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As we mentioned tonight in our Wednesday discussion, Diogenes Laertius says that according to Epicurus or the Epicureans:
[118] And even if the wise man be put on the rack, he is happy.
So next week as we continue to discuss these issues we will want to revisit whether we agree with Cicero's expecting that happiness for an Epicurean is something that is always under our control.
Episode 214 of the Lucretius Today Podcast Is now available. Today we take up Cicero's challenges that friendship cannot be friendship if it can be terminated for advantage, and happiness cannot be happiness if it is not completely under our control and we have the possibility of losing it.
Another note while editing:
We have previously pointed out by referencing Philebus and Seneca that the anti-Epicureans argue that pleasure cannot be the goal of life because it has no limit - it can allegedly (when viewed in non-Epicurean terms) be made better by the addition of "more."
In this section of the text, Cicero makes a related argument: pleasure cannot be the basis of happiness because a man cannot be truly happy if he is constantly concerned about losing his happiness. In other words, since happiness allegedly cannot be "permanent," then we need to be constantly afraid of losing it, so the Epicurean cannot be truly happy because he is constantly afraid.
I don't think we've done enough to treat that argument, and I think it jumps out at you when you think about it that this is a large part of what PD04 (there are others, but especially PDO4) is all about:
PD04. Pain does not last continuously in the flesh, but the acutest pain is there for a very short time, and even that which just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh does not continue for many days at once. But chronic illnesses permit a predominance of pleasure over pain in the flesh.
This observation, combined with the observation that seeing pleasure broadly as both stimulative *and* non-stimulative activities (seeing it broadly as "absence of pain") is how (as Torquatus says) the wise man is always going to have more reason for joy than for vexation.
CIcero stating the issue for us in this way is, and alleging the Epicureans are wrong in thinking that we can be confident of remaining until death in a condition of more pleasure than pain, is extremely helpful I think.
I am concerned that I am reading these sections of Cicero a little too quickly than they deserve to be read, especially at the beginning of the episode, but once you get past that into our discussion I think there is some extremely helpful material in this episode.
His grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, was positively Lucretian in his allegiances. Charles seems to have adopted a number of Epicurean propositions from his grandfather, but he did not identify as an explicit Epicurean or Lucretian in the tradition of the Garden.
So Charles Darwin's grandfather was heavily engaged with Lucretius but Charles Darwin himself stated that he had not read Lucretius. Ok so he didn't sit down and "read" the book but presumably he was aware of his grandfather's activities? Or is it possible they were estranged? Not sure that this makes much difference but kind of weird nonetheless.
Elli posted this video and her commentary on the Facebook Group today:
Today I noticed this video at youtube that is created by a lady who is philosophized and she is introduced her self (in a comment below) as a "neoplatonist". So, I left to her a comment based on Epicurus and his philosophy, and for the purpose to make some things more CLEAR.
<<Hello, dear lady. I am an epicurean-greek lady, and I have noticed somewhere that you wrote: "Ninon de Lenclos (1620, Paris - 1705) and her libertine approach - according to the famous hedonist thinker Epicurus of Samos - to a new philosophy of love".
Hold on a second dear, Epicurus was not a hedonist thinker as introduced by the many. Epicurus was not a hunter of all the pleasures/hedones. Since, we read in his epistle to Meneoceus the following important excerpt:
<<And since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time. Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided. Yet by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good>>.
As for "romantic love", imo, is to love the IDEA of love (similar to Platos' world of IDEAS) and not the love that exists in reality of life with such thoughts and actions, and is balanced when is based on the MUTUAL BENEFIT, that is the balance to offer and taking pleasurable activities and things i.e. to share time and all goods that have quality and are called as values. E.g. the greatest value - good for Epicurus is friendship "φιλία" and this word is synonym with the word "αγάπη" i.e. LOVE - any kind of LOVE.
When any relationship is based on friendship ( love ) includes such gifts as : TRUST, CARE, HONESTY, and PRUDENCE, and prudence is higher than philosophy (as Epicurus said) that is the root of all virtues, and these choices- virtues are the means that are leading to a pleasurable living i.e. Eudaemonia that is the goal of all greek philosophers.
Pleasure/hedone, for Epicurus, and as long as pleasure exists, it means to not have agitation in the mind and pain in the body.
As for Ninon that claims that any romantic love is based on hypocricy she got used on this in accordance with the circumstances of her life to have company with all hypocrites and kings. Moreover, when someone proclaims that any kind of love is based on hypocricy, it is the same that when someone fears death in anticipation. Ninon fears love in anticipation, because she hung back and did not want to run risks to offer herself without hesitation, since she had in mind that men loved her because she was very beautiful. We see beauty sometimes is a curse and not a bless. But anyway, the hesitation of Ninon and her claims that "romantic love" is based on hypocricy, it is similar with the following saying on friendship, by Epicurus.
VS 28. We must not approve either those who are always ready for friendship, or those who hang back, but for friendship’s sake we must run risks.
And finally we have the epicurean Lucretius that was against the IDEALISM and the IDEA of love as introduced by Plato. But I see, that somewhere you claim that you are a "neoplatonist" and at the sametime your're introducing to the public Ninon de Lenclos as an epicurean? This leads to confusion my dear, and thank you very much!
From Lucretius DRN 4.1278-1287. [...And not through divine effect and the arrows of Venus it sometimes happens that a woman of inferior form is loved (i.e a woman that is not so beautiful like a mannequin). For sometimes a woman herself brings it about through her own actions and compliant ways (morigerique modis) and neatly groomed body that she easily accustoms you to live your life with her. For the rest, familiarity creates love (amor); for that which is beaten by a frequent blow, however lightly, yet after long lapse of time is conquered and gives way. Do you not also see that drops of water falling onto rocks after long lapse of time beat through the rocks ?...]>>
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He closes mentioning lack of "feeling" and then lack of "hope"
We come now to the final test of these systems in their application to that feeling of Hope which is native and imperishable in man, and to that cheerful and beneficent working that should realize the hopes of Humanity. It may fitly characterize the system of Lucretius to say, there is no hope in it; and it was a fitting commentary on such a system that he who framed it, seeing nothing to live for and nothing to hope for, should end his life by his own hand. Not that I would charge the suicide of Lucretius as a crime upon his system or himself. So far from being put under the ban of priestly superstition, or the more mercenary ban of Life Insurance companies, the suicide should be looked upon with a tender, even sacred pity, as the victim of mental or moral disease. Yet when Lucretius was so tempted, we find in his system nothing of the hope that could have restrained the hand which had written “alter death there will remain no self”—that is no conscious personality-—and “no one wakes up upon whom the chill cessation of life has once come.." Thus we see this proud master of the material universe succumbing to the fate that befalls his atoms.
And then winds up for the close:
But the scheme of Lucretius admits of no expansion. It is shut down within its own horizon—rather it is shut up within a cavern of endless gloom, where those who enter must bid farewell to Hope. The scheme of Paul has made peoples wiser and better in the degree that they have accepted it; it wants but to be accepted in its completeness, to ll the world with light and peace and joy. It carries in itself the future of all poetry and prophecy, and they who teach it are messengers of gladness and joy. But how can the followers of Lucretius exult in such a system‘? Does the physician put on airs of mirth and exultation when he tells his patient there is no hope? Yet this message of despair is what the priests of Materialism bring from the arcana of nature. One would think they would go forth in sackcloth and ashes, with inverted torches, to the grave of all things. Against a nature of such origin and end, I pit my own manhood, and do not fear the issue. Would I cherish the tender, graceful sentiment of gratitude? then must I follow Paul, and not Lucretius. Would I yield to the noble impulses of patriotism? then must l follow Paul, and not Lucretius. Would I rise to the magnanimous heights of philanthropy? then must I follow Paul, and not Lucretius. Would I help Mankind in their sorrows, deliver them from their superstitions, raise them from their sins? then must l follow Paul, and not Lucretius. Would I lift myself and my race to immortal hopes? then must I drop Lucretius, and follow Paul to the life everlasting.
Thompson goes on at length on pages 25 - 30 about gratitude, and alleges that it would have no part in a Lucretian view of things. It is interesting to consider that Epicurus wrote to the effect that we should be grateful to nature and had other things to say about gratitude, as if Epicurus understood that gratitude was an issue that had to be addressed.
He then mentions patriotism as being impossible, even though Epicurus mentioned those who were "enemies of Hellas" and his whole system of "friendship" can be extended to social groups.
He then mentions philanthropy, and even mention's the opening of book 2 of the poem as totally inconsistent with philanthropy! We've dealt with that before and this shows the need to be uncompromising on it 
Oh give me a break - this is why Epicurus warned against poets and he probably should have warned explicitly against hallucinogenic drugs too!
There is a certain grandeur and beauty in these conceptions, and l confess that when first I had mastered Lucretius, I felt a touch of awe at the majesty of a soul thus blindly bowing to its fate, and Samson-like dragging down men and gods together in its own destruction. But as I looked upon such a universe, in which destruction is the ever-recurring law, and death alone is immortal, from this background of darkness and despair, I saw rise before
me that marvelous vision of Wordsworth;“In my mind’s eye a temple, like a cloud
Slowly surmounting some invidious hill
Rose out of darkness: the bright work stood still;
And might of its own beauty have been proud,
But it was fashioned, and to God was vowed
By virtues that ditfused, in every part,
Spirit divine through forms of human art;
Faith had her arch - her arch when winds blow loud,
Into the consciousness of safety thrilled;
And Love her towers of dread foundation laid
Under the grave of things; Hope had her spire
Star-high, and pointing still to something higher;
Trembling I gazed, but heard a voice,-—it said,
Hell-gates are powerless Phantoms when we build.”
This is why Epicureans can't ignore canonics and can't rely solely on superficial statements about "the senses" without explaining how reasoning based on the senses works:
We must now keep in mind how strongly Lucretius insists that “from the senses first proceeded the knowledge of the true, and the senses can not be refuted.” Yet he here assumes several successive stages of motion by the impact of bodies before either body or motion becomes cognizable by the senses. That is, for the foundation of his atomic theory he reasons back from the seen to the unseen: — the reasoning may be valid, but the existence of the atom is not attested by the senses. Yet now-a-days, to reason from the seen to the unseen, from phenomena to cause, from adaptation to intelligence, is forsooth made an offense in the metaphysician, though Lucretius arrived at his atom by deduction, and then assumed the atom as the basis of his materialistic universe! Next, having inferred the motion of invisible atoms from the perceived motion of visible particles, he makes the bold assumption of self-originated motion for the first-beginnings. This is sheer assertion, since his senses had shown him only motion by impact, and neither the senses nor logic could derive from this motion without “blows” to start it.
Lot's could be said about this following paragraph - most of it negative. This is what Frances wright attacks under the name "imagination" -
For the constitution of a material universe, it is true that matter and space or body and void are alike essential, and so .far as we know are all; but the question is, whether the material universe is all; and that question cannot be settled by purely physical observation upon the nature of bodies or the contents of space. That incessant striving of man’s nature after something above and beyond, a striving that grows the more impatient with his mastery over nature and his accumulating stores of knowledge;—— that mighty unrest in which a Prometheus, a Lucifer, a Faust are but projected types of our inner selves—the unrest that urges man on to think the unthinkable and to know the unknowable — that makes poetry, philosophy, music so much higher and worthier representations of humanity than the recorded observation of phenomena - what is this but an attestation of that “third thing” that Lucretius could not feel nor see, but that Paul had attained to when he spoke of “body, soul and spirit,” and found not only a third element in the constitution of man and of the universe, but also a “third heaven” in which spirit might abide?
Ok I cannot resist getting started. Thompson seems very admiring of Lucretius, and his extended discussion of how Lucretius is using the deductive method about atoms that have been and never will be seen by the unaided eye emphasizes the point that DeWitt makes, that Epicurus and Lucretius were not strict "empiricists" as that term is often used.
Now, the point I make, and would insist upon, is, that these were not lucky guesses or coincidences of Lucretius, but results of the deductive method to which scientific materialism is compelled to do homage by its own discoveries. But remarkable as are these correspondences of experimental physics and chemistry with the atomic theory, the atom itself is simply assumed. It never has been, and never can be, brought within the range of the senses.
The atomic theory is evidenced by experiments as to atomic weights, volume, heat, and combining capacity, and as to isomerism, and chemical molecules and homogeneity; but the theory is still stoutly contested by some, and the very existence of the atom is disputed by others.3) Yet we are called upon to accept the materialistic doctrine of the universe, and to receive nothing as knowledge which does not come to us through the senses, while forsooth the foundation of this sensible universe lies utterly beyond the senses, is not at all a physical fact that any one has seen or handled, but a theoretical deduction, an assumption of the mind to explain facts that are seen. Let the atomic theory have all due acceptance as an ingenious and subtile theory, but let it not be thrust upon us as a dogma by a hierarchy of physicists —— which, in the name of human freedom, is as much to be resisted and detested as an ecclesiastical hierarchy. Most heartily and gratefully do I welcome all facts ascertained by physical science; nor do I see, upon theistic grounds, any solid objection to the nebular hypothesis, the atomic theory, the doctrine of the correlation of forces, or of natural selection. But should all these be established upon the physical basis of experimental observation, I pray men of science to be honest enough to own that it was not physics but Metaphysics that first suggested and sought to demonstrate them, each and all. Materialism can not repudiate its own parentage; can not steal the name of Lucretius and scorn his method. Materialism was begotten not of Nature, but of Mind through metaphysics.
Thank you Don! that looks to be fascinating! i am not going to be able to read it tonight so if others get a chance before I do please let us know if you think it is a worthwhile read!
In the process of editing this episode I want to call out an interesting aspect of the discussion:
Joshua makes the point that, like Justice, friendship arises through natural experience over time. We brought that up initially on the point that some Epicureans argued that friendship arises from advantages, but changes over time. However I want to pursue another aspect of the analogy, insofar as it may shed light on the question: From the Epicurean perspective, does "friendship" necessarily mean "to the death"? We need to consider not only the question as to whether every friendship should mean that we should die for that friend (most of us would probably say "of course not"). But we also need to consider the general question: "Is it ever appropriate to terminate a friendship? Under what conditions?
PD37 and PD38 go on at great length to explain how, when circumstances change and mutual advantage no longer exists, justice itself no longer exists. Should we take by analogy that when mutual advantage of friendship no longer exists, that friendship also can or should terminate?
I think we tend to underestimate the implications of PD37 and PD38, as we find it very hard not to "deify" justice and think that justice has a life of its own and should never be terminate or violated, despite what PD37 and PD38 say.
Do we have the same problem with friendship? Are we seduced by Cicero's examples of Orestes and others that if we are not willing to die for a friend then we are not true friends at all?
This possibility of terminating friendship when advantage changes seems to be at the heart of Cicero's attacks on Epicurean friendship, so attractive as Cicero's romantic notions might be (as to both friendship and justice) is Epicurus telling us to be ruthlessly practical and not to consider either justice or friendship to exist when the mutual advantage is no longer there?
I think we have here a very interesting question to unwind. Our discussion in the episode should be helpful, but is by no means the last word.
...the areas of active pleasure in my body have been limited to specific places and to specific times. Most of the time, most parts of my body are not feeling [stimulative] pleasure.
My response to that would be that your view of pleasure is incomplete. If you are alive and aware of anything at all, what you are aware of is pleasure or pain. Stimulative pleasure is only one type of pleasure, and all other experiences of life which are not stimulative and not painful are also pleasure.
So when you say "Most of the time, most parts of my body are not feeling [stimulative] pleasure," what you are saying is that most of the time most parts of your body are not feeling either pain or stimulative pleasure. But you have not completed the description: it is right and proper to label what those parts of your body *are* feeling at those times as pleasure.
Bryan your last comment is exactly what I just sat down to post about. Some people seem to have a problem with "absence of pain" because they refuse to separate out the parts of the body, which you just pointed out is important to consider. They want to say that "I" am in pain whenever their foot or their stomach hurts, as if there is some abstract "I" that is the sum of all the separate feelings from all the separate parts of the body and mind, and that they should ignore the entire rest of their mind and body that is not in pain.
While we do have a consciousness that can shift its awareness from one part of the body to another, or to multiple parts at once, when we are talking about pleasure and pain we are really talking about the parts of the mind or body that are involved, and we are considering the duration and intensity of those pleasures in the different locations.
We can have a headache, but our little finger at the same time is not in pain. Epicurus is telling us to think about the big picture but not to lose sight of the fact that you can do more than one thing at once. Just like Epicurus did at the end, you can offset the pleasures of thinking about pleasant things against the pains in other parts of the mind and body. You can't erase the pains from existence by doing so, and if they hurt bad enough then you're definitely going to feel it, but you can offset them against each other when evaluating your overall existence.
I would say that the point Epicurus seems to be getting at is that we are not some disembodied "unit" where we are either "in pleasure" or "in pain" as a unit. We are real living things with different parts of our minds and bodies, and just because our little finger is hurting that does not mean that our entire existence is controlled by that pain.
This comes to mind too because this is covered in why "absence of pain" is not a "fancy pleasure" (Elayne's term in her article). A peanut without salt is a peanut. Any specific pleasure without accompanying pain is still that same specific pleasure - not something new. When we stipulate that someone is experiencing life "without any pain," what we mean is that the person is experiencing life - the same combination of pleasurable experiences that existed before that last unit of pain was removed - not entering some kind of state of transcendental ecstacy or euphoria.
I think your bringing this up is extremely helpful both to the "Bursting the Gate" article and Elayne's "Pleasure Pain and Happiness" article. The Bursting the Gate article focuses more on what Epicurus/ Torquatus "were" saying, and the "Pleasure Pain and Happiness" which argues against "Fancy Pleasure" is focusing more on what Epicurus "was not" saying.
Both perspectives require this understanding that "absence of pain" doesn't mean the creation of some new type of experience. If I recall correctly, this is where Gosling and Taylor end up in their long article on katastematic pleasure in "The Greeks On Pleasure." There are definitely all sorts of mental and physical pleasures, but "absence of pain" does not constitute a pleasure of its own unique type. There are numberless types of pleasures and pains, but in the end we come back to the understanding that there are only two feelings, pleasure and pain, and "absence of pain" is just another term for "pleasure." Epicureans reason by analogy from their own experience to those things which have not yet been observed by them, they don't let loose of reality and all of a sudden then that getting to 0% pain transports us to another dimension (as implied by those who talk in low voices about "absence of pain" in a Buddhist-like sense).
Both "pleasure" and "absence of pain" can be used to describe the same numberless set of ordinary agreeable experiences with which we are all familiar, and neither describe any separate and special experience that is outside the term "pleasure" and available only to the gods, or available only to the person who hypothetically reaches a state of "total absence of pain." As I think we've discussed on the forum before, there's no reason at all to think that there is a major change in condition between the person who is experiencing 99.9% pleasure / .01% pain and the person who is experiencing 100% pleasure and 00% pain.
Almost four years later, I still think this is one of the most useful articles on the website, so today I added it to the "Articles" section where it will be easier to find. I see this is one of the most-read articles on the website, and as I read it today it still strikes me as a very good summary of where I think most of us are on this topic.
I also added this note below to Elayne's footnote five. I would have to go back through this thread to see what I was thinking at the time, and so far I haven't been able to figure out whether we ended up agreeing after discussing the issues. But no matter where we ended up in the past conversations, I am footnoting the final article so it will be clear that I think Elayne was correct in the comment to which she notes me as objecting:
02/12/24 Admin Edit From Cassius: Today I am reposting this article to the "Articles" section, and in seeing this footnote it appears to me that Elayne is correct about this. I will go on record now that I think Elayne's comments here are correct, and that she is stating the Epicurean position based on what Torquatus explains in On Ends Book 2: If we are aware of anything at all, that awareness is either pleasurable or painful.
I would like to propose that by thinking through the idea that "the highest pleasure is the absence of pain" will provide some insight into the sense of discontent that is at play in this situation and provide an opportunity to develop contentment rather than be driven by compulsion.
If that works for you I would say more power to you.
As for me, I see hypotheticals like that, no matter how intricate they are made, as all boiling down to questions that are solved by looking to VS71 and following this guidance: "Every desire must be confronted by this question: What will happen to me if the object of my desire is accomplished, and what if it is not?"
As far as "absence of pain" goes, for me that's mainly a statement that expands the definition of pleasure and tells me that the best I can hope for in life is as much pleasure accompanied by as little pain as possible. The pleasure that comes from eating chocolate is not necessarily more or less pleasurable than the extra time I might have laying in bed staring at the ceiling at the nursing home if I keep my blood sugar under control for a longer period. That may be an extreme example but to state it more neutrally, the pleasure of health that comes from eating low-carb/keto is not necessarily greater than the pleasure that comes from eating a more sugary diet.
Posing stark examples helps make the questions more clear. Is it necessarily so that living a longer number of years (which might occur if you eat a lean and hungry diety) always and for everyone better than living a shorter life while eating the "standard American diet"? Yes it's better in terms of the physical health of the body, if that is your *only* measure of "better," but I don't think anyone can persuasively maintain that Epicurus would say (or we should think) that the "health of the body" is the only thing in play. Would or should *everyone* choose to eat a "cave-man" diet in order to live a longer number of days?
I always turn back to the letter to Menoeceus for what I think is most persuasive on that point:
[126] But the many at one moment shun death as the greatest of evils, at another (yearn for it) as a respite from the (evils) in life. (But the wise man neither seeks to escape life) nor fears the cessation of life, for neither does life offend him nor does the absence of life seem to be any evil. And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant.
So yes I think that "absence of pain" is they key to a proper understanding of the full nature of pleasure, so that we understand that sensory stimulation is not all that we live for. But the expanded definition of pleasure still does not tell anyone which particular pleasures to pursue in life, so we have to decide what is our own best mix of mental and bodily experiences, based on what we find to be "most pleasant." And I don't think there is a universal right and wrong answer to the question of "what" is most pleasant, as that is something each person feels uniquely for himself.
Some new ideas after reading this: "Absence of pain is the highest pleasure" is different than saying something like: "any pleasure without pain is the best kind of pleasure we can experience".
This is another point. I don't think it makes any sense given the rest of Epicurean physics and epistemology to conclude that when Epicurus spoke of "the highest pleasure" he was speaking of a single particular experience such as sex, or eating, or anything else that is a specific activity. Sex with whom? Eating what? Listening to what kind of music? Who other than ourselves is to say that listening to Bach is more pleasant to us than listening to Beethoven?
Epicurus talks about the man at the banquet choosing food that is "the most pleasant" rather than the greatest quantity. I think we can apply that reasoning to the entire subject. When we speak of pleasure we speak of agreeableness, but exactly what kind of agreeableness is going to be personal to the individual living thing that is experiencing it. There are no Platonic ideals in any other aspect of life, and I don't think there is a Platonic ideal of "the highest pleasure" that fits everyone exactly the same way. Pleasure is ultimately a feeling and feelings aren't abstractions that can be stated in a precise mathematical or verbal formula. To employ one of the phrases we posted about recently: All models are 'wrong,' in that they are not the exact equivalent of the reality that they seek to describe, but some models (like "absence of pain") are useful, in that they help us understand how to target a goal.
Both of these last comments by Kalosyni show to me how much there is to think through on these questions:
1 - *We* might consider that Cicero's choice of Torquatus as spokesman undermines Epicurus, but I would say that would mainly come from the preexisting mindset that we have, based on years of commentators drumming on "absence of pain" without explaining it the way Torquatus did. In the modern world they have created a drumbeat that Epicurus must have been a neoBuddhist, and anyone who says so is wrong -- even if the person who says so was taught by Epicurean teachers, had many Epicurean friends, was writing to a significantly Epicurean audience, and had a greater command of the source materials of Greek philosophy than we today will ever hope to have. Cicero likely felt just the opposite - that by using Torquatus as spokesman he was granting to Epicurean philosophy a vigor that he did not think that it had. These attitudes are a problem that can' be worked through overnight, and getting to the appreciation of how much Cicero knew in relation to how much we know takes a strong dose of humility.
2 - Many of these phrases have multiple meanings from multiple perspectives. What is stated here in (2) could be one of them, especially if you're stuck in a rut from failing to have properly understood and implemented Epicurean philosophy in the past. But if you've failed to the point where you are at such a point of desperation, you probably better question whether your latest insight is any better than the failed insights that got you where you are. Sometimes when you have dug yourself into a ditch of asceticism, the first thing to do might be to stop digging rather than seek justification for what you've already dug!
