More articles to gather over time:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/638785 - On Some Epicurean and Lucretian Arguments for the Infinity of the Universe Ivars Avotins The Classical Quarterly Vol. 33, No. 2 (1983), pp. 421-427 (7 pages)
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3295240 Infinity in Epicurean Philosophy Marshall E. Blume
The Classical Journal Vol. 60, No. 4 (Jan., 1965), pp. 174-176 (3 pages) Published By: The Johns Hopkins University Press
Here from book three is where Lucretius mentions the possibility that our atoms might in the future come together again as they are now placed:
[843] And even if the nature of mind and the power of soul has feeling, after it has been rent asunder from our body, yet it is naught to us, who are made one by the mating and marriage of body and soul. Nor, if time should gather together our substance after our decease and bring it back again as it is now placed, if once more the light of life should be vouchsafed to us, yet, even were that done, it would not concern us at all, when once the remembrance of our former selves were snapped in twain. And even now we care not at all for the selves that we once were, not at all are we touched by any torturing pain for them. For when you look back over all the lapse of immeasurable time that now is gone, and think how manifold are the motions of matter, you could easily believe this too, that these same seeds, whereof we now are made, have often been placed in the same order as they are now; and yet we cannot recall that in our mind’s memory; for in between lies a break in life, and all the motions have wandered everywhere far astray from sense.
Thinking as someone living 2000 years ago, why wouldn't this have existed infinitely into the past as well as the future?
I would say the anchor in all this will always remain that Epicurean physics tells us that nothing has eternally the same existence except atoms, and that the universe as a whole has nothing outside it or above it which created it. There was never a "first" moment in the universe.
I expect they would say that the same processes which are going on now will have been going on eternally, so in that sense it would be concluded that the class of deathless beings, which are a part of that process, have been around forever.
Now as to any single deathless being having existed forever and not having a beginning, I would tend to think that the Epicureans would not have thought that likely. My best guess at the moment is that they would see the *process* of atoms coming together, and eventually deathless beings resulting, would have been a *process* that has been repeating forever. As a result, a class of beings which are deathless has existed forever. One question that might arise would be "Well if there is new ones all the time does the universe fill up with gods?" To which the answer would be "no" because the universe is infinite in size, and there are not *new* atoms being generated to create gods -- that would be part of the "flowing atoms" theory - the deathless beings make use of existing atoms.
I think probably the biggest stumbling block to clear discussion about this is that we have to totally eliminate the possibility that there was ever a *first* anything, except in a particular locality and particular slice of time. From a "universal" perspective, whatever processes are going on today (which means they are possible) have been going on forever, and there was never a 'first' anything. *That's* pretty hard to get one's head around, but no harder than to get one's mind around that there *was* a first. The idea that there was a "universal first" is religious conditioning, not validated by neutral observation of nature.
Another question regards "two alternatives equally possible." What are the relative quantities of two alternatives that are not equally possible? Wouldn't they still be equal as both are infinite in number?
I'm still thinking about it, but I suspect the answer is "Yes, in total" and that the caveat that makes things reasonable is that in any locality some things can easily be more common than others, just as they are here on earth.
As for talking about "dichotomies we probably need to define that:
dichotomy
formalus /daɪˈkɑː.t̬ə.mi/ uk /daɪˈkɒt.ə.mi/
Add to word list
a difference between two completely opposite ideas or things.
I don't really know if it adds anything to talk about "dichotomies" if that is all the word means. It's the details behind that which will need to be examined.
To paraphrase, for anything that is possible in an infinite and eternal universe, there is an infinite number of that thing. From that it can be said that anything that exists, exists in the same quantity as any other thing spread throughout the universe. Infinite bananas, infinite 1965 Mustangs, infinite deathless beings....
That seems to me to be a reasonably good way of describing the potential theory, although we don't know for sure that this is an accurate description of it. I am sure others will come up with more potential corollaries, especially as to whether time should be taken into account, or just the infinity of space.
But for the moment that's a working description that does not involve anything supernatural, and comports with the example Lucretius speculating that the atoms of one's bodies could eventually come back into essentially similar positions to where they were before.
More logically, I suspect that what he's really saying is that for everything natural there is something supernatural
I understand your concern in the post in general (I think) but I don't think that this would be a fair criticism of what is presented. I do think we can presume that Cicero is not taking the time to present the most complete Epicurean argument possible, because he doesn't agree with it, but I do not think that his Epicurean friends would allow him to cross a line to an absolute falsehood like that. Cicero well knows that no Epicurean would accept anything "supernatural," and it would have destroyed his credibility to his friends (to whom he was writing, not to us 2000 years later) to try to do so. He was writing to real people of his own time trying to save Rome, and to grossly misrepresent Epicurean philosophy on a factual point like that would not be consistent with his goal of being effective with his friends. They would simply dismissed him not as having a legitimate concern, but as "you don't know what you are talking about." Lawyers don't win cases in fair trials stating obvious mistruths that are easily disproven, and accusing Epicureans of believing in supernatural beings would never pass that kind of "smell test."
And as for the "immortal" part, that is exactly why DeWitt stresses that Epicurue' own writing is better viewed as "deathless" rather than immortal. Epicurue would not have allowed anything to be supernaturally immortal, and even in the mouth of Cicero and Epicurean argument cannot be fairly construed that way.
lower how? Higher how? And how do you compare theoretical quantities in a spectrum?
I think that is exactly where "prolepsis" comes in. The mind is recognizing that certain things are of a type and belong in a spectrum, while other things are not of that type and are outside that spectrum, likely due to images and other sensory data building up genetically (over long time) into similar "patterns."
Because Cicero (as Vellius) is comparing "an equal number" of mortals and immortals
Right now my best guesstimate on that is that of things that are possible, in an infinite and eternal universe, though in any locality some things are more common than others, there is -- at once or over time -- an infinite number of each and every possible thing, and "infinite number" is equal to "infinite number."
And I would say this is the path by which to unwind their path:
And most of all give yourself up to the study of the beginnings and of infinity and of the things akin to them, and also of the criteria of truth and of the feelings, and of the purpose for which we reason out these things. For these points when they are thoroughly studied will most easily enable you to understand the causes of the details. But those who have not thoroughly taken these things to heart could not rightly study them in themselves, nor have they made their own the reason for observing them.
This statement early in the Masson article seems helpful I think on a basic point. I added the underline for emphasis:
By this Velleius seems to mean a law of averages or chances; the law, namely, that of two alternatives equally possible, each will occur with equal frequency if an infinite number of cases be taken.
It seems to me that it is essential to keep in mind the point that we are discussing things that are "possible."
Without getting yet into the difficulty of establishing exactly what is possible, and what is impossible, the logical point has to be kept in mind that infinity is not itself going to change the impossible into the possible.
That which is impossible will have exactly zero occurrences, and no matter how far space or time extends, even to infinity, the number of occurrences of the impossible is going to remain zero.
But the other question is maybe key, before we even get to the "spectrum" issues.
We know from experience on earth that some things are more common than others, and thus there are more grains of sand than there are diamonds, and more stupid people than there are Epicuruses.
But given the fact that diamonds and Epicuruses are possible, do we conclude from the principle of infinity that there are (or have been or will be) an infinite number of diamonds and Epicurus's in the universe?
I am presuming at this point that the answer to that question is "Yes," and that answer is why Lucretius specifically mentions the "even if" possibility of atomic rearrangement in his poem. (To the effect that even if our atoms rearrange themselves into the same configuration in the future, we would not be the same person, as our memories would not be the same.) While in any individual locale certain things are more common than others, taking into account the whole of the infinite universe, there are (or were or will be) an infinite number of diamonds and Epicuruses.
Is that "Yes" the obvious deduction that the Epicureans would have reached, or not?
(Edit: To anticipate where this would go afterwards, obviously it is "possible" to experience pleasure, and "possible" to be alive for a period of time, and so both (1) the degrees of pleasure and (2) the degrees of living over time are to be expected (given local circumstances) to extend all the way from zero to actual or effective infinity.)
Thank you Don, that John Masson article is quite something. I recommend it, but only to those who have the power to keep focus through its intricate twists and turns. I've read through it once and there is so much going on in it that it reminds me to keep the big picture in mind and not get too far into the weeds. This one definitely goes into the weeds!
I understand Masson's viewpoint to include that both Scott and Giussiani thought there was a very close relationship between isonomia and Epicurus' proof of the existence and/or nature of the gods.
And I also understand that Masson is in violent disagreement with some of the details of what Scott and Giussani wrote.
But by the time he goes through all the details and reaches the end of the article, I am not exactly sure whether Masson himself thinks that there is a relationship between isonomia and proof of the gods, or what that relationship is.
But no doubt there's a lot of interesting material in it1
But as time continues infinitely, how does that remain at the apex?
I think that is where Dewitt is right to focus on the gods not being "by nature" immortal, and that they must act to remain so.
And I don't think we we saying anything other than "living a totally pleasurable life" and "having the capacity to continue without death.". So within those two characteristics (death and life) there is a theoretical limit that any number of living beings could attain.
So I wouldnt say "best" implies that a particular set of gods outranks another.
On one level it implies that we might wish to evaluate how any "collateral damage" might come back to bite us.
Now that part I certainly agree with!
To me this question is always dependent on the context of who you are talking to and what is your goal in talking to them, and there is plenty of room for alternative approaches customized with that in mind. If our goal is to promote Epicurean philosophy most effectively, its going to take many different approaches.
I will add also that as far as the translation goes "if they seem to produce harm" would have to be read "more pain than pleasure" to be consistent with the rest of the philosophy. But that caveat wouldn't change my view that the "more pain the pleasure" that is being discussed is to "yourself and your friends" rather than "more pain than pleasure to all possible people and animals anywhere in the world."
To me, this implies personal responsibility beyond oneself as it doesn't have wording to limit the potential harm produced to the particular individual or limit it in any other way.
I certainly see where you are going, but I would have to question that interpretation for a number of reasons and I bet a lot more can be listed.
First of all, I don't think there is a blanket prohibition choosing pain or harm, so I would not interpret those sayings in a way that conflicts with the clear statement that we sometimes do choose pain when it leads in the end to more pleasure or less harm.
Second, I do think that you are right to the extent that "friends" are involved, because if we are willing to due for them under certain circumstances we are certainly concerned about their well being.
But to extend that concern to "others in general" would overrule the more general rule that our goal by nature is pleasure for ourselves (and by extension our friends. There will certainly be times when it is for the greater pleasure of ourselves and friends that we do great harm to "others" who are not aligned with our interests. PD06 has various translations but all imply that there are times when the interests of some people have to be placed above "others." Torquatus says in On Ends One that some men are so corrupted that they must be "restrained" rather than reformed.
We could probably go on and on with textual citations, but if "the production of harm of any kind to any person" were considered to be an ironclad Epicurean rule I cannot see the rest of the philosophy making consistent sense.
So I think the thread topic is a great question, but the question is a little ambiguous as to the meaning of "beyond oneself." Unless the "beyond oneself" is limited to "friends," I would answer the question as written ("Does PD26 imply personal responsibility beyond oneself?") with a "No."
Episode 236 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week we enlist Lucretius in support of Velleius's presentation the Epicurean view of divinity.
Now, if I could convince you to drop 'theology' in favour of something like 'cerebration of nature' j
Yes for those who were not there, "the definition question" was the issue that several of us discussed on Zoom last night. Tau Phi and several others are firmly in what I will call the - "What the heck was Epicurus doing messing with the definitions of words?!?#!&^????" camp. 
That's where Cicero was too, so they are in very respectable company!
However challenging and changing the definitions we give to words seems to be a central element of the whole Epicurean project. That means there will need to be smoother and more persuasive ways to convince people that that is a valid approach. I think Bryan and Joshua at the very least have some good ideas on that, because the list of words that Epicurus was using in unique ways seems to be very long. Even if we start only with the list Cicero himself gives, the list goes all the way from pleasure to prolepsis, and that just gets us started with the "p's," without even mentioning the "g-words!"
Right now I am still inclined to go with DeWitt's reasoning:
“The extension of the name of pleasure to this normal state of being was the major innovation of the new hedonism. It was in the negative form, freedom from pain of body and distress of mind, that it drew the most persistent and vigorous condemnation from adversaries. The contention was that the application of the name of pleasure to this state was unjustified on the ground that two different things were thereby being denominated by one name. Cicero made a great to-do over this argument, but it is really superficial and captious. The fact that the name of pleasure was not customarily applied to the normal or static state did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing.
So to interpolate that last sentence to our current context:
The fact that the name of "gods" has not been customarily applied to beings who live only in pleasure and without any pain, and who can continue to live for an unlimited lifespan, does not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to them; nor that reason justifies the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing.
Another link that I will file away to consider as to how exposure to repetitive images over time would impact us:
Does there really have to be anything more to Epicurean theology than that? Is not *everything* beyond that which causes so much controversy (expectations of omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence), false opinions that people under the influence of non-Epicurean perspectives are adding in, *none* of which false opinions are appropriate when Epicurean physics and canonics are consistently applied?
From this perspective, and taking into account how far we observe medical science has come in less than 2000 years, I would say that Epicurean theology is *more* persuasive than it was in 50BC or 250BC!
Maybe somebody can convince me that the above chain reasoning is not a fair summary of Epicurean theology, but to the extent it *is* a fair summary, I am personally 100% convinced of its validity!
Edit: I would say that "prolepsis" comes in mostly to allow stages 1, 2, and 3 to occcur - but 1,2, and 3 are not examples of prolepsis themselves. Without a faculty of prolepsis, we would "look" but we would never "see" things that lead us to form concepts such as Earth, "we," "people," "animals," or any of the rest of the concepts being used to construct this chain reasoning. I would say a faculty of prolepsis is necessary to organize and construct every step of the chain reasoning, but that none of the individual links in the chain are themselves "a prolepsis."
Also very probably related, Lucretius Book 2, Bailey:
[522] And since I have taught this much, I will hasten to link on a truth which holds to it and wins belief from it, that the first-beginnings of things, which are formed with a shape like to one another, are in number infinite. For since the difference of forms is limited, it must needs be that those which are alike are unlimited, or else that the sum of matter is created limited, which I have proved not to be, showing in my verses that the tiny bodies of matter from everlasting always keep up the sum of things, as the team of blows is harnessed on unbroken on every side.
[532] For in that you see that certain animals are more rare, and perceive that nature is less fruitful in them, yet in another quarter and spot, in some distant lands, there may be many in that kind, and so the tale is made up; even as in the race of four-footed beasts we see that elephants with their snaky hands come first of all, by whose many thousands India is embattled with a bulwark of ivory, so that no way can be found into its inner parts: so great is the multitude of those beasts, whereof we see but a very few samples.
[541] But still, let me grant this too, let there be, if you will, some one thing unique, alone in the body of its birth, to which there is not a fellow in the whole wide world; yet unless there is an unlimited stock of matter, from which it might be conceived and brought to birth, it will not be able to be created, nor, after that, to grow on and be nourished.
And here from book three is where Lucretius mentions the possibility that our atoms might in the future come together again as they are now placed:
[843] And even if the nature of mind and the power of soul has feeling, after it has been rent asunder from our body, yet it is naught to us, who are made one by the mating and marriage of body and soul. Nor, if time should gather together our substance after our decease and bring it back again as it is now placed, if once more the light of life should be vouchsafed to us, yet, even were that done, it would not concern us at all, when once the remembrance of our former selves were snapped in twain. And even now we care not at all for the selves that we once were, not at all are we touched by any torturing pain for them. For when you look back over all the lapse of immeasurable time that now is gone, and think how manifold are the motions of matter, you could easily believe this too, that these same seeds, whereof we now are made, have often been placed in the same order as they are now; and yet we cannot recall that in our mind’s memory; for in between lies a break in life, and all the motions have wandered everywhere far astray from sense.
I think DeWitt is correct about this too, where he says that from infinity "Epicurus deduced his chief theoretical confirmation of belief in the existence of gods." This view would strongly influence how we interpret what Velleius says about prolepsis being the basis. Under this view prolepsis alone would not write in our minds "gods exist and are blessed and imperishable" but rather prolepsis provides the spark to get us started thinking about the subject, at which point our reasoning takes over and through isonomia and related argument leads us to more specific conceptual conclusions.
"It was from this principle [infinity] that Epicurus deduced his chief theoretical confirmation of belief in the existence of gods. It was from this that he arrived at knowledge of their number and by secondary deduction at knowledge of their abode."
Lucretius Book 2: 1077 - Bailey:
[1077] This there is too that in the universe there is nothing single, nothing born unique and growing unique and alone, but it is always of some tribe, and there are many things in the same race. First of all turn your mind to living creatures; you will find that in this wise is begotten the race of wild beasts that haunts the mountains, in this wise the stock of men, in this wise again the dumb herds of scaly fishes, and all the bodies of flying fowls. Wherefore you must confess in the same way that sky and earth and sun, moon, sea, and all else that exists, are not unique, but rather of number numberless; inasmuch as the deep-fixed boundary-stone of life awaits these as surely, and they are just as much of a body that has birth, as every race which is here on earth, abounding in things after its kind.
As usual I think DeWitt is going in a very productive direction but I don't know that he explains it as persuasively as he could.
When he says ..... : "The necessity here appealed to is a necessity of thought, which becomes a necessity of existence. The existence of the imperfect in an infinite universe demands belief in the existence of the perfect. " .... I doubt it's best to use the words "perfect" and "imperfect" because of the connotations of magic those words carry.
In the very next sentence DeWitt quotes what I think is the better alternative: "Cicero employs very similar language: "It is his doctrine that there are gods, because there is bound to be some surpassing being than which nothing is better." 72 Like the statement of Lactantius, this recognizes a necessity of existence arising from a necessity of thought; the order of Nature cannot be imperfect throughout its whole extent; it is bound to culminate in something superior, that is, in gods."
So I wouldn't say we're talking about "perfect" vs "imperfect,' but rather more in the line of a spectrum from poor, good, better, best -- in that whenever you line up a spectrum, you're going to have *something* at the top of the spectrum. Simply being at the top of the spectrum does not mean that you are of a different type than what came before -- if you weren't of the same type you wouldn't be on the same spectrum in the first place. So simply being at the top of the "living beings experiencing pleasure" spectrum doesn't mean necessarily anything more than that all your time is pleasurable and that you don't ever have to die. Translating Cicero as saying "surpassing" does not require any kind of "magical" connotation.
That kind of interpretation would seem to me to be consistent with the way Lactantius and Cicero are understanding what Epicurus had said, and it would be consistent with Epicurean physics and not introduce any kind of "magical" analysis of deriving the existence of a 'supernatural' being from the existence of the "natural." That's an obvious non-starter under epicurean physics and should not even be entertained as a possibility of what he was saying.
