Pros and Cons Of Considering Epicurean Philosophy To Be A "Religion"

Cassius · March 23, 2024 at 1:40 PM

Dewitt:

Quote

ISONOMY AND THE GODS
In spite of a supercilious opinion to the contrary, Epicurus was not a muddled thinker but a very systematic one. He enunciated his Twelve Elementary Principles and adhered to them closely. Two of these, the fifth and sixth, asserted the infinity of the universe in respect of matter and space. To this idea of infinity he ascribed fundamental importance. He exhorted the young Pythocles to study it as one of those master principles which would render easy the recognition of causation in details.⁶⁸ Cicero must have been recalling some similar exhortation when he wrote: "But of the very greatest importance is the significance of infinity and in the highest degree deserving of intense and diligent contemplation." ⁶⁹ He was quoting Epicurus.
It was from this principle that Epicurus deduced his chief theoretical confirmation of belief in the existence of gods. It was from this that he arrived at knowledge of their number and by secondary deduction at knowledge of their abode. He so interpreted the significance of infinity as to extend it from matter and space to the sphere of values, that is, to perfection and imperfection. In brief, if the universe were thought to be imperfect throughout its infinite extent, it could no longer be called infinite. This necessity of thought impelled him to promulgate a subsidiary principle, which he called isonomia, a sort of cosmic justice, according to which the imperfection in particular parts of the universe is offset by the perfection of the whole. Cicero rendered it aequabilis tributio, "equitable apportionment." ⁷⁰ The mistake of rendering it as "equilibrium" must be avoided.
The term isonomia itself, which may be anglicized as isonomy, deserves a note. That it is lacking in extant Epicurean texts, all of them elementary, and is transmitted only by Cicero is evidence of its belonging to higher doctrine and advanced studies. Epicurus switched its meaning slightly, as he did that of the word prolepsis. To the Greeks it signified equality of all before the law, a boast of Athenians in particular. It was a mate to eunomia, government by law, as opposed to barbaric despotism, a boast of Greeks in general. That Epicurus thought to make capital of this happy connotation may be considered certain. He was vindicating for Nature a sort of justice, the bad being overbalanced by the good. It is also possible that he was remotely influenced by the teachings of Zoroaster, well known in his day through the conquests of Alexander, according to whom good and evil, as represented by Ormazd and Ahriman, battled for the upper hand in mundane affairs.
Whatever may be the facts concerning this influence, Epicurus discovered a reasonable way of allowing for the triumph of good in the universe, which seemed impossible under atomic materialism. Thus in his system of thought isonomy plays a part comparable to that of teleology with Plato and Aristotle. Teleology was inferred from the evidences of design, and design presumes agencies of benevolence, whether natural or divine. Epicurus was bound to reject design because the world seemed filled with imperfections, which he listed, but by extending the doctrine of infinity to apply to values he was able, however curiously, to discover room for perfection along with imperfection.
That he employed isonomy as theoretical proof of the existence of gods is well documented. For example, Lactantius, who may have been an Epicurean before his conversion to Christianity, quotes Epicurus as arguing "that the divine exists because there is bound to be something surpassing, superlative and blessed."⁷¹ The necessity here appealed to is a necessity of thought, which becomes a necessity of existence. The existence of the imperfect in an infinite universe demands belief in the existence of the perfect. Cicero employs very similar language: "It is his doctrine that there are gods, because there is bound to be some surpassing being than which nothing is better." ⁷² Like the statement of Lactantius, this recognizes a necessity of existence arising from a necessity of thought; the order of Nature cannot be imperfect throughout its whole extent; it is bound to culminate in something superior, that is, in gods.
It is possible to attain more precision in the exposition. Cicero, though brutally brief, exhibits some precision of statement. The infinity of the universe, as usual, serves as a major premise. This being assumed, Cicero declares: "The nature of the universe must be such that all similars correspond to all similars." ⁷³ One class of similars is obviously taken to be human beings, all belonging to the same grade of existence in the order of Nature. As Philodemus expresses it in a book about logic, entitled On Evidences, "It is impossible to think of Epicurus as man and Metrodorus as non-man." ⁷⁴ Another class of similars is the gods. This being understood, the truth of Cicero's next statement follows logically: "If it be granted that the number of mortals is such and such, the number of immortals is not less." ⁷⁵ This reasoning calls for no exegesis, but two points are worthy of mention: first, Cicero is not precise in calling the gods immortals; according to strict doctrine they are not deathless, only incorruptible of body; the second point is that Epicurus is more polytheistic in belief than his own countrymen.
The next item, however, calls for close scrutiny. Just as human beings constitute one set of similars and the gods another, so the forces that preserve constitute one set and the forces that destroy constitute another.
At this point a sign of warning is to be raised. There is also another pair of forces that are opposed to each other, those that create and those that destroy.⁷⁶ The difference is that the latter operate in each of the innumerable worlds, while the former hold sway in the universe at large. For example, in a world such as our own, which is one of many, the forces of creation have the upper hand during its youthful vigor. At long last, however, the forces of destruction gradually gain the superiority and eventually the world is dissolved into its elements.⁷⁷
In the universe at large, on the contrary, the situation is different and the forces opposed to each other are not those that destroy and those that create but those that destroy and those that preserve. Moreover, a new aspect of infinity is invoked, the infinity of time. The universe is eternal and unchanging. Matter can neither be created nor destroyed. The sum of things is always the same, as Lucretius says. This truth is contained in the first two of the Twelve Elementary Principles. In combination they are made to read: "The universe has always been the same as it now is and always will be the same." ⁷⁸ This can be true only on the principle that the forces that preserve are at all times superior to the forces that destroy.
It follows that Cicero was writing strictly by the book when he made his spokesman draw the following conclusion from the doctrine of isonomy: "And if the forces that destroy are innumerable, the forces that preserve must by the same token be infinite."⁷⁹ This doctrine, it is essential to repeat, holds only for the universe at large. It is not applicable to the individual world and it does not mean that the prevalence of elephants in India is balanced by the prevalence of wolves in Russia. Isonomy does not mean "equal distribution" but "equitable apportionment." It does not denote balance or equilibrium. No two sets of similar forces are in balance; in the individual world the forces of destruction always prevail at last, and in the universe at large the forces of preservation prevail at all times.
By this time three aspects of the principles of isonomy have been brought forward: first, that in an infinite universe perfection is bound to exist as well as imperfection; that is, "that there must be some surpassing being, than which nothing is better"; second, that the number of these beings, the gods, cannot be less than the number of mortals; and third, that in the universe at large the forces of preservation always prevail over the forces of destruction.
All three of these are direct inferences from the infinity and eternity of the universe. There remains to be drawn an indirect inference of primary importance. Since in the individual worlds the forces of destruction always prevail in the end, it follows that the incorruptible gods can have their dwelling place only outside of the individual worlds, that is, in the free spaces between the worlds, the so-called intermundia, where the forces of preservation are always superior. There is more to be said on this topic in the section that follows.

Display More

Cassius · March 23, 2024 at 1:57 PM

Quote from Twentier

Epicureanism is my religion, and there's not a goddamn thing anyone can do about it.

You know, when I combine my thoughts after reading that section of DeWitt on "Isonomy and the Gods," with our friend Twentier's statement, I have to comment that if ever in the future there is a resurgence of Epicureanism as a "religion," Norman DeWitt deserves a special place its "Hall of Apostles." No one else I know of is anywhere close to DeWitt in bringing the implications of the various texts out into the open for us to discuss.

The gods are not immortal, just deathless.
Isonomia
The principle that nature never creates only a single thing of a kind.
Prolepsis, as much or more so than images, as the basis of Epicurus' belief in the gods.
The importance of the implications of infinity.

All of these things are right there in the various texts, but the writers for laymen rarely seem interested in their significance. Laymen themselves don't have nearly the depth of reading to recognize how they fit together without some of DeWitt's training to bring them together. We'd never be able to bring all these to bear in our discussions here, and if we listened to most modern theorists, who seem to frown on "infinity" and "eternality," we'd never even get started.

Kalosyni · March 23, 2024 at 3:02 PM

Quote from Don

τὸν θεὸν ζῷον "the god (is a) blessed and imperishable ζῷον. But what is a ζῷον?
First, note the singular "god." Not gods. This use of the singular - a god,

Possibility of transcription error? Perhaps it was originally plural.

Godfrey · March 23, 2024 at 5:39 PM

Thanks for the DeWitt section, Cassius ; it helps a lot to read it again.

Now I'm beginning to understand the sources of my bafflement with isonomy:

- Isonomy appears to be simply a logical formula, not a natural principle, and therefore is subject to fallacies and misuse. The formula is fine, but each premise must be evaluated for validity.

- In this way, the principle of isonomy can create conclusions which conflict with the conclusion reached by thinking through the implications of a fully material universe.

- The idea of perfection in a fully material universe is problematic to me. To my understanding, in an infinite universe there can be no "perfect" just as there can be no boundary or limit.

- "Perfection" seems to be getting uncomfortably close to Plato's ideal forms. If there must exist a perfect mirror of a human, using the principle of isonomia, mustn't there exist a perfect dolphin? Elephant? Fruit fly? &c....

- A similarly disturbing conclusion reached through isonomia might be this: "the number of living beings must be equal to the number of dead beings." This is to offset the imperfection of death with the perfection of eternal life, another logical leap of monotheistic religions.

- An interesting conclusion that follows from isonomy is that the gods must be shaped like humans. In this way they are of the same class, and logically consistent.

Quote from DeWitt via Cassius

By this time three aspects of the principles of isonomy have been brought forward: first, that in an infinite universe perfection is bound to exist as well as imperfection; that is, "that there must be some surpassing being, than which nothing is better"; second, that the number of these beings, the gods, cannot be less than the number of mortals; and third, that in the universe at large the forces of preservation always prevail over the forces of destruction.

To the best of my understanding (which may be wrong), I disagree with all three of these conclusions.

1. "in an infinite universe perfection is bound to exist, that there must be some surpassing being, than which nothing is better". This, to me, is an erroneous proposition in that it describes a finite universe, not an infinite one.

2. "that the number of these beings, the gods, cannot be less than the number of mortals". If there is no perfection, then this is erroneous in that it's comparing two different classes of beings, such as great apes and humans.

3. "in the universe at large the forces of preservation always prevail over the forces of destruction." This seems to conflict with the idea of isonomia: shouldn't the forces of preservation and destruction be equal in the universe at large? Isn't their equality a basic principle of modern science as well?

Cassius · March 23, 2024 at 7:33 PM

Godfrey I would suspect that if there is a logical inconsistency here, it would be in DeWitt's description of "perfection" rather than in Epicurus' theory. Surely you are right that in fighting Plato's ideals, Epicurus would not then turn around and adopt the same problem in a new form.

No doubt there's a lot more investigation to be done into the background of the isonomia discussion, but I would expect this reasoning to be of the "nature never makes only a single thing of a kind" variety that is clearly described by Lucretius.

In that other case, it seems they were taking from the observation that here on earth there is nothing absolutely unique, but that everything belongs to a class of similars, and extrapolating that to the universe as a whole. That's a reasonable procedure it seems to me, and the burden of proof to refute a theory based on what we see here on earth is on someone who asserts that there IS something that is absolutely unique but which cannot be observed (a burden which cannot be met by observation) rather than on Epicurus' position, which rests deductions from what we do in fact observe.

We'd have to dive into whether in fact Epicurus was talking about "perfection" as a concept, but I would suspect more that he was (1) starting with the observation that there is nothing unique, all belonging to a class of similars, and then proceeding to (2) that within any class of similars, it is possible for us (probably by process related to preconception) to "rank" those similars in terms of varying characteristics.

Happiness and length of life being characteristics of the class of "living beings," it makes logical sense to conclude from the examples we observe that happiness and length of life exist on a spectrum from less happy to completely happy, and from short life to much longer life. Given that we see such spectrums of characteristics here on earth, it is logical to believe that in a universe that is eternally old and boundlessly wide, there exist examples within those classes that extend out in both directions (greater toward total happiness; longer life toward deathlessness).

We could probably compare what Philodemus is saying in "On Signs," but it does seem that the Epicureans were taking the canonical position that it is legitimate to reason in that way, from things that we observe here on earth to how those things might occur in wider variety in an infinite number of places.

Remember too, that the purpose of scientific investigation is not to latch onto a single true theory of everything, which is essentially impossible, but to determine what is both consistent with what we observe and not contradicted by that which we observe. Then, using sound reasoning, we then consider what is possible to be a real possibility, while "waiting" to reduce the number of possibilities if any new evidence arrives to contradict one of more of them.

This is very different, and in my view superior, to the modern arbitrary speculations that sometimes seems to be "if I can't see if for myself here then it didn't and doesn't happen," or that accept some theory that has absolutely no evidential proof behind it, but which makes sense in some logic-only analysis.

So I see this as an area where DeWitt has generally pointed in the right direction, but further research needs to follow his path and extend his observations more precisely.

And yes it's definitely a process that has limitations, but I see this as very similar to logically dividing all experiences of life into pleasure and pain, and then logically observing that the presence of one is the absence of the other. Epicurus wasn't willing to use logical processes to work with Platonic ideals that have no evidence in reality to support them, but he was willing to use logical processes to work with the evidence that the senses provide to us, and Epicurus seems to have been just as sharp a logician as any of his enemies, carrying his reasoning to its logical conclusions.

Cassius · March 23, 2024 at 7:53 PM

Godfrey I would also draw an analogy to what DeWitt discusses (disapprovingly) here:

DeWitt talks several times about "faith in doctrine" as if he thinks Epicurus had gone too far in several cases. I think DeWitt is on the right course in observing that this kind of thing is exactly what Epicurus was doing, but DeWitt is wrong in his analysis of the result, because Epicurus' position is much stronger than DeWitt's assessment of it. I do think DeWitt's right in talking about it in terms of "faith," (confidence is probably a better word) but the "faith" issue is really more like: "I'm never going to know everything I'd like to know, so where do I place my confidence? Do I place it in Epicurean reasoning based on things I do observe, or do I allow any and all speculation, even that which has absolutely no evidence to support it?" Epicurus chose to place his "faith" about things that are unseen in reasoning based on things that are seen. To me that's a decision I can fully agree with.

Observing that pain is short if intense but manageable if long also seems like going too far when we think of how bad pain can be, but the best way to look at this seems to me to be that we NOT consider it "clinical medical advice," but as a philosophic statement that addresses the bigger philosophical issue, which is: While continuous pleasure is available to those who can figure the problem out, continuous pain can never hold us in its grip forever (we have death as an ultimate cure for that).

Seems to me Epicurus is frequently taking this kind of approach, he's using logical reasoning to explain the big picture to us as a way of organizing our lives, while also reminding us that there's no god or fate to magically solve all our problems, and that we have to work our way through them as best we can.

I might as well go ahead and observe that I see myself making this observation over and over in multiple discussions, probably not convincing many people, but becoming more confident of it myself:

In my view, Epicurus needs to be understood as first and foremost a philosopher attacking the big issues who wants to know the truth about them. Epicurus wants the truth more than he wants happiness, because he's convinced that happiness depends on having a logically consistent understanding of nature. That means Epicurus is committed to talking about everything in a rigorously logical way, and he embraces big-picture logical reasoning, so long as it is based on evidence. That's the starting point for understanding Epicurus, not seeing him as a modern psychologist who throws logic out the window in favor of looking haphazardly for whatever seems to work at the moment. A modern clinician is going to want to dissect "pleasure" into thousand different components, but for Epicurus the first step in making practical use of the issue is to observe the big picture and gain the confidence that comes from the highest level logical analysis, that comes from observing reality and then concluding that is is reasonable to classify all pleasures *as being by definition* the absence of pain.

Bryan · March 23, 2024 at 11:09 PM

Quote from Don

To me the "flaming ramparts of the world" are exactly the outer shell of our cosmos/world-system described by other philosophers of the time. The outer shell - the outer wall/ramparts - are on fire. That's what makes the stars shine. 2:1144 also uses the "ramparts/walls of the world" moenia mundi

Accepting, as we do, the significance that the "walls" can be little more than currents/pressure and, even if more substantial, can and will breakdown into the infinite space beyond them, I must agree that we have the typical high tolerance for various possibilities:

(DL X 88) "A world is a circumscribed portion of sky, containing heavenly bodies and an earth and all the heavenly phenomena, whose dissolution will cause all within it to fall into confusion, it is a piece cut off from the infinite and ends in a boundary either rare or dense, either revolving or stationary: its outline may be spherical or three-cornered or any kind of shape" (Bailey)

"A world is a circumscribed portion of the universe, which contains stars and earth and all other visible things, cut off from the infinite, and terminating [and terminating in a boundary which may be either thick or thin, a boundary whose dissolution will bring about the wreck of all within it] in an exterior which may either revolve or be at rest, and be round or triangular or of any other shape whatever. All these alternatives are possible : they are contradicted by none of the facts in this world, in which an extremity can nowhere be discerned. (Hicks)

Godfrey · March 23, 2024 at 11:24 PM

Thanks Cassius , you do a better job of clarifying isonomy than DeWitt does! Still a lot to chew on, but you've cleared up the shocking inconsistencies.

Perhaps DeWitt's conclusions were colored by his interest in Christianity....

Bryan · March 24, 2024 at 1:44 AM

Quote from Kalosyni

Possibility of transcription error? Perhaps it was originally plural.

It seems the use between the plural and the singular was very casual, just as we still have the casual essential similarity of singular and plural in many statements ("one may say.../people may say"), ( "an animal acts in order to... /animals act in order to... "). Understating one cow goes a long way towards understanding cows generally.

Cassius · March 24, 2024 at 5:22 AM

Quote from Godfrey

you do a better job of clarifying isonomy than DeWitt does

i am not sure "clarifying" is the right word, because i am just speculating too. But like DeWitt generally does, i think we should look for ways to reconcile apparent inconsistencies by going back to the more basic fundamentals and working forward again to see if there is a logical way to fit all the pieces together. I think that it's generally possible to think we can retrace Epicurus' own steps by doing so. DeWitt generally seems to do that except....

Quote from Godfrey

Perhaps DeWitt's conclusions were colored by his interest in Christianity....

Yes this may be the problem. However I don't think we've ever really pinned down that DeWitt himself was a strong Christian. We know for sure that he had a personal interest in the linkage, but interestingly to me i've never (or very rarely) seen him cross the line into outright endorsement of Christianity as the superior system. Most Christian or religious writers (even the "humanist" writers) are to my observation much more overt in specifically endorsing or denouncing particular moral theories of Epicurus. I have to admit that your suggest there Godfrey is the most likely one, but even at this point in reading him over and over I am not convinced I know exactly what DeWitt truly believed himself.

Peter Konstans · March 24, 2024 at 1:15 PM

The Epicurean acceptance of the existence of the gods didn't just rely on abstract theories but also on the idea that the existence of the gods is an empirically verifiable fact because of visions or images of them streaming into our mind. So Epicurus is basically telling us that we know gods exist because many people have actually seen them.

This strange idea ceases to be strange if we recall that mass hallucinations of the sort described below were probably common in ancient communities. They could have been the result of chronic use of hallucinogenic substances traditionally consumed in religious rituals.

The anthropolgist Daniel Everett who observed an Amazonian tribe for years describes witnessing the remarkable occurrence of a whole village simultaneously observing the presence of a 'spirit' that he and his daughter just couldn't see. If you asked these people how they know that 'spirits' exist they would simply tell you that they have seen them. In other words primitive communities experience shared hallucinations.

The following Paragraphs are from his book.

Often when I first opened my eyes, groggily coming out of a dream, a Pirahã child or sometimes even an adult would be staring at me from between the paxiuba palm slats that served as siding for my large hut. This morning was different.

I was now completely conscious, awakened by the noise and shouts of Pirahãs. I sat up and looked around. A crowd was gathering about twenty feet from my bed on the high bank of the Maici, and all were energetically gesticulating and yelling. Everyone was focused on the beach just across the river from my house. I got out of bed to get a better look—and because there was no way to sleep through the noise.
I picked my gym shorts off the floor and checked to make sure that there were no tarantulas, scorpions, centipedes, or other undesirables in them. Pulling them on, I slipped into my flip-flops and headed out the door. The Pirahãs were loosely bunched on the riverbank just to the right of my house. Their excitement was growing. I could see mothers running down the path, their infants trying to hold breasts in their mouths.

The women wore the same sleeveless, collarless, midlength dresses they worked and slept in, stained a dark brown from dirt and smoke. The men wore gym shorts or loincloths. None of the men were carrying their bows and arrows. That was a relief. Prepubescent children were naked, their skin leathery from exposure to the elements. The babies’ bottoms were calloused from scooting across the ground, a mode of locomotion that for some reason they prefer to crawling. Everyone was streaked from ashes and dust accumulated by sleeping and sitting on the ground near the fire.
It was still around seventy-two degrees, though humid, far below the hundred-degree-plus heat of midday. I was rubbing the sleep from my eyes. I turned to Kóhoi, my principal language teacher, and asked, “What’s up?” He was standing to my right, his strong, brown, lean body tensed from what he was looking at.
“Don’t you see him over there?” he asked impatiently. “Xigagaí, one of the beings that lives above the clouds, is standing on the beach yelling at us, telling us he will kill us if we go to the jungle.”
“Where?” I asked. “I don’t see him.”
“Right there!” Kóhoi snapped, looking intently toward the middle of the apparently empty beach.
“In the jungle behind the beach?”
“No! There on the beach. Look!” he replied with exasperation.
In the jungle with the Pirahãs I regularly failed to see wildlife they saw. My inexperienced eyes just weren’t able to see as theirs did.

But this was different. Even I could tell that there was nothing on that white, sandy beach no more than one hundred yards away. And yet as certain as I was about this, the Pirahãs were equally certain that there was something there. Maybe there had been something there that I just missed seeing, but they insisted that what they were seeing, Xigagaí, was still there.
Everyone continued to look toward the beach. I heard Kristene, my six-year-old daughter, at my side.
“What are they looking at, Daddy?”
“I don’t know. I can’t see anything.”
Kris stood on her toes and peered across the river. Then at me. Then at the Pirahãs. She was as puzzled as I was.

Kristene and I left the Pirahãs and walked back into our house. What had I just witnessed? Over the more than two decades since that summer morning, I have tried to come to grips with the significance of how two cultures, my European-based culture and the Pirahãs’ culture, could see reality so differently. I could never have proved to the Pirahãs that the beach was empty. Nor could they have convinced me that there was anything, much less a spirit, on it.

As a scientist, objectivity is one of my most deeply held values. If we could just try harder, I once thought, surely we could each see the world as others see it and learn to respect one another’s views more readily. But as I learned from the Pirahãs, our expectations, our culture, and our experiences can render even perceptions of the environment nearly incommensurable cross-culturally.

Everett also describes another hilarious shared hallucination among the tribesmen. When I first read it, I just couldn't stop laughing.

The morning after one evening’s “show” an older Pirahã man, Kaaxaóoi, came to work with me on the language. As we were working, he startled me by suddenly saying, “The women are afraid of Jesus. We do not want him.”
“Why not?” I asked, wondering what had triggered this declaration.
“Because last night he came to our village and tried to have sex with our women. He chased them around the village, trying to stick his large penis into them.”
Kaaxaóoi proceeded to show me with his two hands held far apart how long Jesus’s penis was—a good three feet.
I didn’t know what to say to this. I had no idea whether a Pirahã male had pretended to be Jesus and pretended to have a long penis, faking it in some way, or what else could be behind this report. Clearly Kaaxaóoi wasn’t making this up. He was reporting it as a fact that he was concerned about. Later, when I questioned two other men from his village, they confirmed his story.

Cassius · March 24, 2024 at 3:20 PM

Quote from Peter Konstans

The Epicurean acceptance of the existence of the gods didn't just rely on abstract theories but also on the idea that the existence of the gods is an empirically verifiable fact because of visions or images of them streaming into our mind. So Epicurus is basically telling us that we know gods exist because many people have actually seen them.

I don't think that (which is the foundation for the rest of the post) is correct at all. The weight of the evidence as I understand the sources is that the images of the gods are not perceived by the eyes, but by the mind.

As DeWitt begins his chapter on the Knowledge of the Gods:

Quote

KNOWLEDGE OF THE GODS
An inveterate tendency to classify Epicurus as an empiricist has resulted in the conclusion that according to his thinking knowledge of the gods comes by vision. The absurdity of this view will become clear as abundant items of evidence are assembled against it.
According to these evidences the sources of knowledge are multiple. The Prolepsis apprises men of the blissfulness and incorruptibility of the gods. The Feelings, that is, fears and worries, serve to inform the individual of the true nature of the divine through the distress that follows upon "false opinions." Reason, by deductive inferences from the Twelve Elementary Principles, informs men of the existence of gods, of their corporeal nature, their number, their gradation in kind and their abode. By the method of analogy, that is, progression from similars to similars, reason also produces confirmatory evidence concerning their form, by a chain argument concerning their nature, and by a disjunctive syllogism concerning the kind of life they lead.

And I would in no way or form equate the Epicurean view of the gods with mass hallucinations.

Bryan · March 24, 2024 at 3:53 PM

I believe that DeWitt is technically correct given the narrow modern view of vision. I do wish to add, as we all already know, that Epicurus clearly emphasized visualization of mental images. If "cow" is the object of consideration, he did not want you to just think about the word "cow" and the definition of a cow, and the logic involved in making cow a distinct class, etc., he wanted you, to the best of your ability, to focus on your mental vision of a cow.

For some contrast, I will share Bailey's comments "There do exist divine being or gods: they are innumerable as are the created things which perish and immortal even as created things are mortal. They are, as is proved by their 'idols' which visit us, like in figure to men. In constitution they are eternal in form but composed of transient matter: this matter, which is all 'alike' and contains no alien elements, comes from the innumerable atoms moving in the void between the worlds: in everlasting succession the atoms stream into the 'forms' of the divine being and unite there for the moment to constitute their body. Then they fly off again in the union in which they have now joined, thus forming the continuous succession of like 'idols', which are perceived by the mind and our direct source of knowledge of the existence of the gods."

(Aetius 4.13.1) “Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus believe that the visual sensation is the result of the penetration of images.”

Don · March 24, 2024 at 11:04 PM

Quote from Bryan

Quote from Don

To me the "flaming ramparts of the world" are exactly the outer shell of our cosmos/world-system described by other philosophers of the time. The outer shell - the outer wall/ramparts - are on fire. That's what makes the stars shine. 2:1144 also uses the "ramparts/walls of the world" moenia mundi

Accepting, as we do, the significance that the "walls" can be little more than currents/pressure and, even if more substantial, can and will breakdown into the infinite space beyond them, I must agree that we have the typical high tolerance for various possibilities:
(DL X 88) "A world is a circumscribed portion of sky, containing heavenly bodies and an earth and all the heavenly phenomena, whose dissolution will cause all within it to fall into confusion, it is a piece cut off from the infinite and ends in a boundary either rare or dense, either revolving or stationary: its outline may be spherical or three-cornered or any kind of shape" (Bailey)
"A world is a circumscribed portion of the universe, which contains stars and earth and all other visible things, cut off from the infinite, and terminating [and terminating in a boundary which may be either thick or thin, a boundary whose dissolution will bring about the wreck of all within it] in an exterior which may either revolve or be at rest, and be round or triangular or of any other shape whatever. All these alternatives are possible : they are contradicted by none of the facts in this world, in which an extremity can nowhere be discerned. (Hicks)

Thanks for the citations. So, Epicurus is talking here in 88 about a κόσμος (cosmos). I agree Epicurus is willing to entertain various shapes for the cosmos/cosmos/world-system/visible universe. But the important thing is that the cosmos is delimited portion of The All (the universe) with a definite boundary ofsome kind enclosing it. Epicurus used his imagination andreasoning and observation to "fly" beyond that boundary out into outer-cosmic space and share what he learned. So, by definition, IF the gods live in the space between cosmoi, they, by the definition of intermundia "between world-systems", they have no world to stand on nor stars to see. There's obviously some matter in that space between worlds but not enough to have a world, otherwise the gods would be *in a cosmos*.

btw, I have no idea why I'm so fixated on this. I don't believe gods exist in this physical, metacosmic way... Basically because the universe isn't built like this... Like I said unless we go with the multiverse. Even then, we would have no way of accessing the intercosmic/multiverse spaces. That's why I continue to take the Sedley "idealist" position on the Epicurean gods as I understand it. I can at least reconcile that to both a classical and modern understanding.

Bryan · March 24, 2024 at 11:25 PM

Quote from Don

There's obviously some matter in that space between worlds but not enough to have a world, otherwise the gods would be *in a cosmos*.

My view is there is an infinite amount of matter in the universe and an infinite amount of matter between worlds, while there is a finite amount of matter within worlds.

Aetius, Placita -- Text and translation by Jaap Mansfeld and David Runia:

(1.5.4) "“Metrodorus,* the teacher of Epicurus says that it is equally absurd that a single stalk should have sprung up on a large plain and that a single cosmos should have done the same in the Infinite. That the kosmoi are infinite in their multiplicity is clear from the fact that the causes are infinite in number. For if the cosmos is limited, while all the causes from which the cosmos originated are infinitely many, then necessarily the kosmoi are infinitely many. After all, where the causes are without limit, there the products [or: effects] are infinite in number or without limit also. These causes are either the atoms or the elements."

*Metrodorus of Chios, not Metrodorus of Lampsacus

(1.7.25) “Epicurus says that the gods are human in form and are all observable by reason only because of the fine particles of which the nature of their images consists. The same philosopher says there are four other classes of natures that are indestructible: the indivisibles, the void, the infinite, and the similarities; these natures are called homoiomereiai (things with like parts) and elements.”

(2.2.5) “Epicurus, however, says that it is possible that the kosmoi are like a ball, but that it is possible that they make use of other shapes as well.”

Peter Konstans · March 25, 2024 at 4:13 AM

I recommend reading the academic book

Pleasure, Mind, and Soul, Selected Papers in Ancient Philosophy by C. C. W. Taylor

The second chapter examines the Epicurean thesis that all perceptions are true, arguing that what it means is that every instance of sensory presentation (widely construed, to include dreams, hallucinations, and imagination as well as perception proper) consists in the stimulation of a sense-organ by a real object, which is represented in that perception exactly as it is in reality. That thesis presupposes the truth of the physical theory as a whole. It is itself supported by the epistemological principle that it is possible to distinguish truth from falsity only if all perceptions are true. But since the latter thesis is unfalsifiable, it is empty, and cannot therefore refute scepticism.

It seems clear to me that Epicurus considered visions and hallucinations (and therefore the existence of the gods as the sources of those visions) to be true. His notion that the sun is as large as it seems should also be understood in the context of his epistemology.

Here are some excerpts from C. C. W. Taylor

Epicurus is reported by Diogenes Laertius (X. 31) as having said that perceptions (or perhaps ‘the senses’ or ‘sense-impressions’, which are also possible meanings of Epicurus’s own term aistheseis) are among the criteria of truth; this report is confirmed by two passages of Epicurus himself, at DL
X. 50–2 and 147.

By itself this need imply nothing more than the merest common sense; of course perception and the senses must have some role in determining what is the case and what is not, and hence which statements are true and which are false. But the matter is not so straightforward. For, firstly, aisthesis and related words are used in a wider range of contexts than ‘perceptions’ and its cognates: e.g. cases of hallucination are sometimes said to involve aisthesis (see below). Secondly, Epicurus is also said to have maintained the much more obviously controversial thesis that every aisthesis is true. In this paper I shall try to establish what he meant by those statements, to clarify the relation between them, and to consider their
wider implications for his epistemological and physical theory.

I turn first to the doctrine that all aistheseis are true, for which the evidence has been helpfully collected by Gisela Striker. No version of it occurs in the texts of Epicurus himself, but the following doctrines, or versions of the same doctrine, are attributed to him by other writers.

1. Every aistheton is true (Sext. M VIII. 9: Ep. ta men aistheta panta elegen alethe kai onta ... panton de ton aistheton alethon onton; 63: Ep. elege men panta ta aistheta einai alethe, kai pasan phantasian apo hyparchontos einai ...). Cf. M VIII. 355, every aistheton is reliable (bebaion).

2. Every aisthesis and every phantasia is true (Usener, no. 248: Aetius IV.
9. 5; Usener, p. 349, 5–6: Aristocles apud Eus. PE XIV. 20. 9).

3. Every phantasia occurring by means of aisthesis is true (Plut. Col. 1109
a–b).

4. Every phantasia is true (M VII. 203–4, 210).

5. Aisthesis always tells the truth (M VIII. 9: ten te aisthesin ... dia pantos te
aletheuein ; 185: medepote pseudomenes tes aistheseos). Cf. the passages in Cicero referred to by Striker, to the effect that the senses are always truthful.

It appears likely that most of these formulations differ from one another
only verbally. Thus Sextus is the only writer cited above to use the term aistheton (‘sense-content’), and his use of the term strongly suggests that it is interchangeable with phantasia (‘appearance’).

This appears particularly from M VII. 203–4, where the thesis that phantasia is always true is supported by a number of examples from the various senses, e.g. ‘The visible (horaton) not only appears (phainetai) visible, but in addition is of the same kind as it appears to be’, which are summed up in the words ‘So all phantasiai are true.’ Here, then, what is true of aistheta is taken to be true of phantasiai as a whole; further evidence that Sextus regards the terms as coextensive is given by M VIII. 63–4, where he represents Epicurus as counting Orestes’ hallucination of the Furies as a case of aisthesis, and therefore as true.

Again, in the passage from Aristocles cited above, quoted by Eusebius, aisthesis is treated as interchangeable with phantasia, since the thesis introduced by means of both terms (i.e. 2 above), is expressed in the course of the passage firstly as the thesis that every aisthesis is true and then as the thesis that every phantasia is true.

If these writers treat aistheton and phantasia as strictly coextensive terms, they misrepresent Epicurus, who distinguishes phantasiai of the mind (e.g. appearances in dreams) from phantasiai of the senses (DL X. 50–1). In strict Epicurean doctrine, then, aistheta are a species of phantasiai.

But the misrepresentation is not crucial, since Epicurus clearly holds that both sensory and non-sensory phantasiai are always true (ibid.: for the Epicurean view of the ‘truth’ of dreams, see below). In the passages from Sextus cited under above, where aisthesis is said always to tell the truth and never to lie, it is possible to render the word as ‘sense’ (equivalent to ‘the senses’), ‘perception’, ‘sensation’ (i.e. the
faculties thereof), ‘the (particular act of ) perception’, or ‘the (particular)
sensation (occurring in the perceptual context)’.

But however we render it, the thesis that aisthesis always tells the truth is presented either as following immediately from the central thesis that all aistheta are true, or as entailing it, or as restating it. The precise logical relation of the two theses (if indeed they are two) is impossible to determine from these passages; by the same token, their intimate logical interconnection is displayed by both. Our evidence, then, indicates that ancient writers regularly attribute to Epicurus or the Epicureans the doctrines that every phantasia is true and that every aistheton is true. Though strictly aistheta are a species of phantasiai, differentiated by their causation via the sense-organs, some later sources appear to make no distinction between the terms. In some reports the doctrine that every aistheton is true appears to be expressed as ‘Every aisthesis is true’; in others, where aisthesis may mean ‘sense’ or ‘faculty’, the thesis that aisthesis always tells the truth is inextricably interwoven with the thesis
that all aistheta are true.

In the concluding paragraphs he writes

... Epicurus had, then, some good arguments, or at least the materials
of such arguments, which he could advance against scepticism without
presupposing his physical theory. His method thus displays a subtle interaction of epistemological and metaphysical considerations.

The fundamental epistemological requirement is that every aisthesis should be true, i.e. that whatever seems to be the case should in some sense or other actually be the case. It then becomes part of the task of the general theory of nature to specify the sense or senses in which what seems to be actually is. It is an astonishing achievement of atomism, both in its fifth-century and in its Epicurean version, to have provided an even reasonably plausible account
of the satisfaction of this requirement as part of a comprehensive account of the world.

But problems remain. For the sceptic can reasonably claim that the account of how things always are as they seem is, in the last resort, empty. For example, how is the claim that sweetness is always the taste of a
structure of smooth atoms to be tested? Suppose microscopic examination revealed that in some cases the atoms were smooth, but in others spiky.

If both the microscopic and the gustatory observations are, in the theoretical sense, ‘true’, then we have two sets of atoms instead of one. No doubt we could add to the theory a description of how a structure of smooth atoms emits a structure of spiky ones, but the problem of verification arises there again, and so on at every level. The basic difficulty is that a theory of objective reality which is not subject to any constraint by experience must be empty of actual content.

Epicurus could have avoided this difficulty only by abandoning his fundamental epistemological requirement and facing up to the sceptical challenge to find a way of discriminating veridical from non-veridical experience. The subsequent history of philosophy to the present indicates the formidable nature of that undertaking; the Epicurean alternative, though ultimately unsuccessful, was well worth exploring.

Cassius · March 25, 2024 at 6:49 AM

Quote from Don

So, by definition, IF the gods live in the space between cosmoi, they, by the definition of intermundia "between world-systems", they have no world to stand on nor stars to see.

Quote from Don

So, by definition, IF the gods live in the space between cosmoi, they, by the definition of intermundia "between world-systems", they have no world to stand on nor stars to see. There's obviously some matter in that space between worlds but not enough to have a world, otherwise the gods would be *in a cosmos*.

Just to weigh in here, for the reasons stated by Bryan in post 118 I personally would not reach these conclusions myself. I don't see why a boundary area has to be essentially sharply defined or without width. They might not have their own "world" but that doesn't mean to me that they don't have plenty of room within which to be living.

To quip a little, if they have quasi-bodies filled with quasi-blood, they could be standing on quasi-land.

Cassius · March 25, 2024 at 7:02 AM

Quote from Peter Konstans

t seems clear to me that Epicurus considered visions and hallucinations (and therefore the existence of the gods as the sources of those visions) to be true.

Quote from Peter Konstans

The fundamental epistemological requirement is that every aisthesis should be true, i.e. that whatever seems to be the case should in some sense or other actually be the case.

As to post 119, virtually all of it, if I read it correctly, is dealt with by DeWitt's explanation that "true" has multiple meanings, in which "true to the facts" is only one meaning, while "reported honestly without injection of opinion" is the meaning often intended by Epicurus. If the Epicureans had in fact held that all sensations are "true to the fact" then Lucretius would not have spent so much time in Book Four dealing with the topic of illusions.

This issue is dealt with at length in DeWitt's Chapter 8, which includes the sentence: "To assume that Epicurus was unaware of these plain truths, as one must if belief in the infallibility of sensation is imputed to him, is absurd."

Quote

The example of the tower will serve as a transition from the topic of ambiguity to that of confusion. When modern scholars seize upon the saying "all sensations are true," which appears nowhere in the extant writings of Epicurus, and stretch it to mean that all sensations are reliable or trustworthy or "that the senses cannot be deceived," they are confusing the concept of truth with the concept of value.¹⁷ They overlook the fact that even a truthful witness may fall short of delivering the whole truth or may even give false evidence. The distant view of the square tower is quite true relative to the distance but it fails to reveal the whole truth about the tower.
To assume that Epicurus was unaware of these plain truths, as one must if belief in the infallibility of sensation is imputed to him, is absurd. It is because he was aware that the value of sensations, apart from their truth, varied all the way from totality to zero, that he exhorted beginners "under all circumstances to watch the sensations and especially the immediate perceptions whether of the intellect or any of the criteria whatsoever." ¹⁸ Obviously, so far from thinking the sensations infallible, he was keenly aware of the possibility of error and drew sharp attention to the superior values of immediate sensations.

Don · March 25, 2024 at 8:34 AM

Quote from Godfrey

1. "in an infinite universe perfection is bound to exist, that there must be some surpassing being, than which nothing is better".

This strikes me as similar to Aquinas 's fourth argument for God (which, surprise, I don't think works either):

Quote from Aquinas

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But “more” and “less” are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaphysics ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

Cassius · March 25, 2024 at 8:47 AM

Quote from Don

This strikes me as similar to Aquinas 's fourth argument for God (which, surprise, I don't think works either):

I am by no means an expert on this argument, but I see two separate things going on in this aspect of the discussion, one of which is valid and one of which is not:

1 - The first part, observing the progression, seems valid to me: "But “more” and “less” are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest;" (But what we're really saying is that they are similar to each other, which we can observe, not something which we can't observe.)

2 - But this part seems to me to involve a leap which is NOT valid: "Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God."

I don't see how "1" necessarily leads to "2" at all, and at least at the moment that's where I think Epicurus would object: I think he'd say that yes we can see a progressive scale in real things, and we can rank them in order of superiority, using our senses and preconceptions and feelings-- these are all "real" things. But as for then leaping to the conclusion that all of these real items were originally generated by a "perfect" model of them, which was the "cause" of them -- I would say that's totally a hard stop and something that Epicurus would reject.

Possibly this is also a variation of not letting the "perfect" be the enemy of the "good" in that there are many things in this world that we deal with and assess that are in fact "real," but we shouldn't let our assessment of them be colored or watered down by our speculation that there is a "perfect" which makes them all fade in comparison.

Update: I wonder if this "cause" issue as stated here in this way is what Frances Wright had in mind when she swatted hard at it in A Few Days In Athens.

A Few Days In Athens Chapter 15 (and this extends much further in length and detail through the rest of the chapter):

“Without challenging the meaning of the terms you have employed,” said Metrodorus, “I would observe, that there is little danger of our pushing investigation too far. Unhappily the limits prescribed to us by our few and imperfect senses must ever cramp the sphere of our observation, as compared to the boundless range of things; and that even when we shall have strained and improved our senses to the uttermost. We trace an effect to a cause, and that cause to another cause, and so on, till we hold some few links of a chain, whose extent like the charmed circle, is without beginning as without end.”

Welcome To EpicureanFriends.com!

"Remember that you are mortal, and you have a limited time to live, and in devoting yourself to discussion of the nature of time and eternity you have seen things that have been, are now, and are to come."

Pros and Cons Of Considering Epicurean Philosophy To Be A "Religion"

Cassius August 23, 2024 at 2:30 PM

Unread Threads

⟐ as the symbol of the philosophy of Epicurus 34

Is All Desire Painful? How Would Epicurus Answer? 24

Pompeii Then and Now 7

Names of Bits of Reality 4

Why pursue unnecessary desires? 74

Episode 280 - Wrapping Up Cicero's Arguments On Death

Ancient Greek Gods and Goddesses Positive Attributes

⟐ as the symbol of the philosophy of Epicurus

Is All Desire Painful? How Would Epicurus Answer?

Introductory Level Study Group via Zoom - Interest Level and Planning

Happy Birthday General Thread

Welcome LukeTN!

Pompeii Then and Now

Names of Bits of Reality

Episode 279 - On "Dying Before One's Time"