on under the surface.
That's my thought too, and that's why I also think that the ultimate crux of the issue is that Epicurus is extending the word "pleasure" to cover both the exciting/stimulative type of activities that everyone acknowledges to be pleasure, plus what I would call - if I were German - EveryOtherExperienceOfLifeThatIsNotPainful.
It's the sweeping inclusion of normal everyday healthy non-painful existence (which is what is being referenced in response to Chysippus' hand argument) under the word "pleasure" that is the revolutionary issue and which makes "a life of pleasure" an attainable goal.
Within that sweeping overall term there are all sorts of pleasurable experiences, including (referencing Don above) "ataraxia ... the tranquility of mind that results from ridding one's mind of fears of death and the gods and obtaining a proper understanding of natural phenomena, and so on." Within that big picture framework I can see the usefulness of discussing k/k matters as a means of being sure we understand every detail. But the big picture is not established by the k/k detail, and any valid interpretation of a k/k distinction is going to have to fit within the big picture that all non-painful life experience is "pleasure."
I think we're all in agreement as to the importance of the Epicurean focus on the importance of freedom from fear of the gods and fear of death. What I don't know that we are all together on is that (1) if there are only two feelings, and (2) if someone is alive they are aware of feeling something(s), and (3) each and every one of those feelings is *either* pleasure or pain but not both in the same part of the person's body or mind.
I actually think most all of us *are* together on that last paragraph, but we're not together on the ramifications of what that last paragraph means. Cicero wouldn't accept that pleasure can embrace both stimulative pleasures and normal ordinary healthy feelings of proper functioning, and I am not sure that we (like Cicero) are all together in accepting it either. It would be surprising if all of our readers here, new and old, *were* all together, because it's a dramatic redefinition of the normal use of the word.
Let's suppose that the issue we are really discussing were the difference between "excited" or "stimulated' experiences, such as riding a rollercoaster or running for the touchdown, vs experiences of daily normal experience that do not involve pain (so we are going to label them pleasurable) but that also do not involve that "rush of excitement" or "rush of stimulation."
Here's one of the problems that you run into unless you are careful, because while these words may be the reverse of excited, most (except for calm and maybe a few others) carry negative connotations that no one but a Stoic would endorse.
Episode 198 of Lucretius Today is Now Available! This week we return to our coverage of "On Ends" Book Two, and we summarize several aspects of where we are in the discussion.
The thing to be careful about is, not to go in the opposite direction and even begin to embrace katastematic for the sake of reaching a "nirvana-like state of ataraxia".
That's the way I see it, and I also see no reason at all to ever associate "katastematic" with "a nirvana-like state of ataraxia." But I think that's exactly what a lot of people outside this forum are doing.
So I go to the shop of the best basket weaver in town. He's not in, but there's a pile of wicker on the floor and a note that reads, "there's warp and there's woof." I have no idea that means, but I'm pretty sure it's gonna be helpful in some way.
As you know and agree, Don has a list of citations supporting his position. If you have not read it, you can read the Boris Nikolsky article on this website which builds on the Gosling & Taylor analysis and takes a different position. All I can tell you is to read the articles to the extent you are interested and form your own opinion. In the end, I would suggest the best approach is to look at the reality of what is in the wicker basket, and what you can feel for yourself in your own mind and body, and label according to the reality you can observe.
But I also wanna feel the most pleasure from the least effort
That describes me precisely!
A generally very positive review, but this comes from England, so be prepared for a little criticism.
Aoiz and Boeri (hereafter ‘A&B’) have written an important contribution to the study of Epicureanism and ancient political thought. Epicurean political theory has been a topic of increasing interest in recent years (see esp. G. Roskam, Live Unnoticed [2007]), and many scholars are increasingly inclined to reject interpretations of the school that rely on clichés paraded by hostile ancient commentators that portray Epicureans as apolitical, antisocial parasites. A&B not only summarize these scholarly trends but offer what is probably the most up-to-date and comprehensive interpretation of Epicurean political theory, along with discussions of the political activities of actual historical actors in Greece and Rome for whom there is evidence of Epicurean sympathies. The result is a monograph that will be required reading for specialists in Epicurean philosophy and of great interest to scholars of ancient philosophy and political thought more generally.
Note:
The reason for my comment about England comes from Norman DeWitt's book, which I am personally expanding on by "joking" that most English writers seem to drink too deeply from Stoicism and inhale negativity about Epicurus. I don't expect the next wave of pro-Epicurean philosophers to come from England, but rather from outside that island (and isn't it interesting that Epicurean social engagement is not being defended by someone from England, but from two professors who hale from below the equator):
I would say for example that the reviewer displays his British reserve when he says that ""One also wonders about the reasons for Epicurus’ sometimes provocative and bombastic language (e.g. fr. 512 Us.: ‘I spit on to kalon’), which seems to have given his opponents rather easy targets to attack."
I suspect Epicurus would say that it is better to give your opponents material to attack than to be less than forthright in speaking the truth.
Austin Sun-News:
"The Epicurean Life Revealed: Politics and Security"
The Epicurean Life Revealed: Politics and Security – SUN NEWS AUSTIN
Please follow this link:
I expect this book to generate discussion for years to come, and I expect to cite it as the preferred interpretation of Epicurean engagement in society. That means it deserves a forum of its own, so some of the posts about the book (but not this thread in its entirety, as it applies to the podcast) will be moved here:
Theory And Practice In Epicurean Political Philosophy - Javier Aoiz and Marcelo Boeri
But, since I do tend to take the distinction as legitimate, it does make me wonder what, exactly, it means though!
Someone is eventually going to wade through the texts and the scholarly commentaries that parse the vocabularies and give examples of how all these words are used. I tend to think that the Gosling & Taylor book is exhaustive, but there are many many more.
As for here on the forum, I tend to think Don is your man who will eventually do that!
In the meantime I would just advise caution in getting too wedded to a particular position, along the lines of the "waiting" idea in Diogenes Laertius.
And part of the reason I advise that caution is that if someone gets too caught up in the wording, that focus could tend to distract away from more common sense analysis you are trying to pursue. I think you are right in your direction, and that's all there is too it. On the other hand, *many* people seem to have decided to themselves: "Epicureans were constantly dropping the name "katastematic" as a synonym for "absence of pain," and so therefore I will set my sights on "katastematic pleasure" as "absence of pain," and I'll write the whole world of kinetic pleasure out of the equation."
"Absence of pain" is the key to the analysis. If you conclude that "absence of pain" means "pleasure" then you will conclude that "absence of pain" can refer to **any** kind of pleasure, meaning **any** kind of mental or physical activity which is not painful. And that opens up the full spectrum of non-painful human activity as being desirable, which is a great deal more liberating than thinking that you need to go back to graduate school and learn detailed Greek vocabulary before you can understand Epicurus.
If you conclude that absence of pain means "katastematic pleasure," then I think you lose the benefit of what is being said on very face of the quotes I included above. You then turn against not only what Cicero's Epicurean speaker insists on repeatedly, but you turn against Epicurus himself "By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul.") and what Diogenes Laertius said that Epicurus valued "both" types of pleasure.
If you suspend this analysis until you get a graduate degree to unwind the Greek, you'll lose appreciation for the pleasure-maximizing viewpoint that "if I am not in pain I am in pleasure," and you'll constantly go looking for something else (probably through asceticism).
To repeat I am not saying that you personally are running afoul of that problem, but I would wager a lot of money that many of the commentaries are doing exactly that, and that is what leads to a lot of confusion.
Here is a tough question: Can the killing of a another human being ever be justified under Epicurean philosophy? Thoughts?
It's all about context. Self-defense? To prevent them from killing others? Etc etc etc.
Don gives a very short answer - almost as if he is implying that the question isn't "tough" at all!
Actually I agree that the question as worded is not very difficult, and the answer is "yes," as illustrated by Cassius Longinus' decision to act in regard to Julius Caesar even as an avowed Epicurean.
But there is a lot of toughness that comes in as Don says when he says "it's all about context." And also that's another way of saying "Justified to whom?" Justified to the police or the courts? Justified to the dead man's family? Justified to god? Justified as not being a breach of some contention of absolute justice? Justified to Epicurus as a person? You'd have to know more facts to be able to give a thorough opinion on whether the deed was "justified" in the sense that you will reward and honor and respect the killer in the future, or whether you will hold him in disrepute and disrespect and want nothing to do with the killer in the future.
And I think that's the real question Kalosyni is asking. If we reword it as "Is there a "flat" rule against killing another human being in all circumstances?" It seems to me that that pretty clearly is answerable under Epicurean philosophy as "No - there is no flat absolute rule against all killing of human beings in all circumstances." Then you have to get into all the details of the repercussions in terms of punishment and regret and remorse (if any) after that, where the issues are very tough.
Here, he seems to expresses the idea that grateful recollections have played an important role in the old man having 'come to anchor' in life, suggesting again that by way of gratitude one can find peace of mind.
But before I go off to much further on the details, re-reading your original post I presume what you are doing is looking to identify pleasures that are accessible and longer-lasting and looking at ways to cultivate those rather than moment to moment stimulations and excitements. Just thought again I would be clear and say that that is a very desirable search and something to explore and write at length about, no matter what labels we put on it.
PS. I should have read further down before replying
You raise some interesting points.
Another part of the problem is that "stable" implies "good" while "transitory" implies "less good than stable."
But if the word kinetic means anything at all, is it not associated with "motion" or "moveo" / movement in Cicero's wording? Yes you can have motion that is "smooth," and long-lasting, and surely that is a more desirable kind of pleasure than a pleasure that last less long and is more "rough." I would think all of us probably agree that a pleasure that is smooth and longer-lasting is more desirable than a pleasure that is not.
Is that all that is in issue? Then we could just say "a pleasure that is smooth and longer-lasting is more desirable than a pleasure that is not."
Is something else in issue? If it is, then I'm not yet convinced I have a clue as to what that issue is, because it's surely not a distinction between mental vs physical, which is another point on which I think all of us agree. Maybe there is some issue of "confidence" that is "unshakeable" and stays with us for a really long time due to our philosophical conclusions, but if so, again, I'd assert that everyone would be better off being clear about that in one's own language.
Emily Austin, Chapter 4 Footnote 8:
This is a non-specialist text, so I have chosen not to wade into the dispute about katastematic and kinetic pleasures in the body of the text. A specialist will recognize that I am adopting a view roughly in line with Gosling and Taylor (1982) and Arenson (2019). On my reading, katastematic pleasures are sensory pleasures that issue from confidence in one’s ability to satisfy one’s necessary desires and an awareness of one’s healthy psychological functioning; choice-worthy kinetic pleasures are the various pleasures consistent with maintaining healthy functioning, and those pleasures vary, but do not increase healthy psychological functioning.
You'll note that Dr. Austin is saying that katastematic pleasures are also "sensory," which is in itself a sort of wading into the issue, as many of the writers who advocate katastematic pleasures as better than kinetic either expressly or implicitly take the position that katastematic pleasures are not "sensory" at all.
There's that same problem again -- sensation would appear to go along with kinetic, and yet if katastematic pleasures are non-sensory, as some advocate, then what's the use of something you can't sense? The real problem in my view is that a lot of people want to overaly "absence of pain" as meaning "katastematic pleasure" rather than accepting the repeatedly asserted position that "absence of pain" is just another term for "pleasure" of any type.
And thus you trigger my latest list of cites:
- Epicurus PD03 : ”The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once .“
- Epicurus Letter to Menoeceus : ”By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul.“
- Diogenes Laertius X-34 : ”The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined.“
- On Ends Book One, 30 : ”Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?
- On Ends Book One, 38 : Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“
- On Ends Book One, 39 : For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.
- On Ends Book One, 56 : By this time so much at least is plain, that the intensest pleasure or the intensest annoyance felt in the mind exerts more influence on the happiness or wretchedness of life than either feeling, when present for an equal space of time in the body. We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain. [57] But as we are elated by the blessings to which we look forward, so we delight in those which we call to memory. Fools however are tormented by the recollection of misfortunes; wise men rejoice in keeping fresh the thankful recollection of their past blessings. Now it is in the power of our wills to bury our adversity in almost unbroken forgetfulness, and to agreeably and sweetly remind ourselves of our prosperity. But when we look with penetration and concentration of thought upon things that are past, then, if those things are bad, grief usually ensues, if good, joy.
- On Ends Book One, 62 : But these doctrines may be stated in a certain manner so as not merely to disarm our criticism, but actually to secure our sanction. For this is the way in which Epicurus represents the wise man as continually happy; he keeps his passions within bounds; about death he is indifferent; he holds true views concerning the eternal gods apart from all dread; he has no hesitation in crossing the boundary of life, if that be the better course. Furnished with these advantages he is continually in a state of pleasure, and there is in truth no moment at which he does not experience more pleasures than pains. For he remembers the past with thankfulness, and the present is so much his own that he is aware of its importance and its agreeableness, nor is he in dependence on the future, but awaits it while enjoying the present; he is also very far removed from those defects of character which I quoted a little time ago, and when he compares the fool’s life with his own, he feels great pleasure. And pains, if any befall him, have never power enough to prevent the wise man from finding more reasons for joy than for vexation.
- On Ends Book Two, 9 : Cicero: “…[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same thing as 'pleasure.'” Torquatus: “Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be.”
- On Ends, Book Two, 11: Cicero: Still, I replied, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for he moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?” Torquatus: “Absolutely the same, indeed the negation of pain is a very intense pleasure, he most intense pleasure possible.”
- On Ends Book Two, 16 : “This, O Torquatus, is doing violence to one's senses; it is wresting out of our minds the understanding of words with which we are imbued; for who can avoid seeing that these three states exist in the nature of things: first, the state of being in pleasure; secondly, that of being in pain; thirdly, that of being in such a condition as we are at this moment, and you too, I imagine, that is to say, neither in pleasure nor in pain; in such pleasure, I mean, as a man who is at a banquet, or in such pain as a man who is being tortured. What! do you not see a vast multitude of men who are neither rejoicing nor suffering, but in an intermediate state between these two conditions? No, indeed, said he; I say that all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too. Do you, then, say that the man who, not being thirsty himself, mingles some wine for another, and the thirsty man who drinks it when mixed, are both enjoying the same pleasure?”
As to how the fact of coexistence of pleasure and pain existing in different parts of experience do no contradict PD03:
- Epicurus to Idomeneus, Diogenes Laertius: On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could increase them; but I set above them all the gladness of mind at the memory of our past conversations. But I would have you, as becomes your lifelong attitude to me and to philosophy, watch over the children of Metrodorus.
- Lucretius Book 3 line 98: “Thus often the body, which is clear to see, is sick, when, all the same we feel pleasure in some other hidden part; and contrariwise it happens that the reverse often comes to be in turn, when one wretched in mind feels pleasure in all his body; in no other wise than if, when a sick man’s foot is painful, all the while, may be, his head is in no pain. Moreover, when the limbs are given up to soft sleep, and the heavy body lies slack and senseless, yet there is something else in us, which at that very time is stirred in many ways, and admits within itself all the motions of joy and baseless cares of heart.”
I'll offer up an example: a guy goes to a football game and cheers with glee when his team scores the touchdown, only to sulk minutes later when the other team scores the touchdown. This is kinetic pleasure: externally generated and (relatively) unstable.
Later he writes gratefully about his fun experience at the game in his journal, which generates a warm glow within that stays with him the rest of the night. This is katastematic pleasure: internally generated and (relatively) stable.
My guess, anyway.
This is where Don't research into the Greek is eventually going to help us out of this cave, in my view, because we are eventually going to latch on to what "kinetic" really includes (almost every kind of mental and physical pleasure) and then it will be easier to decide whether what's left is in fact usefully described as "katastematic."
It has been too long since I read the Gosling & Taylor "The Greeks on Pleasure" but they spilled a *lot* of ink on this issue. The trouble is that *kinetic* does tend to imply "in motion" and *katastematic* implies .... something else.
The distinction you raise in your example between the two types of pleasurable experiences - "touchdowns vs gratefulness" - certainly exists. No one in his right mind would say that they are exactly the same, or that both are not enjoyable.
Part of the problem is that *duration* alone does not appear to be the distinction implied in K/K discussions, nor is duration the deciding factor in which pleasures to value. Epicurus says explicitly we do NOT value exclusively by duration in the letter to Menoeceus as to the food we choose at a banquet and the type of life we should seek. We want the "most pleasant" and not the "longest."
And for someone who might want to assert that duration is the key, I would ask them - What is the magic line between stable and unstable? Does a minute or an hour or a day or a week or a year qualify as "stable"?
You will see in Emily Austin's footnote on this topic that she goes with Gosling & Taylor that this issue may be interesting but not crucial to analysis (I will see if I can find her exact wording).
Definitely there are many types of pleasures, and definitely some last longer than others, and definitely some are mental and some are physical, and definitely some are easier to access than others. All those factors seem indisputably important. But is it correct to overlay the word "kastematic" over some rather than others? That's a much tougher question.
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