1. New
    1. Member Announcements
  2. Home
    1. Get Started - Activities
    2. Posting Policies
    3. Community Standards
    4. Terms of Use
    5. Moderator Team
    6. Site Map
    7. Quizzes
    8. Articles
      1. Featured Articles
      2. Blog Posts at EpicureanFriends
  3. Wiki
    1. Wiki Home
    2. FAQ
    3. Classical Epicureanism
    4. Physics
    5. Canonics
    6. Ethics
    7. Search Assistance
    8. Not NeoEpicurean
    9. Foundations
    10. Navigation Outlines
    11. Key Pages
  4. Forum
    1. New Activity
    2. New Threads
    3. Welcome
    4. General Discussion
    5. Featured
    6. Activism
    7. Shortcuts
    8. Dashboard
    9. Full Forum List
    10. Level 3+
    11. Most Discussed
  5. Podcast
    1. Lucretius Today Podcast
    2. Episode Guide
    3. Lucretius Today At Youtube
    4. EpicureanFriends Youtube Page
  6. Texts
    1. Overview
    2. Diogenes Laertius
    3. Principal Doctrines
    4. Vatican Sayings
    5. Lucretius
    6. Herodotus
    7. Pythocles
    8. Menoeceus
    9. Fragments - Usener Collection
    10. Torquatus On Ethics
    11. Velleius On Gods
    12. Greek/Latin Help
  7. Gallery
    1. Featured images
    2. Albums
    3. Latest Images
    4. Latest Comments
  8. Calendar
    1. Upcoming Events List
    2. Zoom Meetings
    3. This Month
    4. First Monday Zoom Meetings
    5. Wednesday Zoom Meeting
    6. Twentieth Zoom Meetings
    7. Zoom Meetings
  9. Other
    1. Featured Content
    2. Blog Posts
    3. Files
    4. Logbook
    5. EF ToDo List
    6. Link-Database
  • Login
  • Register
  • Search
This Thread

Welcome To EpicureanFriends.com!

"Remember that you are mortal, and you have a limited time to live, and in devoting yourself to discussion of the nature of time and eternity you have seen things that have been, are now, and are to come."

Sign In Now
or
Register a new account
  1. New
  2. Home
  3. Wiki
  4. Forum
  5. Podcast
  6. Texts
  7. Gallery
  8. Calendar
  9. Other
  1. Forum
    1. New Activity
    2. New Threads
    3. Welcome
    4. General Discussion
    5. Featured
    6. Activism
    7. Shortcuts
    8. Dashboard
    9. Full Forum List
    10. Level 3+
    11. Most Discussed
  1. EpicureanFriends - Home of Classical Epicurean Philosophy
  2. Forum
  3. The Lucretius Today Podcast and EpicureanFriends Videos
  4. The Lucretius Today Podcast
  • Sidebar
  • Sidebar

Episode 216 - Cicero's On Ends - Book Two - Part 23 - Why Does Epicurus Say Length Of Time Does Not Contribute To Pleasure?

  • Cassius
  • February 24, 2024 at 3:03 PM
  • Go to last post
Regularly Checking In On A Small Screen Device? Bookmark THIS page!
  • 1
  • 2
  • Online
    Cassius
    05 - Administrator
    Points
    101,869
    Posts
    13,947
    Quizzes
    9
    Quiz rate
    100.0 %
    • February 29, 2024 at 5:37 AM
    • #21

    We had some interesting discussion in the Zoom tonight, with most of the comments being relatively consistent with what has been discussed already.

    My own thoughts are not likely to be satisfied without more clarity (citations) on what exactly the non-Epicureans were arguing about about the nature of the "limits" argument (which I perceive to be likely another way of stating Plato's "class of the infinite" argument).

    For me, the most clear statement at the moment of what I perceive to be the "limits" argument remains that of Seneca. I wonder that the next-to-last sentence in this translation could be made more clear, and I would like to see this more precisely stated using the word "limit" in the sense of edge or "definition" (in the sense of high-definition photo) but i think this helps a lot:

    Seneca’s Letters – To Lucilius – 66.45: “What can be added to that which is perfect? Nothing otherwise that was not perfect to which something has been added. Nor can anything be added to virtue, either, for if anything can be added thereto, it must have contained a defect. Honour, also, permits of no addition; for it is honourable because of the very qualities which I have mentioned.[5] What then? Do you think that propriety, justice, lawfulness, do not also belong to the same type, and that they are kept within fixed limits? The ability to increase is proof that a thing is still imperfect.”

    It's the last sentence that seems to me to be most revealing. I wonder if the meaning of "perfect" here is not "perfect in the sense of best" but rather "perfect in the sense of perfected / finished / sharp."

    In other words, an incomplete / imperfect jar is not really a jar at all - it is something else that is in the process of becoming a jar, but it is not a jar at all.

    If that is the direction of the argument, then incomplete or unfinished pleasure is not really pleasure at all, and the drift of the argument from Seneca's / Plato's / Cicero's perspective is that "pleasure" cannot really be experienced at all, because it is always accompanied by pain of some sort, and that the experience is mixed and not the same as pleasure.

    From Epicurus' perspective, this argument (that it is impossible to experience pleasure at all because it is always mixed with pain) is solved by showing that what we are experiencing anytime we feel pleasure in some part of our experience. In other words, there is no such thing as "incomplete" pleasure, because if you feel pleasure you know it is pleasure because it does not feel painful.

    This interpretation would place the emphasis on understanding from a conceptual perspective that pleasure is pleasure and pain is pain and they can exist in *different* parts of the body and in different amounts of duration and different intensities, but that these differences do not mean that what is being experienced at any moment of pleasure is not pleasure.

    This interpretation would also mean that what is being discussed is not the "best" or the "highest" pleasure at all, but whether "pleasure" itself can be said to exist as a certain thing that can be experienced, or whether it is always (like a gas or liquid) something that can never be grasped and is always "slipping through our fingers."

    Were it not for the understanding that every experience of pleasure is "complete in itself," then one would never be able to experience pleasure at all.

    It seems to me that that might be an interpretation of PD03 that would explain how it fits in parallel along with PD01 and PD02 as an antidote (ok, a "remedy" if you like) for a major error that has to be refuted. The three are:

    (1) The error that a "god" would concern himself with us is refuted by the position that a god is complete in itself,

    (2) the error that the state of being dead is a concern for us is refuted by showing that where life is, death is not (life is complete without needing any aspect of death) and

    (3) the error of thinking that pleasure can never be attained is refuted by establishing that pleasure too is complete in itself. All pleasure is complete in itself because given that there are only two feelings, whenever what we are feeling is not painful it is pleasurable - pleasure is complete wherever pleasure exists. The life that contains some pain does not fail to contain pleasure, it is just the life of a human being, in contrast to the life of a "god," which has attained the ability to never expeience pain.

    PD03. The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once.

    Nothing here would then be intended to imply that "absence of pain" should be understood to describe is the most intense pleasure, the longest pleasure, or the pleasure covering the most numerous parts of the body. Nor would it imply at all that you need not concern yourself with continuing to stay alive, because you do in fact want to experience more pleasure by staying alive. The main point would be that since pleasure is complete whereever pleasure exists, the consideration of "pleasure" to be a proper goal of life does make sense, because it is in fact possible to experience pleasure. You're not doomed to be always drowning an inch below the surface never able to breathe - you do in fact figuratively "break through to the surface of the water and escape drowning" every time you experience any pleasure at all.

    It would be very desirable to see if there are other surviving texts (such as the Seneca quote, or the statement in Hermotimus) that will make clear that this aspect of completeness was what was being argued by the non-Epicurean philosophers. Finding statements even more clear than Seneca's would help nail down this perspective and keep us from going around and around being frustrated that Plato's Philebus argument was not as clear as we would like it to be asking: SOCRATES: Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class which admits of more and less?

    Understanding and being able to explain clearly to an ordinary person why asked that question, and why Epicurus' answer would differ from that of Plato, is key.

  • Don
    ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΕΙΟΣ (Epicurist)
    Points
    39,510
    Posts
    5,509
    Quizzes
    9
    Quiz rate
    92.8 %
    • February 29, 2024 at 7:32 AM
    • #22

    Here's another translation of that Seneca quote, starting a lttle earlier in the letter (LXVI.8-9 )

    "Therefore the power and the greatness of virtue cannot rise to greater heights, because increase is denied to that which is superlatively great. You will find nothing straighter than the straight, nothing truer than the truth, and nothing more temperate than that which is temperate. 9. Every virtue is limitless; for limits depend upon definite measurements. Constancy cannot advance further, any more than fidelity, or truthfulness, or loyalty. What can be added to that which is perfect? Nothing otherwise that was not perfect to which something has been added. Nor can anything be added to virtue, either, for if anything can be added thereto, it must have contained a defect. Honour, also, permits of no addition; for it is honourable because of the very qualities which I have mentioned.[5] What then? Do you think that propriety, justice, lawfulness, do not also belong to the same type, and that they are kept within fixed limits? The ability to increase is proof that a thing is still imperfect."

    Seneca is saying that a virtue is limitless, it is infinite in that nothing can be added to it *because* it has no limits. If something could be added, it wouldn't be infinite. It seems to me it's the "adding" part that is important. Epicurus comes along and says pleasure has a limit (the removal of all pain) but, by definition, once all pain is removed and pleasure is complete, no more pleasure can be added. Therefore, as Senea says "the power and the greatness of virtue cannot rise to greater heights, because increase is denied to that which is superlatively great. You will find nothing straighter than the straight,..." Epicurus answers that by saying pleasure cannot rise to greater heights than the absence of all pain, therefore, pleasure cannot be added to once it has replaced all pain.

  • Online
    Cassius
    05 - Administrator
    Points
    101,869
    Posts
    13,947
    Quizzes
    9
    Quiz rate
    100.0 %
    • February 29, 2024 at 7:54 AM
    • #23

    Thank you Don for the extra Seneca because that ("You will find nothing straighter than the straight, nothing truer than the truth, and nothing more temperate than that which is temperate") does make the point more clear.

    I think we are on the same track but for perhaps the final sentence:

    Quote from Don

    Epicurus answers that by saying pleasure cannot rise to greater heights than the absence of all pain, therefore, pleasure cannot be added to once it has replaced all pain.

    If pleasure IS absence of pain, as Torquatus insists to Cicero multiple times, then the same analysis applies to pleasure as to virtue. There is no "rising" or "moving" involved in the analysis at the level we are talking about. "You will find nothing straighter than the straight, nothing truer than the truth, and nothing more temperate than that which is temperate." It's easy to extend that to "You will find nothing more pleasurable than pleasure."

    The important point would be NOT that it is essential to remove all pain in life before we can experience pleasure. Only "the gods" can do that, and that is the lever that Cicero is using to argue that Epicurus makes no sense. Cicero is saying that Epicurus himself does not even experience pleasure because what he in fact experiences is a mixture of pleasure and pain, which is not pleasure.

    The important point would be that WHEREVER pleasure exists, pain is absent, which means that anytime we experience pleasure we are in fact experiencing pleasure in the full and complete sense of the term. Nothing is more pleasurable than pleasure.

    If this were not so, then we would never be able to experience pleasure at all, because what we would be experiencing would be some incomplete pleasure, some mixture of pleasure and pain, which from this perspective is not pleasure at all. A "mixture" is not the same thing as a "thing in its pure form."

    So this "pleasure is the absence of pain" is necessary to comprehend that it is possible to experience pleasure at all.

    This would be the "mental" part of the perspective, the part that the mind has to do in order for the person to understand that what his body feels when it feels pleasure is not lacking something, but which is in fact complete.

    And since I think it is fair to say that Seneca is even more derivative as a philosopher than is Cicero, we are going to find this same point argued in other forms in other philosophers of the Platonic-Stoic line. But at the moment, this particular passage from Seneca stands out for its clarity.

  • Online
    Cassius
    05 - Administrator
    Points
    101,869
    Posts
    13,947
    Quizzes
    9
    Quiz rate
    100.0 %
    • February 29, 2024 at 8:15 AM
    • #24
    Quote from Don

    Epicurus answers that by saying pleasure cannot rise to greater heights than the absence of all pain, therefore, pleasure cannot be added to once it has replaced all pain.

    Still thinking about this, and to repeat a point from post 23, I think a danger in emphasizing this "pleasure cannot be added to once it has replaced all pain" part of the perspective is that the superficial point overwhelms the deeper point. While it is true that once "all pain is removed no more pleasure can be added," that situation is effectively limited only to "the gods." If we obsess over the goal of eliminating "all pain" then we are trying to duplicate Zeus, which we can never fully do.

    Now we can approximate Zeus figuratively, and I think that's what Epicurus is talking about as "competing with Zeus" and "living as a god among men." But that distinction between literally eliminating all pain and becoming a Zeus, vs figuratively eliminating as much pain as possible so you can run with Zeus for a while, is very important.

    What I think a lot of writers about Epicurus are doing is saying that your literal goal is to be Zeus by draining every drop of pain from experience, and they imply the best way to do that is live on bread and water in a cave. When living ascetically fails to satisfy us, as it always will, we set ourselves up for disappointment and thus fail to be as happy as we could otherwise. So from that perspective wanting to be Zeus would be a natural but unnecessary desire - unnecessary because while the variation is desirable, we can live approximately like Zeus while we are alive and say we have tasted the same thing. Frustration at not being perfect doesn't become an enemy of living a good pleasant life.

    So to repeat what I think is the main point that needs center stage:

    You will find nothing straighter than the straight, nothing truer than the truth, and nothing more temperate than that which is temperate -- and you will also find nothing more pleasurable than pleasure.

    This does in fact place pleasure in the same category of "completable" or "graspable" things as virtue, which as Joshua stated in the podcast, could be a concern --- but the concern isn't a problem when you see that the main issue is not that the perfect is being made the enemy of the good, but in fact the perfect is a "concept" that is being used as a guide toward the good, never to be confused with our actual experience. That's another application too of "all models are wrong, but some models are useful." Neither the words "virtue" nor "pleasure" exist as entities out in the universe on their own - they are just conceptions of the human mind, but when viewed properly they are very useful conceptions.

  • Online
    Cassius
    05 - Administrator
    Points
    101,869
    Posts
    13,947
    Quizzes
    9
    Quiz rate
    100.0 %
    • February 29, 2024 at 9:35 AM
    • #25
    Quote from Cassius

    This does in fact place pleasure in the same category of "completable" or "graspable" things as virtue, which as Joshua stated in the podcast, could be a concern --- but the concern isn't a problem when you see that the main issue is not that the perfect is being made the enemy of the good, but in fact the perfect is a "concept" that is being used as a guide toward the good, never to be confused with our actual experience. That's another application too of "all models are wrong, but some models are useful." Neither the words "virtue" nor "pleasure" exist as entities out in the universe on their own - they are just conceptions of the human mind, but when viewed properly they are very useful conceptions.

    Given that Joshua stated his concern very eloquently in the podcast episode that there was a danger in viewing pleasure as the stoics apparently viewed virtue, this issue deserves further comment.

    Joshua was essentially affirming the hazards of letting the perfect be the enemy of the good. Joshua stated that it would be very self-defeating and would lead to all sorts of frustrations and other negative consequences if you allow perfectionism to prevent you from achieving the "good enough." We see that all the time in real life, when people get obsessed with perfection. We run into the problem than an friend once mentioned in the form of a question: "You know what happened to the man who kept searching for the perfect woman? He found her but couldn't keep her, because she was searching for the perfect man!"

    It seems to me that Joshua's concern is very close to what has happened to many modern Epicureans. In thinking that "absence of pain" means that they must drain every ounce of pain from their lives, which they frequently think is best done through "simple living / asceticism," they obsess over their goal just like a stoic obsesses over virtue. Wen they fail to achieve a pleasurable life, which they always fail to do (PD25. If on each occasion, instead of referring your actions to the end of nature, you turn to some other, nearer, standard, when you are making a choice or an avoidance, your actions will not be consistent with your principles) they either stay frustrated or give up on the philosophy completely or just compartmentalize it as just another impractical philosopher's dream.

    If, in contrast, we follow the lead of Torquatus' statements and see that the primary meaning of Epicurus' doctrine is that pleasure is absence of pain and absence of pain is pleasure, then we see that the terms are interchangeable and mean nothing more of less than each other. Seeing that, we don't fall for the trap of pursuing frugality or luxury as the way to a happy life of pleasure. We can see that since pleasure is absence of pain then we can spend our time on whatever combination of pleasures that result from "outside stimulation" or "inner appreciation of living" that we ourselves find most suited to our conditions and our preferences and our personalities.

    We need to be "extraordinarily obstinate" on this point: On Ends Book Two, 9 : Cicero: “…[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same thing as 'pleasure.'” Torquatus: “Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be.” Which is basically the same, but more starkly clear given the surrounding conceptual argument, as Epicurus saying in the letter to Menoeceus that ”By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul.“

    Getting confident on this issue is going to mean getting confident in seeing why Torquatus was right in saying that this formulation is as true as any proposition can be. It seems very similar to using the same reasoning which leads someone to say "You will find nothing straighter than the straight, nothing truer than the truth, and nothing more temperate than that which is temperate" to also conclude that "there is nothing more pleasurable than pleasure."

  • Online
    Cassius
    05 - Administrator
    Points
    101,869
    Posts
    13,947
    Quizzes
    9
    Quiz rate
    100.0 %
    • February 29, 2024 at 12:36 PM
    • #26
    Quote from Don

    "Therefore the power and the greatness of virtue cannot rise to greater heights, because increase is denied to that which is superlatively great. You will find nothing straighter than the straight, nothing truer than the truth, and nothing more temperate than that which is temperate. 9. Every virtue is limitless; for limits depend upon definite measurements. Constancy cannot advance further, any more than fidelity, or truthfulness, or loyalty. What can be added to that which is perfect? Nothing otherwise that was not perfect to which something has been added. Nor can anything be added to virtue, either, for if anything can be added thereto, it must have contained a defect. Honour, also, permits of no addition; for it is honourable because of the very qualities which I have mentioned.[5] What then? Do you think that propriety, justice, lawfulness, do not also belong to the same type, and that they are kept within fixed limits? The ability to increase is proof that a thing is still imperfect."

    The closer you look at this the more clear it is, so we can thank Seneca in addition to Cicero.

    Part of why this is complex to us is because of the multiple meanings of "limits", but Seneca makes it clear:

    Every virtue is limitless; for limits depend upon definite measurements.

    That's the sentence that shines the spotlight - what they are talking about when they are talking about limits is not "the highest" or "the best" but whether a thing can be measured with definite measurements.

    Saying that "Absence of pain = pleasure" does not primarily refer to the "most intense" or "longest" or "widest scope of the organism" - it refers first and most importantly to a definite measurement which can be grasped and understood.

    "Absence of pain" is important because it is a definite measurement of pleasure.

    It is only by recognizing that "absence of pain equals pleasure" that we can conceptualize a definite amount of pleasure, and that applies regardless of whether we are talking about a length of time, a part of the body, a measure of intensity ---- or an entire lifetime.

    Somewhere along the way the Stoics apparently took this to the ridiculous extreme exhibited in Hermotimus that a moment at the top of the mountain of virtue would be worth a lifetime of effort. That makes no more sense than arguing that a moment of "pure pleasure" is worth a life time of effort.

    But along the way, the observation that a definite measurement is possible allows you to talk about a goal and to see that no matter how long you live, the experience of pleasure never gets 'better" than before - it only varies. And yes more experiences of pleasure are desirable, so it is desirable to live longer, but you can die knowing that you have not missed pleasure that was "better" than what you actually experienced while you were alive.

    This perspective also fits along well with Martin's example of the set level of temperature which we have discussed a number of times and which Onenski brought up last night.

  • Godfrey
    Epicurist
    Points
    12,147
    Posts
    1,702
    Quizzes
    3
    Quiz rate
    85.0 %
    Bookmarks
    1
    • February 29, 2024 at 3:47 PM
    • #27

    The idea of measurement is a great take on the subject. I'd like to envelop that in a "brute force" argument, which to me is common sense and available to everyone. You need to have the big picture in mind before getting into the details.

    Quote from Cassius

    SOCRATES: Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class which admits of more and less?

    Understanding and being able to explain clearly to an ordinary person why asked that question, and why Epicurus' answer would differ from that of Plato, is key.

    First step back and compares the competing worldviews of "Platonic Forms" to the worldview of "atoms and void and none other." You must think completely outside of (discard?) the Platonic worldview in order to fully understand Epicurus, even though Epicurus does the work to refute the Platonic worldview. The Platonic worldview is one of mysticism, which has no place for Epicurus.

    Nothing material is perfect. Here's a minor reworking of Seneca, to emphasize this point:

    "Therefore the power and the greatness of virtue cannot rise to greater heights, because increase is denied to that which is [a Platonic Ideal]. You will find nothing straighter than the straight, nothing truer than the truth, and nothing more temperate than that which is temperate. 9. Every virtue is limitless; for limits depend upon definite measurements. Constancy cannot advance further, any more than fidelity, or truthfulness, or loyalty. What can be added to that which is [a Platonic Ideal]? Nothing otherwise that was not [a Platonic Ideal] to which something has been added. Nor can anything be added to virtue, either, for if anything can be added thereto, it must have contained a defect. Honour, also, permits of no addition; for it is honourable because of the very qualities which I have mentioned.[5] What then? Do you think that propriety, justice, lawfulness, do not also belong to the same type, and that they are kept within fixed limits? The ability to increase is proof that a thing is [not a Platonic Ideal]."

    Read in this context, PDs 18-25 are each about not getting caught up in the Platonic worldview.

    Quote from Cassius

    So from that perspective wanting to be Zeus would be a natural but unnecessary desire - unnecessary because while the variation is desirable, we can live approximately like Zeus while we are alive and say we have tasted the same thing. Frustration at not being perfect doesn't become an enemy of living a good pleasant life.

    This might even be considered an unnatural desire, since it's arises from the groundless opinion that you can achieve perfection. But from these two PDs it seems to be open to debate whether it's natural or unnatural, but not that it's unnecessary:

    PD29. Among desires, some are natural and necessary, some are natural and unnecessary, and some are unnatural and unnecessary (arising instead from groundless opinion).

    PD30. Among natural desires, those that do not bring pain when unfulfilled and that require intense exertion arise from groundless opinion; and such desires fail to be stamped out not by nature but because of the groundless opinions of humankind.

  • Godfrey
    Epicurist
    Points
    12,147
    Posts
    1,702
    Quizzes
    3
    Quiz rate
    85.0 %
    Bookmarks
    1
    • February 29, 2024 at 3:49 PM
    • #28
    Quote from Cassius

    If this were not so, then we would never be able to experience pleasure at all, because what we would be experiencing would be some incomplete pleasure, some mixture of pleasure and pain, which from this perspective is not pleasure at all. A "mixture" is not the same thing as a "thing in its pure form."

    So this "pleasure is the absence of pain" is necessary to comprehend that it is possible to experience pleasure at all.

    This sounds a lot like the argument that you can never get from point A to point B, because you can only advance half of the way at a time and the halfways keep getting smaller, ad infinitum. Can't remember the name of the argument....

  • Online
    Cassius
    05 - Administrator
    Points
    101,869
    Posts
    13,947
    Quizzes
    9
    Quiz rate
    100.0 %
    • February 29, 2024 at 6:18 PM
    • #29
    Quote from Godfrey

    You must think completely outside of (discard?) the Platonic worldview in order to fully understand Epicurus, even though Epicurus does the work to refute the Platonic worldview

    I would say that definitely you do not have to be restricted by the bounds of the box set by Plato, but I do not think it is a good idea to "discard" knowledge of Plato's worldview, because i think we see that Epicurus was in many cases responding to an argument of Plato, so you have to know that the argument came from Plato in the first place, and at least understand its outline, so you can understand why Epicurus is addressing the issue.

    I think most of us would say that the argument that a thing cannot be the good unless it can be contained within definite limits (nothing is straighter than straight) is a relatively absurd argument. And yet it seems in Epicurus' time it was a huge issue, huge enough to rank third in attention behind the first two principal doctrines.

    And yet because we today don't keep in mind the Platonic/Cicero/Seneca argument, we presume that Epicurus must be saying something else that is profound, and so a simple statement that pleasure also has definite measurements, and can therefore be grasped and attained, becomes transmuted into a call to live like a monk on bread and water in a cave!

    I don't mean to sound too frivolous in that last paragraph. I think that's exactly what has happened, and why so many Epicureans today are in thrall of "simplicity" and "minimizing desires" and the other assorted corruptions that so attract those of Buddhist or Stoic mindset.

    And it is also safe to say that there would be a lot of resistance by the same crowd to updating their viewpoint on what PD03 and Absence of Pain are all about, but that's exactly what is needed from my point of view.

  • Godfrey
    Epicurist
    Points
    12,147
    Posts
    1,702
    Quizzes
    3
    Quiz rate
    85.0 %
    Bookmarks
    1
    • February 29, 2024 at 9:25 PM
    • #30

    Agreed. However, I think it's important to begin with the big picture:

    - Platonism and its offspring subscribe to a worldview that includes things beyond what is natural. These things include "Forms" and "Ideals" which are more real than material reality.

    - Epicurus rejected anything beyond the natural, including "Forms" and "Ideals" which are more real than material reality.

    That may be enough for some people to know, without diving deeper into the details. But every discussion of the details which has been prompted by a Platonist argument needs to begin with the explicit understanding that Platonism is antithetical to EP for these reasons. And this needs to be repeated, early and often. Apples and oranges.

    How do you describe Platonism in Epicurean terms? You can't: it's nonsense. How do you describe EP in Platonic terms? The best example that we have comes from Epicurus, but in today's world that is extremely difficult to decipher. So every argument needs to begin with this distinction, because the Platonists insist on arguing in their own terms and discard the Epicurean worldview. If we want to resuscitate EP, we need to argue in our own terms. In this way we can point out the absurdities of Platonism while we explain EP.

    That's my rant :) I'm not trying to refute any of the arguments being made above, I just feel that they need to be firmly and repeatedly placed in the proper context. Reframed. Which is to see Platonism through Epicurean eyes, and not to see EP through Platonic eyes. They're fundamentally incompatible.

  • Godfrey
    Epicurist
    Points
    12,147
    Posts
    1,702
    Quizzes
    3
    Quiz rate
    85.0 %
    Bookmarks
    1
    • February 29, 2024 at 9:40 PM
    • #31

    P.S. Joshua, in particular, is doing in the podasts exactly what I'm describing :thumbup::thumbup:

  • Bryan
    ὁ ᾨκειωμένος
    Points
    4,708
    Posts
    576
    Quizzes
    4
    Quiz rate
    97.6 %
    • March 2, 2024 at 7:40 PM
    • #32

    If every Pleasure was fully condensed in time and also existed in the whole organism -- or [at least] in the most important parts of its nature -- then Pleasures would never differ from one another. (KD 9)

    Another argument using negative assumptions, showing that the opposite is true. This statement is in part a response to the view of the Κυρηναϊκοί (Cyrenaics), following Ἀρίστιππος ὁ Κυρηναῖος (Aristippus of Cyrene), that (1) pleasures do not differ from one another, (2) one pleasure is not more or less pleasant than another, and (3) any particular pleasure is momentary, unable to be prolonged. This incorrect understanding leads to indiscrimination in choosing pleasures.

    In reality, even though pleasure cannot be increased beyond the absence of pain, pleasures are variable in duration (from momentary to continuous) and location (affecting different parts of the body, including the mind) and have different qualities. Therefore, discrimination is required in choosing pleasures.


    κατЄπυκνοYτο “was fully condensed” sg imperf ind, from κατα·πυκνῶ–[καταπύκνειν]: to pack tightly, compress, fill up; consider κατά·πυκνος–κατάπυκνος–κατάπυκνον: thick, close together; ἡ καταπύκνωσις–[τῆς καταπυκνώσεως]: condensation, densification; from πυκνόω "to thicken, condense.” Consider ἡ πύκνωσις–πυκνώσεως: condensation, aggregation.


    Consider «…πρὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῶν νεφῶν φάσκοντας πυκνουμένων τὴν τοῦ ὕδατος φύσιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι – καὶ νομίζοντας καὶ τοῦτο σημεῖον εἶναι ὡς ἐκ μιᾶς φύσεως ἅπαντα γίνεται πυκνώσει καὶ ἀραιώσει παρεξαλλαττούσης τὸν ἀέρα. (On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148, column 27, Fragment 6) …to those who assert that the condensation of clouds results in the formation of water – and believe this to be a sign that everything is made from a single nature through the processes of condensation and rarefaction affecting the air.»

    The prefix "κατα-" formed a technical term that seems to have been associated with Έπίκουρος. It is used mockingly by Ἀθήναιος (Athenaeus), author of Δειπνοσοφισταί (Deipnosophistae, Dinner Sophists), saying «Έπίκουρος οὕτω ‘κατεπύκνου τὴν ἡδονήν’ – ἐμασᾶτ’ ἐπιμελῶς. Eἶδε τἀγαθὸν μόνος ἐκεῖνος οἶόν ἐστιν (Δειπνοσοφισταί 3.103b) Ἐπίκουρος in this way ‘condensed pleasure’ – he chewed attentively. He was the only one who knew what the good is.»

    Ἀλκίφρων (Alciphron), in his fictional letters, uses the word in association with Έπίκουρος «Tοῖτο εἶναι ‘τὸ τῆς σαρκὸς ἀόχλητον’ καὶ ‘τὴν καταπύκνωσιν τοῦ ἡδομένου’ (Τὰ Ἀλκιφρονεία 3.19.8) This is ‘the lack of disturbance of the flesh’ this is ‘the condensation of the pleasured.’»

  • Online
    Cassius
    05 - Administrator
    Points
    101,869
    Posts
    13,947
    Quizzes
    9
    Quiz rate
    100.0 %
    • March 2, 2024 at 8:12 PM
    • #33
    Quote from Bryan

    This statement is in part a response to the view of the Κυρηναϊκοί (Cyrenaics), following Ἀρίστιππος ὁ Κυρηναῖος (Aristippus of Cyrene), that (1) pleasures do not differ from one another, (2) one pleasure is not more or less pleasant than another, and (3) any particular pleasure is momentary, unable to be prolonged. This incorrect understanding leads to indiscrimination in choosing pleasures.

    That's very helpful Bryan! Is the source of that information from Diogenes Laertius, or somewhere else? It's probably worth it to track this down to a particular cite so that we can annotate PD09 with this information. Do you know how they come up with that (what seems to me) very strange set of positions? Is the explanation in the cite you are referencing?

  • Bryan
    ὁ ᾨκειωμένος
    Points
    4,708
    Posts
    576
    Quizzes
    4
    Quiz rate
    97.6 %
    • March 2, 2024 at 8:56 PM
    • #34

    Yes, for this I was mostly looking at DL 2.86-90: (Hicks trans.) Those then who adhered to the teaching of Aristippus and were known as Cyrenaics held the following opinions. They laid down that there are two states, pleasure and pain, the former a smooth, the latter a rough motion, and that pleasure does not differ from pleasure nor is one pleasure more pleasant than another. [87] The one state is agreeable and the other repellent to all living things. However, the bodily pleasure which is the end is, according to Panaetius in his work On the Sects, not the settled pleasure following the removal of pains, or the sort of freedom from discomfort which Epicurus accepts and maintains to be the end. They also hold that there is a difference between "end" and "happiness." Our end is particular pleasure, whereas happiness is the sum total of all particular pleasures, in which are included both past and future pleasures.

    [88] Particular pleasure is desirable for its own sake, whereas happiness is desirable not for its own sake but for the sake of particular pleasures. That pleasure is the end is proved by the fact that from our youth up we are instinctively attracted to it, and, when we obtain it, seek for nothing more, and shun nothing so much as its opposite, pain. Pleasure is good even if it proceeds from the most unseemly conduct, as Hippobotus says in his work On the Sects. For even if the action be irregular, still, at any rate, the resultant pleasure is desirable for its own sake and is good. [89] The removal of pain, however, which is put forward in Epicurus, seems to them not to be pleasure at all, any more than the absence of pleasure is pain. For both pleasure and pain they hold to consist in motion, whereas absence of pleasure like absence of pain is not motion, since painlessness is the condition of one who is, as it were, asleep. They assert that some people may fail to choose pleasure because their minds are perverted; not all mental pleasures and pains, however, are derived from bodily counterparts. For instance, we take disinterested delight in the prosperity of our country which is as real as our delight in our own prosperity. Nor again do they admit that pleasure is derived from the memory or expectation of good, which was a doctrine of Epicurus. [90] For they assert that the movement affecting the mind is exhausted in course of time. Again they hold that pleasure is not derived from sight or from hearing alone. At all events, we listen with pleasure to imitation of mourning, while the reality causes pain. They gave the names of absence of pleasure and absence of pain to the intermediate conditions. However, they insist that bodily pleasures are far better than mental pleasures, and bodily pains far worse than mental pains, and that this is the reason why offenders are punished with the former. For they assumed pain to be more repellent, pleasure more congenial. For these reasons they paid more attention to the body than to the mind. Hence, although pleasure is in itself desirable, yet they hold that the things which are productive of certain pleasures are often of a painful nature, the very opposite of pleasure; so that to accumulate the pleasures which are productive of happiness appears to them a most irksome business.

    Edited 3 times, last by Bryan (March 2, 2024 at 9:23 PM).

  • Online
    Cassius
    05 - Administrator
    Points
    101,869
    Posts
    13,947
    Quizzes
    9
    Quiz rate
    100.0 %
    • March 2, 2024 at 9:27 PM
    • #35

    Thank you again Bryan. I'd like to test opinions on this part in particular. Do we think that this part, which is not stated to be inconsistent with Epicurus, would be something that Epicurus would have agreed with? If so, this would be a helpful statement of detail on the relationship between pleasure and happiness that i don't think we have preserved in the Epicureans' own texts to this level of detail. Much of this *does* seem to be consistent with Epicurus and at the moment I am inclined to believe that all of it may represent the Epicurean view as well as Cyreniac.

    Anyone see a reason to reject any of this?

    Quote from Bryan

    They also hold that there is a difference between "end" and "happiness." Our end is particular pleasure, whereas happiness is the sum total of all particular pleasures, in which are included both past and future pleasures.

    [88] Particular pleasure is desirable for its own sake, whereas happiness is desirable not for its own sake but for the sake of particular pleasures. That pleasure is the end is proved by the fact that from our youth up we are instinctively attracted to it, and, when we obtain it, seek for nothing more, and shun nothing so much as its opposite, pain. Pleasure is good even if it proceeds from the most unseemly conduct, as Hippobotus says in his work On the Sects. For even if the action be irregular, still, at any rate, the resultant pleasure is desirable for its own sake and is good.

    • 1
    • 2

Unread Threads

    1. Title
    2. Replies
    3. Last Reply
    1. ⟐ as the symbol of the philosophy of Epicurus 77

      • Like 2
      • michelepinto
      • March 18, 2021 at 11:59 AM
      • General Discussion
      • michelepinto
      • May 21, 2025 at 5:48 AM
    2. Replies
      77
      Views
      9k
      77
    3. Julia

      May 21, 2025 at 5:48 AM
    1. "All Models Are Wrong, But Some Are Useful" 5

      • Like 3
      • Cassius
      • January 21, 2024 at 11:21 AM
      • General Discussion
      • Cassius
      • May 20, 2025 at 5:35 PM
    2. Replies
      5
      Views
      1.3k
      5
    3. Novem

      May 20, 2025 at 5:35 PM
    1. Analysing movies through an Epicurean lens 16

      • Like 1
      • Rolf
      • May 12, 2025 at 4:54 PM
      • General Discussion
      • Rolf
      • May 19, 2025 at 12:45 AM
    2. Replies
      16
      Views
      905
      16
    3. Matteng

      May 19, 2025 at 12:45 AM
    1. Is All Desire Painful? How Would Epicurus Answer? 24

      • Like 1
      • Cassius
      • May 7, 2025 at 10:02 PM
      • General Discussion
      • Cassius
      • May 10, 2025 at 3:42 PM
    2. Replies
      24
      Views
      1.3k
      24
    3. sanantoniogarden

      May 10, 2025 at 3:42 PM
    1. Pompeii Then and Now 7

      • Like 2
      • kochiekoch
      • January 22, 2025 at 1:19 PM
      • General Discussion
      • kochiekoch
      • May 8, 2025 at 3:50 PM
    2. Replies
      7
      Views
      1.2k
      7
    3. kochiekoch

      May 8, 2025 at 3:50 PM

Latest Posts

  • ⟐ as the symbol of the philosophy of Epicurus

    Julia May 21, 2025 at 5:48 AM
  • Happy Twentieth of May 2025!

    Don May 20, 2025 at 9:07 PM
  • "All Models Are Wrong, But Some Are Useful"

    Novem May 20, 2025 at 5:35 PM
  • Article: Scientists in a race to discover why our Universe exists

    kochiekoch May 20, 2025 at 1:26 PM
  • Episode 281 - Is Pain The Greatest Evil - Or Even An Evil At All? - Part One - Not Yet Recorded

    Eikadistes May 19, 2025 at 6:17 PM
  • New "TWENTIERS" Website

    Cassius May 19, 2025 at 4:30 PM
  • Sabine Hossenfelder - Why the Multiverse Is Religion

    Eikadistes May 19, 2025 at 3:39 PM
  • What Makes Someone "An Epicurean?"

    Eikadistes May 19, 2025 at 1:06 PM
  • Analysing movies through an Epicurean lens

    Matteng May 19, 2025 at 12:45 AM
  • Personal mottos?

    Kalosyni May 18, 2025 at 9:22 AM

EpicureanFriends - Classical Epicurean Philosophy

  1. Home
    1. About Us
    2. Classical Epicurean Philosophy
  2. Wiki
    1. Getting Started
  3. Frequently Asked Questions
    1. Site Map
  4. Forum
    1. Latest Threads
    2. Featured Threads
    3. Unread Posts
  5. Texts
    1. Core Texts
    2. Biography of Epicurus
    3. Lucretius
  6. Articles
    1. Latest Articles
  7. Gallery
    1. Featured Images
  8. Calendar
    1. This Month At EpicureanFriends
Powered by WoltLab Suite™ 6.0.22
Style: Inspire by cls-design
Stylename
Inspire
Manufacturer
cls-design
Licence
Commercial styles
Help
Supportforum
Visit cls-design
  • Everywhere
  • This Thread
  • This Forum
  • Forum
  • Articles
  • Blog Articles
  • Files
  • Gallery
  • Events
  • Pages
  • Wiki
  • Help
  • FAQ
  • More Options
foo
Save Quote