That's a great summary and consistent with my experience too, and good advice, especially the part about making sure when you buy a phone that it's compatible with an alternative ROM, because otherwise vendors like Verizon tend to lock them down so they cannot be modified.
I have found basic knowledge of Linux to be invaluable, and though I am by no means an expert, "By the way I use Arch" is a worthwhile nerdy joke if you can find the time to invest.
First - I agree with most of that, so that's my primary comment ***but*** :
They were all swept up in a world not of their making and hostile to their teachings. To paraphrase Star Trek's Borg "Resistance was futile."
NEIN!
Captain Kirk would ha e found a way! (That's why I stopped watching after TOS - that confident and positive spirit - which Cicero denounced in Velleius, and Lucian mentioned in Alexander the Oracle Monger, and.which I strongly associate with Epicurus - seemed missing.)
I've said elsewhere that we will never reconstruct The Garden. We don't know enough to reconstruct the administration
No it won't be recreated exactly - but it can be recreated in spirit and in new and even better ways if capable and dedicated people come along to work hard enough. All the primary elements survive and they provide the keys to reconstruct the rest
To take the attitude that failure is inevitable would be to give in to a fatalistic determinism that Epicurus was right in rejecting.
I use Newpipe on Android and Freetube on Linux because there's no way I am going to watch all those Youtube ads!
Several years ago I ran Cyanogen on my cell phone but I haven't done that recently - need to get back to it.
Lot's of good stuff on F-droid, and I favor free open source software whenever possible.
During Epicurus's lifetime,
My impression (just an impression) is that in Epicurus' time he wasn't facing organized region-wide central opposition from opposing radically intolerant schools (religions) of his day, and that the final submersion of the school coincides with the rise of that centralized and radically intolerant religious authority. So in fairness to Epicurus and the early leaders, they didn't have much reason to expect the rise of opposing and intolerant forces that couldn't be dealt with, even in an extreme situation, simply by moving to another city or region.
The successful emergence of Judeo-Christianity as a "worldwide" force of intolerance, and the institutions that that it set up to enforce compliance, weren't yet on the horizon in 250 BC. So any "failures" to adapt (and I am not trying to be critical of any individuals, just noting that it occurred) was something that happened significantly later. Apparently through as late as 40 or so BC in Cicero's time, and probably later, an argument could be made that Epicureanism and organized teaching of it was still very successful. So fingering the critical time period and the critical inability to adapt / respond in some way (even by moving to another region in rough analogy to Mormonism) would come much later than the founding period.
Adding these:
12 - All meetings will be conducted primarily in English. We will regularly discuss the translation of Latin and Greek words, but the majority of our participants are primarily or fluently English-speakers, so efficiency and consideration requires that we communicate primarily in English.
13 - It is not necessary to attend every session in order to attend any sessions. Participants are welcome to attend as their schedules allow. Participants should, however, familiarize themselves with the published agenda of the meeting they attend so that they can interact appropriately and on topic with other participants.
This is a great project Joshua and very worthy of continuing!!!
By definition, God is a being than which none greater can be imagined.
I presume there are all sorts of ways to come at the overall argument, but I wonder if the very first assertion ("by definition") does not already set the tone of the entire problem. The assertion that our placing a label on something creates a physical reality seems to me a possible place to start.
"Definition" seems to me to be an apparent word game, and it probably ought to be seared into everyone's mind from an early age that words may be used to describe reality but do not constitute reality -- the "map is not the territory" observation that we have discussed many times before.
But no doubt there are many ways to get at the problems here and I hope you will continue.
It has been suggested that we post a public list of "protocols" or "etiquette" so that people who attend our EpicureanFriends zoom meeting will know what to expect. We've received a number of comments about how appearing live on camera can be intimidating for new people on a first time visit, so this document will allow us to explain the ground rules and hopefully lessen any anxiety that might hold back someone from participating. This will likely be revised over time, but for now the list is as follows. Please feel free to comment in the thread below if you have any comments or questions about this.
I suspect we will never have much data on what I am about to mention, but the reference to Epicurus' house being in ruins at the time of Memmius raises questions as to whether the successor leaders of the Epicurean school failed to make proper use of their inheritance from Epicurus, or whether perhaps the house was destroyed in a war, or whatever led to it (and/or the garden property) not being maintained over that period.
One of the subtexts that anyone who is interested in a revitalized Epicurean school, as opposed to simply personal self-help, is the question of whether the organization of the ancient Epicurean school failed in some way, or whether its demise was entirely the fault of outside pressures, or some combination of both. Presumably a combination is more likely, but that leaves the question for future discussion of what steps might have been taken then, or should be taken now, to enhance the survivability of Epicurean organizations.
I can imagine a couple of questions here:
1. Do the terms "good" and "evil" even apply to elements/ atoms / void / matter, or are those things "neutral" in some way?
2. Does that answer differ among the Platonic, Peripatetic, Stoic, and Epicurean Schools?
3. Do we have specific quotes where this issue is specifically addressed?
It seems to me it's not necessarily obvious even in Epicurean terms how "good" and "evil" should be used. Pretty clearly Epicurus said that nature gives us only pleasure and pain in order to know what to choose and what to avoid, so are "good" and "evil" only "abstractions added on to the pleasure / pain base? Do we have specific quotes that show Epicurus talking about how pleasure and pain relate to good and evil?
In terms of the Platonists, Peripatetics, and Stoics, who are into "virtue" as an end in itself, then the terms "good" and "evil" seem much more natural and easy to apply. It seems to me that all three of them are essentially equating their god/prime mover/ divine fire as the ultimate source of "good," so they can slap that label onto something without all the contextual evaluation (evaluation in terms of pleasure and pain) that is involved in Epicurean philosophy.
i tend to question, along with the tile of Nietzsche's book "Beyond Good and Evil," whether Epicurus was not either (1) rejecting the whole "good vs evil" paradigm that was common to the other schools, or (2) redefining those words (good and evil) in terms of pleasure and pain just as he was redefining "gods" and the meaning of "pleasure."
Precision here is probably of particular importance since the Stoics were apparently trying to rehabilitate matter themselves, and perhaps considered matter to be part of divine fire and perhaps therefore "good" in a way that may have distinguished them from Platonics/Peripatetics(?)
Is he correct at the 2:20 point in the video to say that "matter in the Platonic worldview is EVIL?"
I am not doubting that as a general summary, but if there are quotes stating that explicitly, those would be good to have - and to know also whether that applies to the Aristotelians and Stoics.
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This is probably too deep in the weeds to be of immediate use, but since I found it, here is a philosophy professor's attack on a book which is apparently well-thought-of by the website that published the attack on Epicurus:
https://fitelson.org/dembski.pdf
What is of immediate relevance is being articulate with the allegation that Epicurus' views of the nature of the universe have been refuted by modern physics and no longer serve as a sound basis for arguing against intelligent design.
We ought to be able to state Epicurus' position clearly and show that it is neither refuted nor no longer relevant to the "creationist" argument.
And in that respect I think the monkeys and typewriters will serve to illustrate the proper (and improper) way of looking at "randomness" as an aspect of Epicurean physics.
But new discoveries seem to have finished what the Big Bang theory started. It is becoming increasingly undeniable that the building blocks of life are far too unlikely to emerge by chance even in a universe as large and old as ours.
For a long time, Epicurus’ version of the universe seemed probable to many. After natural philosophers realized how vast the universe really was, and again after the existence of atoms was confirmed, Epicurus seemed to be vindicated. But now, we have discovered that however vast the universe may be, it is finite, and its size does not hold a candle to the vast improbability of the miracle that is life. After more than 2,000 years, the original foundation of materialist naturalism in Western thought seems to be crumbling. The question is: how long will it take for the worldview built on that foundation to crumble too?
So what IS this guy's point? Is he arguing for intelligent design? A quick scan of the website "about" section does not make clear the site's orientation.
OK I guess the site does contain clues:
This link originally came up through a Google search, so that's how I found it.
In our universe we don't have infinity of possible creations. As far as matter is concerned, the variety of atoms is strictly limited by universal laws governing the universe. Since we have limited building blocks types and constrains in the form of universal laws which have to be obeyed, the universe is not a place where anything goes.
I think that is an excellent point and it is where I (intuitively) think Epicurus is coming from.
In addition, we have no reason to think, and therefore we should not think, that there are "other universes" in which there are an infinitely larger number of infinite types of atoms that do in fact create an "anything goes" environment.
I *think* that takes us back to the article, and what I perceive to be a point of the article, which I read as asserting that Epicurus was advocating for an "anything goes" universe, when in fact he was not.
Now maybe this sentence does not say that .....
"Since the universe is infinite, there are enough opportunities for every possible arrangement of atoms to occur eventually, even the most unlikely. Our world, and the life on it, is one of those unlikely (but eventually inevitable) arrangements."
.. but I would say it comes awfully close to saying that, and that it would be better to be clear that Epicurus's argument against intelligent design does not end up being an "anything goes" universe.
One of the sections of the letter to Herodotus that has always seemed to me of closest relevance to issues like this is the following (Bailey translation). I've highlighted a couple of phrases that seem particularly of note.
[74] And further we must believe that these worlds were neither created all of necessity with one configuration nor yet with every kind of shape. Furthermore, we must believe that in all worlds there are living creatures and plants and other things we see in this world; for indeed no one could prove that in a world of one kind there might or might not have been included the kinds of seeds from which living things and plants and all the rest of the things we see are composed, and that in a world of another kind they could not have been.
[75] Moreover, we must suppose that human nature too was taught and constrained to do many things of every kind merely by circumstances; and that later on reasoning elaborated what had been suggested by nature and made further inventions, in some matters quickly, in others slowly, at some epochs and times making great advances, and lesser again at others. And so names too were not at first deliberately given to things, but men’s natures according to their different nationalities had their own peculiar feelings and received their peculiar impressions, and so each in their own way emitted air formed into shape by each of these feelings and impressions, according to the differences made in the different nations by the places of their abode as well.
[76] And then later on by common consent in each nationality special names were deliberately given in order to make their meanings less ambiguous to one another and more briefly demonstrated. And sometimes those who were acquainted with them brought in things hitherto unknown and introduced sounds for them, on some occasions being naturally constrained to utter them, and on others choosing them by reasoning in accordance with the prevailing mode of formation, and thus making their meaning clear.
[77] Furthermore, the motions of the heavenly bodies and their turnings and eclipses and risings and settings, and kindred phenomena to these, must not be thought to be due to any being who controls and ordains or has ordained them and at the same time enjoys perfect bliss together with immortality (for trouble and care and anger and kindness are not consistent with a life of blessedness, but these things come to pass where there is weakness and fear and dependence on neighbors). Nor again must we believe that they, which are but fire agglomerated in a mass, possess blessedness, and voluntarily take upon themselves these movements. But we must preserve their full majestic significance in all expressions which we apply to such conceptions, in order that there may not arise out of them opinions contrary to this notion of majesty. Otherwise this very contradiction will cause the greatest disturbance in men’s souls. Therefore we must believe that it is due to the original inclusion of matter in such agglomerations during the birth-process of the world that this law of regular succession is also brought about.
(This last highlighted section being referenced, if I recall correctly from the AA Long article on Chance and Natural law, as indicating that as to non-intelligent beings there is in fact a major aspect of necessity/determinism, in that the atoms can only combine in ways that are consistent with their natures, and that while there are an infinite NUMBER of atoms, there are not infinite TYPES of atoms, but in fact a limited number of types, as indicated in the first highlighted area.)
Ok Joshua and others, we now have an intersection of two discussions: (1) On the Nature of the Gods, and (2) The Monkey Typewriter Theorem! We'll work to answer this by next Sunday!
One of the earliest instances of the use of the "monkey metaphor" is that of French mathematician Émile Borel in 1913,[1] but the first instance may have been even earlier. Jorge Luis Borges traced the history of this idea from Aristotle's On Generation and Corruption and Cicero's De Natura Deorum (On the Nature of the Gods), through Blaise Pascal and Jonathan Swift, up to modern statements with their iconic simians and typewriters.[2] In the early 20th century, Borel and Arthur Eddington used the theorem to illustrate the timescales implicit in the foundations of statistical mechanics.
Looks to me like we're making good progress and will be able to unwind this question here:
Welcome to Episode 229 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.
Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com. Be aware that none of us are professional philosophers, and everyone here is a a self-taught Epicurean.
For our new listeners, let me remind you of several ground rules for both our podcast and our forum.
First: Our aim is to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it, which is often not the same as presented by many modern commentators. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and one of the best places to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.
Second: We won't be talking about modern political issues in this podcast. How you apply Epicurus in your own life is of course entirely up to you. We call this approach "Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean." Epicurean philosophy is a philosophy of its own, it's not Stoicism, Humanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Atheism, Libertarianism or Marxism - it is unique and must be understood on its own, not in terms of any conventional modern morality.
Third: One of the most important things to keep in mind is that the Epicureans often used words very differently than we do today. To the Epicureans, Gods were not omnipotent or omniscient, so Epicurean references to "Gods" do not mean at all the same thing as in major religions today. In Epicurean ethics, "Pleasure" refers not ONLY to sensory stimulation, but also to every experience of life which is not felt to be painful. The classical texts show that Epicurus was not focused on luxury, like some people say, but neither did he teach minimalism, as other people say. Epicurus taught that all experiences of life fall under one of two feelings - pleasure and pain - and those feelings -- and not gods, idealism, or virtue - are the guides that Nature gave us by which to live. More than anything else, Epicurus taught that the universe is not supernatural in any way, and that means there's no life after death, and any happiness we'll ever have comes in THIS life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion.
Today we are continuing to review the Epicurean sections of Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," as presented by the Epicurean spokesman Velleius, beginning at the end of Section 10.
For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here. The text which we include in these posts is the Yonge version, the full version of which is here at Epicureanfriends. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.
Additional versions can be found here:
A list of Velleius' arguments against the existence of supernatural gods will be here.
These are your doctrines, Lucilius; but what those of others are I will endeavor to ascertain by tracing them back from the earliest of ancient philosophers. Thales the Milesian, who first inquired after such subjects, asserted water to be the origin of things, and that God was that mind which formed all things from water. If the Gods can exist without corporeal sense, and if there can be a mind without a body, why did he annex a mind to water?
It was Anaximander’s opinion that the Gods were born; that after a great length of time they died; and that they are innumerable worlds. But what conception can we possibly have of a Deity who is not eternal?
Anaximenes, after him, taught that the air is God, and that he was generated, and that he is immense, infinite, and always in motion; as if air, which has no form, could possibly be God; for the Deity must necessarily be not only of some form or other, but of the most beautiful form. Besides, is not everything that had a beginning subject to mortality?
XI. Anaxagoras, who received his learning from Anaximenes, was the first who affirmed the system and disposition of all things to be contrived and perfected by the power and reason of an infinite mind; in which infinity he did not perceive that there could be no conjunction of sense and motion, nor any sense in the least degree, where nature herself could feel no impulse. If he would have this mind to be a sort of animal, then there must be some more internal principle from whence that animal should receive its appellation. But what can be more internal than the mind? Let it, therefore, be clothed with an external body. But this is not agreeable to his doctrine; but we are utterly unable to conceive how a pure simple mind can exist without any substance annexed to it.
Alcmæon of Crotona, in attributing a divinity to the sun, the moon, and the rest of the stars, and also to the mind, did not perceive that he was ascribing immortality to mortal beings.
Pythagoras, who supposed the Deity to be one soul, mixing with and pervading all nature, from which our souls are taken, did not consider that the Deity himself must, in consequence of this doctrine, be maimed and torn with the rending every human soul from it; nor that, when the human mind is afflicted (as is the case in many instances), that part of the Deity must likewise be afflicted, which cannot be. If the human mind were a Deity, how could it be ignorant of any thing? Besides, how could that Deity, if it is nothing but soul, be mixed with, or infused into, the world?
Then Xenophanes, who said that everything in the world which had any existence, with the addition of intellect, was God, is as liable to exception as the rest, especially in relation to the infinity of it, in which there can be nothing sentient, nothing composite.
Parmenides formed a conceit to himself of something circular like a crown. (He names it Stephane.) It is an orb of constant light and heat around the heavens; this he calls God; in which there is no room to imagine any divine form or sense. And he uttered many other absurdities on the same subject; for he ascribed a divinity to war, to discord, to lust, and other passions of the same kind, which are destroyed by disease, or sleep, or oblivion, or age. The same honor he gives to the stars; but I shall forbear making any objections to his system here, having already done it in another place.
The formation of life on Earth had similar odds.
Since we're setting up all sorts of good questions to ask, I am not sure that I would intuitively agree with this either. The whole idea that the universe consists of "truly random" events seems to me to be very questionable, and that the better alternative view is (as I interpret Epicurus, maybe incorrectly) that the world is the result of natural un-designed combinations of atoms with fixed natures (suitable seeds) (but not truly "random" in the sense of all combinations being possible) which therefore limits the possibilities and disposes toward some results more than others.
Given that life exists on Earth, we know that the possible combinations leading to life are non-zero (out of "nine" planets, in fact, one has life). So I would think that the "chances" of repetition of things that we know to exist is far greater than the chance of occurrence of things that we intuitively grasp have never existed in our experience (monkeys have never in our past duplicated Shakespeare).
I'll be the first to admit that these questions are not easy to answer, but almost certainly they were grappled with by the ancient Epicureans, so we should grapple with them too.
....And after reading those articles I am as confused as ever! 
It appears that the assumptions involved in the words setting up the sentence are going to determine the "answer."
