Posts by Cassius

Mentioned in this episode:

Epicurus' refutation of determinism

Epicurus' refutation of determinism

www.academia.edu

Yes it is - I don't know who Alex O'Conner is .... familiar with him?

Over at the Facebook group a reader posted to this video as part of a longer post which referenced several videos. The topic of the post was broadly speaking about issues with reductionism, with which I am sympathetic and frequently cite the David Sedley paper "Epicurus' Refutation of Determinism."

Now that i have had a chance to watch this video, I see that the topic of this one isn't really reductionism, but broadly about Dawkins' views of memes as a "mind virus" vs. Peterson's amalgamation of Jungian archetypes and all sorts of other things. As Dawkins says, Peterson is "drunk" on symbolism." [I hope the word is "drunk" - might be another word of similar meaning.]

So while this video is only tangentially related to reductionism, I do think it's very interesting for revealing how Peterson is happy to admit that he is not convinced of the truth of core Bible stories, but doesn't think that their truth is relevant to their importance. To me this just oozes of a Platonic "noble myth" approach where one doesn't care a bit whether a story that is being told is "true" so long as it is effective in producing a desirable social result.

I have tremendous respect for Richard Dawkins but I have to question whether Dawkins responded with the kind of intensity that was appropriate. Peterson is long-winded and tends to filibuster whenever he gets a chance to speak, with the result that this video is mostly Peterson telling Dawkins what Peterson thinks with an occasional break to give Dawkins a short reply.

For those who might want to watch I think this video is useful for:

1. Revealing a straightforward and bold-faced proponent of "I don't care if something is true as long as it leads to a result that i desire." (Peterson)

2. Giving an example of how someone who's broadly aligned with Epicurean views (Dawkins) can respond to such a position. I'm beginning to see Dawkins more as someone almost to be sorry for than as an example for Epicurean argument. His age is not his fault, and he seems to be under a lot of censorship pressure in England to tiptoe around religious issues he'd have been much more clear about in the past. And I detect that Dawkins' humanism inclines him to look for agreement with Peterson where he can agree on political issues, rather than to fight with Peterson on the fundamental errors of his approach.

But all in all it's a worthwhile video -- if you can stomach listening to Peterson's preachy style of talking.

Welcome to Episode 253 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we have a thread to discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

Today we will take a brief detour from Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," to take a look at what is known today as "The Riddle of Epicurus."

David Hume attributes this argument to Epicurus: “Epicurus’s old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?“ (Dialogues concerning Natural Religion 1779).

Lactantius, On the Anger of God, states: "You see, therefore, that we have greater need of wisdom on account of evils; and unless these things had been proposed to us, we should not be a rational animal. But if this account is true, which the Stoics were in no manner able to see, that argument also of Epicurus is done away. God, he says, either wishes to take away evils, and is unable; or He is able, and is unwilling; or He is neither willing nor able, or He is both willing and able. If He is willing and is unable, He is feeble, which is not in accordance with the character of God; if He is able and unwilling, He is envious, which is equally at variance with God; if He is neither willing nor able, He is both envious and feeble, and therefore not God; if He is both willing and able, which alone is suitable to God, from what source then are evils? or why does He not remove them?2 I know that many of the philosophers, who defend providence, are accustomed to be disturbed by this argument, and are almost driven against their will to admit that God takes no interest in anything, which Epicurus especially aims at; but having examined the matter, we easily do away with this formidable argument. For God is able to do whatever He wishes, and there is no weakness or envy in God. He is able, therefore, to take away evils; but He does not wish to do so, and yet He is not on that account envious. For on this account He does not take them away, because He at the same time gives wisdom, as I have shown; and there is more of goodness and pleasure in wisdom than of annoyance in evils. For wisdom causes us even to know God, and by that knowledge to attain to immortality, which is the chief good. Therefore, unless we first know evil, we shall be unable to know good. But Epicurus did not see this, nor did any other, that if evils are taken away, wisdom is in like manner taken away; and that no traces of virtue remain in man, the nature of which consists in enduring and overcoming the bitterness of evils. And thus, for the sake of a slight gain in the taking away of evils, we should be deprived of a good, which is very great, and true, and peculiar to us. It is plain, therefore, that all things are proposed for the sake of man, as well evils as also goods" (Chapter 13, translated by William Fletcher 1886).

Next week we will return to our normal sequence, and get back to Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," which began with the Epicurean spokesman Velleius defending the Epicurean point of view. This week will continue into Section 42 as Cotta, the Academic Skeptic, continues to attack the Epicurean view of the nature of divinity.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here at Archive.org. The text which we include in these posts is available here. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of arguments presented will eventually be put together here.

Today's Text

XLII. And why should we worship them from an admiration only of that nature in which we can behold nothing excellent? and as for that freedom from superstition, which you are in the habit of boasting of so much, it is easy to be free from that feeling when you have renounced all belief in the power of the Gods; unless, indeed, you imagine that Diagoras or Theodorus, who absolutely denied the being of the Gods, could possibly be superstitious. I do not suppose that even Protagoras could, who doubted whether there were Gods or not. The opinions of these philosophers are not only destructive of superstition, which arises from a vain fear of the Gods, but of religion also, which consists in a pious adoration of them.

What think you of those who have asserted that the whole doctrine concerning the immortal Gods was the invention of politicians, whose view was to govern that part of the community by religion which reason could not influence? Are not their opinions subversive of all religion? Or what religion did Prodicus the Chian leave to men, who held that everything beneficial to human life should be numbered among the Gods? Were not they likewise void of religion who taught that the Deities, at present the object of our prayers and adoration, were valiant, illustrious, and mighty men who arose to divinity after death? Euhemerus, whom our Ennius translated, and followed more than other authors, has particularly advanced this doctrine, and treated of the deaths and burials of the Gods; can he, then, be said to have confirmed religion, or, rather, to have totally subverted it? I shall say nothing of that sacred and august Eleusina, into whose mysteries the most distant nations were initiated, nor of the solemnities in Samothrace, or in Lemnos, secretly resorted to by night, and surrounded by thick and shady groves; which, if they were properly explained, and reduced to reasonable principles, would rather explain the nature of things than discover the knowledge of the Gods.

XLIII. Even that great man Democritus, from whose fountains Epicurus watered his little garden, seems to me to be very inferior to his usual acuteness when speaking about the nature of the Gods. For at one time he thinks that there are images endowed with divinity, inherent in the universality of things; at another, that the principles and minds contained in the universe are Gods; then he attributes divinity to animated images, employing themselves in doing us good or harm; and, lastly, he speaks of certain images of such vast extent that they encompass the whole outside of the universe; all which opinions are more worthy of the country of Democritus than of Democritus himself; for who can frame in his mind any ideas of such images? who can admire them? who can think they merit a religious adoration?

But Epicurus, when he divests the Gods of the power of doing good, extirpates all religion from the minds of men; for though he says the divine nature is the best and the most excellent of all natures, he will not allow it to be susceptible of any benevolence, by which he destroys the chief and peculiar attribute of the most perfect being. For what is better and more excellent than goodness and beneficence? To refuse your Gods that quality is to say that no man is any object of their favor, and no Gods either; that they neither love nor esteem any one; in short, that they not only give themselves no trouble about us, but even look on each other with the greatest indifference.

Quote from Root304

I found much fruit in the notion of "bounded recursion" to describe that indeterminancy and waveform happens within a relatively short range of possibilities.

I think that's a very useful way of looking at passages like Diogenes of Oinoanda saying that Epicureans agree that there is a flux, but it is not so fast or indeterminate that it cannot be perceived by our natural faculties. Waveforms or other motions can be very fast, but if they "oscillate" within a bounded area they they are readily perceivable as within a pattern.

Quote from Don

iistening to some fine music, and enjoying quality local brews.

Ah those sensual pleasures!

Along the same lines of deprecating the senses, Joshua, this quote from Cicero's ON DIVINATION:

Quote

"Moreover, divination finds another and a positive support in nature, which teaches us how great is the power of the soul when it is divorced from the bodily senses, as it is especially in sleep, and in times of frenzy or inspiration. For, as the souls of the gods, without the intervention of eyes or ears or tongue, understand each other and what each one thinks (hence men, even when they offer silent prayers and vows, have no doubt that the gods understand them), so the souls of men, when released by sleep from bodily chains, or when stirred by inspiration and delivered up to their own impulses, see things that they cannot see when they are mingled with the body. And while it is difficult, perhaps, to apply this principle of nature to explain that kind of divination which we call artificial, yet Posidonius, who digs into the question as deep as one can, thinks that nature gives certain signs of future events. Thus Heraclides of Pontus records that it is the custom of the people of Ceos, once each year, to make a careful observation of the rising of the Dog-star and from such observation to conjecture whether the ensuing year will be healthy or pestilential. For if the star rises dim and, as it were enveloped in a fog, this indicates a thick and heavy atmosphere, which will give off very unwholesome vapours; but if the star appears clear and brilliant, this is a sign that the atmosphere is light and pure and, as a consequence, will be conducive to good health.

"Again, Democritus expresses the opinion that the ancients acted wisely in providing for the inspection of the entrails of sacrifices; because, as he thinks, the colour and general condition of the entrails are prophetic sometimes of health and sometimes of sickness and sometimes also of whether the fields will be barren or productive. Now, if it is known by observation and experience that these means of divination have their source in nature, it must be that the observations made and records kept for a long period of time have added much to our knowledge of this subject. Hence, that natural philosopher introduced by Pacuvius into his play of Chryses, seems to show very scanty apprehension of the laws of nature when he speaks as follows:

This comes from Cicero's "On Divination" (Loeb), and it would be perhaps useful to get some practice thinking about how this kind of thinking seems to attract some people and how an Epicurean would have responded to it:

Quote

The Stoics, for example, establish the existence of divination by the following process of reasoning:

"'If there are gods and they do not make clear to man in advance what the future will be, then they do not love man; or, they themselves do not know what the future will be; or, they think that it is of no advantage to man to know what it will be; or, they think it inconsistent with their dignity to give man forewarnings of the future; or, finally, they, though gods, cannot give intelligible signs of coming events. But it is not true that the gods do not love us, for they are the friends and benefactors of the human race; nor is it true that they do not know their own decrees and their own plans; nor is it true that it is of no advantage to us to know what is going to happen, since we should be more prudent if we knew; nor is it true that the gods think it inconsistent with their dignity to give forecasts, since there is no more excellent quality than kindness; nor is it true that they have not the power to know the future; therefore it is not true that there are gods and yet that they do not give us signs of the future; but there are gods, therefore they give us such signs; and if they give us such signs, it is not true that they give us no means to understand those signs — otherwise their signs would be useless; and if they give us the means, it is not true that there is no divination; therefore there is divination.'

Quote from Don

I don't think that's what Cassius is saying either, but I want to make it clear that - from what I read here in this text and elsewhere - Epicurus is not endorsing the "sex, drugs, and rock n roll" lifestyle of the ἄσωτος (Read the quote from my commentary on that word below). Did Epicurus engage in drinking, revelry, etc.? Sure, I got no problem with that. Did he go on binges of drinking to find himself hungover and nauseated? Definitely not, as far as I'm concerned.

Good point that the same question pops up here. I think (as you say) that both you and I *DO* endorse the pleasures of sex, rock'n'roll, and (sometimes) drugs So we could never accept an interpretation that these are blanketly forbidden. As you said, it's the overindulgence in these, or any other pleasure, even ice cream, that is the problem.

So the real problem is that the sentence as translated has a truncated structure that leaves it ambiguous in English as written, and it demands commentary, or else it will be exhibit number one - which it is what it has become - for those who make Epicurus out to be an ascetic.

Also: While I do think it is most clear to a modern reader to add in the "only," if we put the issue in a clearly philosophical context, such as the heap analogy, then the "only" isn't strictly necessary.

A heap "is not" any of the individual grains of sand that compose it. That can also be said as "A heap is not only the individual grains of sand that compose it, the heap is the combination of the grains of sand." I think that's the Epicurean position on the sorites question, and the reason for him saying that he would not know the good *without* the sensual pleasures. If someone understands that then the discussion we're having right now never comes up. But that's the problem, people are not thinking in terms of the sorites/heap issue. They are thinking generally from their preconceived Platonic/Humanist perspective that sensual issues are "bad," so they jump to conclude that that is what Epicurus is saying.

So I would say that it's not strictly necessary to say "Pleasure is not only the pleasures of sensuality and of the profligate...." because if you realize the the term "pleasure" is meant conceptually, then you automatically read into the sentence an understanding that the concept of pleasure is not identical with any individual pleasure -- you understand that as a matter of logic just like you understand that a heap is not the same as its parts. But very few ordinary people think that way, so they probably need the "only."

The real erroneous interpretation in my view is not that of adding in the "only," but in failing to see that the sentence structure makes clear that the blanket term "pleasure" is not identical with *any* particular pleasure. Once that is established then the meaning can be communicated in many ways. So I would say that the main error to be avoided would be any reading that separates "sensual pleasures" out of a list of "approved pleasures" as very many commentators today are doing. That interpretation sounds like "Pleasure does not include the pleasures of sensuality or the profligates," which I would maintain is clearly wrong.

Yes Epicurus was different from the Cyreniacs, but he was not different because he subtracted sensual pleasures from a list of approved pleasures, he was expanding the Cyreniac list of pleasures to include experiences that they did not consider to be pleasure.

Don I think our different perspective there parallels our different perspective on PD10. I don't think the passage can be reconciled with the rest of the philosophy without acknowledging that sensual pleasures are pleasure too. Therefore I think the danger is on the other side - that of reading this passage as a blanket condemnation of sensual pleasures - which I think is in fact is the way a lot of people are interpreting it so as to arrive at an ascetic interpretations of Epicurus.

Discussing this is very helpful cause I agree this is a critical issue.

Citations relevant to this episode:

Vatican Saying 32: The veneration of the wise man is a great blessing to those who venerate him.

Velleius Previously In On The Nature of The Gods:

XVII ... We have then a preconception of such a nature that we believe the gods to be blessed and immortal. For nature, which bestowed upon us an idea of the gods themselves, also engraved on our minds the belief that they are eternal and blessed. If this is so, the famous maxim of Epicurus truthfully enunciates that "that which is blessed and eternal can neither know trouble itself nor cause trouble to another, and accordingly cannot feel either anger or favor, since all such things belong only to the weak." If we sought to attain nothing else beside piety in worshiping the gods and freedom from superstition, what has been said had sufficed; since the exalted nature of the gods, being both eternal and supremely blessed, would receive man's pious worship (for what is highest commands the reverence that is its due); and furthermore all fear of the divine power or divine anger would have been banished (since it is understood that anger and favor alike are excluded from the nature of a being at once blessed and immortal, and that these being eliminated we are menaced by no fears in regard to the powers above). But the mind strives to strengthen this belief by trying to discover the form of god, the mode of his activity, and the operation of his intelligence.

XX ... Well then, in this immensity of length and breadth and height there flits an infinite quantity of atoms innumerable, which though separated by void yet cohere together, and taking hold each of another form unions wherefrom are created those shapes and forms of things which you think cannot be created without the aid of bellows and anvils, and so have saddled us with an eternal master, whom day and night we are to fear. For who would not fear a prying busybody of a god, who foresees and thinks of and notices all things, and deems that everything is his concern? An outcome of this theology was first of all your doctrine of Necessity or Fate, heimarmene, as you termed it, the theory that every event is the result of an eternal truth and an unbroken sequence of causation. But what value can be assigned to a philosophy which thinks that everything happens by fate? It is a belief for old women, and ignorant old women at that. And next follows your doctrine of mantike, or Divination, which would so steep us in superstition, if we consented to listen to you, that we should be the devotees of soothsayers, augurs, oracle-mongers, seers and interpreters of dreams. But Epicurus has set us free from superstitious terrors and delivered us out of captivity, so that we have no fear of beings who, we know, create no trouble for themselves and seek to cause none to others, while we worship with pious reverence the transcendent majesty of nature.

Welcome to Episode 252 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we have a thread to discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

Today we are continuing to review Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," which began with the Epicurean spokesman Velleius defending the Epicurean point of view. This week will continue into Section 41 as Cotta, the Academic Skeptic, continues to attack the Epicurean view of the nature of divinity.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here at Archive.org. The text which we include in these posts is available here. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of arguments presented will eventually be put together here.

Today's Text

XLI. But they are free from pain. Is that sufficient for beings who are supposed to enjoy all good things and the most supreme felicity? The Deity, they say, is constantly meditating on his own happiness, for he has no other idea which can possibly occupy his mind. Consider a little; reflect what a figure the Deity would make if he were to be idly thinking of nothing through all eternity but “It is very well with me, and I am happy;” nor do I see why this happy Deity should not fear being destroyed, since, without any intermission, he is driven and agitated by an everlasting incursion of atoms, and since images are constantly floating off from him. Your Deity, therefore, is neither happy nor eternal.

Epicurus, it seems, has written books concerning sanctity and piety towards the Gods. But how does he speak on these subjects? You would say that you were listening to Coruncanius or Scævola, the high-priests, and not to a man who tore up all religion by the roots, and who overthrew the temples and altars of the immortal Gods; not, indeed, with hands, like Xerxes, but with arguments; for what reason is there for your saying that men ought to worship the Gods, when the Gods not only do not regard men, but are entirely careless of everything, and absolutely do nothing at all?

But they are, you say, of so glorious and excellent a nature that a wise man is induced by their excellence to adore them. Can there be any glory or excellence in that nature which only contemplates its own happiness, and neither will do, nor does, nor ever did anything? Besides, what piety is due to a being from whom you receive nothing? Or how can you, or any one else, be indebted to him who bestows no benefits? For piety is only justice towards the Gods; but what right have they to it, when there is no communication whatever between the Gods and men? And sanctity is the knowledge of how we ought to worship them; but I do not understand why they are to be worshipped, if we are neither to receive nor expect any good from them.

XLII. And why should we worship them from an admiration only of that nature in which we can behold nothing excellent? and as for that freedom from superstition, which you are in the habit of boasting of so much, it is easy to be free from that feeling when you have renounced all belief in the power of the Gods; unless, indeed, you imagine that Diagoras or Theodorus, who absolutely denied the being of the Gods, could possibly be superstitious. I do not suppose that even Protagoras could, who doubted whether there were Gods or not. The opinions of these philosophers are not only destructive of superstition, which arises from a vain fear of the Gods, but of religion also, which consists in a pious adoration of them.

What think you of those who have asserted that the whole doctrine concerning the immortal Gods was the invention of politicians, whose view was to govern that part of the community by religion which reason could not influence? Are not their opinions subversive of all religion? Or what religion did Prodicus the Chian leave to men, who held that everything beneficial to human life should be numbered among the Gods? Were not they likewise void of religion who taught that the Deities, at present the object of our prayers and adoration, were valiant, illustrious, and mighty men who arose to divinity after death? Euhemerus, whom our Ennius translated, and followed more than other authors, has particularly advanced this doctrine, and treated of the deaths and burials of the Gods; can he, then, be said to have confirmed religion, or, rather, to have totally subverted it? I shall say nothing of that sacred and august Eleusina, into whose mysteries the most distant nations were initiated, nor of the solemnities in Samothrace, or in Lemnos, secretly resorted to by night, and surrounded by thick and shady groves; which, if they were properly explained, and reduced to reasonable principles, would rather explain the nature of things than discover the knowledge of the Gods.

Lucretius Today Episode 251 is now available: "How Niagara Falls Helps Us Understand the Flux, the Heap, and the Epicurean Gods"

And applying that last observation about heaps and waterfalls to the statement in the letter to Menoeceus:

"When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality, as is supposed by some who are either ignorant or disagree with us or do not understand, but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind."

Given that we know that Epicurus DOES accept the pleasures of profligates and the pleasures of sensuality as pleasures, the better interpretation of what he is saying is incorporate Epicurus's position on the heap/river questions, to the effect that:

We should not identify the concept of pleasure as being limited ONLY to the particular pleasures of profligates or sensuality (such as sex, food, drink, etc) because that is not our definition of pleasure as the goal. The concept of Pleasure, which we take as our definition of the ultimate good, includes NOT ONLY those particular pleasures but ALSO all other pleasures, such as those of the mind, literature, art, calmness, etc. This "Pleasure as the good" does not exist as a Platonic ideal, it exists and is recognized only by our perception of many particular pleasures. The unifying characteristic of any set of particular pleasures is not that they reflect or partake of some ideal Platonic form or Aristotelian essence, but that we feel it to be pleasure, rather than feeling it to be pain.

It has always made sense to mentally insert an "ONLY" so as to read "When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean ONLY the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality..." given that we know that sensuality and even the things that profligates do are pleasurable. But placing this sentence in the context of the sorites/heap/waterfall/river question gives us a context in which to supply the missing "only." Waterfalls and rivers and heaps are not ONLY individual grains of sand or drops of water, they are a composite of the individual particles. Pleasure is not ONLY sensuality, but it is also all feelings of all experiences in life which are not painful, because that is a necessary deduction from there being only two feelings, pleasure or pain, into one of which category all feelings must be placed.

You can't recognize heaps or waterfalls or rivers without recognizing their components, and you can't recognize Pleasure as the good without recognizing all the individual pleasures of which the concept of Pleasure is composed.

Just to add this as a note for future thought and discussion, what we talk about in this podcast plays into our recent discussion of the sorites / heap question and how that is related both to the waterfall / bathing in the same river questions. And both of those play into the issue of seeing pleasure as both the composite ultimate good while also consisting of individual feelings of pleasure.

When Epicurus asked how he should recognize the good if not for the pleasures of sex, food, etc, that is essentially the same question as "how should he recognize a waterfall or a river if not for the drops of water that compose it?"

The point would not be that we should consider any individual drops of water to make up the whole waterfall, or any individual pleasures to make up the whole of good, but that the parts and the whole are both real and inseparably connected.

Our natural faculties allow us to assemble the notion of a "waterfall" or a "river" from the perceptions of the individual drops of which the waterfall or river is composed. Likewise, our natural faculties (perceptions and minds) allow us to assemble "the good" from the individual pleasures of which the notion of "the good" is composed. There is no conflict between saying that both individual drops and waterfalls exist and are real to us. Likewise it is proper to say that both individual pleasures and the overall concept of the good as pleasure exist and are real to us.

And just like a waterfall or a river or a heap exists through the movement of the particles that compose it, at least one type of living being could he held to exist indefinitely, analogous to a river or waterfall, if it could find a way to constantly replenish the movement of the particles that compose it.

But for the ethics question, which concerns more people today than the god question does, the point would be that the abstract good of pleasure can be said to exist only because it is a composite of all the constantly moving and changing particular pleasures that compose it. Were we to try to separate out all the individual physical and mental pleasures that compose it (such as sex, food, drink, calmness, delight, tranquility, etc) we would have nothing left by which to recognize the good. The concept of Pleasure as the good does not exist as a Platonic ideal, it exists and is recognized only by our perception of "Pleasure" as a composite many particular pleasures, in the same way that we perceive "heaps" or "waterfalls" or "rivers" as composites of many grains of sand or drops of water.

Quote from Julia

What gives you your certainty that this was not the case?

I may misunderstand your question (as to what "this" refers to), but my point of view is that while gosh knows a consensus of scholars over hundreds if not thousands of years can be wrong about major things, in this case there are few if any others who have held that Lucretius was anything but sincere in his admiration for Epicurus and his intent to convey Epicurus' philosophy faithfully. I am not aware of any significant writer who has ever taken any other position.

Further, in this case it's not just a matter of agreeing or disagreeing with what Lucretius is saying. Most scholars don't agree with Lucretius, but here the issue is not agreeing or disagreeing with doctrine, but interpreting Lucretius' "tone." Yes Lucretius uses a satirical tone in criticizing the opponents of Epicurus, but he's never disrespectful of Epicurean views.

It's almost always possible to argue many sides of the same question, so I am preferring a charitable interpretation of THM's argument. Yes Lucretius uses satire, but the purpose of the book is not to conform to a literary genre of satire, but to convey Epicurean philosophy using the poetic form.

Maybe THM ends up that way in his book, but if his book goes in the same direction as certain commens in the video, I doubt I will spend the time to read the book. No doubt it contains some good nuggets of information, but if the ultimate point is that "Lucretius was not sincere in his attempt to teach Epicurean philosophy faithfully" then I think THM picked an insurmountable mountain to try to climb.

I understand we have two significant birthdays today! Happy birthday Joshua and...

Happy Birthday to Joshua! Learn more about Joshua and say happy birthday on Joshua's timeline: Joshua