Posts by Cassius

Don -- Some of these old hymns seem to be sung in "unrecognizable" ways nowadays. Do you have a youtube link to the version of the tune you're thinking of?

Erik - Sorry that you missed us tonight. Please respond to your Welcome message and we will get you set up to attend soon! thanks

Erik can you let us know the basis of your interest since you are brand new? we try to avoid Zoom bombing so please identify yourself first.

In addition to whatever comments follow, for those of us who can be with us tonight in our "First Monday" meeting, I suggest we consider this a topic of discussion,

I started this thread and subforum to point to David Furley's book in part because it is useful in discussion of Zeno's paradoxes. There is much more in the book for those who have time to investigate.

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“With Epicurus, the position may have been much simpler [than Aristotle]. His [Epicurus’] view was that the real world of atoms and void was composed of minima. Any account of the basic structure of the world therefore must consist of counting the minima: there is nothing more to it.

What we should expect, therefore, a priori, is that Epicurus would regard geometry as irrelevant to the study of nature, because one of its essential principles (that of infinite divisibility) was contrary to the facts of nature.

There is little evidence for Epicurus’ views about geometry, but such as it is it exactly confirms this expectation. Sextus, at the beginning of his Adversus Mathematicos, reports that the Epicureans regarded the matlzemata (a class of subjects to be learnt which included geometry) as “contributing nothing to the perfection of wisdom.”

Proclus, in his Commentary on Euclid (Friedlein, p. 199), divides the critics of geometry into two classes: those who object to its principles, and those who complain that its theorems do not follow from the principles as given. The former class is divided into those who criticize the principles of knowledge in general (the Sceptics), and those who criticize the principles of geometry alone (the Epicureans).

The Epicurean theory of minimal parts, if it has been correctly described in this essay, was a typical piece of Epicurean philosophy. We might say that Epicurus was confronted with a choice between infinite divisibility and minimal parts. He thought he saw that the former alternative would lead him into positions inconsistent with experience: for instance, it would be necessary for a man to be able to “reach infinity in thought,” and this was contrary to experience.

There was no counter-evidence against the existence of minimal parts in nature; the analogy of the senses suggested that there was a minimum; so he opted for this alternative, and doggedly worked out the details, in so far as he thought it necessary. But he made no attempt, apparently, to work out a fully systematic mathematical theory to support his physics. On his own premises, there was no reason why he should. His purpose was to teach peace of mind.”

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Quote from Robert

I can see some possible objections. An Epicurean might not use the phrase "becoming more fully human," and "God" here is presumably the Christian version (though perhaps perfect and incorruptible, as an Epicurean deity should be). Still, the idea seems to be that we humans can reach a divine state through a practice of mindful living, as opposed to traveling after death to some mysterious region outside of physics and nature.

i see your point Robert and think you're on the right track. Certainly the embrace of focusing on living now and denying christian distinctions between body and soul ring true to Epicurus.

And as you say the problem would be in the connotations of how "god" is used there, and "saving" life, and becoming "more fully human."

And last but not least, it's always a major red flag in my book when a formulation completely fails to use the word "pleasure." There are lots of people who have lots of good ideas on lots of things, but in my view probably the core trait of something being "Epicurean" is that it is willing to stand up and say straightforwardly that it is the "pleasure" of living that makes life worth living. It can sound like a word game sometime to insist on the word "pleasure," but anyone whose not willing to go all the way to the use of that term, in defiance of all the normal prejudice and peer pressure against it, isn't really in sync with Epicurus. Being willing and unafraid to stand up for "Pleasure," as in Emily Austin's book title "Living for Pleasure," is to me one of the best possible litmus tests to apply.

And sadly this is where a lot of the "atheist" literature out there fails so badly. The "Good without God" approach accepts the Platonic and other premise that there is a "good" other than "pleasure," and in the end that philosophical debate is the real battleground.

Don:

This question cries out for your discussion on the meaning of bread and water, but I am not sure where to point him. Do you happen to know the best place for your longest discussion of it?

Epicurean Philosophy | When Epicurus said that you could live on bread and water, with an occasional treat of some cheese, I presume the bread was more nutritious than today... | Facebook

When Epicurus said that you could live on bread and water, with an occasional treat of some cheese, I presume the bread was more nutritious than today’s but…

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John Bramwell
When Epicurus said that you could live on bread and water, with an occasional treat of some cheese, I presume the bread was more nutritious than today’s but have never given it much thought. I know Epicurus had the occasional drop of wine but was his diet that frugal?

It seems to me that a point I would stress is that we are not "saving reality" by finding mathematical solutions to Zeno's paradoxes.

We're "saving mathematics" (or maybe more specifically, a form of propositional logic) by finding answers, but in the end, what we care about is living life happily, not saving mathematics or propositional logic.

People are harmed if they waste their lives in uncertainty and doubt, taken in by argument that motion is impossible and their senses cannot be trusted. Further, the good reputation of philosophy is harmed when people take these arguments seriously without immediately pointing out the ultimate validity of the senses.

The point to be emphasized is the one made by Seneca about mice and cheese and syllables. Word games can be fine if they are played for fun, or for sharpening our skills with words, but word games are not what life is about, and word games are not beneficial when they start interfering with life rather than enhancing it.

Norton says in the article that we can choose to take a "kinder" view of what Parmenides and Zeno were doing, but I see no reason to be so charitable from the information we have to go on. Much more likely is that they were not massively deluded OR in the grip of a mad fantasy, but testing out ways to gaslight people into doubting the validity of their senses, a path many others have followed.

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It is hard to believe that Parmenides and Zeno really believed that motion is impossible. The evidence of our senses is powerful, unrelenting and, I believe, irrefutable. Someone who genuinely believes that all change in illusion would seem to be massively deluded and in the grip of a mad fantasy.

We can cast a kinder light on Parmenides and Zeno's project if we understand them not to be challenging change, but to be challenging the accounts we give of it. Can we really reason reliably about motion using the concepts we have? We think we can. Zeno says otherwise. Look at them more closely and you will find them to be an internal mess.

The UC Davis article is very helpful. We don't need it for this episode, but at some point we will want to clarify what the writer is asserting in the part i underlined below.

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The totality is said to be unlimited. The argument is that a limitation of the totality would require that it have an end-point or extreme. An end-point can exist only as the beginning of something else. But there is nothing other than the totality (as had already been established), so the totality has no extreme and consequently is unlimited. This lack of limitation applies both to bodies and the void. If the void were limited and bodies were unlimited (in number), there would be no place for all the bodies. On the other hand, if the bodies were limited and the void unlimited, there would be so much space available for bodies that they would not meet with one another to form anything stable, but instead move in a scattered fashion throughout the universe. Note that once again, appeal must be made to sense-perception for the datum that that there are stable bodies which are not in motion (a claim that modern science has since overthrown). This view flies against that of Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle. In particular, Aristotle believe that the totality of bodies can be limited by something which is not itself body and which lies outside the cosmos, namely the prime mover (Physics, VIII, 10), which he identified with God (Metaphysics XII, 7).

This also to me appears to be a typo:

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Fate

We are told by Cicero that Epicurus introduced the swerve to solve a problem only directly related to that of the motion of bodies: "the necessity of fate" (On Fate, 22). Lucretius describes the reasoning involved

Presumably that should be INdirectly (?)

And the Pittsburgh site is great -- opens with a full characterization of the absurdity of it all!

Quote from Bryan

Yes, paradoxes can be intellectually demoralizing—almost a type of brain-clearing trick

I should be clear that for those who like them they are fine. I've been known to like math puzzles myself and I recall when I was very young there was something about "magic squares" (I forget) that I was into doing for a while. But the majority of people aren't into those kind of games, and it's a total turnoff to make them think that they should be, and it seems to me that that's what I've witnessed a lot in philosophy over the years (at least in college) - it seemed to me it was being used as a game for the amusement of insiders to confuse and put off the outsiders, rather than for the help to everyone that it should be.

One more comment on Zeno for tonight; Most of the youtube videos seem fixated on explaining the math, and "solving the math problem," as if "saving mathematics" is what is important about the exercise.

To me, that totally misses the point. The point is that Zeno was using math to make normal people doubt the validity of their senses, to try to persuade them to think that "everything is one" and that "void cannot exist" and the motion and change are impossible.

These would be very damaging to human happiness if accepted. And even more damaging to happiness is that they persuade people to think that philosophy is impractical and in fact nonsensical. The truth is, as in Seneca's quote, that people do need philosophy, and they need the kind of philosophy that Epicurus was offering, but people who are made jaded and cynical by being told that "Zeno's paradox" is profound philosophy are going to check out before they finish their first philosophy class. And it's my view that people need to realize that that kind of "turn off" reaction is exactly what was expected and hoped for by Zeno (and his variants after him). They want people to give up looking for a true philosophy that they can understand, and default to give THEM the sole claim to philosophy and wisdom and the right to define was is moral what is desirable in life.

That's why it's important to deal with Zeno's paradoxes and to give them the treatment they deserve. It's a shame they don't seem to be listed specifically in the list given by Diogenes Laertius. I wonder if we should not consider the Eleatics to be under the umbrella of the "Logicians" in this passage. "Destroyers" also makes sense to me as a good term - at least as a start! Or maybe they were related more to Antidorus and deserve the title "Maniac." The two adjectives together seem to me most appropriate.

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"Heraclitus he called ‘The Muddler,’ Democritus [he called] Lerocritus (‘judge of nonsense’), Antidorus he called Sannidorus (‘Maniac’), the Cynics [he called] ‘Enemies of Hellas,’ the Logicians [he called] ‘The destroyers,’ and Pyrrho [he called] ‘The uneducated fool.’"

I went looking for a youtube video that reflected what I think is the proper attitude to take toward Zeno's "paradoxes" (I think the proper attitude is contempt without finding something suitable. However here's one where Meg Ryan illustrates the stupidity of it:

And here is one that, but giving some very good quotes from the people who came up with this, does a good job of setting the table:

Unfortunately, after setting the table by showing the quotes which make clear what kind of nonsense the Eleatics were after, it drops the ball and leaves things hanging.

Here's Joe Rogan giving a look of astonishment at the suggestions. I don't know who he's talking to but I see this as the attitude that anyone of common sense would have toward hearing this kind of thing stated: He says something like "maybe we should stop listening to these people."

After listening to the descriptions of these paradoxes I see these as very close to the ontological arguments for god. "Because in my mind I can imagine a god of infinite power, such a god must exist," IS VERY SIMILAR TO: "Because I can in my mind imagine that there are an infinite number of points between two other points, it must be impossible to count them all or walk across a room." To me this is very similar nonsense. Both should be rejected out of hand and considered nonsense on the ground that the reality perceived through the senses always trumps the allegations of "logic constructed by the mind" when that logic cannot ultimately be traced back to something that can be verified through the senses. Neither the purely mental contention that all-powerful beings exist nor the purely mental contention that all distances can be infinitely divided have any connection to the reality that we perceive through our senses, and both should be rejected as absurd without any more consideration than would be given to the person who asserts that all knowledge is impossible, or who asserts a totally deterministic view of human nature.

That's where Isaac Asimov's criticism of Socrates comes into play as well, and I think it applies to Zeno of Elea as well, of whom I feel also "sick and tired":

Quote from Isaac Asimov "The Relativity of Wrong"

First, let me dispose of Socrates because I am sick and tired of this pretense that knowing you know nothing is a mark of wisdom. No one knows nothing. In a matter of days, babies learn to recognize their mothers. Socrates would agree, of course, and explain that knowledge of trivia is not what he means. He means that in the great abstractions over which human beings debate, one should start without preconceived, unexamined notions, and that he alone knew this. (What an enormously arrogant claim!) In his discussions of such matters as "What is justice?" or "What is virtue?" he took the attitude that he knew nothing and had to be instructed by others. (This is called "Socratic irony," for Socrates knew very well that he knew a great deal more than the poor souls he was picking on.) By pretending ignorance, Socrates lured others into propounding their views on such abstractions. Socrates then, by a series of ignorant-sounding questions, forced the others into such a mélange of self-contradictions that they would finally break down and admit they didn't know what they were talking about. It is the mark of the marvelous toleration of the Athenians that they let this continue for decades and that it wasn't till Socrates turned seventy that they broke down and forced him to drink poison.

But my attitude is best expressed in the quote from Seneca, where I think he's channeling Epicurus rather than his Stoic friends.

Quote from (Seneca’s Letters – Book II Letter XLVIII)

And on this point, my excellent Lucilius, I should like to have those subtle dialecticians of yours advise me how I ought to help a friend, or how a fellowman, rather than tell me in how many ways the word “friend” is used, and how many meanings the word “man” possesses. Lo, Wisdom and Folly are taking opposite sides. Which shall I join? Which party would you have me follow? On that side, “man” is the equivalent of “friend”; on the other side, “friend” is not the equivalent of “man.” The one wants a friend for his own advantage; the other wants to make himself an advantage to his friend. What you have to offer me is nothing but distortion of words and splitting of syllables. It is clear that unless I can devise some very tricky premises and by false deductions tack on to them a fallacy which springs from the truth, I shall not be able to distinguish between what is desirable and what is to be avoided! I am ashamed! Old men as we are, dealing with a problem so serious, we make play of it! ‘Mouse’ is a syllable. Now a mouse eats its cheese; therefore, a syllable eats cheese.”

Suppose now that I cannot solve this problem; see what peril hangs over my head as a result of such ignorance! What a scrape I shall be in! Without doubt I must beware, or some day I shall be catching syllables in a mousetrap, or, if I grow careless, a book may devour my cheese! Unless, perhaps, the following syllogism is shrewder still: “‘Mouse’ is a syllable. Now a syllable does not eat cheese. Therefore a mouse does not eat cheese.” What childish nonsense! Do we knit our brows over this sort of problem? Do we let our beards grow long for this reason? Is this the matter which we teach with sour and pale faces?

Would you really know what philosophy offers to humanity? Philosophy offers counsel. Death calls away one man, and poverty chafes another; a third is worried either by his neighbor’s wealth or by his own. So-and-so is afraid of bad luck; another desires to get away from his own good fortune. Some are ill-treated by men, others by the gods. Why, then, do you frame for me such games as these? It is no occasion for jest; you are retained as counsel for unhappy men, sick and the needy, and those whose heads are under the poised axe. Whither are you straying? What are you doing? This friend, in whose company you are jesting, is in fear. Help him, and take the noose from about his neck. Men are stretching out imploring hands to you on all sides; lives ruined and in danger of ruin are begging for some assistance; men’s hopes, men’s resources, depend upon you. They ask that you deliver them from all their restlessness, that you reveal to them, scattered and wandering as they are, the clear light of truth. Tell them what nature has made necessary, and what superfluous; tell them how simple are the laws that she has laid down, how pleasant and unimpeded life is for those who follow these laws, but how bitter and perplexed it is for those who have put their trust in opinion rather than in nature.

Over the years I have heard repeated references to Victor Stenger as a physicist whose views are among those which some find most closely supportive of atomism and other aspects of Epicurean philosophy. I see we have an article here already by Godfrey which I will move into this section.

Unfortunately I have never found time to read him myself, but I hope to correct that oversight. For that reason, I don't know if he ever specifically commented on his general approval or disapproval of Epicurus except in regard to basic atomism.

Until I'm able to comment further, i've set up this subforum to expand on Godfrey's earlier observations and allow people a place to make more specific comments.

Here is a good biography of Stenger written on Skeptic.com after his death. Here's his Wikipedia entry.

I see that some Stenger resources are no longer available on the web, but a version on Archive.org exists at this link. These articles include:

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Quantum Time Travel. Reality Check column in Skeptical Briefs Vol. 10, No. 2, June 2000, showing why the Time Travel Causal Paradox ("Grandfater's Paradox") does not apply for pure quantum states, thus allowing time to be reversible at the quantum level.

If you want to read a Short Primer on Quantum Mechanics  go here.

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Papers, Talks and Preprints:

• The Mystical World of Quantum Mechanics Essay that appeared in The Times Higher Educaton Supplement January 5, 2001, p. 20. OK to distribute, with credit.
• "Quantum Quackery." This article appeared in Skeptical Inquirer Vol. 21. No. 1, January/February 1997, p. 37. It was based on an invited talk at the World Skeptics Congress in Buffalo in June, 1996. Link to article on CSICOP web site
• A video of talk on "Quantum Quackery" given at Cal Tech in June, 1996 is available from The Skeptics Society.
• "Quantum Metaphysics." Talk given at the Westminster College, Oxford Conference on the Modern Spiritualities, March 1995. Appearing in "Modern Spiritualities," Prometheus Books1996. Also published in The Scientific Review of Alternative Medicine 1(1), 26-30, 1997.
• "Mystical Physics." Paper published in Free Inquiry 16(3)1996. PDF.
• "Myth of Quantum Consciousness." Paper published in The Humanist, Vol. 53(3), May/June 1993. pp. 13-15. PDF file of paper.

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Book Reviews by V. Stenger:

• "The Dreams that Stuff is Made Of." Review of Dreams of a Final Theory by Steven Weinberg. Published in Free Inquiry 13(3) Summer 1994, p. 59. Text file of review.
• Review of Cranks, Quarks and the Cosmos by Jeremy Bernstein. Published in Physics Today, August 1993. Text file of review.

We can use this thread to make general comments, but those who are more familiar with specific aspects of his work than I am are encourage to start independent threads with titles that reflect the subject.

Also, if anyone runs across any earlier threads on Stenger that need to be moved here, please let me know.

Although not dealing directly with Zeno, as we discuss this issue we'll want to refer back to this prior thread from Bryan on "The Covered Father":

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The Covered Father

(Epicurus - On Nature - Book 28, P.Herc. 1479 (1417), fr. 13, col. 9 sup., David Sedley trans.)

"...these will be confuted, if they are false and whether the cause of their error is irrational or rational, either because (1) some other than theoretical opinion expressed on the basis of them is untrue, or, (2) if they become indirectly linked up with action, wherever they lead to disadvantageous action. If none of these consequences ensues, it will be correct to conclude that opinions are not…

Bryan

March 2, 2024 at 9:43 PM

Interesting thoughts Twentier. I don't have anything to add to your thinking at the moment, but this phrase in particular sparked my interest:

Quote from Twentier

but, the total sum of immortals in the universe never, ever, ever decreases

Are we sure that that is part of the theory? If so, why?

Is there something more going on to explain that, or is that exclusively a deduction from the view that if a class exists, then it exists and infinite number of times, and if so then "infinity never decreases" and so "the total sum of mortals in the universe never, ever, ever decreases"?

Today a friend referred me to an essay by Isaac Asimov entitled "The Relativity of Wrong" with which I was not previously familiar. It contains of Socrates which seems right in line with the Epicurean perspective. Even more than that, it contains an analysis of what it means to be "right" or "wrong" that I think is probably also very consistent with Epicurus' perspective. Here's a good summary of the point from Wikipedia ("In the title essay, Asimov argues that there exist degrees of wrongness, and being wrong in one way is not necessarily as bad as being wrong in another way")

I don't know anything about this website that has a copy other than that it comes up first when one searches for the author and title) but here it is in easy to read form. (Let me expand my caveat - I haven't vetted any of these websites I am linking to - I just see on their face that they address this topic.)

The Relativity of Wrong by Isaac Asimov

Looks like it can also be read here: https://skepticalinquirer.org/1989/10/the-relativity-of-wrong/

There's also a copy on Archive.org

Some criticism of the article here.

Seems to me to be an enjoyable article and well worth reading.

We can probably take this article as key material:

Zeno’s Paradoxes (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Zeno’s Paradoxes

First published Tue Apr 30, 2002; substantive revision Wed Mar 6, 2024

Almost everything that we know about Zeno of Elea is to be found in the opening pages of Plato’s Parmenides. There we learn that Zeno was nearly 40 years old when Socrates was a young man, say 20. Since Socrates was born in 469 BC we can estimate a birth date for Zeno around 490 BC. Beyond this, really all we know is that he was close to Parmenides (Plato reports the gossip that they had a sexual relationship when Zeno was young), and that he wrote a book of paradoxes defending Parmenides’ philosophy. Sadly this book has not survived, and what we know of his arguments is second-hand, principally through Aristotle and his commentators (here we draw particularly on Simplicius, who, though writing a thousand years after Zeno, apparently possessed at least some of his book). There were apparently 40 ‘paradoxes of plurality’, attempting to show that ontological pluralism—a belief in the existence of many things rather than only one—leads to absurd conclusions; of these paradoxes only two definitely survive, though a third argument can probably be attributed to Zeno. Aristotle speaks of a further four arguments against motion (and by extension change generally), all of which he gives and attempts to refute. In addition, Aristotle attributes two other paradoxes to Zeno. Sadly again, almost none of these paradoxes are quoted in Zeno’s original words by their various commentators, but in paraphrase.

1.1 Ancient Background

Before we look at the paradoxes themselves it will be useful to sketch some of their historical and logical significance. First, Zeno sought to defend Parmenides by attacking his critics. Parmenides rejected pluralism and the reality of any kind of change: for him all was one indivisible, unchanging reality, and any appearances to the contrary were illusions, to be dispelled by reason and revelation. Not surprisingly, this philosophy found many critics, who ridiculed the suggestion; after all it flies in the face of some of our most basic beliefs about the world. In response to this criticism Zeno did something that may sound obvious, but which had a profound impact on Greek philosophy that is felt to this day: he attempted to show that equal absurdities followed logically from the denial of Parmenides’ views. You think that there are many things? Then you must conclude that everything is both infinitely small and infinitely big! You think that motion is infinitely divisible? Then it follows that nothing moves! (This is what a ‘paradox’ is: a demonstration that a contradiction or absurd consequence follows from apparently reasonable assumptions.)

I would say that I think your post illustrates how two of the most important things to do at the very start is:

1 - Get rid of every implication and every attribute we think we know about gods except that they are (1) living beings, (2) live totally happy lives, and (3) are deathless.

2 - Then consider everything after that to be a matter of lesser importance, on which you can come up with some reasonable theories, but can't be sure about the details. That's just like the stars and other things in the sky where you don't have much evidence. You can come up with possibilities that are consistent with basic physics, and harmonize with point 1, but there you have to be satisfied with multiple possibilities rather than single certainties.

As Velleius put it in the nature of the gods, it's Point 1 that is essential and the place where you can really stop. Point 2 may be helpful to some people, but not to others, and we don't have enough information to be totally sure how things really are. So if we go into Point 2 we really have to be careful about the limits of what we know and what we don't.

Point 1 is the part we can be sure about based on the reasoning given:

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XVII. Here, then, you see the foundation of this question clearly laid; for since it is the constant and universal opinion of mankind, independent of education, custom, or law, that there are Gods, it must necessarily follow that this knowledge is implanted in our minds, or, rather, innate in us. That opinion respecting which there is a general agreement in universal nature must infallibly be true; therefore it must be allowed that there are Gods; for in this we have the concurrence, not only of almost all philosophers, but likewise of the ignorant and illiterate. It must be also confessed that the point is established that we have naturally this idea, as I said before, or prenotion, of the existence of the Gods. As new things require new names, so that prenotion was called πρόληψις by Epicurus; an appellation never used before. On the same principle of reasoning, we think that the Gods are happy and immortal; for that nature which hath assured us that there are Gods has likewise imprinted in our minds the knowledge of their immortality and felicity; and if so, what Epicurus hath declared in these words is true: “That which is eternally happy cannot be burdened with any labor itself, nor can it impose any labor on another; nor can it be influenced by resentment or favor: because things which are liable to such feelings must be weak and frail.” We have said enough to prove that we should worship the Gods with piety, and without superstition, if that were the only question.

Going that far gets you to the point where you are certain that there is no need to live in dread of gods.

Going further into Point 2 gets you more into matters of "curiosity" rather than what you really need to know, and takes you into areas where you are "directed partly by nature and party by reason" where the conclusions are less certain. And there you get into areas where "waiting" and multiple possibilities are going to be the best you can do, and you start talking then about "quasi-bodies" and "quasi-blood" because you just don't have any more detail.

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For the superior and excellent nature of the Gods requires a pious adoration from men, because it is possessed of immortality and the most exalted felicity; for whatever excels has a right to veneration, and all fear of the power and anger of the Gods should be banished; for we must understand that anger and affection are inconsistent with the nature of a happy and immortal being. These apprehensions being removed, no dread of the superior powers remains. To confirm this opinion, our curiosity leads us to inquire into the form and life and action of the intellect and spirit of the Deity.

XVIII. With regard to his form, we are directed partly by nature and partly by reason.

Thanks for that exhaustive treatment Twentier!

Robert we have a lot of former Buddhists here, so you might find this subforum interesting, especially if you find yourself wanting to discuss points of comparison.

But to you (and all new people) who just get starting reading the forum, please feel free to post questions or comments in any section as you are getting started, and don't worry about waiting to try to read everything before you post.

This isn't like a computer tech forum where the standard answer to basic questions is RTFM. We have some basic materials or locations to which we can point you, but more than that our participants enjoy going through basic points with "newer" people. Doing that regularly helps us sharpen our own understanding and reminds us of the basic points, rather than staying deep in weeds, as we can tend to do when we're discussing some history or translation or textual issue. The basic points always need to be our primary points of discussion.