Posts by Cassius

Quote from Don

On the other, I'm trying to shoehorn a 2,000+ year old round peg into a modern neuroscience square hole. The understanding of Epicurus's perspective is interesting, valuable, and worthwhile from a philosophical and historical perspective but I'm skeptical if it's possible to "translate" that perspective and connect it to a modern neuroscience understanding of the brain, perception, sensation, etc.

i'm not focusing on you or this discussion with this comment, but yes I think you've put your finger on a big problem. Epicurus wasn't working in our current framework and I'd say we need to first understand Epicurus in his own terms before we can even begin to apply what he said to another framework.

But to repeat this isn't a problem of individuals in this discussion, I think the entire history of Epicurus is warped almost beyond recognition by trying to interpret him in terms of ideas that he never thought or considered plausible. Epicurus was working in the framework that had been put in place by Plato and others well before his time, and it's going to be more revealing to compare him to what came *before* than to what came *after*.

I'd say that much of the frustration that we find in disagreements about Epicurus among commentators comes from that attempt to force him into Stoic or Buddhist or modern psychology frameworks. We can and should do that, but *after* we're confident of Epicurus's views, not before.

Done Joshua -- When you get a chance can I get you to add some more description to the document listing?

File

PROLEGOMENA AD HOMERUM - Middlebury College - William Harris

A thoughtful approach to acquiring Latin and Greek.

Cassius

July 1, 2024 at 6:05 AM

LR's last question I think points out the problem in making the criteria to be four rather than three. I have always thought that the following arguments on this point, also from Chapter 8, seemed persuasive to me:

The following objections may also occur to the mind of the reader: if the formation of the general concept ensues upon acts of sensation, then all elements of anticipation are removed; again, if it is formed as the residuum of acts of sensation, this is a sort of inductive process and no result of a rational process can itself be a primary criterion of truth, which Epicurus declared the prolepsis to be; still again, if the general concept is the sum of a series of sensations, then the prolepsis is merged with sensation, and the second criterion of Epicurus disappears. This, in turn, would mean that Epicurus possessed no criterion of truth on the abstract levels of thought. Such a conclusion is hardly to be tolerated.

....

Even within Epicurean circles the term prolepsis underwent unjustified extensions. For instance, Epicurus, recognizing Nature as the canon or norm, had asserted that, just as we observe fire to be hot, snow to be cold, and honey to be sweet, so, from the behavior of newborn creatures, we observe pleasure to be the telos or end. Certain of his followers, however, shaken no doubt by Stoic criticism, took the position that the doctrine was an innate idea, that is, a prolepsis.48 In strict logic this error was a confusion between quid and quale. The problem was not to decide what could be predicated of the end or telos but what was the identity of the end. Was it pleasure or was it something else?

....

When once these ambiguities and confusions have been discerned and eliminated, it is possible to state the teaching of Epicurus with some of that precision by which he set high store. In the meaning of the Canon, then, a sensation is an aisthesis. All such sensations may possess value; otherwise there would be no sense in saying, "We pay attention to all sensations." Their values, however, range all the way from totality to zero. The value is total only when the sensation is immediate. For example, when Aristotle says, "The sense of sight is not deceived as to color," this is true only of the close view, because colors fade in more distant views.

Sensations, however, usually present themselves in combinations of color, shape, size, smell, and so on. An immediate presentation of such a composite unit is a phantasia. All such presentations are true, but they do not rank as criteria in the meaning of the Canon, for the reason that the intelligence has come into play. An act of recognition (epaisthesis) has taken place in the mind of the observer, which is secondary to the primary reaction that registered color, shape, size, smell, and so forth.

That Epicurus did not regard these composite sensations as criteria is made clear by a statement of his own: "The fidelity of the recognitions guarantees the truth of the sensations." 19 For example, the animal standing yonder is recognized as a dun-colored ox. This is a secondary reaction. Only the primary perceptions of color, shape, size, and so on constitute a direct contact between man and the physical environment. The truth of these perceptions is confirmed by the fidelity of the recognition.

....

Again, let it be assumed that the quality of sweetness is registered by sensation. It is not, however, sensation that says, "This is honey"; a secondary reaction in the form of a recognition involving intelligence has taken place. This, in the terminology of Epicurus, is "a fantastic perception of the intelligence." These were not given the rank of criteria by Epicurus for the reason already cited. It is on record, however, that later Epicureans did so.20

For those who are reading along here and don't have ready access to DeWitt's text, here is how he introduces the subject in his Chapter 8. i don't agree that Lucretius has no help to offer, but much of the rest seems useful:

Quote

The innate capacity to distinguish colors is an anticipation of experience no less than the innate capacity to distinguish between justice and injustice. The difference is that the color-sense is part of the individual's preconditioning for life in his physical environment and emerges in early childhood, while the sense of justice is part of the preconditioning for life in the social environment and emerges later, developing in pace with experience, instruction, and reflection. How the Anticipation functions as a criterion may be seen in the case of the gods: it is impossible to think of them as in need of anything, for example, because according to the idea universal among men their happiness is perfect.

Unfortunately the traditional accounts of the Anticipations have gone far astray. Three excellent reasons can be cited for these aberrations: first, in the graded textbooks of Epicurus the topic was reserved for advanced students and entirely omitted from both the Little and the Big Epitome; consequently Lucretius has no help to offer; second, already in antiquity the concepts of such abstract things as justice had become confused with the general concepts of such concrete things as horses and oxen; third, modern scholars have become victims of the confusion of the ancients and on their own account have committed the error of merging the Anticipations with the Sensations.

It is highly probable that Epicurus allowed even to certain animals, especially elephants, the possession of these embryonic anticipations of social virtues. The tendency of the day was to have recourse to the study of irrational creatures in order to learn the teachings of Nature. It should be recalled too that not only was Epicurus very eager to have information of Pyrrho, who had been in India, but also that the writings of Alexander's associates, Aristobulus, Nearchus, and Onesicritus concerning India were available in his youth, and the same is true of the description of India by Megasthenes of the time of Seleucus. The elder Pliny, who quotes three of the above writers, ascribed to elephants "a sort of divination of justice," ³¹ an excellent equivalent of the Epicurean Anticipation. Pliny also ascribes to elephants the possession of pride, honesty, prudence, equity, and even religion.³² All of these fall squarely into the category of abstract notions, where the Anticipations belong.

The term prolepsis was correctly rendered by Cicero as anticipatio or praenotio ³³ and less precisely, though intelligently, by the elder Pliny as divinatio. It is wrongly rendered as "concept" by those who confuse the general concept of such a thing as an ox with the abstract idea of justice. One scholar prefers "preconception," but perhaps "preconcept" would be preferable. It seems most advantageous, however, to adhere to "Anticipation" because this is the meaning of the Greek word prolepsis.

Two explicit accounts of the term have fortunately survived from antiquity, the first from Cicero and the second from Diogenes Laertius. Unfortunately there is virtual unanimity among modern scholars that the authority of Cicero is to be rejected and that of Laertius accepted. This would mean that the word of a stodgy compiler weighs more with us than that of the gifted Cicero. It means also that we, who possess about seventy pages of the text of Epicurus, are in a better position to form a judgment than Cicero himself, who knew all the outstanding Epicureans of his time, whether Greek or Roman, and enjoyed access to all the original texts.

Quote from Little Rocker

But then a complete perception of an object would involve a faculty of intellect, right, not only sensory organs?

From my point of view, a "complete perception" of an object would be more a function of repeated observations, from different perspectives, at different distances,using all of the faculties of perception, but there is where I would draw the line, and as far as the process of drawing those observations into an opinion that is right or wrong, that part i would classify as "intellectual" and therefore no longer "perception."

Quote from Little Rocker

So if there is a 'criterion' of horse, then it seems to me that it must depend on thought and memory. And I admit that I think that if Epicurus doesn't think that, then I'm not sure his view is plausible.

This is the point in the conversation where I go with DeWitt, who argues that in regard to concrete objects to which we are exposed over time we will indeed form a concept (mental picture) of a horse, and then use that concept in the future to apply the same "word" to new instances of four-legged animals when we see them, to form an opinion as to whether those animals or are or not horses. This is what Laertius hammers home, but in my view this is describing what is done *after* the five senses and feelings and anticipations have relayed their input to the mind. DeWitt's position seems to me to be that Laertius is confusing the process of "working with" proleptic input with the more important issue of "forming" proleptic input, and that the process of forming proleptic input to the mind is completely pre-rational, pre-conceptual, and actually is present as a faculty and in operation *before* we ever see our first horse, just as the eyes are operational and functional before we ever use them to see (and then in the mind) to classify anything at all.

Quote from Little Rocker

It seems to me that Epicurus thinks opinions can be true or false, and not all opinions are about sensations. Sensations don't have to confirm an opinion for the opinion to count as true.

As to "not all opinions are about sensations" I would agree with that. We can definitely have opinions about opinions (adding layers upon layers there). And I would say that there is prolectic involvement in the assembling of opinions about opinions. But that proleptic invoilvement would not involve telling us which opinions are true, but would function more on the order of recognizing in the first place that arithmetic has some relationship to calculus about which to take notice.

In discussing today the issue of what Lucretius means about the gods not having a pattern by which to create the universe, it seemed to me that Lucretius should not be interpreted so much as taking the position that gods cannot create planets and the like from existing materials (I would expect Epicurus to take the position that they can in fact do things that we will be capable of one day). Rather, it seems to me that the emphasis is on that no one, gods or human, can do anything without their minds having the disposition to assemble experiences into more complicated constructs (the anthropomorphizing Don mentioned earlier today being an example). I would therefore see the example as implying that both gods and men must rely on Nature to provide the disposition and ability for a mind to construct abstractions, but the faculty of prolepsis is not any single abstraction which is formed, but the *capability* to form abstractions in the first place.

I would say that the meaning is more likely to be that were it not for the faculty of anticipations, the raw data presented by (1) the five senses (2) the feelings of pain and pleasure, and (3) previous anticipations would never be assembled into any abstractions whatsoever. To me, that distinction keeps the focus on prolepsis being a pre-rational, pre-cognitive faculty, and yet still gives it an important place in the formation and use of concepts.

Quote from Don

They're both pre-rational and things upon which reason works, but they're not the same.

If they were exactly the same and did exactly the same thing, they wouldn't be separate things!

I would say our best lead on all this is from Velleius, and I do not see in these Latin words the necessity to conclude that nature has implanted any "ideas" of the gods at all. Seems to me this can be read with connotations of "notions" that are not ideas at all, and that people are forcing an "idea" or concept template onto this because of their own expectation to find it.

There's another excerpt below that one where the Latin needs to be parsed ...

Quote from Don

that you don't think "gods are blessed and incorruptible" cannot be the content (so to speak) of a "a pre-conceptual / pre-opinion faculty"

Right - I don't think that *any* "preconceptual - preopinion faculty" can have "content" of any kind -- the absence of "content" is exactly the point of it being pre-conceptual.

I think a lot of the problem we have is that centuries of conventional commentators have been trying to force Epicurus' statements into boxes that are not appropriate. And on the prolepsis, I think the main error is equating prolepsis with "concepts" in the first place. In fairness to them, I think what Diogenes Laertius is talking about is the conceptual reasoning process, that does in fact occur and is in fact very important, but that "prolepsis" is a process that precedes that stage.

By forcing the conversation to be about conceptual reasoning, which I would say is another process entirely, taking the input FROM the faculties and processing it, the commentators are going astray and not focusing on the "mechanism" of prolepsis, which should be treated just like eyes and ears and the rest.

As for what Epicurean style gods are, I think we are in the same multiple explanations boat we are in in regard to the stars and other phenomena that are too far away to be certain about. I don't gather that Epicurus obsessed about getting more detail about stars after he developed his non-supernatural explanations of them, and I doubt he obsessed about the details of the gods either.

I don' think we are too far apart at all. If on anything, only possibly in the question of how firmly we should expect to find very smart beings in other parts of the universe. I see that as so firm as to a virtual certainty, only waiting on confirmation through space travel and more advanced technology.

At the moment I would tend to think the way Godfrey is going is most likely. It seems likely that prolepsis is, like the eyes or other senses, a pre-conceptual / pre-opinion faculty that is neither right nor wrong. In contrast, even the assertions that "gods are blessed" or "gods are incorruptible" are chock full of conceptual right/wrong content.

So at this point it seems to me that those statements, which are "right" from Epicurus' point of view as stated by Epicurus to Menoeceus and by Velleius to Cicero, are better thought as "based in part on proleptic input" (which probably goes for all 'statements' of any kind that are recognizable to us) rather than "are prolepsis" or "being proleptic" themselves.

More likely than saying that our brains are stamped at birth "gods exist and are incorruptible and blessed," he's saying that our brains are stamped at birth with an operating system that, when exposed to certain experiences, are disposed to "anthropomorphize and to engage in teleological thinking." The results of that process are deemable to be true and consistent with all evidence only when we conclude that gods are blessed and imperishable, which means that they don't have anything to do with us or earth (that would indicate weakness). To reason otherwise contradicts our physics and all other repeatable and verifiable sensory observations.

However in my view there is no conflict at all with concluding that the evidence we do have (including infinite and eternal universe, isonomia, nature never makes only a single thing of a kind) we should expect to exist beings which do have physical reality and are totally happy and deathless. Reasoning in that way provides at least one plausible "explanation" of the phenomena that allows us to dismiss fears of supernatural causation.

Reasoning in that way I see no reason to be concerned that such theories as Don mentions above would "violate Epicurean othodoxy." The only way they would do so would be if "orthodoxy" required us to jump directly from "human ideas of divinity stem from mental phenomena" to "no superior forms of life exist elsewhere in the universe."

To me such a conclusion is a total non sequitur and goes against all scientific observations about life being natural and not supernatural. To reason that way seems to me to be a very basic error that Epicurus would and did reject. The fact that a huge number of people otherwise favorable to Epicurus seem inclined to reason in exactly that way (and conclude that Epicurean style gods do not in fact exist) is to me a defect in the reasoning of those making that assertion, not in the reasoning of Epicurus.

Here is something we've been needing for a while:

A Complete Episode Guide To the Lucretius Today Podcast

Over time I hope to get this expanded to include more detailed notes on each episode, but in the meantime we now have a single page listing of each episode (linked to where it can be found), date of release, and title.

Just for future planning purposes, after a while here in "General Discussion" we'll move this thread to the Philodemus section. I'll probably also link it or create a version of it for the "Justice" section as well, probably to point up the "Typology Chart" that Bryan linked above, so we can have a "forms of government" discussion. Such discussion is fully appropriate given its discussion in the texts, and it won't violate the "no politics" rule so long as we stay clear of discussion modern historical particulars that still evoke lots of emotion.

Given commonalities with parts of Aristotle at some future point it's probably worth citing to the section of Aristotle where the typology is explained, and then we can compare the full discussion there to the surviving Epicurean material and look for parallels / contrasts.

There are a lot of interesting statements in this Rhetoric that should be explored but it all seems kind of disjointed due to the fragmentation so we'll have to pull it out carefully.

Note - We'll want to correlate that with the Boeri book: Interview With Dr. Marcelo Boeri: Theory and Practice In Epicurean Political Philosophy

The "number of shapes" question and the others questioned should now be updated. Thanks all and please continue to report questions.

It would be good to collect references like this and compare them with for example Aristotle. Didn't he have some kind of listing of types of government according to how large was the ruling class, and he also had a classification of good and bad forms of each (?).

But the main thing is that it would be helpful to collect the sources, including the reference to Philodemus being sympathetic to Caesar.

I have these two links:

v.23 (1919-1920) - Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences - Biodiversity Heritage Library

Philodemi Rhetorica (trans. Hubbell) OPTIMIZED : Hubbell : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Philodemus - On Rhetoric - Translated by Hubbell BEST COPY

archive.org

Here's the "worst form of government" --- https://www.biodiversitylibrary.org/item/32303#page/385/mode/1up

Martin: Think there is a better way to word that? Simply change it to "Why do atoms move?" I need to look back at the way it is worded in Lucretius and the letter to Herodotus.

Yes indeed. I am thinking also that with Youtube processing it speech-to-text, that text will generate a lot more hits than previously.

Over the last ten days with help from Remus and others, we've added a significant number of new quiz questions to the quiz section. There are three new basic sets of questions on Epicurean Canonics, Physics, and Ethics, and the "Norman DeWitt's Epicurus and His Philosophy" quiz is also new. I think most of the questions are pretty good, and I am confident that the answers are pretty close to correct, but before we let these get too far out into the wild it would be helpful if our regulars go through these and see if they disagree with any of the question/answer combinations.

I am learning that developing multiple-choice questions is something of an art, and we'll continue to appreciate volunteer assistance for developing new ones.

For the moment, please help us check out the latest quizzes here:

Welcome To the EpicureanFriends Quiz Page! - Epicureanfriends.com

www.epicureanfriends.com

Happy Birthday to akurvata! Learn more about akurvata and say happy birthday on akurvata's timeline: akurvata

One more cite - this is the Lucretius1743 edition, in the 100's

Nor are you to believe that the sacred mansions of the gods are placed in any parts of this world of ours, for the nature of the gods is so subtle, and at so remote a distance from our senses, that it can scarce be apprehended by the mind. Since therefore it cannot be touched or felt by our hands, it can touch nothing that it is the object of our senses, for nothing has a power to touch that is incapable of being touched itself. For this reason the abodes of the gods must be far different from ours; they must be subtle, and answerable to their own nature. But the truth of this I shall more fully prove in another place.

Issues I want to be sure to include in this episode:

1. Is "pattern" correct usage in the context of prolepsis? Is the Latin "exemplum" (see Lucretius below)? Is "example" or "notion" a better term? Does "pattern" imply intelligent designer?
2. Is "recognition" correct usage?
3. Are any "patterns" innate at birth? (beavers and dams?)
4. Relationship of "patterns" and "images"
5. Does the mind itself create patterns?
6. Lucretius 5:181, see post 40 above: [181-Bailey] Further, how was there first implanted in the gods a pattern for the begetting of things, yea, and the concept of man, so that they might know and see in their mind what they wished to do, or in what way was the power of the first-beginnings ever learnt, or what they could do when they shifted their order one with the other, if nature did not herself give a model of creation? For so many first-beginnings of things in many ways, driven on by blows from time everlasting until now, and moved by their own weight, have been wont to be borne on, and to unite in every way, and essay everything that they might create, meeting one with another, that it is no wonder if they have fallen also into such arrangements, and have passed into such movements, as those whereby this present sum of things is carried on, ever and again replenished.
   1. Martin Ferguson Smith - Furthermore, how was a model for the creation of things implanted in the gods? How did they obtain the conception of human beings, so that they might know and perceive in their minds what they wished to produce? And how did they ever recognize the capacity of the primary particles and the potential effect of their different arrangements, if nature herself did not furnish them with a pattern for creation? The fact is that from time everlasting countless elements, impelled by blows and by their 190 own weight, have never ceased to move in manifold ways, making all kinds of unions and experimenting with everything they could combine to create. 17 It is not surprising therefore that they have at last fallen into such arrangements, and acquired such movements, as those whereby this aggregate of things is maintained and constantly renewed.
   2. MFS Note 16 - 16. 181-186: The same argument is used in 1046 1049, where Lucr. is maintaining that language cannot have been an artificial invention. The point is that neither the gods nor the inventors of language can have had a conception of what they wanted to create, if nature had not already created a world or language that they could use as a model. The argument depends on an important principle of Epicurean epistemology, which is that repeated reception of sense impressions creates in the mind a general conception of each class of things, and that without these conceptions, to which further sense impressions arc referred, scientific knowledge would be impossible. On (pre)conceptions as a criterion of truth, see p. xxv.
   3. MFS Note page xxv - "Sensation by itself is irrational and incapable of memory, but the repeated reception of sense impressions creates in the mind general
      conceptions or all classes or things. Both in Greek and in Latin these general conceptions arc often (though not by Lucretius) called "preconceptions," because, once created in the mind, they remain there, and further sense impressions are referred to them for testing and identification. However, it is imp0l1ant to understand that the (pre)eonceptions are not innate, but derived from sensation. Indeed it is because they are derived from sensation that they arc valid. Without them, memory, thought, and knowledge would be impossible, and they are the second criterion of truth.
7.