Posts by Cassius

Quote from Don

Always the killjoy here at the forum ...

No need to consider anyone who is committed to accuracy to be a killjoy - we need to be committed to accuracy above all if we are ever going to understand this stuff!

Don can you tell how that proclaiming/exclaiming compares with Martin Ferguson Smith's translation of Diogenes of Oenoanda's "shouting" in fragment 32?

Fr. 32

... [the latter] being as malicious as the former.

I shall discuss folly shortly, the virtues and pleasure now.

If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end.

Episode 229 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available, with Velleius continuing his attack on Intelligent Design

Godfrey I think that's the most important point.

To me the word "satisfaction" is much too ambiguous of abstraction to be of much help. I can much more identify with the attitude of Vatican Saying 47, which I find much more concrete. I want to be able to say at all times, and under any circumstances, no matter what may happen to me, that when it is time for me to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who vainly cling to it, I will leave life crying aloud a glorious triumph-song that I have lived well.

VS47. Bailey: “I have anticipated thee, Fortune, and entrenched myself against all thy secret attacks. And I will not give myself up as captive to thee or to any other circumstance; but when it is time for me to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who vainly cling to it, I will leave life crying aloud a glorious triumph-song that I have lived well.”

Well at the hazard of sounding pessimistic I would say that you can't *always* try again, if things go badly enough, but at the very least you won't be in the position of having to say to yourself "I didn't even try" and if the activity involved is important enough to you, I would think having to say to yourself "I didn't even try" would be the worst possible outcome.

I would place that right up there with the depth of error involved in wishing one had never been born.

I see that episode can currently be viewed at the link below. If you want to skip the good but extensive lead-in you can start around the 11 minute mark:

In this episode Joshua spends some time going through the background of the Milesian school, and that reminds me that if anyone has not seen Episode 7 of Carl Sagan's Cosmos - "Backbone of Night," he does a great job of describing the background of these early philosophers.

I see that episode can currently be viewed here. If you want to skip the good but extensive lead-in you can start around the 14:30 minute mark:

As i mention in our 20th Zoom, thanks to Kalosyni I have become aware of a new series of five videos put out just in the last month by noted Stoic philosophy professor Greg Sadler. Here's a link to the first of the series of five:

The episodes don't seem to have numbers in their titles, you just start with the oldest and go from oldest to newest to get them in order.

Here in episode three at right around the 14:43 mark is the place where he makes what I think is a pretty clear error - He references how it is interesting that Lucillus is objecting to Cotta's skeptical presentation on the gods. The issue is that he calls Lucilius the EPICUREAN and says it is interesting that an EPICUREAN would talk about defending the gods. At 15:21 he again says that it is the Epicurean who is objecting.

I though to myself that that WOULD be pretty interesting, and actually very impossible, given that the Epicureans were strongly defending their views of the gods. However in checking the actual text it is in fact Lucilius who objects - Professor Sadler just calls Lucilius an Epicurean rather than a Stoic.

I haven't listened to the rest yet, and I am sure it isn't going to go through the book the way we will on the podcast, but it sounds like a very good overview that will be helpful to set the stage for deeper analysis.

To expand on this: "You generally don't know how much more time you have to live, but one thing you know for certain is that once passed you never get that particular moment back again."

I don't have a suggested resolution to this, but to me this points the opposite way from nihilism, which strikes me as the worst enemy, at least for us today. I don't get the idea that the ancient Greeks or Romans were plagued by nihilism like we are today, so maybe that's an example that there really are changes in thought patterns over time, as in some recent discussions we're having. (Or maybe we can just chalk it up to that German word "Zeitgeist.")

If every moment you are alive you are focused on how short life is and how important it should be to you to make the most of your time, then you don't drift through life and inevitably run into the regret that you wish you had done more with your time.

That's pretty much why I have so little sympathy with a flat "me-oh-my-i-am-satisfied-with-what-i-have" approach.

Maybe you should be satisfied with your life, because you understand how the world works and you understand that variation, while it may be desirable, is not necessary in order to be able to say that you have experienced the "greatest" pleasure / "best life" possible.

But maybe you shouldn't be satisfied with your life if you've drifted from one false idea to another, exposing yourself to totally unnecessary pains and forgoing easily possible pleasures, and never really grasped what life is all about.

I think Epicurus' comments about satisfaction have to be taken in that context, such as:

VS68. Nothing is sufficient for him to whom what is sufficient seems too little.

That "what is sufficient" shouldn't be read to mean that "whatever you have is sufficient," but that it's important to think about what really is sufficient and target your plans for pleasure based on your circumstances. The same with:

VS35. We must not spoil the enjoyment of the blessings we have by pining for those we have not, but rather reflect that these too are among the things desirable.

That doesn't mean that you should be happy no matter what your current circumstances are, but that it's likely that during the ups and downs of life you have in fact achieved many thinks that you always wanted but never thought possible.

But even that isn't a blanket endorsement of the status quo. Simply "being satisfied for the sake of being satisfied" sounds like an awfully Platonic or even Stoic reading of Epicurean philosophy to me. Feeling satisfied is certainly a type of pleasure, but it's far from the only type of pleasure. I would reject the idea that "satisfaction' is a complete and correct statement of the goal for the same reason I would reject "tranquility" as a complete and correct statement of the goal. Epicurus and his successors spent hundreds of years debating the precise way to articulate the goal, and it seems to me there's a very good reason that they settled on "pleasure" as the best single word statement, rather than on some more narrow subset of pleasure.

Quote from Kalosyni

Pondering the Hedonic Calculus or prioritizing "smart choices" would lead one to choose less risky activities.

I think as stated that's overbroad. Risk is only one aspect of the equation, and the major (and really only elements ultimately in play) are the pleasure and pain that result - the question is your prediction as to each and is not limited to chance of failure.

As Godfrey illustrated in post 3 above, sometimes the biggest improvements in life come through the greatest risk. The problem is that no none can make that risk/reward decision for you but yourself, in part because only you can factor in the pain that will come from thinking "you didn't even try" when you get to the end of your life and realize that you have no further options forward.

Certainly everyone has different tolerances for risk and there's no single right or wrong answer, but to adopt a general rule to *always* choose the less risky alternative would almost certainly lead to huge regret in the end.

We have at least one clear example of Epicurus noting this himself, and I would say that he would apply the same rule across the board with all aspects of the context needing to be considered all the time:

VS28. We must not approve either those who are always ready for friendship, or those who hang back, but for friendship’s sake we must run risks.

This is a very important point because I think we see a large number of people who otherwise listen to Epicurus's suggestions think that he is always telling them to flee from ALL pain and ALL risk ALL the time - which I think is perversely wrong in the big Epicurean picture. The *only* way to succeed in a goal stated that way is to choose death.

Quote from Kalosyni

But this does have me wondering...if the failure is in the mental realm of the mind, such that it doesn't affect the body, but only the mind could be affected by the thought "I tried but I failed" then seems like the risk of failure shouldn't be feared, and because you know that you can then just move on to something else.

But you CAN'T always move on to something else, and that's the point of why it is so important to emphasize that death leads to nothingness. You generally don't know how much more time you have to live, but one thing you know for certain is that once passed you never get that particular moment back again. And you add that to the observation that mental pain and pleasure are often more significant, because the mind is aware of the past, present, and future, while the body is aware only of the present.

Very interesting quote. And I agree with how speculative this reconstruction of the text seemed to me when I first checked out his book. But I agree with his reasoning that Epicurus would have thought that there would always be intelligent beings somewhere thinking about these things.

I was listening yesterday to Greg Sadler deride the Epicurean arguments in "On The Nature of the Gods" as easier to refute than the Stoic arguments, but one of the things he said prompts this comment about what Velleius said:

Quote

“You see therefore that the foundation (for such it is) of our inquiry has been well and truly laid. For the belief in the gods has not been established by authority, custom, or law, but rests on the unanimous and abiding consensus of mankind; their existence is therefore a necessary inference, since we possess an instinctive or rather an innate concept of them; but a belief which all men by nature share must necessarily be true; therefore it must be admitted that the gods exist. And since this truth is almost universally accepted not only among philosophers but also among the unlearned, we must admit it as also being an accepted truth that we possess a ‘preconception,’ as I called it above, or ‘prior notion,’ of the gods. (For we are bound to employ novel terms to denote novel ideas, just as Epicurus himself employed the word prolepsis in a sense in which no one had ever used it before)."

Right now I am entertaining the thought that the focus ought to be not on Epicurus inventing the idea and the term prolepsis from nothing, but on the "in a sense in which no one had ever used it before." (I'm sure that this has been probably obvious to everyone but me.

If Epicurus was expanding the term prolepsis to cover more things in the same way that he expanded use of the word "pleasure," then you could analogize that:

- just as Epicurus appears to have expanded the existing term "pleasure" to cover not just agreeable stimulative sensations (which the Cyreniacs and everyone else too agrees with), but to include all awareness of feeling that is not painful (with which standard philosophers would disagree);

would it not make sense to consider that:

- Epicurus may have expanded the existing term "prolepsis" to cover not just the recognition of physical objects like men or horses or oxes as a result of having seen examples of them over time (which is the example Diogenes Laertius gives, and everyone agrees with as a process that definitely happens), but to include identification of abstractions such as justice or divinity which require considerably more organizing in the mind because they aren't physical objects that can be touched or seen or heard or smelled or tasted (which is a process with which other philosophers - especially blank slate philosophers - would disagree).

The point of this post being that maybe the emphasis on prolepsis can be analogized to the expansion of the word as an explanation of why Diogenes Laertius' explanation does not seem complete.

For reference this is pretty close to what Dewitt says around page 142 et seq.

Quote from Bryan

What has "nature used to impress a notion of gods on our minds" if not the very images of the gods that come from their bodies?

Yep I think that is definitely the question, but even as I argue for the realist position I am not sure that the question is answered very easily.

Do we have notions of "atoms" impressed on our minds even though we have never seen them?

Do we have notions of "justice" impressed on our minds even though justice is an abstract concept which cannot be seen in bodily form?

Quote from Pacatus

At least for me. But prolepsis really seems to be the key.)

Prolepsis being the key to LOTS of things, not just the gods, and that's a huge subject in itself.

I understand that we have to take the senses, anticipations, and feelings as given, as they are our connection with reality, but it seems to me it's all one big question: We have good reason to think that no supernatural god created them, and that they didn't occur simply by chance, but through the natural aspects of atoms moving through void. But I think we all have the tendency to presume that there must have been a **First** combination or event that led to everything else, and I think we have to get past that to connect with where Epicurus would have been going by asking us to study principles of infinity. Whatever process allows for life to develop and then evolve, that process has *always* been something that is naturally part of the universe, so we have to think through what that *always* means. If we take the optimistic view that mankind (our closest example) won't eventually destroy itself,*** then we've got infinite number of species with tremendously developed technologies all across the universe, and that's going to make it important eventually that we distinguish (1) advanced civilizations far ahead of us, which we expect to exist from (2)universe-creating supernatural gods, which we are confident cannot and do not exist.

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*** And even if mankind does destroy itself, we should presume that it wasn't fated that it do so, and that other speicies would not necessarily destroy themselves.

That's a great quote and I think that's consistent with Dewitt's view too that Velleius (taking that Cicero is simply following some contemporary Epicurean text) has it right.

But just like Velleius doesn't stop there, and he joins with it the isonomy argument, I am thinking that there is no reason that *we* should stop there either. We should also factor in the Epicurean argument for life on other worlds, existing in "equitable distribution" (based on how we see a progression of life here on earth). From those we can conclude that living beings more blessed than us, and deathless, are as certain to exist somewhere as are the atoms, which are also beyond our sensory reach, but about which we are confident, based on reasoning from observations that *are* within our sensory reach.

As far as the gods living "between" the worlds, that sounds to me more like one of those manifold possibilities that must satisfy us, rather than a requirement that they live *only* in that location. The requirement would be that they have mastery over their environment so that it provides all that they need for their happiness, and we could suggest numbers of possibilities for how that could be set up, rather than thinking that "intermundia" gives us a complete physical description of a specific particular location. The main thing is that we see no evidence or reason to believe that they would take any notice of us, wherever they are and no matter how many of them there may be.

I am editing last week's podcast, and we are now going through Velleius' criticisms of standard supernatural religion.

In so doing we will come up with a list (started here) of what Velleius (and presumably the Epicureans) thought to be the most important arguments to deal with . In addition, Joshua and I have already mentioned that we would like to include other issues (such as the "riddle" / problem of evil ) which may not be in Velleius' commentary.

So for those who find this topic of interest, let us know if you think there are particularly influential arguments that we should include in this series. There is probably an endless number of them, but certainly some are more popular than others, and we don't want to miss anything obvious, so please mention in the commente any that you would like us to be sure to cover. We particularly want to cover the "logical" or "natural" arguments that would tend to impress younger people who think they are being fair-minded, as opposed to those who are taking everything explicitly on faith.

Thanks!

Quote from Don

maybe it's the self-sufficiency (autarkeia) aspect of the gods. By Epicurean definition, they neither expect praise nor dispense random punishment. They are always "blessed" and have an unshakable (incorrupible) blessed life. So a sage can live a god-like life in the here and now?

I would say it that way too (that the gods are a model of achieving that we can aspire to even if we can't achieve their success ourselves).

Humans, even Epicurus, suffer from diseases and all sorts of nagging pains that detract from a totally pleasant life, and it would be desirable to expand our knowledge and technology to eliminate even those. So even Epicurus himself and the ancient Epicureans would have profited by "reverencing the gods" to the extent that emulating a "better" gives you motivation or ideas to work to maintain your own blessedness (live watching a master tennis player helps younger players get better).

At least that's the way I would interpret the "Captain Kirk perspective" on Epicurean philosophy - do everything possible to achieve more pleasure than pain, and push the envelope as far as you can on what is possible, because you're not going to get a second chance.

That would be another reason why I think there is work to be done on articulating Epicurus' full perspective on "impossible" goals, I don't think we have a well-developed-enough reconciliation of "life is desirable so it's desirable to live longer" with "it's impossible to live forever." Variation may not be new, and may not make the pleasure "greater" in every respect, but it seems clear that variation is itself desirable even if it doesn't "greaten" the total pleasure. Unless this calculation is made clear it seems a lot of people are tempted to accept less than what they could actually obtain if they focused their efforts on trying harder. (And of course I realize that some are going to say "you're just setting yourself up for disappointment," and I would respond with something like: "Since I know there is pain in life, and that I only have one life, I'll gladly accept the inevitability that at some point I will fail to stay alive in exchange for the pleasure that I will obtain by living longer. My goal is not running from every moment of pain, but achieving the most pleasurable life possible, so I gladly accept some pain in exchange for greater pleasure."

For some reason as I write this I am reminded of the abortion debate, and how medical technology has shifted the date of "viability" shorter and shorter and effectively overturned what seemed to be a way to come up with a dividing line. We surely don't want to talk too much about abortion here, but I think this specific analogy is relevant -- as medical technology advances, it's likely that humans can live longer and longer under better and better conditions, and old dividing lines about how long is reasonable to live will become obsolete.

My reading of Epicurus is that he would fully endorse living longer so long as conditions remain more pleasurable than painful, so it seems to me the focus really needs to be on "live as long as you can reasonably expect to experience more pleasure than pain" rather than suggesting that there is any period of XX number of years that everyone should deem to be sufficient - or too short.

Quote from Don

I'll admit that I hadn't heard the term "bicameral mind" before

A lot of this discussion is entirely new to me to, so I have little comment at least at this point. I am glad we have intelligent people who can bring things like this to our attention.

Quote from JMGuimas

Is there any way to make subtitles available on videos, it would make it much easier for those who understand little English. Thanks.

Thank you JM for the comment and to the responses.

I definitely agree that this is desirable and i will appreciate comments on other options.

The main affordable option i am aware of is to upload a media file to youtube and let it do the transcription and then hand-edit them afterwards.

But I also see and like what people are doing on videos on Facebook / TicTok /etc where the word that is spoken is highlighted as the voice goes forward - i have not even seen a hint on how that it is done.

This is definitely an area where i would appreciate input from any and all or our tech-savvy people. We have a lot of old material that would be good to convert over time, plus we can get started on making new material the best way.

Luckily for purposes of the podcast there is no reason to prejudice the issue. We will methodically go through the texts and see where we end up at the other end.

Going though On Ends was a cathartic experience for me, and I expect "On the Nature of the Gods," combined with Joshua's color commentary, to be the same!

Quote from Kalosyni

2. The gods have no influence on our lives.

i agree with points one and three, but on this one the formulation is probably too broad. I think Epicurus was saying that the gods don't INTERVENE in our lives, but that doesn't mean that their existence, and (I don't like the word contemplation so I will use) "consideration" of them does have a very strong influence on our lives.

If we consider them incorrectly that leads to disaster. If we consider them incorrectly that leads to the greatest confidence in the ability to live happily.