Posts by Cassius

Last week we ended before fully addressing this passage below. It's wording is a bit complicated, so might be worth comment here in the thread. Cicero appears to be saying that it is not the fact that the crowd may think a thing moral that makes it moral, but the intrinsic beauty of the thing that would make it moral regardless of whether the crowd recognized it or not. Seems like this might be a variation of the Euthyro dilemma that Joshua mentioned in the last episode-- with this variation saying it's not the crowd (rather than god) that judges morality to be beautiful, but that morality is a beautiful thing in itself regardless of whether the crowd recognizes it (?)

Quote from Cicero

A famous philosopher, by whom not only Greece and Italy, but even all foreign nations have been thrown into excitement, declares that he does not understand what morality means, if it does not lie in pleasure, unless perhaps it be some qualities extolled by the babble of the crowd. But I hold such qualities to be often actually immoral, and if at any time they be not immoral, they are then not immoral when the crowd extols what is essentially in its own nature right and deserves to be extolled; yet it is not called moral for the reason that it is applauded by many men, but because it is of such a nature that even if men knew nothing about it, or had even been struck with dumbness, it would deserve to be extolled for its inherent loveliness and beauty.

Welcome to Episode 206 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

This week we continue our discussion of Book Two of Cicero's On Ends, which is largely devoted Cicero's attack on Epicurean Philosophy. Going through this book gives us the opportunity to review those attacks, take them apart, and respond to them as an ancient Epicurean might have done, and much more fully than Cicero allowed Torquatus, his Epicurean spokesman, to do.

Follow along with us here: Cicero's On Ends - Complete Reid Edition. Check any typos or other questions against the original PDF which can be found here.

This week we move through Section XV and into XVI, starting roughly here:

Do you not see how extensive is this disagreement? A famous philosopher, by whom not only Greece and Italy, but even all foreign nations have been thrown into excitement, declares that he does not understand what morality means, if it does not lie in pleasure, unless perhaps it be some qualities extolled by the babble of the crowd. But I hold such qualities to be often actually immoral, and if at any time they be not immoral, they are then not immoral when the crowd extols what is essentially in its own nature right and deserves to be extolled; yet it is not called moral for the reason that it is applauded by many men, but because it is of such a nature that even if men knew nothing -about it, or had even been struck with dumbness, it would deserve to be extolled for its inherent loveliness and beauty. So again, yielding to nature, which cannot be withstood, he makes in another passage the statement which you also put forward a little while ago, that an agreeable life is not possible, unless it be also a moral life. What does he now mean by moral? The same that he means by agreeable? So this is it, that a moral life is not possible, unless it be also a moral life? Or, unless it accord with the talk of the multitude? He declares then that without this he cannot live agreeably? What is more immoral than that the life of a wise man should depend on the conversation of those who are no wise men? What is it then that in this passage he understands by moral? Assuredly nothing but what can with justice be extolled in and for itself. Since if it be extolled for the pleasure it brings, what kind of merit is that which can be bought in the meat- market? Seeing that he assigns such a place to morality as to declare that without it an agreeable life is impossible, he s not the man to adopt the kind of morality which depends on the multitude, and to declare that without that an agreeable life is an impossibility, or to understand anything else to be moral except what is right in itself and worthy of eulogy for its own sake, in its own essence, unaided, and by its own constitution.

XVI. So, Torquatus, when you stated how Epicurus cries aloud that an agreeable life is not possible, unless it be a moral, a wise, and a just life, you yourself seemed to me to be uttering a vaunt. Such energy was breathed into your words by the grandeur of those objects which your words represented, that you seemed to grow taller, and sometimes ceased your walk, and gazing at us almost deposed as a witness that morality and justice are sometimes eulogized by Epicurus. How well it became you to take these words on your lips, for if they were never uttered by philosophers, we should not care to have any philosophy at all! It is from a passion for those phrases which are very seldom employed by Epicurus, wisdom, I mean, courage, justice, temperance, that men of preeminent ability have devoted themselves to the pursuit of philosophy. Our eyesight, says Plato, is the keenest sense we have, yet it does not enable us to descry wisdom. What passionate affection for herself would she inspire in us! Why so? Because she is so crafty that she can build the fabric of the pleasures in the most excellent manner? Why is justice praised, or whence comes this saying so hackneyed from of old, a man you may play with in the dark? This proverb, though pointed at one thing only, has this very wide application, that in all transactions we should be influenced by the character of our actions and not by the presence of witnesses. Indeed the arguments you alleged were insignificant and very weak, I mean, that unprincipled men are tortured by their own consciousness within them, and also by the fear of punishment, which they either suffer, or live in dread of suffering at some time. It is not proper to imagine your bad man as a coward or a weakling, torturing himself about any- thing he has done, and frightened at everything, but rather as one who craftily judges of everything by his interests, being keen, shrewd and hardened, so that he readily devises means for cheating without detection, without witnesses, without any accomplice. Do you think I am speaking of Lucius Tubulus ? He, having presided as praetor over the court for trying murderers, took bribes in view of trials with such openness, that in the following year Publius Scaevola, the tribune of the commons, carried a bill in the popular assembly directing an inquiry to be made into the matter. Under this bill the senate voted that the inquiry should be conducted by Gnaeus Caepio the consul; Tubulus went into exile at once, and did not venture to defend himself; the facts were indeed evident.

Episode 205 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week we address Cicero's criticisms of Epicurus based on Cicero's view of the nature of morality.

Yes Don's post get's right to the point. If you are the type of person who values the longer-term "satisfaction" that comes from your actions, then what you are talking about is just a different name for the feeling that you get from that work.

The real heart of the matter is whether the Platonists and others were right to label only agreeable immediate sensory stimulation as pleasure and disagreeable immediate sensory stimulation as pain. Epicurus goes right to the heart of the matter and says that it is the *feeling* that is the ultimate way to decide, not your "intellectual" assessment of it by some abstract logical standard.

And it is equally important to say that we aren't playing simple word games with "pleasure." Sometimes it can sound like that because we have first-world attitudes privileges that lead us to think that rearranging our kitchens and our recipes to produce maximum eating pleasure is all we need to worry about.

Epicurus was a *philosopher*, not a cook or a medical doctor. The big issues that drive the world in his time and in ours are the ultimate questions of whether (1) there are supernatural gods, (2) whether there is life after death with reward or punishment, (3) whether there are logical absolute ideals, or (4) whether there is only what Nature gives us directly by which we should live.

Epicurus held that if we want to deal with reality then (1), (2), and (3) are out of the question, as they simply do not exist given the nature of the universe. That leaves us with (4) which resolves down to "feeling" and it ultimately makes sense to realize that there are really only two types of feelings, those that are agreeable (Pleasure) and those that are disagreeable (Pain).

We're talking in this thread in very precise medical terms as if Epicurus were standing over our shoulder pointing out specific things to do and not to do, even though he lived 2000 years ago and had no idea of the technology we have and the way we live today. Certainly he had specific pieces of advice to the effect that seeking unlimited power, unlimited money, unlimited fame, or to live forever are unattainable and will be damaging if we make them our goals. We can derive a lot of useful "life coach" information from what he had to say.

But if you skip over the ultimate philosophical war in favor of the clinical details then you never understand the big picture. The big picture is FIRST that these false guides of life do not exist. That in itself is a very heavy lift for most people. The flag that Epicurus raises is indeed called "Pleasure" but that's a generic term for agreeable mental and bodily feelings, and those do exist, and they stand in the same rank and compete with the alternatives of supernatural gods and ideal forms and "logic" and "virtue" and things like that which either do not exist or are at best tools for something else.

In the end it's very possible to reconcile "satisfaction" and "worthwhile things" etc etc with "pleasure," and if you spend time with Epicurus you will see how he does that.

What's *NOT* possible to reconcile with Epicurus is supernatural gods, and ideal forms, and essences and logical abstractions and any other sort of absolutist things or principles that can tell us what to do.

The title of Lucretius' Poem is generally translated as "The Nature of Things" -- but Rolphe Humphries translates it as "The Way Things Are" and I'd say also something like "The Nature of Reality" are more indicative of what is really at stake.

Atoms and void and all the theories that come from them give us ways to come to terms with reality, and that's the first and most important goal. Once you orient yourself to the reality that the only guide you have is the physical pleasure and pain that Nature gives you, it's relatively easy to come up with a rational pleasure and pain analysis of all the rest. But the nature of reality is the place to start -- the ethics follow from that.

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All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

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In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

"Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt

The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.

"On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"

"Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky

The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."

Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section

Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section

The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation

A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright

Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus

Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

"The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

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Braintobeing - I am driving so this is brief but others can expand. Epicurus advised exactly what you are doing. The issue is the definition of pleasure, and Epicurus used a much more sweeping definition of pleasure than just immediate sensory stimulation. Your longer term goals are just as much under pleasure (because you find them desirable) than immediate satisfaction.

I also want to spend more time on what Tau Phi is saying but I suspect I differ with (or would say differently) what I am reading as "more or less" pleasure and pain. I think the weighing of relative pleasures and pains is essential to Epicurus. That's what allows us to agree that putting aside short term pleasures, or even accepting pains, is worthwhile in terms of the ultimate greater pleasure and lesser pain.

But the big issue here is the definition of pleasure, and Epicurus says life is desirable and that if the experience of life that we are talking about is not a pain, then whatever the experience is and no matter how removed it may be from immediate bodily sensory stimulation, it still deserves to be called pleasure.

This is readily observable in reading Cicero's on ends. What Cicero objected to is that everyone calls agreeable immediate bodily stimulation "pleasure," but Epicurus innovated and extended the word pleasure to all non-painful experiences of life.

That extension is what Cicero objected to but it is how the ancients were reading Epicurus when he wrote PD03 and "By pleasure we mean the absence of plain."

Thank you for your work in producing this Kalosyni! Since it's a just a brief video for use on the front page of the channel it's not extremely detailed, but it sure is a lot better than what was there before, and having a "regular person" sound adds a lot too. In the future I would like to see us do a lot more multimedia like that since it generally produces much longer lasting benefits than just text. Even short and simple videos can have a big impact.

Sounds reasonable as a general priority, but I would question whether it is really that easy to segment things. Death as an example of things that cannot be changed in the long run can still be affected by planning for the time and manner you encounter it. So even as to things beyond your control you still plan for them (for example life insurance is sometimes appropriate).

I wonder whether it's not more practical to line things up in order of significance in terms of pain and pleasure, and then to deal with them in that order (considering whether they can be changed or not as part of the analysis)?

Yes that's the lettter to Menoeceus:

[133] For indeed who, think you, is a better man than he who holds reverent opinions concerning the gods, and is at all times free from fear of death, and has reasoned out the end ordained by nature? He understands that the limit of good things is easy to fulfill and easy to attain, whereas the course of ills is either short in time or slight in pain; he laughs at (destiny), whom some have introduced as the mistress of all things. (He thinks that with us lies the chief power in determining events, some of which happen by necessity) and some by chance, and some are within our control; for while necessity cannot be called to account, he sees that chance is inconstant, but that which is in our control is subject to no master, and to it are naturally attached praise and blame.

[134] For, indeed, it were better to follow the myths about the gods than to become a slave to the destiny of the natural philosophers: for the former suggests a hope of placating the gods by worship, whereas the latter involves a necessity which knows no placation. As to chance, he does not regard it as a god as most men do (for in a god’s acts there is no disorder), nor as an uncertain cause (of all things) for he does not believe that good and evil are given by chance to man for the framing of a blessed life, but that opportunities for great good and great evil are afforded by it.

[135] He believes that the misfortune of the wise is better than the prosperity of the fool. It is better, in short, that what is well judged in action should not owe its successful issue to the aid of chance. [1]

Quote from frank1syl

In other words, the things in our power are mental abilities and capacities.

While I would agree with that generally there's also a limit to that: Diogenes Laertius X-117: "But before considering it let us explain what he and his followers think about the wise man. ... He will be more deeply moved by feelings, but this will not prove an obstacle to wisdom. A man cannot become wise with every kind of physical constitution, nor in every nation."

Quote from frank1syl

But, taking my cue from the Stoics, the way to lessen mental pain is to realize that this is an area in which we have considerable power, and to focus on our mental capacities and abilities, rather than external events or circumstances, is the best way to approach mental pain

I'd agree that certainly the way to deal with mental pain is to focus on the cause of the mental pain and to work as hard as possible to fix the conditions that led to it. The problems with the Stoics is that they seem to focus on simply by force of will convincing yourself that the pain is not significant, or is a matter of indifference, and that approach can conflict with working to to change the condition that caused it. In the case of two of the most significant pains of life, fear of the gods and fear of death, Stoic physics is an absolute barrier to arriving at what Epicureans consider the truth to be -- that neither are a cause for fear or concern in the first place.

What this reminds me of is the constant interplay between Stoics and Epicureans as to virtue. Epicureans do not deprecate the virtues, such as prudence and wisdom and all the rest. Epicureans simply see the virtues as tools to an end and not an end in themselves.

In the example your giving about focusing on what is within control vs outside control I see the same issue. Yes it's obvious to everyone that some external events are beyond our control, but it should be equally obvious that some ARE within our control, and the first step of proper action would be to make that distinction and act on the ones that can be acted on, not fixate on the fact that those within our total control (our minds) are all that is important.

As in many of these comparisons you can seem to end up in a similar place at time, but the Stoic worldview if followed consistently would never get you to a pleasurable life, because no matter how the modern stoics work to water it down, true Stoicism holds pleasure in contempt and values nothing but "virtue" as the proper end.

I think a lot of people tend to look for the commonalities and then stop because they don't want to go further, as they sense the ultimate issue. Just like we're discussing in the podcast right now, the question of pleasure vs virtue underlies everything else:

Quote from Cicero in On Ends Book 2

So setting aside the systems of ail the rest, there remains a contest not between me and Torquatus, but between virtue and pleasure: a contest of which Chrysippus, a man both shrewd and careful, does not think lightly, for he considers that the entire decision about the supreme good is involved in the opposition between these things.

Quote from BrainToBeing

And, I was wondering if, particularly in this era of the planet, we can really say that searching for "a happy life" is going to save us all from the ecological and technological dilemmas we are creating.

Somehow I missed this part of the discussion earlier today so that's why I didn't comment already. Godfrey and Don answered it well but this sentence gives an opportunity to point out that most of us would probably say that saving ourselves and future generations would indeed be a major concern in looking to live a happy life -- unless we like the idea of living on a polluted and ecologically devastated planet! No doubt there are some contrarians who would say that they wouldn't care about that, but that's the kind of attitude that simply refuses to see that virtue is not its own reward, and that we want out of life is the broad kind of "good feeling" that ultimately resolves to falling under the term "pleasure."

I realized that a limitation of the outline generator I am using that looks best in "portrait" mode (for phones) is that the text on the page is not easily searchable if the outline is not expanded. Here's a version where a word-search on the page works much more easily. The collapsible version now has a link at the top of the page which will take you to this "alternate" page view.

This is *definitely* a question of great interest. Many people come to Epicurean philosophy thinking he is focused on "bodily" pain, and it's a surprise to find that he puts equal or really greater stock in the mental side.

I file sure anything you'd offer on pain would be of great interest here so thanks for offering!!

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Just for what it's worth I've reached a sort of milestone today of getting at least one citation in the outline for each of the major bullet points. In most cases I have several, but there's definitely a lot more to add.

After stops and starts through the years this version of the outline has built on past efforts and on contributions of citations from lots of people, and I'll work to continue to expand it and make it available in different formats.

Thanks for the contributions so far as I think this will be very useful over time.

Epicurean Philosophy Navigation Map

On my list of things to do is to figure out how to add what I think is a "meta" tag that will provide a link to a "snapshot" picture of the outline, so that when the above link is shared those browsers that know how to it will provide a snapshot (maybe it's called a card view or something like that) rather than a raw URL.

Seems to work now on Twitter and Facebook but not here yet --

Epicurus to Menoeceus: [129] And for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good. And since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time. Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided.

Torquatus In Cicero's On Ends, Book One, X - But I must explain to you how all this mistaken idea of reprobating pleasure and extolling pain arose. To do so, I will give you a complete account of the system, and expound the actual teachings of the great explorer of the truth, the master-builder of human happiness. No one rejects, dislikes or avoids pleasure itself, because it is pleasure, but because those who do not know how to pursue pleasure rationally encounter consequences that are extremely painful. Nor again is there anyone who loves or pursues or desires to obtain pain of itself, because it is pain, but because occasionally circumstances occur in which toil and pain can procure him some great pleasure. To take a trivial example, which of us ever undertakes laborious physical exercise, except to obtain some advantage from it? But who has any right to find fault with a man who chooses to enjoy a pleasure that has no annoying consequences, or one who avoids a pain that produces no resultant pleasure? On the other hand, we denounce with righteous indignation and dislike men who are so beguiled and demoralized by the charms of the pleasure of the moment, so blinded by desire, that they cannot foresee the pain and trouble that are bound to ensue; and equal blame belongs to those who fail in their duty through weakness of will, which is the same as saying through shrinking from toil and pain. These cases are perfectly simple and easy to distinguish. In a free hour, when our power of choice is untrammeled and when nothing prevents our being able to do what we like best, every pleasure is to be welcomed and every pain avoided. But in certain emergencies and owing to the claims of duty or the obligations of business it will frequently occur that pleasures have to be repudiated and annoyances accepted. The wise man therefore always holds in these matters to this principle of selection: he rejects pleasures to secure other greater pleasures, or else he endures pains to avoid worse pains.

Epicurus Letter To Herodotus - [40] - And if there were not that which we term void and place and intangible existence, bodies would have nowhere to exist and nothing through which to move, as they are seen to move. And besides these two, nothing can even be thought of either by conception or on the analogy of things conceivable such as could be grasped as whole existences and not spoken of as the accidents or properties of such existences. Furthermore, among bodies some are compounds, and others those of which compounds are formed.

Lucretius Book One (Bailey Edition)

[329] And yet all things are not held close pressed on every side by the nature of body; for there is void in things. To have learnt this will be of profit to you in dealing with many things; it will save you from wandering in doubt and always questioning about the sum of things, and distrusting my words. There is then a void, mere space untouchable and empty. For if there were not, by no means could things move; for that which is the office of body, to offend and hinder, would at every moment be present to all things; nothing, therefore, could advance, since nothing could give the example of yielding place. But as it is, through seas and lands and the high tracts of heaven, we descry many things by many means moving in diverse ways before our eyes, which, if there were not void, would not so much be robbed and baulked of restless motion, but rather could in no way have been born at all, since matter would on every side be in close-packed stillness.

[346] Again, however solid things may be thought to be, yet from this you can discern that they are of rare body. In rocky caverns the liquid moisture of water trickles through, and all weeps with copious dripping: food spreads itself this way and that into the body of every living thing: trees grow and thrust forth their fruit in due season, because the food is dispersed into every part of them from the lowest roots through the stems and all the branches. Noises creep through walls and fly through the shut places in the house, stiffening cold works its way to the bones: but were there no empty spaces, along which each of these bodies might pass, you would not see this come to pass by any means.

[358] Again, why do we see one thing surpass another in weight, when its size is no whit bigger? For if there is as much body in a bale of wool as in lead, it is natural it should weigh as much, since ’tis the office of body to press all things downwards, but on the other hand the nature of void remains without weight. So because it is just as big, yet seems lighter, it tells us, we may be sure, that it has more void; but on the other hand the heavier thing avows that there is more body in it and that it contains far less empty space within. Therefore, we may be sure, that which we are seeking with keen reasoning, does exist mingled in things—that which we call void.

[370] Herein lest that which some vainly imagine should avail to lead you astray from the truth, I am constrained to forestall it. They say that the waters give place to the scaly creatures as they press forward and open up a liquid path, because the fishes leave places behind, to which the waters may flow together as they yield: and that even so other things too can move among themselves and change place, albeit the whole is solid. In very truth this is all believed on false reasoning. For whither, I ask, will the scaly creatures be able to move forward, unless the waters have left an empty space? again, whither will the waters be able to give place, when the fishes cannot go forward? either then we must deny motion to every body, or we must say that void is mixed with things, from which each thing can receive the first start of movement.

[384] Lastly, if two broad bodies leap asunder quickly from a meeting, surely it must needs be that air seizes upon all the void, which comes to be between the bodies. Still, however rapid the rush with which it streams together as its currents hasten round, yet in one instant the whole empty space cannot be filled: for it must needs be that it fills each place as it comes, and then at last all the room is taken up. But if by chance any one thinks that when bodies have leapt apart, then this comes to be because the air condenses, he goes astray; for in that case that becomes empty which was not so before, and again that is filled which was empty before, nor can air condense in such a way, nor, if indeed it could, could it, I trow, without void draw into itself and gather into one all its parts.

[398] Wherefore, however long you hang back with much objection, you must needs confess at last that there is void in things. And besides by telling you many an instance, I can heap up proof for my words. But these light footprints are enough for a keen mind: by them you may detect the rest for yourself. For as dogs ranging over mountains often find by scent the lairs of wild beasts shrouded under leafage, when once they are set on sure traces of their track, so for yourself you will be able in such themes as this to see one thing after another, to win your way to all the secret places and draw out the truth thence. But if you are slack or shrink a little from my theme, this I can promise you, Memmius, on my own word: so surely will my sweet tongue pour forth to you bounteous draughts from the deep well-springs out of the treasures of my heart, that I fear lest sluggish age creep over our limbs and loosen within us the fastenings of life, before that the whole store of proofs on one single theme be launched in my verses into your ears.

[418] But now, to weave again at the web, which is the task of my discourse, all nature then, as it is of itself, is built of these two things: for there are bodies and the void, in which they are placed and where they move hither and thither. For that body exists is declared by the feeling which all share alike; and unless faith in this feeling be firmly grounded at once and prevail, there will be naught to which we can make appeal about things hidden, so as to prove aught by the reasoning of the mind. And next, were there not room and empty space, which we call void, nowhere could bodies be placed, nor could they wander at all hither and thither in any direction; and this I have above shown to you but a little while before.

[430] Besides these there is nothing which you could say is parted from all body and sundered from void, which could be discovered, as it were a third nature in the list. For whatever shall exist, must needs be something in itself; and if it suffer touch, however small and light, it will increase the count of body by a bulk great or maybe small, if it exists at all, and be added to its sum. But if it is not to be touched, inasmuch as it cannot on any side check anything from wandering through it and passing on its way, in truth it will be that which we call empty void. Or again, whatsoever exists by itself, will either do something or suffer itself while other things act upon it, or it will be such that things may exist and go on in it. But nothing can do or suffer without body, nor afford room again, unless it be void and empty space. And so besides void and bodies no third nature by itself can be left in the list of things, which might either at any time fall within the purview of our senses, or be grasped by any one through reasoning of the mind.

Welcome to Episode 205 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

This week we continue our discussion of Book Two of Cicero's On Ends, which is largely devoted Cicero's attack on Epicurean Philosophy. Going through this book gives us the opportunity to review those attacks, take them apart, and respond to them as an ancient Epicurean might have done, and much more fully than Cicero allowed Torquatus, his Epicurean spokesman, to do.

Follow along with us here: Cicero's On Ends - Complete Reid Edition. Check any typos or other questions against the original PDF which can be found here.

This week we move on to the middle of Section XIV, starting roughly here:

CIcero says: ... Well, by what is moral we understand something of such a nature that, even if absolutely deprived of utility, it may with justice be eulogized for its own qualities, apart from all rewards or advantages. Now the nature of this object cannot be so easily understood from the definition I have adopted (though to a considerable extent it can) as from the general verdict of all mankind, and the inclinations and actions of all the best men, who do very many things for the sole reason that they are seemly, right and moral, though they see that no profit will follow. Men indeed, while differing in many other points from brutes, differ especially in this, that they possess reason as a gift of nature, and a sharp and powerful intellect, which carries on with the utmost speed many operations at the same moment, and is, if I may so speak, keen- scented, for it discerns the causes of phenomena and their results, and abstracts their common features, gets together scattered facts, and links the future with the present, and brings within its ken the entire condition of life in its future course. And this same reason has given man a yearning for his fellow men, and an agreement with them based on nature and language and intercourse, so that starting from affection for those of his own household and his own kin, he gradually takes wider range and connects himself by fellowship first with his countrymen, then with the whole human race, and, as Plato wrote to Archytas, bears in mind that he was not born for him-self alone, but for his fatherland and his kindred, so that only a slight part of his existence remains for himself. And seeing that nature again has implanted in man a passion for gazing upon the truth, as is seen very clearly when, being free from anxieties, we long to know even what takes place in the sky; so led on by these instincts we love all forms of truth, I mean all things trustworthy, candid and consistent, while we hate things unsound, insincere and deceptive, for instance cheating, perjury, spite, injustice. Reason again brings with it a rich and splendid spirit, suited to command rather than obedience, regarding all that may happen to man as not only endurable, but even inconsiderable, a certain lofty and exalted spirit, which fears nothing, bows to none, and is ever unconquerable. And now that we have marked out these three classes of things moral, there follows a fourth endued with the same loveliness and dependent on the other three; in this is comprised the spirit of orderliness and self-control. When the analogies of this spirit have been recognized in the beauty and grandeur of outward shapes, a man advances to the display of moral beauty in his words and deeds. For in consequence of the three classes of meritorious qualities which I mentioned before, he shrinks from reckless conduct, and does not venture to inflict injury by either a petulant word or action, and dreads to do or utter anything which seems unworthy of a man.

Added under the second bullet point of the Canonics section:

Diogenes Laertius 31: "Thus in The Canon Epicurus says that the tests of truth are the sensations and anticipations and the feelings; the Epicureans add to these the intuitive apprehensions of the mind." Direct perceptions of the mind (phantastikai epibolai tes dianoias) are mentioned in the Letter to Herodotus [51] and Principal Doctrine #24, but the remaining texts are unclear as to how direct perceptions of the mind relate to the sensations (aistheseis), anticipations (prolepseis), and feelings (pathe).

Thanks Tau Phi.

Great suggestion and I will add that in!