Posts by Cassius

In a companion thread we are mentioning Sisyphus, and this thread will be the place to explore that in more depth so we have a thread to cite in the future.

I know Lucretius mentions him but we need to start earlier to get the back story.

Lots of good material to discuss coming from this. We need a thread specifically on Sisyphus, so I will set that up.

Thread

The Meaning Of the Story of Sisyphus

In a companion thread we are mentioning Sisyphus, and this thread will be the place to explore that in more depth so we have a thread to cite in the future.

I know Lucretius mentions him but we need to start earlier to get the back story.

Cassius

July 5, 2024 at 12:52 PM

Please don't take these or my prior remarks as being unfriendly, because I do not mean them in that way at all. All of us have gone through different philosophies in the past and we would not be here now if we have not.

Having said that, this is an Epicurean forum, and not a generalist philosophy group where all philosophies are equally "respected" and discussed dispassionately. And therefore I would say:

Quote from UnPaid_Landlord

As I understand it, it's more about accepting the reality with it's absurd nature and still living passionately

This is exactly the point in issue --- life does NOT have an absurd nature, from my point of view, and from what I read of Epicurus, he would say the same. Giving in on the question of whether "life is absurd" and not challenging that perspective is to give up the issue at the beginning.

Quote from UnPaid_Landlord

but I think it need not be a pessimistic philosophy, I don't why some people just misunderstand many things as negative, for example I have personally met some fellows who think Buddhism is really negative and pessimistic, and I can't understand what them at all,

Same perspective here, but in the reverse. I DO see Buddhism as essentially negative and pessimistic, and I cannot understand at all why someone would view it otherwise.

To repeat, we have all gone through different phases and perspectives and I don't make these statements to be argumentative. If we didn't have discussions with people who come to Epicurean discussion with different views, then we'd never give anyone the opportunity to engage with pro-Epicurean positions and potentially change their minds.

But we would not be an Epicurean forum if we did not --- at the same time that we welcome people who are not currently in tune with Epicuruean views - state clearly how we see Epicurus' views compare with others, and if we did not advocate for Epicurus' position, rather than accept very contradictory positions as if they were equally valid.

In this thread we're focusing on Absurdism and digging directly into the negative aspects, and it is unfortunate that we're doing so without having first engaged with you (talking to Unpaid_Landord) on the commonalities between what you're saying and Epicurus. I hope that you'll not get such an immediate bad impression from this thread that you don't continue to keep an open mind about this forum and Epicurus in general.

I don't think Epicurus would advise starting out tacking divisive subjects immediately, so this turn of discussion is probably unfortunate. But I think Epicurus would say that when clear issues arise, and others are watching (this is a public forum that anyone can read) it's best not to gloss over and defer deep issues for a later time that may never come. That's one reason why so much of the preliminary materials on this website that people go through in the registration process are geared toward putting such issues front and center, so they get discussed early.

If someone were to ask me: "Give me a cite to an Epicurean or someone writing about Epicurus who says something like the rant you just wrote" my first response would be Frances Wright in Chapter 10 of A Few Days In Athens. I think this section does a great job of capturing the flavor of what is explicit and implicit in the surviving texts, and which rejects the nihilism and absurdism and similar modern "isms':

A reasonable-length excerpt from that to quote here would be:

Quote from Frances Wright - A Few Days in Athens

Should we, then, to avoid the evil, forego the good? Shall we shut love from our hearts, that we may not feel the pain of his departure? No; happiness forbids it. Experience forbids it. Let him who hath laid on the pyre the dearest of his soul, who hath washed the urn with the bitterest tears of grief — let him say if his heart hath ever formed the wish that it had never shrined within it him whom he now deplores. Let him say if the pleasures of the sweet communion of his former days doth not still live in his remembrance. If he love not to recall the image of the departed, the tones of his voice, the words of his discourse, the deeds of his kindness, the amiable virtues of his life. If, while he weeps the loss of his friend, he smiles not to think that he once possessed him. He who knows not friendship, knows not the purest pleasure of earth. Yet if fate deprive us of it, though we grieve, we do not sink; Philosophy is still at hand, and she upholds us with fortitude. And think, my sons, perhaps in the very evil we dread, there is a good; perhaps the very uncertainty of the tenure gives it value in our eyes; perhaps all our pleasures take their zest from the known possibility of their interruption. What were the glories of the sun, if we knew not the gloom of darkness? What the refreshing breezes of morning and evening, if we felt not the fervors of noon? Should we value the lovely-flower, if it bloomed eternally; or the luscious fruit, if it hung always on the bough? Are not the smiles of the heavens more beautiful in contrast with their frowns, and the delights of the seasons more grateful from their vicissitudes? Let us then be slow to blame nature, for perhaps in her apparent errors there is hidden a wisdom. Let us not quarrel with fate, for perhaps in our evils lie the seeds of our good. Were our body never subject to sickness, we might be insensible to the joy of health. Were our life eternal, our tranquillity might sink into inaction. Were our friendship not threatened with interruption, it might want much of its tenderness. This, then, my sons, is our duty, for this is our interest and our happiness; to seek our pleasures from the hands of the virtues, and for the pain which may befall us, to submit to it with patience, or bear up against it with fortitude. To walk, in short, through life innocently and tranquilly; and to look on death as its gentle termination, which it becomes us to meet with ready minds, neither regretting the past, nor anxious for the future.”

Note: As per earlier commentary on Wright by me and others here on the forum, it is questionable whether it is necessary to go down the road of arguing philosophically that the "good would not exist but for the bad." However as a practical argument to focus the mind that we have to make choices and set our own attitudes, and that we might not understand the pleasure so well without the experience of pain, I think this argument in Chapter 10 works extremely well.

Here's more commentary on what I perceive to be one of the larger problems this discussion brings up. I'm not criticizing Camus, because I don't know that he himself took these positions. But this is based on what I would expect the word "Absurdism" to convey to the average man-on-the-street in 2024 English.

The meaning I get from the term "absurdism" is:

"When I look at the world I see horror and injustice and sadness all around, sprinkled with a few dots of pleasure that are ridiculously insignificant in comparison with the pain. I don't think it's worth worrying about whether I can explore nature and understand the way the world works so as to reduce the pain and increase the pleasure. The horror and sadness are so overwhelming that there is no alternative but wall it off from my mind and paper over the wall with an attitude of considering everything to be "Absurd." That way I don't have to think about taking responsibility for my role in the problem, or for the fact that it is *my* assessment that the world is such a horrible place. I will just occupy my mind with thinking how useless and absurd the universe is and how insignificant I am and just do the best I can to survive."

If I were to rewrite that from what I would expect Epicurus to say, it would be something like:

"When I look at the world I see both terrible and beautiful things. I also see Nature as the originator of everything, and I see that nature has no intention to create things that I think are horrible. I see that Nature works through regular and understandable means, and that tells me that I can work *with* nature to increase the number of things that I see that are pleasing, and to reduce the number of things that I find to be sad. I do that because I see that the pleasing things in life are far more significant and important to me than the painful things, and I see that I can have an effect upon my world and that I have a limited time within which to experience and increase pleasure and minimize those parts that painful. The pleasure I get from the pleasing aspects of life so far outweighs the painful that I am more than happy to choose the painful, at time, so that my overall life contains more pleasure. I will therefore explore nature and work to understand the way the world works so as to reduce the pain and increase the pleasure that I find in it. The last thing I will do is close my mind to facts and laugh at the seriousness of my desire to obtain pleasure or eliminate pain. And since nature is what it is, and I have the power to assess it pleasurably, even though some who call themselves "absurdists" assess it negatively, I will take responsibility for seeing that so long as I am alive and can experience life with more pleasure than pain, then I will see life as pleasurable to me, and do everything I can to stay alive to enjoy it as long as I can. I will do the best I can, not resigning that I have no hope to succeed, but confident that I do have the free will and ability to live happily even though I know I will encounter pain along the way. And I will hold in contempt those who are so "otherworldly" minded that they rebel against the way things are and label it "absurd."

Just to be clear despite my initial negative remarks I do think this thread will be very helpful. It sounds like the questions everyone is asking are very logical and exploring this will lead to identification of why Camus (and maybe Nietzsche too) seemed to drift "away" from Epicurus. So far in my book this issue stems from seeing Epicurus as "sad" and "retreating" (which i would argue is extremely mistaken) and is at the core of many problems.

Both Camus and Nietzsche seem to have some very good points, but my current speculation would be that when they ran into the "absence of pain" problem, rather than rejecting the orthodox academic interpretation of Epicurus, they dropped Epicurus hlmself. They should have embraced the interpretation preserved through Torquatus that life in the "absence of pain" IS pleasurable -- and that this position is logical, straightforward, and without any hint of irony or sarcasm or logical double-dealing or word-gaming.

Rather than interpret Epicurus sympathetically, they decided that Epicurus was essentially a deeply sad and fragile "snowflake" (need another synonym there to avoid the current political overtones of that word) who adopted as his primary goal in life that of walling himself up in a garden so as to flee from every drop of pain. That's the problem interpretation we are regularly running into, and for Epicurus to be seen as life-affirming and happy and positive, that interpretation has to be combated and exposed as erroneous.

From Wikipedia, i find this to be an interesting and appealingly practical quotation from Camus. This and some of the other material about his later life doesn't sound to me like someone who was totally dedicated to framing life itself as "absurd." I presume like everyone else, Camus was a complicated figure:

Quote

In one, often misquoted incident, Camus confronted an Algerian critic during his 1957 Nobel Prize acceptance speech in Stockholm, rejecting the false equivalence of justice with revolutionary terrorism: "People are now planting bombs in the tramways of Algiers. My mother might be on one of those tramways. If that is justice, then I prefer my mother.

Quote from Little Rocker

Because I suspect Epicurus is truly concerned to find a response to that particular absurdist worry.

Having now finished the paper, and not finding more so far on Camus talking about Epicurus directly, I very much agree with this statement. At this point Epicurean philosophy does not appear to me to be in any way similar to Absurdism, it is the cure for Absurdism.

This article would lead me to believe that Camus has picked up fully on the aged and deteriorated side of Nietzsche's views of Epicurus without any of Nietzsche's appreciation for Epicurus' battle against otherworldism that Nietzsche seemed to appreciate in Epicurus and Lucretius. My assessment of Nietzsche is that N. bought into this same view of Epicurus as someone who was running in fear of pain, which I reject entirely, rather than as a crusading reformer against felonious philosophy in which "absence of pain" is completely synonymous with pleasure, and a recognition that life can be and is and should be viewed as pleasure itself - and the opposite of "absurd."

I will be very interested to see what else people might come up with in regard to Camus, but these quotes from Don's article indicate to me that Camus was as far from being an Epicurean as one could possibly be. Just based on this I would say that Epicurus's attitude toward Camus might parallel his attitude toward determinism, in that there would be little worse than looking at life with "dreadful sadness," and that it would be better to believe in the untrue myths of the gods than to look at life this way:

Quote

The starting point for Camus’ analysis is Epicurus’ “dreadful sadness” (85).

Camus believes that “anxious fear of death” is the root of Epicurus’ sadness.

It is clear from this interpretive summary that Camus’ Epicurus is not a metaphysical rebel. His repressed fear and bitterness lead to ratiocinative defense mechanisms, not open condemnation of the universe and its makers.

His physics and ethics extinguish desire for joy the world cannot provide, while hardening the body against suffering; and his theology eliminates hope.

I find nothing whatsoever "sad" about Epicurus' ultimate viewpoint on life, and I see Epicurus' conclusions as the ultimate rejection of sadness as the proper attitude toward it. Calling something absurd can be very useful, and I can see Epicurus liking that word, but as a weapon against the false philosophies and religions, not as a summary as one's attitude toward life.

Of course the writer of this article could be misinterpreting Camus, so I'll suspend judgment pending more information.

Lots of good information. Thank you Matteng!

Thank you Don! That Sextus Empiricus reference is particularly interesting and helpful!

Thanks for the outline and it is a very good first post. My only comment to start out with would be as to this part:

Quote from UnPaid_Landlord

What is the Goal of Epicureanism?

It's Aponia and Atraxia, basically a body free of pain and a mind free of trouble,

The highest pleasure itself is Aponia and Atraxia, the limit of pleasure is reached when we attain it.

Yes I think each sentence there is pretty much true, but just as you've commented on the tension between modern Science and Epicurean metaphysics, I'd suggest similar caution on the relationship between "Pleasure" and "Aponia" and "Ataraxia." Ultimately Epicurus identified the highest good as "Pleasure," and while the ideal and goal is certainly be to be as *totally* free of mental and bodily pain as possible, one important phrase I think you will see cited here a lot is to not let "the perfect be the enemy of the good."

Some people get puzzled by the relationship between the Greek words and the practical day to day seeking to maximize pleasure and minimize pain, so if you have any concerns about that please be sure to bring them up.

Again, welcome to the forum, and we look forward to getting to know you better.

UnPaid_Landlord thanks for posting your outline here: Unpaid_Landlord's personal outline

In addition, please circle back and respond to this thread when you get a chance.

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All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

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In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

"Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt

The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.

"On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"

"Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky

The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."

Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section

Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section

The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation

A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright

Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus

Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

"The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).

Welcome to the forum!

Welcome to Episode 236 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com.

For our new listeners, let me remind you of several ground rules for both our podcast and our forum.

First: Our aim is to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it.

Second: We won't be talking about modern political issues in this podcast. How you apply Epicurus in your own life is of course entirely up to you. We call this approach "Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean." Epicurean philosophy is a philosophy of its own, it's not the same as Stoicism, Humanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Atheism, Libertarianism or Marxism - it is unique and must be understood on its own, not in terms of any conventional modern morality.

Third: One of the most important things to keep in mind is that the Epicureans often used words very differently than we do today. To the Epicureans, Gods were not omnipotent or omniscient, so Epicurean references to "Gods" do not mean at all the same thing as in major religions today. In the Epicurean theory of knowledge, all sensations are true, but that does not mean all opinions are true, but that the raw data reported by the senses is reported without the injection of opinion, as the opinion-making process takes place in the mind, where it is subject to mistakes, rather than in the senses. In Epicurean ethics, "Pleasure" refers not ONLY to sensory stimulation, but also to every experience of life which is not felt to be painful. The classical texts show that Epicurus was not focused on luxury, like some people say, but neither did he teach minimalism, as other people say. Epicurus taught that all experiences of life fall under one of two feelings - pleasure and pain - and those feelings -- and not gods, idealism, or virtue - are the guides that Nature gave us by which to live. More than anything else, Epicurus taught that the universe is not supernatural in any way, and that means there's no life after death, and any happiness we'll ever have comes in THIS life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion.

Today we are continuing to review the Epicurean sections of Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," as presented by the Epicurean spokesman Velleius. We will continue with Section 18 and begin moving into 19.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here at Archive.org. The text which we include in these posts is available here. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of arguments presented will eventually be put together here.

Today's Text

XIX. Surely the mighty power of the Infinite Being is most worthy our great and earnest contemplation; the nature of which we must necessarily understand to be such that everything in it is made to correspond completely to some other answering part. This is called by Epicurus ἰσονομία; that is to say, an equal distribution or even disposition of things. From hence he draws this inference, that, as there is such a vast multitude of mortals, there cannot be a less number of immortals; and if those which perish are innumerable, those which are preserved ought also to be countless. Your sect, Balbus, frequently ask us how the Gods live, and how they pass their time? Their life is the most happy, and the most abounding with all kinds of blessings, which can be conceived. They do nothing. They are embarrassed with no business; nor do they perform any work. They rejoice in the possession of their own wisdom and virtue. They are satisfied that they shall ever enjoy the fulness of eternal pleasures.

XX. Such a Deity may properly be called happy; but yours is a most laborious God. For let us suppose the world a Deity—what can be a more uneasy state than, without the least cessation, to be whirled about the axle-tree of heaven with a surprising celerity? But nothing can be happy that is not at ease. Or let us suppose a Deity residing in the world, who directs and governs it, who preserves the courses of the stars, the changes of the seasons, and the vicissitudes and orders of things, surveying the earth and the sea, and accommodating them to the advantage and necessities of man. Truly this Deity is embarrassed with a very troublesome and laborious office. We make a happy life to consist in a tranquillity of mind, a perfect freedom from care, and an exemption from all employment. The philosopher from whom we received all our knowledge has taught us that the world was made by nature; that there was no occasion for a workhouse to frame it in; and that, though you deny the possibility of such a work without divine skill, it is so easy to her, that she has made, does make, and will make innumerable worlds. But, because you do not conceive that nature is able to produce such effects without some rational aid, you are forced, like the tragic poets, when you cannot wind up your argument in any other way, to have recourse to a Deity, whose assistance you would not seek, if you could view that vast and unbounded magnitude of regions in all parts; where the mind, extending and spreading itself, travels so far and wide that it can find no end, no extremity to stop at. In this immensity of breadth, length, and height, a most boundless company of innumerable atoms are fluttering about, which, notwithstanding the interposition of a void space, meet and cohere, and continue clinging to one another; and by this union these modifications and forms of things arise, which, in your opinions, could not possibly be made without the help of bellows and anvils. Thus you have imposed on us an eternal master, whom we must dread day and night. For who can be free from fear of a Deity who foresees, regards, and takes notice of everything; one who thinks all things his own; a curious, ever-busy God?

Hence first arose your Εἱμαρμένη, as you call it, your fatal necessity; so that, whatever happens, you affirm that it flows from an eternal chain and continuance of causes. Of what value is this philosophy, which, like old women and illiterate men, attributes everything to fate? Then follows your μαντικὴ, in Latin called divinatio, divination; which, if we would listen to you, would plunge us into such superstition that we should fall down and worship your inspectors into sacrifices, your augurs, your soothsayers, your prophets, and your fortune-tellers.

Epicurus having freed us from these terrors and restored us to liberty, we have no dread of those beings whom we have reason to think entirely free from all trouble themselves, and who do not impose any on others. We pay our adoration, indeed, with piety and reverence to that essence which is above all excellence and perfection. But I fear my zeal for this doctrine has made me too prolix. However, I could not easily leave so eminent and important a subject unfinished, though I must confess I should rather endeavor to hear than speak so long.

Episode 235 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week we deal move ahead with Velleius's presentation of the proleptic basis for the Epicurean view of divinity.

Quote from Don

On the other, I'm trying to shoehorn a 2,000+ year old round peg into a modern neuroscience square hole. The understanding of Epicurus's perspective is interesting, valuable, and worthwhile from a philosophical and historical perspective but I'm skeptical if it's possible to "translate" that perspective and connect it to a modern neuroscience understanding of the brain, perception, sensation, etc.

i'm not focusing on you or this discussion with this comment, but yes I think you've put your finger on a big problem. Epicurus wasn't working in our current framework and I'd say we need to first understand Epicurus in his own terms before we can even begin to apply what he said to another framework.

But to repeat this isn't a problem of individuals in this discussion, I think the entire history of Epicurus is warped almost beyond recognition by trying to interpret him in terms of ideas that he never thought or considered plausible. Epicurus was working in the framework that had been put in place by Plato and others well before his time, and it's going to be more revealing to compare him to what came *before* than to what came *after*.

I'd say that much of the frustration that we find in disagreements about Epicurus among commentators comes from that attempt to force him into Stoic or Buddhist or modern psychology frameworks. We can and should do that, but *after* we're confident of Epicurus's views, not before.

Done Joshua -- When you get a chance can I get you to add some more description to the document listing?

File

PROLEGOMENA AD HOMERUM - Middlebury College - William Harris

A thoughtful approach to acquiring Latin and Greek.

Cassius

July 1, 2024 at 6:05 AM

LR's last question I think points out the problem in making the criteria to be four rather than three. I have always thought that the following arguments on this point, also from Chapter 8, seemed persuasive to me:

The following objections may also occur to the mind of the reader: if the formation of the general concept ensues upon acts of sensation, then all elements of anticipation are removed; again, if it is formed as the residuum of acts of sensation, this is a sort of inductive process and no result of a rational process can itself be a primary criterion of truth, which Epicurus declared the prolepsis to be; still again, if the general concept is the sum of a series of sensations, then the prolepsis is merged with sensation, and the second criterion of Epicurus disappears. This, in turn, would mean that Epicurus possessed no criterion of truth on the abstract levels of thought. Such a conclusion is hardly to be tolerated.

....

Even within Epicurean circles the term prolepsis underwent unjustified extensions. For instance, Epicurus, recognizing Nature as the canon or norm, had asserted that, just as we observe fire to be hot, snow to be cold, and honey to be sweet, so, from the behavior of newborn creatures, we observe pleasure to be the telos or end. Certain of his followers, however, shaken no doubt by Stoic criticism, took the position that the doctrine was an innate idea, that is, a prolepsis.48 In strict logic this error was a confusion between quid and quale. The problem was not to decide what could be predicated of the end or telos but what was the identity of the end. Was it pleasure or was it something else?

....

When once these ambiguities and confusions have been discerned and eliminated, it is possible to state the teaching of Epicurus with some of that precision by which he set high store. In the meaning of the Canon, then, a sensation is an aisthesis. All such sensations may possess value; otherwise there would be no sense in saying, "We pay attention to all sensations." Their values, however, range all the way from totality to zero. The value is total only when the sensation is immediate. For example, when Aristotle says, "The sense of sight is not deceived as to color," this is true only of the close view, because colors fade in more distant views.

Sensations, however, usually present themselves in combinations of color, shape, size, smell, and so on. An immediate presentation of such a composite unit is a phantasia. All such presentations are true, but they do not rank as criteria in the meaning of the Canon, for the reason that the intelligence has come into play. An act of recognition (epaisthesis) has taken place in the mind of the observer, which is secondary to the primary reaction that registered color, shape, size, smell, and so forth.

That Epicurus did not regard these composite sensations as criteria is made clear by a statement of his own: "The fidelity of the recognitions guarantees the truth of the sensations." 19 For example, the animal standing yonder is recognized as a dun-colored ox. This is a secondary reaction. Only the primary perceptions of color, shape, size, and so on constitute a direct contact between man and the physical environment. The truth of these perceptions is confirmed by the fidelity of the recognition.

....

Again, let it be assumed that the quality of sweetness is registered by sensation. It is not, however, sensation that says, "This is honey"; a secondary reaction in the form of a recognition involving intelligence has taken place. This, in the terminology of Epicurus, is "a fantastic perception of the intelligence." These were not given the rank of criteria by Epicurus for the reason already cited. It is on record, however, that later Epicureans did so.20

For those who are reading along here and don't have ready access to DeWitt's text, here is how he introduces the subject in his Chapter 8. i don't agree that Lucretius has no help to offer, but much of the rest seems useful:

Quote

The innate capacity to distinguish colors is an anticipation of experience no less than the innate capacity to distinguish between justice and injustice. The difference is that the color-sense is part of the individual's preconditioning for life in his physical environment and emerges in early childhood, while the sense of justice is part of the preconditioning for life in the social environment and emerges later, developing in pace with experience, instruction, and reflection. How the Anticipation functions as a criterion may be seen in the case of the gods: it is impossible to think of them as in need of anything, for example, because according to the idea universal among men their happiness is perfect.

Unfortunately the traditional accounts of the Anticipations have gone far astray. Three excellent reasons can be cited for these aberrations: first, in the graded textbooks of Epicurus the topic was reserved for advanced students and entirely omitted from both the Little and the Big Epitome; consequently Lucretius has no help to offer; second, already in antiquity the concepts of such abstract things as justice had become confused with the general concepts of such concrete things as horses and oxen; third, modern scholars have become victims of the confusion of the ancients and on their own account have committed the error of merging the Anticipations with the Sensations.

It is highly probable that Epicurus allowed even to certain animals, especially elephants, the possession of these embryonic anticipations of social virtues. The tendency of the day was to have recourse to the study of irrational creatures in order to learn the teachings of Nature. It should be recalled too that not only was Epicurus very eager to have information of Pyrrho, who had been in India, but also that the writings of Alexander's associates, Aristobulus, Nearchus, and Onesicritus concerning India were available in his youth, and the same is true of the description of India by Megasthenes of the time of Seleucus. The elder Pliny, who quotes three of the above writers, ascribed to elephants "a sort of divination of justice," ³¹ an excellent equivalent of the Epicurean Anticipation. Pliny also ascribes to elephants the possession of pride, honesty, prudence, equity, and even religion.³² All of these fall squarely into the category of abstract notions, where the Anticipations belong.

The term prolepsis was correctly rendered by Cicero as anticipatio or praenotio ³³ and less precisely, though intelligently, by the elder Pliny as divinatio. It is wrongly rendered as "concept" by those who confuse the general concept of such a thing as an ox with the abstract idea of justice. One scholar prefers "preconception," but perhaps "preconcept" would be preferable. It seems most advantageous, however, to adhere to "Anticipation" because this is the meaning of the Greek word prolepsis.

Two explicit accounts of the term have fortunately survived from antiquity, the first from Cicero and the second from Diogenes Laertius. Unfortunately there is virtual unanimity among modern scholars that the authority of Cicero is to be rejected and that of Laertius accepted. This would mean that the word of a stodgy compiler weighs more with us than that of the gifted Cicero. It means also that we, who possess about seventy pages of the text of Epicurus, are in a better position to form a judgment than Cicero himself, who knew all the outstanding Epicureans of his time, whether Greek or Roman, and enjoyed access to all the original texts.