Posts by Cassius

I want to think further but my first reaction is that your modification definitely improves an otherwise questionable analysis.

What I want to think further about is whether it makes sense to elevate the "is it in my control?" to a first level division, and I am not sure that the natural and necessary deserves that either.

If the topic of the chart is "basic method of thinking" then I suspect the tree needs to be pulled up from its roots and reoriented toward keeping in the central focus the only criteria nature gives us to decide among what to choose and to avoid.

After that, There are likely many other questions to ask and considerations besides whether something is in your control and whether it is "natural" or "necessary"

I agree fleshing out charts is a very useful exercise.

Also just to say - good to hear from you Shahab, and stay safe over there!

Welcome to Episode 241 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we have a thread to discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

Today we are continuing to review Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," which began with the Epicurean spokesman Velleius defending the Epicurean point of view. This week will continue into Section 21 as Cotta, the Academic Skeptic, responds to Velleius, and we - in turn - will respond to Cotta in particular and the Skeptical argument in general.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here at Archive.org. The text which we include in these posts is available here. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of arguments presented will eventually be put together here.

Today's Text

XXIII. ...

I allow that there are Gods. Instruct me, then, concerning their origin; inform me where they are, what sort of body, what mind, they have, and what is their course of life; for these I am desirous of knowing. You attribute the most absolute power and efficacy to atoms. Out of them you pretend that everything is made. But there are no atoms, for there is nothing without body; every place is occupied by body, therefore there can be no such thing as a vacuum or an atom.

XXIV. I advance these principles of the naturalists without knowing whether they are true or false; yet they are more like truth than those statements of yours; for they are the absurdities in which Democritus, or before him Leucippus, used to indulge, saying that there are certain light corpuscles—some smooth, some rough, some round, some square, some crooked and bent as bows—which by a fortuitous concourse made heaven and earth, without the influence of any natural power. This opinion, C. Velleius, you have brought down to these our times; and you would sooner be deprived of the greatest advantages of life than of that authority; for before you were acquainted with those tenets, you thought that you ought to profess yourself an Epicurean; so that it was necessary that you should either embrace these absurdities or lose the philosophical character which you had taken upon you; and what could bribe you to renounce the Epicurean opinion? Nothing, you say, can prevail on you to forsake the truth and the sure means of a happy life. But is that the truth? for I shall not contest your happy life, which you think the Deity himself does not enjoy unless he languishes in idleness.

But where is truth? Is it in your innumerable worlds, some of which are rising, some falling, at every moment of time? Or is it in your atomical corpuscles, which form such excellent works without the direction of any natural power or reason? But I was forgetting my liberality, which I had promised to exert in your case, and exceeding the bounds which I at first proposed to myself. Granting, then, everything to be made of atoms, what advantage is that to your argument? For we are searching after the nature of the Gods; and allowing them to be made of atoms, they cannot be eternal, because whatever is made of atoms must have had a beginning: if so, there were no Gods till there was this beginning; and if the Gods have had a beginning, they must necessarily have an end, as you have before contended when you were discussing Plato’s world. Where, then, is your beatitude and immortality, in which two words you say that God is expressed, the endeavor to prove which reduces you to the greatest perplexities? For you said that God had no body, but something like body; and no blood, but something like blood.

XXV. It is a frequent practice among you, when you assert anything that has no resemblance to truth, and wish to avoid reprehension, to advance something else which is absolutely and utterly impossible, in order that it may seem to your adversaries better to grant that point which has been a matter of doubt than to keep on pertinaciously contradicting you on every point: like Epicurus, who, when he found that if his atoms were allowed to descend by their own weight, our actions could not be in our own power, because their motions would be certain and necessary, invented an expedient, which escaped Democritus, to avoid necessity. He says that when the atoms descend by their own weight and gravity, they move a little obliquely. Surely, to make such an assertion as this is what one ought more to be ashamed of than the acknowledging ourselves unable to defend the proposition. His practice is the same against the logicians, who say that in all propositions in which yes or no is required, one of them must be true; he was afraid that if this were granted, then, in such a proposition as “Epicurus will be alive or dead to-morrow,” either one or the other must necessarily be admitted; therefore he absolutely denied the necessity of yes or no.

Can anything show stupidity in a greater degree? Zeno, being pressed by Arcesilas, who pronounced all things to be false which are perceived by the senses, said that some things were false, but not all. Epicurus was afraid that if any one thing seen should be false, nothing could be true; and therefore he asserted all the senses to be infallible directors of truth. Nothing can be more rash than this; for by endeavoring to repel a light stroke, he receives a heavy blow. On the subject of the nature of the Gods, he falls into the same errors. While he would avoid the concretion of individual bodies, lest death and dissolution should be the consequence, he denies that the Gods have body, but says they have something like body; and says they have no blood, but something like blood."

Quote from Kalosyni

Drives for survival, health, and happiness do not require wealth, power, or fame.

I would say the correctness of that statement depends entirely on how you define "wealth," "power," and "fame." Words like this have very flexible meanings with no bright lines that can be determined philosophically and out of context of the person involved. The question of "how much is enough" for those things - and any "thing" - is going to be contextual and not reducible to high-level specific rules. The only uitimate consideration is "pleasure" and "pain."

Ok I am coming here after the pig latin discussion so I may be off on a tangent but in regard to that chart in the last post, or any chart, it seems to me the basic ground rules are:

(1) Nature give us ONLY two criteria to use for deciding what to choose and to avoid, and those criteria are pleasure and pain.

(2) I perceive that in some minds, this statement of only two criteria sounds like Epicurus was referring to "the pleasures of the moment" and "the pains of the moment." I do *not* see that as a correct inference and I do not think Epicurus was saying that. To me it is very clear that Epicurus is saying that each decision much consider *all* pleasure and pain (mental and bodily) over *all* periods of time (now, tomorrow, for as a long as we live) and that each decision must evaluate *every possible* ramification before you can conclude that the action should be taken or avoided. Of course it is not possible to do an extensive analysis every moment about every decision, and you have no guarantee that your assessment will be correct, because you cannot have total control over the future. But doing our best to make such an analysis *is* essentially what we are doing by internalizing all the considerations and learning to adjust our conduct over time according to the results that our actions bring.

(3) All the discussion of "natural" and "necessary" is *contextual*, and cannot be reduced to universals that apply to all people at all times and all places. Even breathing can be postponed if by holding your breath to swim out of a cave you save your life. As Torquatus said, the classification has a principle, that things which are most natural and most necessary are generally going to be the easiest to obtain, and therefore can generally be obtained with the least resulting pain, but that is **not** a general statement that nature universally demands that you *only* eat bread and drink water and live in a cave. The natural and necessary classifications can act as a general guide for those times when you don't have enough information to be confident that what you can do will be achievable. What is expected as we get smarter over time, however, is that we learn to know what is and is not possible, and at what cost of pain, so over time we move out of the cave and we start eating more than bread and drinking more than water, unless circumstances demand otherwise. And generally speaking circumstances do *not* demand otherwise, and we *can* do a lot better than bread and water and caves.

(4) The most important observation to make at this point in the analysis is that we frequently choose pain in order to gain more pleasure, and so the fact that an action may result in *some* pain is absolutely *not* a reason not to engage in it. The question is the *net result.* If the action generates more pleasure than pain, then it is justifiable to take it. Of course we frequently have lots of choices from which we can choose among, so we also have to not only compare the pleasure and pain from a single action, but we have to compare the net pleasure/pain that would result and choose from between alternatives by comparing the net amount of pleasure.

(5) As to the "emptiness" or "vanity" of some desires, it is obviously a bad idea to set your sights on achieving goals that are impossible to obtain - like living forever - because the impossible will by definition not be achievable, and you will always end up frustrated. But how do you know ahead of time whether a goal is possible or not? And exactly how long you should try to live, or exactly how much money should you should pursue, or exactly how much food should you should eat? There are no universal rules to answer these questions, so you always go back to the first and foremost point, that nature gives you only pleasure and pain by which to decide what to choose and what to avoid. You then do your very best to guide your actions by estimating -- in the long run and from the widest possible perspective - what the results of your actions are going to be in terms of net pleasure and pain. And to be clear - net pleasure and pain *that effects you.* It makes no sense to be concerned about pleasure and pain in the abstract, if they don't affect you, but it does make sense to consider the pleasure or pain of those around you to the extent that their reaction to your actions will have an impact on your own pleasure and pain (just as we evaluate in regard to our friends).

I laughed because I am supposed to but I am not sure I get it ? I can see the "pig" double-meaning, but why put the "vay" at the end?

Quote from Godfrey

I guess my wording wasn't very accurate, as I wasn't trying to imply that at all.

It's me. I tend to be on high alert for Buddhism/Stoicism lurking under every bed.

(But that's NOT a reference to you; it's a valid reference to the "outside world."

Quote from Godfrey

But, for whatever reason, these athletes have determined that the pleasure will outweigh the pain. Maybe that pleasure is in following the dream, maybe in reliving memories of the pleasures of competing at the highest level. And maybe in reliving these memories while they hobble around on artificial joints.

I agree with the implication of your post that I too would never see the Olympic reward as worth the effort. But I also think the point of overriding importance is that Epicurus would not have made that judgment for other people, and the evidence is against that he did so, and so to interpret "natural and necessary" to day that an ascetic life is "better" would be (in my mind) to drive a stake through the heart of the philosophy.

I know I beat this drum despite my confidence that you don't advocate that - the problem is there are far too many people that do. And for there to be a vigorous Epicurean community in the future, it will be necessary to show the vigorous people who could make such a community that vigor is welcomed, not looked down upon. You don't create a world changing philosophy, and stand up to the oppression of religion, as Epicurus did, without being vigorous.

Quote from Martin

For natural but not necessary desires and for desires for which the category is not obvious, e.g. because of individual preferences or circumstances, it is more useful to answer the question whether the expected pleasure is worth the expected pain from fulfilling the desire

I completely agree Martin. The question "whether the expected pleasure is worth the expected pain from fulfilling the desire" is the foundational starting point of every issue in the Epicurean ethics. "Natural" and "necessary" are circumstantial - even air and water and food are neither natural nor necessary at every moment of life. All can be postponed for at least a few moments in favor of some other activity that might be appropriate to preserve life or achieve a more ultimately successful life (successful in terms of the ultimate balance between pleasure and pain).

In this question for a text reference I personally always turn back to Torquatus' explanation of why the natural and necessary categories are helpful. Just like Torquatus gives useful explanations of other ethical issues that appear to us to be ambiguous, he does the same thing here by pointing out that the issue is whether a desire has a "limit" and can be gratified, or whether the desire is illogical to pursue because it can never be achieved: because "the principle of classification [is] that the necessary desires are gratified with little trouble or expense; the natural desires also require but little, since nature's own riches, which suffice to content her, are both easily procured and limited in amount; but for the imaginary desires no bound or limit can be discovered."

Quote

Nothing could be more useful or more conducive to well-being than Epicurus's doctrine as to the different classes of the desires. One kind he classified as both natural and necessary, a second as natural without being necessary, and a third as neither natural nor necessary; the principle of classification being that the necessary desires are gratified with little trouble or expense; the natural desires also require but little, since nature's own riches, which suffice to content her, are both easily procured and limited in amount; but for the imaginary desires no bound or limit can be discovered.

Desires that can never be met are bound to fail and lead to more pain than pleasure, but by prudently selecting desires for goals which can be met, we can logically hope to experience more pleasure than pain from the selection.

To interpret this doctrine to imply that Epicurus held : "We will be better off if we set the goal of only desiring to eat bread and water and live in a cave" - which a lot of writers are not just implying but clearly stating - is a perverse misinterpretation (to put it mildly).

Episode 240 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week we address Cotta's false argument that Epicurus rested his contention that gods exist based on "the general assent of mankind."

For reference and comparison, here is the Stoic professor Greg Sadler's presentation of how Epicurus argues that gods exist due to the "common consent of mankind"

This episode will be released today. In the meantime I wanted to memorialize an observation Joshua made last night to this effect:

That there is a parallel between Epicurus' statement in the letter to Menoeceus as to the nature of gods, and the statement by Torquatus in Cicero's On Ends as to the nature of the highest good.

Joshua can do a better job than I of stating his point, but the way I remember it is that as to gods in the letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus points out that the idea of gods is etched on the minds of all men, but that the particular assertions about the gods that men make are untrustworthy and often wrong.

Quote

The things which I used unceasingly to commend to you, these do and practice, considering them to be the first principles of the good life. First of all believe that god is a being immortal and blessed, even as the common idea of a god is engraved on men’s minds, and do not assign to him anything alien to his immortality or ill-suited to his blessedness: but believe about him everything that can uphold his blessedness and immortality. For gods there are, since the knowledge of them is by clear vision. But they are not such as the many believe them to be: for indeed they do not consistently represent them as they believe them to be. And the impious man is not he who popularly denies the gods of the many, but he who attaches to the gods the beliefs of the many.

In regard to the highest good, Torquatus points out that there is a common conception of the highest good on which all philosophers agree (that the highest good is the thing all actions aim act, but which is not itself aimed at anything else) and yet the specific observations men make against the highest good (that the highest good is virtue or piety) is untrustworthy and often wrong.

Quote

[29] IX. ‘First, then,’ said he, ‘I shall plead my case on the lines laid down by the founder of our school himself: I shall define the essence and features of the problem before us, not because I imagine you to be unacquainted with them, but with a view to the methodical progress of my speech. The problem before us then is, what is the climax and standard of things good, and this in the opinion of all philosophers must needs be such that we are bound to test all things by it, but the standard itself by nothing. Epicurus places this standard in pleasure, which he lays down to be the supreme good, while pain is the supreme evil; and he founds his proof of this on the following considerations.

In both cases, Epicurus is not using the conclusions of other men as the direct basis for his conclusion, he is observing that there is a common root perspective in the minds of men, but what men think about that common root perspective is in many/most cases totally wrong, and must be correcting by going back to observations from the canonical faculties.

Linking these two passages together leads to some interesting possibilities which I'll defer making in this post and see if Joshua gets a chance to elaborate his observation further himself.

All this came up in relation to the main point of this Lucretius Today episode, which is that it is ridiculous to assert that Epicurus based his ideas of gods, or of philosophy, by observing the conclusions of other men - the "general consent of mankind" / "Fifty Million Frenchmen Can't Be Wrong" argument.

This episode is devoted largely to refuting a specific allegation made by Cotta which misrepresents Velleius' and Epicurus' position:

Quote from Cotta addressing Velleius

You have said that the general assent of men of all nations and all degrees is an argument strong enough to induce us to acknowledge the being of the Gods

During the episode, I made a passing allusion to Cotta's argument being essentially that Epicurus had adopted a "fifty million frenchmen can't be wrong" attitude.

This needs to be firmly rejected. Epicurus did not and would endorse, given that Epicurus was well known for setting himself apart from the crowd and pointing out that the crowd is frequently wrong.

Some may not be aware of my "Fifty million Frenchmen" reference, and in fact I am not sure I was aware of the Cole Porter song myself, but here is the source of the allusion:

Fifty Million Frenchmen - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Welcome to Episode 240 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we have a thread to discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

Today we are continuing to review Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," which began with the Epicurean spokesman Velleius defending the Epicurean point of view. This week will continue into Section 21 as Cotta, the Academic Skeptic, responds to Velleius, and we - in turn - will respond to Cotta in particular and the Skeptical argument in general.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here at Archive.org. The text which we include in these posts is available here. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of arguments presented will eventually be put together here.

Today's Text

XXIII. You have said that the general assent of men of all nations and all degrees is an argument strong enough to induce us to acknowledge the being of the Gods. This is not only a weak, but a false, argument; for, first of all, how do you know the opinions of all nations? I really believe there are many people so savage that they have no thoughts of a Deity. What think you of Diagoras, who was called the atheist; and of Theodorus after him? Did not they plainly deny the very essence of a Deity? Protagoras of Abdera, whom you just now mentioned, the greatest sophist of his age, was banished by order of the Athenians from their city and territories, and his books were publicly burned, because these words were in the beginning of his treatise concerning the Gods: “I am unable to arrive at any knowledge whether there are, or are not, any Gods.” This treatment of him, I imagine, restrained many from professing their disbelief of a Deity, since the doubt of it only could not escape punishment. What shall we say of the sacrilegious, the impious, and the perjured? If Tubulus Lucius, Lupus, or Carbo the son of Neptune, as Lucilius says, had believed that there were Gods, would either of them have carried his perjuries and impieties to such excess? Your reasoning, therefore, to confirm your assertion is not so conclusive as you think it is. But as this is the manner in which other philosophers have argued on the same subject, I will take no further notice of it at present; I rather choose to proceed to what is properly your own.

I allow that there are Gods. Instruct me, then, concerning their origin; inform me where they are, what sort of body, what mind, they have, and what is their course of life; for these I am desirous of knowing. You attribute the most absolute power and efficacy to atoms. Out of them you pretend that everything is made. But there are no atoms, for there is nothing without body; every place is occupied by body, therefore there can be no such thing as a vacuum or an atom.

XXIV. I advance these principles of the naturalists without knowing whether they are true or false; yet they are more like truth than those statements of yours; for they are the absurdities in which Democritus, or before him Leucippus, used to indulge, saying that there are certain light corpuscles—some smooth, some rough, some round, some square, some crooked and bent as bows—which by a fortuitous concourse made heaven and earth, without the influence of any natural power. This opinion, C. Velleius, you have brought down to these our times; and you would sooner be deprived of the greatest advantages of life than of that authority; for before you were acquainted with those tenets, you thought that you ought to profess yourself an Epicurean; so that it was necessary that you should either embrace these absurdities or lose the philosophical character which you had taken upon you; and what could bribe you to renounce the Epicurean opinion? Nothing, you say, can prevail on you to forsake the truth and the sure means of a happy life. But is that the truth? for I shall not contest your happy life, which you think the Deity himself does not enjoy unless he languishes in idleness.

But where is truth? Is it in your innumerable worlds, some of which are rising, some falling, at every moment of time? Or is it in your atomical corpuscles, which form such excellent works without the direction of any natural power or reason? But I was forgetting my liberality, which I had promised to exert in your case, and exceeding the bounds which I at first proposed to myself. Granting, then, everything to be made of atoms, what advantage is that to your argument? For we are searching after the nature of the Gods; and allowing them to be made of atoms, they cannot be eternal, because whatever is made of atoms must have had a beginning: if so, there were no Gods till there was this beginning; and if the Gods have had a beginning, they must necessarily have an end, as you have before contended when you were discussing Plato’s world. Where, then, is your beatitude and immortality, in which two words you say that God is expressed, the endeavor to prove which reduces you to the greatest perplexities? For you said that God had no body, but something like body; and no blood, but something like blood.

XXV. It is a frequent practice among you, when you assert anything that has no resemblance to truth, and wish to avoid reprehension, to advance something else which is absolutely and utterly impossible, in order that it may seem to your adversaries better to grant that point which has been a matter of doubt than to keep on pertinaciously contradicting you on every point: like Epicurus, who, when he found that if his atoms were allowed to descend by their own weight, our actions could not be in our own power, because their motions would be certain and necessary, invented an expedient, which escaped Democritus, to avoid necessity. He says that when the atoms descend by their own weight and gravity, they move a little obliquely. Surely, to make such an assertion as this is what one ought more to be ashamed of than the acknowledging ourselves unable to defend the proposition. His practice is the same against the logicians, who say that in all propositions in which yes or no is required, one of them must be true; he was afraid that if this were granted, then, in such a proposition as “Epicurus will be alive or dead to-morrow,” either one or the other must necessarily be admitted; therefore he absolutely denied the necessity of yes or no.

Can anything show stupidity in a greater degree? Zeno, being pressed by Arcesilas, who pronounced all things to be false which are perceived by the senses, said that some things were false, but not all. Epicurus was afraid that if any one thing seen should be false, nothing could be true; and therefore he asserted all the senses to be infallible directors of truth. Nothing can be more rash than this; for by endeavoring to repel a light stroke, he receives a heavy blow. On the subject of the nature of the Gods, he falls into the same errors. While he would avoid the concretion of individual bodies, lest death and dissolution should be the consequence, he denies that the Gods have body, but says they have something like body; and says they have no blood, but something like blood."

Diogenes Laertius on Eudoxus:

LIFE OF EUDOXUS.¶

I. Eudoxus was the son of Æschines, and a native of Cnidus. He was an astronomer, a geometrician, a physician,[373] and a lawgiver. In geometry he was a pupil of Archytas, and in medicine of Philistion, the Sicilian, as Callimachus relates in his Tablets; and Sotion, in his Successions, asserts that he was likewise a pupil of Plato; for that, when he was twenty-three years of age, and in very narrow circumstances, he came to Athens with Theomedon the physician, by whom he was chiefly supported, being attracted by the reputation of the Socratic school. Some say that his attachment to Theomedon was cemented by nearer ties. And when he had arrived at Piræus, he went up to the city every day, and when he had heard the Sophists lecture he returned. And having spent two months there, he returned home again; and being again aided by the contributions of his friends, he set sail for Egypt, with Chrysippus the physician, bearing letters of introduction from Agesilaus to Nectanabis, and that he recommended him to the priests.

II. And having remained there a year and four months, he shaved his eyebrows after the manner of the Egyptian priests, and composed, as it is said, the treatise called the Octaeteris. From thence he went to Cyzicus, and to the Propontis, in both of which places he lived as a Sophist; he also went to the court of Mausolus. And then, in this manner, he returned again to Athens, having a great many disciples with him, for the sake, as some say, of annoying Plato, because he had originally discarded him from his school. Some say, that when Plato gave an entertainment on one occasion, Eudoxus, as the guests were very numerous, introduced the fashion of sitting in a semicircle.

Nicomachus, the son of Aristotle, affirms that he used to say, that pleasure was the good.

III. He was received in his own country with great honours, as the decree that was passed respecting him shows. He was also accounted very illustrious among the Greeks, having given laws to his own fellow citizens, as Hermippus tells us in the fourth book of his account of the Seven Wise Men; and having also written treatises on Astronomy and Geometry, and several other considerable works.

He had three daughters, Actis, Philtis, and Delphis. And Eratosthenes asserts, in his books addressed to Baton, that he also composed dialogues entitled Dialogues of Dogs; others say that these were written by some Egyptians, in their own[374] language, and that Eudoxus translated them, and published them in Greece. One of his pupils was Chrysippus, of Cnidos, son of Erineus, who learnt of him all that he knew about the Gods, and the world, and the heavenly bodies; and who learnt medicine from Philistion the Sicilian. He also left some very admirable Reminiscences.

IV. He had a son of the name of Aristagoras, who was the teacher of Chrysippus, the son of Aëthlius; he was the author of a work on Remedies for the Eyes, as speculations on natural philosophy had come very much under his notice.

V. There were three people of the name of Eudoxus. The first, this man of whom we are speaking; the second, a Rhodian, who wrote histories; the third, a Siciliot, a son of Agathocles, a comic poet, who gained three victories at the Dionysia in the city, and five at the Lenæa,[119] as Apollodorus tells us in his Chronicles. We also find another, who was a physician of Cnidos, who is mentioned by this Eudoxus, in his Circuit of the World, where he says that he used to warn people to keep constantly exercising their limbs in every kind of exercise, and their senses too.

VI. The same author says, that the Cnidean Eudoxus flourished about the hundred and third olympiad; and that he was the inventor of the theory of crooked lines. And he died in his fifty-third year. But when he was in Egypt with Conuphis, of Heliopolis, Apis licked his garment; and so the priests said that he would be short-lived, but very illustrious, as it is reported by Phavorinus in his Commentaries. And we have written an epigram on him, that runs thus:—

’Tis said, that while at Memphis wise Eudoxus

Learnt his own fate from th’ holy fair-horned bull;

He said indeed no word, bulls do not speak

Nor had kind nature e’er calf Apis gifted

With an articulately speaking mouth.

But standing on one side he lick’d his cloak,

Showing by this most plainly—in brief time

You shall put off your life. So death came soon,

When he had just seen three and fifty times

The Pleiads rise to warn the mariners.

[375]

And instead of Eudoxus, they used to call him Endoxus,[120] on account of the brilliancy of his reputation. And since we have gone through the illustrious Pythagoreans, we must now speak of the Promiscuous philosophers, as they call them. And we will first of all speak of Heraclitus.

Eudoxus appears to be one of the major advocates of Pleasure as the highest good prior to Epicurus - and perhaps someone more even more appropriate to compare to Epicurus than Aristippus. Here is an opening discussion of Eudoxus from Gosling & Taylor's "The Greeks on Pleasure:"

Quote

3. Eudoxus 8.3.1.

At the time of the Philebus, then, Plato is encountering two anti-hedonist positions, each backed by a theory of the nature of pleasure. But the opposition in the Philebus is a hedonistic thesis, and one which Plato thinks it worth while to attack with a wealth of argument not given to the subject in any previous dialogue. Some extra stimulus had been given to discussions of pleasure. This (cf. DL VIIl.86-91; Proclus, In Primum Euclidis Elementorum Librum Commen- tarii, B.39) was probably given by Eudoxus of Cnidus (cf. 7.1.4). According to Aristotle (EN 1172b9 ff.), he argued that pleasure is the good on the grounds that

(i) all animals, including men, pursue it, and what all pursue is the good;

(ii) all animals and men avoid pain as evil, and the opposite of pain, pleasure, must therefore be good;

(iii) pleasure is never for the sake of something else: no one ever asks ‘why enjoy yourself?’;

(iv) if pleasure is added to anything it makes it better.

He is also said (EN 1101b27-31) to have argued that pleasure is prized, not praised, just as the good is. The point here is not altogether clear, and Aristotle interprets Eudoxus rather than cites him. It is plausible, however, to suggest that the point is that with other goods we praise them because of the benefits they yield, whereas with pleasure this is not the case. This suggests that this consideration might have supported argument (iii) above. For it seems to suppose that whereas people might cite pleasure as what justifies their praise of X and so gives point to pursuing X, no one praises pleasure because there is no further reason for pursuing pleasure. This might have been thought to imply, what Aristotle considers lacking in Eudoxus’ position, that there is nothing that can be added to pleasure to make it (more) desirable.

8.3.2. At first sight this might seem to be a rehash of the hedonism of the Protagoras, but further consideration reveals important differences. To begin with, in the Protagoras Socrates is simply addressing himself to human beings, and his procedure is to challenge an honest man to acknowledge any other final end. Eudoxus, on the other hand, relies on the supposed observation that all animals, whether rational or not, pursue pleasure, and this is regarded as supporting the conclusion that pleasure is the good (compare EN 1l72b9— 15, 1l72b35-1173a5). In other words pleasure is not shown just to be one goal among many, because the goal of one species, but to be the sole claimant to the title of goal with any goal-pursuing being. He also supports this with an argument from general pain-avoidance and the consideration that pain is opposed to pleasure. While arguments (iii) and (iv) doubt- less rely on facts about human beings’ judgements they are not found at all in the Protagoras. Of course, in so far as ‘pleasure’ is taken in the Protagoras to mean ‘maximization of pleasure’ it will follow that no one will be able to supply a further end to give point to pursuing pleasure; but it is perfectly possible to ask of any individual pleasure what the good of pursuing it is. The point is not, however, made in Eudoxan terms, by appeal to the fact that no one asks a given question. Similarly it will follow from the Protagoras view that an addition of pleasure will make something better; but again, Socrates does not start with that as a premise, but works to it as a conclusion.

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Wikipedia:

Eudoxus of Cnidus - Wikipedia

Eudoxus of Cnidus (/ˈjuːdəksəs/; Ancient Greek: Εὔδοξος ὁ Κνίδιος, Eúdoxos ho Knídios; c. 390 – c. 340 BC) was an ancient Greek astronomer, mathematician, doctor, and lawmaker.^[1] He was a student of Archytas and Plato. All of his original works are lost, though some fragments are preserved in Hipparchus' Commentaries on the Phenomena of Aratus and Eudoxus.^[2] Spherics by Theodosius of Bithynia may be based on a work by Eudoxus.

Mine flat lines too but my recent reading into Seneca has motivated me a little more than in the past. Now it seems likely to be that the Epicureans didn't disappear overnight - which never made sense - and that if we start to look back into the history we will see things that we did not see before.

Exposing Seneca's hypocrisy will go a long way toward purging Modern interpretations of Epicurus of Senecas Stoicism, and I bet if we look closer we will see details in the history of next several hundred years that make a lot more sense if we look for clues in people who -like Julius Caesar himself probably - were holding Epicurean ideas without being called by that name.

Given how active Cassius Longinus and other Epicureans were in 50BC, and lacking any reason why they should be suppressed until the Christian total takeover, there must have continued to be prominent Epicureans for centuries.

A glance at Wikipedia doesn't help much to get a fix on Juvenal, but I do have a couple of additional thoughts. We spent most of our time in this episode criticizing Academic Skepticism and its self-contradictions and lack of position-taking, and some of that applies to that excerpt. It's probably helpful exercise to be able to take any passage and be able to pull it apart and ask Epicurean questions about it to see if it's really helpful or not.

Just what is Juvenal advocating, when his words can be interpreted acceptably by Stoic or Epicurean? Would a Christian or Jew or Hindu or Buddhist have any objection to this wording? If *everyone* finds it acceptable despite their dramatically different worldviews, that strikes me as a major red flag.

As to the first two lines, a healthy body isn't so hard to quantify, but what exactly is a healthy mind? Isn't that the ultimate question? And why not be afraid of death? For the Epicurean reason that there is no existence after death, or for an anti-Epicurean reason that a god is going to reward you in an afterlife?

After the first two lines, each of the following lines seems to me to have a decided unEpicurean slant:

and deems length of days the least of Nature's gifts
that can endure any kind of toil,
that knows neither wrath nor desire and thinks
the woes and hard labors of Hercules better than
the loves and banquets and downy cushions of Sardanapalus.
What I commend to you, you can give to yourself;
For assuredly, the only road to a life of peace is virtue.

1. Time ("length of days") is the *least* of Nature's gifts? Doesn't that reduce to not needing life at all, and doesn't Epicurus specifically condemn the view that it would be better never to have been born, and doesn't Epicurus say that life is desirable?
2. Enduring any kind of toil? Doesn't it make a lot of difference *why* you are toiling?
3. Knows neither wrath nor desire? Aren't there times to be angry, as Philodemus preserves for us, and don't we find life to be desirable, as Epicurus says to Menoeceus?
4. Woes and hard labors of Hercules? Doesn't Lucretius directly minimize Hercules as a symbol by pointing out that his labors were largely unnecessary? I don't get the impression that the Epicureans would have considered Hercules to be a negative figure in all cases, but when Hercules is set up as a paradigm of choosing virtue, not as a means to pleasure, but as an end in itself, then that crosses a line to the clearly negative.
5. Criticisms of the "loves and banquets and cushions" of Sardanapalus makes sense in Epicurean terms, *if* the reader understands Sadanapalus as in fact not being successful in living a happy life (in which case it would be consistent with PD10), but Wikipedia says: "The name Sardanapalus is probably a corruption of Ashurbanipal (Aššur-bāni-apli > Sar-dan-ápalos), an Assyrian emperor, but Sardanapalus as described by Diodorus bears little relationship with what is known of that king, who in fact was a militarily powerful, highly efficient and scholarly ruler, presiding over the largest empire the world had yet seen. ... There is no evidence from Mesopotamia that either Ashurbanipal or Shamash-shum-ukin led hedonistic lifestyles, were homosexual or transvestites. Both appear to have been strong, disciplined, serious and ambitious rulers, and Ashurbanipal was known to be a literate and scholarly king with an interest in mathematics, astronomy, astrology, history, zoology and botany.^[6]" The way the line is written, Juvenal takes the story as a caricature that makes it sound like he is condemning all luxury all the time, which is not what Epicurus says to Menoeceus.
6. "What I commend to you, you can give to yourself" can certainly be read acceptably, but more than anything else it has a Stoic "mind over matter" ring to it, as if you are oblivious to outside circumstances, which Epicureans (who cry out when under torture) are not.
7. "For assuredly, the only road to a life of peace is virtue." And of course the road set out by Epicurus is to "pleasure," and not to "peace," even if the road can be considered to be one of virtue, per PD05. Everything about the tone of this excerpt implies that "virtue" is being stated in the Stoic sense, not the Epicurean sense.

I tend to think your take in the episode is correct, as I see the overall tone of that quote as decidedly slanted toward Stoicism. But I don't have a mental fix on Juvenal at all at this point, so I will try to look further into him in the future.

Episode 239 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week we address the dishonesty of Academic Skepticism as opposed to Epicurus' commitment to knowing and teaching the truth about things that matter in life!