Posts by Cassius

**ΟΥΚ EΣTΙΝ ΗΔEΩΣ ΖΗΝ ****AΝEΥ TΟΥ ΦΡΟΝΙΜΩΣ ****ΚAΙ ΚAΛΩΣ**

**ΚAΙ ΔΙΚAΙΩΣ ****[ΟΥΔE ΦΡΟΝΙΜΩΣ ****ΚAΙ ΚAΛΩΣ ****ΚAΙ ΔΙΚAΙΩΣ] **

**AΝEΥ TΟΥ ΗΔEΩΣ·**** ΟTῼ Δ' EN TΟΥTΩN ΜΗ ΥΠAΡΧEΙ ****ΟION**

**ΖΗΝ ΦΡΟΝΙΜΩΣ ****KAI ΚAΛΩΣ ****KAI ΔΙΚAΙΩΣ ΥΠAΡΧEΙ ****OΥΧ**

**EΣTΙ TΟΥTΟΝ ΗΔEΩΣ ΖΗΝ. **

"It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently, honorably, and justly, [nor again to live a life of prudence, honor, and justice] without living pleasantly. And the man who does not possess the pleasant life is not living prudently, honorably, and justly, [and the man who does not possess the virtuous life] cannot possibly live pleasantly." Epicurus PD5 (Bailey)

“It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently, and honourably, and justly; nor to live prudently, and honourably, and justly, without living pleasantly. But to whom it does not happen to live prudently, honourably, and justly cannot possibly live pleasantly.” Yonge (1853)

“It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and well and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the man does not live wisely, though he lives well and justly, it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life.” Hicks (1910)

“It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and well and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the man is not able to live wisely, though he lives well and justly, it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life.” Hicks (1925)

“It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honourably and justly, [nor again to live a life of prudence, honour, and justice] without living pleasantly. And the man who does not possess the pleasant life, is not living prudently and honourably and justly, [and the man who does not possess the virtuous life], cannot possibly live pleasantly.” Bailey (1926)

“It is impossible to live pleasurably without living according to reason, honor and justice, nor to live according to reason, honor, and justice without living pleasurably….” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 184, 246 (1954)

“It is impossible to live pleasantly without living prudently, well, and justly, (and to live prudently, well, and justly) without living pleasantly. Even though a man live well and justly, it is not possible for him to live pleasantly if he lacks that from which stems the prudent life.” Geer (1964)

“It is impossible to live a pleasantly without living prudently, well, and justly, nor is it possible to live prudently, well, and justly without living pleasantly. The man for whom this latter condition is impossible cannot live prudently, well, or justly; he for whom the former is impossible, cannot live pleasantly.” O'Connor (1993)

“It is impossible to live pleasantly without living prudently, honourably, and justly and impossible to live prudently, honourably, and justly without living pleasantly. And whoever lacks this cannot live pleasantly.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“It is impossible to live pleasantly without living wisely and honorably and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and honorably and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is lacking (when, for instance, one is not able to live wisely, though he lives honorably and justly) it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life.” Anderson (2004)

“It is impossible to lead a pleasant life without leading a life that is prudent, proper, and just. Nor is it possible to live a life that is prudent, proper, and just without living a life that is pleasant. Whoever lacks [any one of] the above [elements of a good and pleasant life] cannot have a good life.” Makridis (2005)

“It is not possible to live joyously without also living wisely and beautifully and rightly, nor to live wisely and beautifully and rightly without living joyously; and whoever lacks this cannot live joyously.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“It is impossible to live the pleasant life without also living sensibly, nobly, and justly, and conversely it is impossible to live sensibly, nobly, and justly without living pleasantly. A person who does not have a pleasant life is not living sensibly, nobly, and justly, and conversely the person who does not have these virtues cannot live pleasantly.” Strodach (2012)

“It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently, honorably, and justly; nor can one live prudently, honorably, and justly without living pleasantly. Nor is it possible for the man who does not live prudently, though he may live honorably and justly, to live pleasantly.” Mensch (2018)

“It is not possible to live pleasantly without living wisely, honorably, and justly, [nor wisely, honorably, and justly] without living pleasantly; and for anyone who does not have that, {does not live wisely, honorably, and justly, does not have,} it is not possible for him to live pleasantly.” White (2021)

For Discussion in the Forum See: Doctrine 5 - It is not possible to live pleasantly without living...

“Pain does not abide continuously in the flesh, but in its extremity it is present only a very short time. That pain which only just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh, does not last many days. But long diseases have in them more that is pleasant than painful to the flesh.” Yonge (1853)

“Continuous pain does not last long in the flesh, and pain, if extreme, is present a very short time, and even that degree of pain which barely outweighs pleasure in the flesh does not occur for many days together. Illnesses of long duration even permit of an excess of pleasure over pain in the flesh.” Hicks (1910)

“Continuous pain does not last long in the flesh ; on the contrary, pain, if extreme, is present a very short time, and even that degree of pain which barely outweighs pleasure in the flesh does not last for many days together. Illnesses of long duration even permit of an excess of pleasure over pain in the flesh.” Hicks (1925) “Pain does not last continuously in the flesh, but the acutest pain is there for a very short time, and even that which just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh does not continue for many days at once. But chronic illnesses permit a predominance of pleasure over pain in the flesh.” Bailey (1926)

“Pain does not prevail continuously in the flesh but the peak of it is present for the briefest interval, and the pain that barely exceeds the pleasure in the flesh is not with us many days, while protracted illnesses have an excess of pleasure over pain in the flesh." De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 244 (1954)

“Continuous bodily suffering does not last long. Intense pain is very brief, and even pain that barely outweighs physical pleasure does not last many days. Long illnesses permit physical pleasures that are greater than the pain.” Geer (1964)

“Pain does not last continuously in the flesh: when acute it is there for a very short time, while the pain which just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh does not persist for many days; and chronic illnesses contain an excess of pleasure in the flesh over pain.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115 (1987)

“Pain does not dwell continuously in the flesh. Extreme pain is present but a very brief time, and that which barely exceeds bodily pleasure continues no more than a few days. But chronic illness allows greater pleasure than pain in the flesh. ” O'Connor (1993)

“The feeling of pain does not linger continuously in the flesh; rather, the sharpest is present for the shortest time, while what merely exceeds the feeling of pleasure in the flesh lasts only a few days. And diseases which last a long time involve feelings of pleasure which exceed feelings of pain.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Continuous physical pain does not last long. Instead, extreme pain lasts only a very short time, and even less-extreme pain does not last for many days at once. Even protracted diseases allow periods of physical comfort that exceed feelings of pain.” Anderson (2004)

“What produces pain does not remain constantly in the body over a long period of time; it is rather that the maximal pain persists for the least span of time, and even that bodily pain which barely exceeds pleasure does not continue to happen for many days <in a row.> And, indeed, chronic illnesses themselves have an excess of what produces bodily pleasure over what is productive of pain.” Makridis (2005)

“Pain does not last continuously in the flesh; instead, the sharpest pain lasts the shortest time, a pain that exceeds bodily pleasure lasts only a few days, and diseases that last a long time involve delights that exceed their pains.” Saint-Andre (2008) “Bodily pain does not last continuously. The peak is present for a very brief period, and pains that barely exceed the state of bodily pleasure do not continue for many days. On the other hand, protracted illnesses show a balance of bodily pleasure over pain.” Strodach (2012)

“Pain does not last long in the flesh; in fact, extreme pain is present for the briefest time, while that which hardly outweighs pleasure does not last for many days. And illnesses that are prolonged may even afford the flesh more pleasure than pain.” Mensch (2018)

“Pain does not continue for long in the flesh. Rather, the most intense pain lasts the shortest time; any pain that exceeds pleasant feeling in the flesh does not last many days; and lengthy infrmities have more pleasant feeling in the flesh than pain.” White (2021)

“Pain does not abide continuously in the flesh, but in its extremity it is present only a very short time. That pain which only just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh, does not last many days. But long diseases have in them more that is pleasant than painful to the flesh.” Yonge (1853)

“Continuous pain does not last long in the flesh, and pain, if extreme, is present a very short time, and even that degree of pain which barely outweighs pleasure in the flesh does not occur for many days together. Illnesses of long duration even permit of an excess of pleasure over pain in the flesh.” Hicks (1910)

“Continuous pain does not last long in the flesh ; on the contrary, pain, if extreme, is present a very short time, and even that degree of pain which barely outweighs pleasure in the flesh does not last for many days together. Illnesses of long duration even permit of an excess of pleasure over pain in the flesh.” Hicks (1925) “Pain does not last continuously in the flesh, but the acutest pain is there for a very short time, and even that which just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh does not continue for many days at once. But chronic illnesses permit a predominance of pleasure over pain in the flesh.” Bailey (1926)

“Pain does not prevail continuously in the flesh but the peak of it is present for the briefest interval, and the pain that barely exceeds the pleasure in the flesh is not with us many days, while protracted illnesses have an excess of pleasure over pain in the flesh." De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 244 (1954)

“Continuous bodily suffering does not last long. Intense pain is very brief, and even pain that barely outweighs physical pleasure does not last many days. Long illnesses permit physical pleasures that are greater than the pain.” Geer (1964)

“Pain does not last continuously in the flesh: when acute it is there for a very short time, while the pain which just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh does not persist for many days; and chronic illnesses contain an excess of pleasure in the flesh over pain.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115 (1987)

“Pain does not dwell continuously in the flesh. Extreme pain is present but a very brief time, and that which barely exceeds bodily pleasure continues no more than a few days. But chronic illness allows greater pleasure than pain in the flesh. ” O'Connor (1993)

“The feeling of pain does not linger continuously in the flesh; rather, the sharpest is present for the shortest time, while what merely exceeds the feeling of pleasure in the flesh lasts only a few days. And diseases which last a long time involve feelings of pleasure which exceed feelings of pain.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Continuous physical pain does not last long. Instead, extreme pain lasts only a very short time, and even less-extreme pain does not last for many days at once. Even protracted diseases allow periods of physical comfort that exceed feelings of pain.” Anderson (2004)

“What produces pain does not remain constantly in the body over a long period of time; it is rather that the maximal pain persists for the least span of time, and even that bodily pain which barely exceeds pleasure does not continue to happen for many days <in a row.> And, indeed, chronic illnesses themselves have an excess of what produces bodily pleasure over what is productive of pain.” Makridis (2005)

“Pain does not last continuously in the flesh; instead, the sharpest pain lasts the shortest time, a pain that exceeds bodily pleasure lasts only a few days, and diseases that last a long time involve delights that exceed their pains.” Saint-Andre (2008) “Bodily pain does not last continuously. The peak is present for a very brief period, and pains that barely exceed the state of bodily pleasure do not continue for many days. On the other hand, protracted illnesses show a balance of bodily pleasure over pain.” Strodach (2012)

“Pain does not last long in the flesh; in fact, extreme pain is present for the briefest time, while that which hardly outweighs pleasure does not last for many days. And illnesses that are prolonged may even afford the flesh more pleasure than pain.” Mensch (2018)

“Pain does not continue for long in the flesh. Rather, the most intense pain lasts the shortest time; any pain that exceeds pleasant feeling in the flesh does not last many days; and lengthy infirmities have more pleasant feeling in the flesh than pain.” White (2021)

Dewitt commentary is below from page 244 of "Epicurus and His Philosophy." This comment is among DeWitt's rare criticisms of Epicurus, but more can be done with this, and we should be able to find Platonic doctrine of which PD04 would constitute a refutation (probably related to Platonic doctrine also being criticized in PD03).

For Discussion of this topic see: Doctrine 4 - Pain does not last continuously in the flesh...

Bailey: 3. The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once.

ΟΡΟΣ TΟΥ ΜEΓEΘΟΥΣ TΩΝ ΗΔΟΝΩΝ Η ΠAΝTΟΣ TΟΥ AΛΓΟΥΝTΟΣ ΥΠEΞAΙΡEΣΙΣ. ΟΠΟΥ Δ' AΝ TΟ ΗΔΟΜEΝΟΝ EΝῌ ΚAΘ' ΟΝ AΝ ΧΡΟΝΟΝ ῌ ΟΥΚ EΣTΙ TΟ AΛΓΟΥΝ Η ΛΥΠΟΥΜEΝΟΝ Η TΟ ΣΥΝAΜΦΟTEΡΟΝ.

“The limit of great pleasures is the removal of everything which can give pain. And where pleasure is, as long as it lasts, that which gives pain, or that which feels pain, or both of them, are absent.” Yonge (1853)

“The magnitude of pleasures is limited by the removal of all pain. Wherever there is pleasure, so long as it is present, there is no pain either of body or of mind or both.” Hicks (1910)

“The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all pain. When pleasure is present, so long as it is uninterrupted, there is no pain either of body or of mind or of both together.” Hicks (1925)

“The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body nor of mind, nor of both at once.” Bailey (1926)

“The removal of all pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. And wherever the experience of pleasure is present, so long as it prevails, there is no pain or distress or a combination of them.” De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 226, 241 (1954)

“The removal of all that causes pain marks the boundary of pleasure. Wherever pleasure is present and as long as it continues, there is neither suffering nor grieving nor both togethers.” Geer (1964)

“The removal of all pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, pain or distress or their combination is absent.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115 (1987)

“The limit of the extent of pleasure is the removal of all pain. Wherever pleasure is present, for however long a time, there can be no pain or grief, or both of these.” O'Connor (1993)

“The removal of all feeling of pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. Wherever a pleasurable feeling is present, for as long as it is present, there is neither a feeling of pain nor a feeling of distress, nor both together.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Pleasure reaches its maximum limit at the removal of all sources of pain. When such pleasure is present, for as long as it lasts, there is no cause of physical nor mental pain present – nor of both together.” Anderson (2004)

“Pleasure has its <upper> limit in the removal of everything that produces pain. For, wherever that which produces pleasure resides, for as long as it abides, there can be nothing that produces pain, grief, or both.” Makridis (2005)

“The limit of enjoyment is the removal of all pains. Wherever and for however long pleasure is present, there is neither bodily pain nor mental distress.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“The quantitative limit of pleasure is the elimination of all feelings of pain. Wherever the pleasurable state exists, there is neither bodily pain nor mental pain nor both together, so long as the state continues.” Strodach (2012)

“The limit of pleasure is reached with the removal of all pain. Whenever pleasure is present, and for however long, there is neither pain nor grief nor any combination of the two.” Mensch (2018)

“The limit to the magnitude of pleasures is the elimination of everything painful; and wherever there is pleasant feeling, so long as it lasts, there is no painful feeling or sorrow, or both together.” White (2021)

FURTHER COMMENTARY:

As to the first sentence of PD3:

See Page 226 of DeWitt's "Epicurus And His Philosophy"

As to "the limit of quantity of pleasure," Plato had previously asserted that pleasure has no limit:

Plato's Philebus 27(e):

Plato's Republic 586b (Book 9)

As to the second sentence of PD03, see DeWitt page 241:

For Discussion of this topic in the forum see: Doctrine 3 - The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal ...

Alternate Renderings

TΟ ΜAΚAΡΙΟΝ ΚAΙ AΦΘAΡTΟΝ ΟΥTE AΥTΟ ΠΡAΓΜATA EΧEΙ ΟΥTE AΛΛῼ ΠAΡEΧEΙ· ΩΣTE ΟΥTE ΟΡΓAΙΣ ΟΥTE ΧAΡΙΣΙ ΣΥΝEΧETAΙ· EΝ AΣΘEΝEΙ ΓAΡ ΠAΝ TΟ TΟΙΟΥTΟΝ.

"The blessed and immortal nature knows no trouble itself, nor causes trouble to any other, so that it is never constrained by anger or favor. For all such things exist only in the weak." Epicurus PD1 (Bailey)

“That which is happy and imperishable, neither has trouble itself, nor does it cause it to anything; so that it is not subject to feelings of either anger or gratitude; for these feelings only exist in what is weak.” Yonge (1853)

“The blessed and incorruptible has no toil or trouble of its own, and causes none to others. It is not subject either to anger or favour.” Wallace, Epicureanism 110 (1880)

“A blessed and eternal being has no trouble itself and brings no trouble upon any other being; hence it is exempt from movements of anger and favour, for every such movement implies weakness.” Hicks (1910)

“A happy and eternal being has no trouble himself and brings no trouble upon any other being ; hence he is exempt from movements of anger and partiality, for every such movement implies weakness.” Hicks (1925)

“The blessed and immortal nature knows no trouble itself nor causes trouble to any other, so that it is never constrained by anger or favour. For all such things exist only in the weak.” Bailey (1926)

“The blissful and incorruptible being neither knows trouble itself nor occasions trouble to another, and is consequently immune to either anger or gratitude, for all such emotions reside in a weak creature.” De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 252 (1954)

“The blessed and incorruptible being neither knows tribulation itself nor occasions it to another; it is consequently immune to feelings of either anger or gratitude, for all such emotion signifies a weak creature." De Witt, St. Paul and Epicurus 187 (1954)

“That which is blessed and immortal is not troubled itself, nor does it cause trouble to another. As a result, it is not affected by anger or favor, for these belong to weakness.” Geer (1964)

“That which is blessed and imperishable neither suffers nor inflicts trouble, and therefore is affected neither by anger nor by favour. For all such things are marks of weakness.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 140 (1987)

“The blessed and immortal is itself free from trouble nor does it cause trouble for anyone else; therefore, it is not constrained either by anger or by favor. For such sentiments exist only in the weak.” O'Connor (1993)

“ What is blessed and indestructible has no trouble itself nor does it give trouble to anyone else, so that it is not affected by feelings of anger or gratitude. For all such things are a sign of weakness.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“A blessed and imperishable being neither has trouble itself nor does it cause trouble for anyone else; therefore, it does not experience feelings of anger or indebtedness, for such feelings signify weakness.” Anderson (2004)

“That which is blessed and indestructible has no affairs of its own to attend to; nor does it inflict any trouble on others. So, it is agitated neither by ire nor by partiality. For all such are to be found in that which lacks power.” Makridis (2005)

“That which is blissful and immortal has no troubles itself, nor does it cause trouble for others, so that it is not affected by anger or gratitude (for all such things come about through weakness).” Saint-Andre (2008)

“The blessed and indestructible being of the divine has no concerns of its own, nor does it make trouble for others. It is not affected by feelings of anger or benevolence,because these are found where there is a lack of strength.” Strodach (2012)

“The blessed and immortal has no troubles himself and causes none for anyone else; hence he has nothing to do with resentments and partisanship; for all such impulses are a sign of weakness.” Mensch (2018)

“What is in bliss and imperishable neither has troubles itself nor causes any for others, so it experiences no feelings of either anger or gratitude; for everything of that sort indicates weakness.” White (2021)

Note: Alternate Renderings are from Kuriai Doxai - A Compilation of Translations by Nathan Bartman

I have now completed phase one of the reorganization of the Vatican Sayings and Principal Doctrines forums, and the result of the Vatican Sayings reorganization is here:

Epicurus - The "Vatican List" of Sayings

On both, I intend to add more links to the full list of sayings and doctrines so that you can navigate from a list (which has the full text of each doctrine/saying) to the discussion section. I plan to do that by going to the texts section and linking each saying to the tag for each saying.

When complete this change will eliminate the looonnnggg scrolling through the full forum list by reducing 121 subforums down to four or so, and I think the material will still be findable a variety of ways.

Please let me know what obvious problems you run into before I do the same to the Principal Doctrines. I doubt I will get to that today so no immediate rush.

Sorry for all the "Thread Starter" notifications today, but as you can see from the number of them, many of the subforums were totally empty.

VS80. The first measure of security is to watch over one’s youth, and to guard against what makes havoc of all by means of maddening desires.

VS79. The man who is serene causes no disturbance to himself or to another.

VS78. The truly noble man busies himself chiefly with wisdom and friendship, of which the one is an understandable good but the other is immortal.

See this linked discussion here for the reason "understandable" is superior to "immortal" as the best translation. Bailey has: "The noble soul occupies itself with wisdom and friendship; of these, the one is a mortal good, the other immortal."

VS77. The greatest fruit of self-sufficiency is freedom.

VS76. You are, in your old age, just such as I urge you to be, and you have seen the difference between studying philosophy for oneself and proclaiming it to Greece at large; I rejoice with you.

VS74. In a philosophical discussion he who is defeated gains more, since he learns more.

VS73. The occurrence of certain bodily pains assists us in guarding against others like them.

VS72. There is no advantage to obtaining protection from other men so long as we are alarmed by events above or below the earth, or, in general, by whatever happens in the boundless universe.

VS70. Let nothing be done in your life which will cause you fear if it becomes known to your neighbor.

VS69. The ungrateful greed of the soul makes the creature everlastingly desire varieties in its lifestyle.

VS68. Nothing is sufficient for him to whom what is sufficient seems too little.

VS65. It is vain to ask of the gods what a man is capable of supplying for himself.

VS62. Now if parents are justly angry with their children, it is certainly useless to fight against it, and not to ask for pardon; but if their anger is unjust and irrational, it is quite ridiculous to add fuel to their irrational passion by nursing one’s own indignation, and not to attempt to turn aside their wrath in other ways by gentleness.

VS61. Most beautiful too is the sight of those near and dear to us, when our original kinship makes us of one mind; for such sight is great incitement to this end.

VS60. Every man passes out of life as though he had just been born.