Posts by Cassius

Also as a side note: I think this is so important that we will eventually want to add another bullet point to the opening list of key takeaways for new readers (the top of the front page).

So it would be good to look for pithy passages from the ancient Epicureans that summarize the point, which is something like:

Reasoning about the nature of the imperceptible must be based on and consistent with the nature of the perceptible.

What we're getting at here is probably the most basic Canonical assertion of Epicurean philosophy.

It is the method for deriving, and being confident of, both the affirmative existence of atoms and void as well as the non-existence of supernatural gods and consciousness after death (immortal souls).

But it must be stated in a way that makes clear why, at the same time, BOTH (1) people who have lived all their lives inland would not declare oceans to be impossible, and also (2) people need not live forever or travel the entire universe before they can affirm that supernatural gods are impossible.

So suggestions for text references which say something like the italicized section above will be appreciated. I expect we have this in Herodotus and Lucretius and probably other places as well.

For example from Herodotus:

Quote

And besides we must keep all our investigations in accord with our sensations, and in particular with the immediate apprehensions whether of the mind or of any one of the instruments of judgment, and likewise in accord with the feelings existing in us, in order that we may have indications whereby we may judge both the problem of sense perception and the unseen.

I can't confirm the Greek, but, for example, it seems important in this passage that the phrasing would be "perceptIBLE" (able to be perceived) rather than "that which has already been perceived."

Just as a cross-refernce, Kalosyni just posted to an article that is relevant to this subject. It discusses Epicurus' reasoning about "the soul," so it is another separate example of what we are discussing here as to proper methods of reasoning about those things that are IMperceptible to the senses by starting with points of reference in what IS perceptible, rather than allowing "anything that can be constructed by the imagination with self-consistent wording is possible" type speculation.

So the list of "Important examples of Epicurean reasoning" needs to include:

1. Atoms
2. Void
3. Gods
4. The Soul
5. Death

And I am sure there are many many more to add to the list -including the ultimate nature of Epicurus' reasoning about pleasure itself. But should start with the "easy" and more concrete ones such as the list above, and establish the general method first, before we graduate to the more abstract issues.

Here is Kalosyni's link to the article on the soul:

Post

RE: What is the soul?

I just found this interesting excerpt, on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy website, "Ancient Theories of Soul" - Section on Epicurus:

[…]

Source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ancient-soul/#5.1

Kalosyni

September 15, 2024 at 8:44 PM

Some good stuff there and it concerns exactly what we are discussing in Episode 246 of the podcast which is of such importance.

"What this suggests, and what in fact we have independent reason to think, is that on Epicurus’ view, once one is in a position adequately to explain sense-perception, one will then also be in a position to work out an explanation of intellectual cognition, by appropriately extending the explanation of sense-perception."

I think that's probably right, and again it points to the central role of reasoning about the IMperceptible based on what IS perceptible. That's how we conclude atoms exist, and no doubt it relates to how Epicurus concluded "gods" exist, but it also answers the charges that skeptics like Cotta raised as to why an Epicurean (if he indeed bases all reasoning on sense experience) would not rule out the possibility of existence of oceans if he had never seen one in the past.

The references cited in the article may be helpful in summing up the answers to that charge, and will allow us to make more clear why the single term "empiricist" does not fully describe Epicurus' method of thinking.

It will take a couple of days to get this edition posted, but in the meantime I want to point out that this passage I'm about to quote seems to me to be a great way to introduce the issues that Philodemus addresses in "On Methods of Inference."

If we strip away the context of discussing gods, and focus on the part that begins with "What!" I think we'll see that this is an argument that strikes much more deeply at Epicurean philosophy than do many others. It goes to the whole issue of Epicurean reliance on the senses and their relationship to reason and how we draw conclusions about things that are not directly seeable or touchable by us.

This gives us a list of specific examples of arguments against Epicurus to observe and confront:

1 - You've never seen anything here on earth like the moon, the stars, or the planets, have you? How can an Epicurean form ANY opinions about something that they've never seen before up close? You Epicureans should be denying that the moon and stars and planets exist at all, because you've never seen any such thing up close to which to compare it!

2 - You've never seen a god here on earth either! You Epicureans should be denying that gods exist, because under your philosophy you can validate nothing that cannot be validated by the sense!

3 - If your Epicurean doctrine were to prevail, we'd have to throw out everything that history or reason discovers, because it if hasn't been previously observed by the senses, then you Epicureans reject that it is even possible!

4 - Yours is such a narrow way of thinking! If you had been born and raised in an inland nation, and neither you nor your friends had ever seen an ocean, you would deny that oceans are possible!

5 - If you had lived in a land which had only rabbits and foxes, you would think that someone who asserted that lions and panthers or elephants exist would be playing you for a fool!

Ok that's this part of Cotta's argument, and it demands a response.

IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING that the Epicureans would not have admitted even a grain of truth in that charge, but in "On the Nature of The Gods" Cicero does not allow Velleius to reply.

Our job is to construct the argument that the ancient Epicureans used against these arguments. Probably Philodemus' "On Methods of Inference / On Signs" is the best place to start, but I bet there are other sources we can pull together as well.

We offer some possible responses in the podcast, but it deserves much longer treatment. Yes it applies to the gods, but it's an argument that applies to atoms and void and much of the rest of Epicurean physics. It's even at the root of the whole question of how we can be confident that the universe operates naturally and isn't the plaything of arbitrary gods.

Quote

But since you dare not (for I am now addressing my discourse to Epicurus himself) absolutely deny the existence of the Gods, what hinders you from ascribing a divine nature to the sun, the world, or some eternal mind?

I never, says he, saw wisdom and a rational soul in any but a human form.

What! Did you ever observe anything like the sun, the moon, or the five moving planets? The sun, terminating his course in two extreme parts of one circle, finishes his annual revolutions. The moon, receiving her light from the sun, completes the same course in the space of a month. The five planets in the same circle, some nearer, others more remote from the earth, begin the same courses together, and finish them in different spaces of time. Did you ever observe anything like this, Epicurus? So that, according to you, there can be neither sun, moon, nor stars, because nothing can exist but what we have touched or seen.

What! have you ever seen the Deity himself? Why else do you believe there is any? If this doctrine prevails, we must reject all that history relates or reason discovers; and the people who inhabit inland countries must not believe there is such a thing as the sea. This is so narrow a way of thinking that if you had been born in Seriphus, and never had been from out of that island, where you had frequently been in the habit of seeing little hares and foxes, you would not, therefore, believe that there are such beasts as lions and panthers; and if any one should describe an elephant to you, you would think that he designed to laugh at you.

When I first looked at the photo i was on my phone -- Now i see that the image behind Epicurus is probably some kind of transfusion apparatus (given the article?)

So maybe I shouldn't take such a dim view of the collage -- if we could all receive a blood transfusion from Epicurus, we'd probably all be much better off! We may have to adopt that kind of imagery ourselves at some point!

1. I hope you find it!

2. Yes I may have more to say about that Ben Stein movie which you first mentioned. The main Richard Dawkins section (a short dialogue with Stein, which occurs after Stein visits that location pictured) is worth watching for the way it crystallizes some of the issues we are currently discussing. No doubt Stein edited it in a way slanted against Dawkins, but I think Dawkins would have been better advised to at least mention the possibility that Epicurus' externality argument is by no means out of the running as a response to Stein's "so give me the details of what happened first?" approach.

I will find a way to pull that out at some point so we can discuss it further.

If he was going to pick one to grossly misuse, i can see why he picked that particular one. It continues to be my least favorite reflection of Epicurus' intensity, which is probably the same reason that it is so favored in some quarters.

I don't see how the writer came up with that choice at all, unless he was looking for something portraying whimsical detachment from reality, combined with a touch of sadness that I think results from the damage to the eyebrow and the lack of paint that was probably in the eyes that would have prevented current blankness

Those are two good posts!

I'm still not clear at all as to the original intent of the statement - as to how broadly it was to be applied.

But taking the words out of context and deciding how they might or might not be reasonably applied sounds like a helpful exercise.

So one important application is what Don raises in terms of making the question one of memory of a loved one, which is picked up in point 2 of Joshua's post, which reminds me that we've discussed that "better to have loved and lost than never to have loved at all" before here on the forum. (I'll find the link). And I think when I find that link we'll find that it discusses this point as made in Chapter 10 of A Few Days In Athens too.

Joshua's point 1 is the broader question that seems harder to answer without taking the time to clarify the premises of what is essentially a hypothetical question. Point 2 seems easier to answer (probably with the "yes" that we don't forgo things like friendship even though we know all friendships eventually come to an end, with the death of one or both). Point 1 can't be answered without drilling down to exactly what is meant by "grief" or "pain." I would say that if we mean "unrelenting and total grief/pain to the exclusion of ALL other experiences," then Epicurus would choose death, because we can exit the play when it truly and fully ceases to please us. But such a hypothetical isn't consistent with normal life, and so the normal answer is that Epicurus would choose to live precisely because he knows that pain is generally endurable if long or short if intense. and that absent exceptional circumstances, it is a very small person who has many reasons for ending his own life.

Here's the link to the prior post. Unfortunately the link to the Facebook post is dead, and it's just a single post rather than a thread ("on better to have loved and lost than never to have loved"):

Post

Query: "Better to have loved and lost than never to have loved at all." Would Epicurus have agreed or disagreed? Why?

A very smart woman in Greece wrote this. Maybe she will post it herself at some point but until then:



As you placed this issue, Epicurus would answer to it, like this: I do not answer in such kind of dilemmas to agree or disagree.

I prefer to post here again, a comment that I have written to another thread and some months ago.

On the matters of : 1) Eros as sexual desire and 2) love as friendship

Two different concepts and meanings : the first (1) is complex, inexplicable and unreason the second…

Cassius

May 21, 2015 at 4:32 PM

I can't believe I had never heard this quote from Faulkner before, but I think I heard it for the first time today in that great intellectual movie "Ferris Bueller's Day Off."

Apparently it comes from William Faulkner, and no doubt it has a context in his writing (which at this moment I don't know).

Regardless of the context, it occurs to me to make an interesting question to discuss in Epicurean terms. We might even rephrase it for better Epicurean application:

"Between pain and nothing, I'll take pain."

Do we think that Epicurus would say that?

My first thought would require a lot of explanation, so I'll reserve it for now, but I think this would make a good topic for a thread.

Could you imagine Epicurus saying "Between pain and nothing, I'll take pain?"

If so, why? If not, why not?

BETWEEN GRIEF AND NOTHING, I’LL TAKE GRIEF

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l'll take grief.

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None come to mind at the moment, but I bet there are a significant number of people who've done something like that. If I come across any I'll definitely let you know.

It's probably pretty obvious to you already that you disagree with Epicurus on determinism (or at least that's the way I read your outline). The issues on that subject are pretty well formulated so you've no doubt thought that through.

However as to the focus you place on "tranquility" rather than pleasure, that's a subject where a lot may remain to be explored. I think I see that you've had an account here for a number of years so you're probably aware of our discussions on that. Discussions on determinism don't usually lead to much changing of minds, but I think there's a lot of little-discussed possibilities in going through the Epicurean texts on the meaning of pleasure vs tranquility, so it might be interesting for you or others in this thread to discuss your variation on the tranquility theme.

The "atheism" and "afterlife nihilism" points are pretty close to Epicurus, and you probably know how your take differs from Epicurus on "the gods."

Your next point is what I interpret as the "determinism" point...

Then comes "moral nihilism," and while I think that the end result might ultimately be not so far off from what I think Epicurus would say, I doubt he would embrace the tone of "nothing is “good” or “bad” or “right” or “wrong” or “just” or “unjust” or “moral” or “immoral.” It seems pretty clear to me that Epicurus himself *was* comfortable in using those terms, but he defined them all in terms of pleasure and pain.

Fear of death being irrational seems very close to Epicurus.

And then the final element is what i am characterizing as your "tranquility" focus, which you have under the name of "negative hedonism." Of course that's where I don't think Epicurus would agree there either, as the Epicureans specifically identified "pleasure" as the goal, and that takes you back into the issues of what "pleasure" really means. I'm firmly convinced that that was a very deliberate decision, and that "pleasure" is the broader term, including every aspect of tranquility, while "tranquility" is only one of many aspects of "pleasure."

But the bottom line is as i said - I think anyone who works out their philosophy which as much detail as you have done is far ahead of most everyone else, so again I compliment you on the document.

Also, thank you Joshua for the link to the info on the Expelled movie. I see that it can be viewed online here so I will try to take a look at it before our next recording. It certainly doesn't look like a movie I would recommend to our group here but it might provide some ideas for the podcast - I'll let you know if it does.

A lot of work in that document, thanks for sharing it.

Like you express, it's not at all fully consistent with Epicurus (and I am not just referring to the tranquility part, but to the deterministic aspects and other aspects as well.).

But there is certainly some overlap, and you've put a lot of work into it. I can see that such an exercise would be helpful to anyone.

Hopefully you will get some constructive comments so again thanks for posting.

Welcome to Episode 246 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we have a thread to discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

Today we are continuing to review Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," which began with the Epicurean spokesman Velleius defending the Epicurean point of view. This week will continue into Section 27 as Cotta, the Academic Skeptic, responds to Velleius, and we - in turn - will respond to Cotta in particular and the Skeptical argument in general.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here at Archive.org. The text which we include in these posts is available here. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of arguments presented will eventually be put together here.

Today's Text

XXXI. In his statement of this sentence, some think that he avoided speaking clearly on purpose, though it was manifestly without design. But they judge ill of a man who had not the least art. It is doubtful whether he means that there is any being happy and immortal, or that if there is any being happy, he must likewise be immortal. They do not consider that he speaks here, indeed, ambiguously; but in many other places both he and Metrodorus explain themselves as clearly as you have done. But he believed there are Gods; nor have I ever seen any one who was more exceedingly afraid of what he declared ought to be no objects of fear, namely, death and the Gods, with the apprehensions of which the common rank of people are very little affected; but he says that the minds of all mortals are terrified by them. Many thousands of men commit robberies in the face of death; others rifle all the temples they can get into: such as these, no doubt, must be greatly terrified, the one by the fears of death, and the others by the fear of the Gods.

But since you dare not (for I am now addressing my discourse to Epicurus himself) absolutely deny the existence of the Gods, what hinders you from ascribing a divine nature to the sun, the world, or some eternal mind? I never, says he, saw wisdom and a rational soul in any but a human form. What! did you ever observe anything like the sun, the moon, or the five moving planets? The sun, terminating his course in two extreme parts of one circle, finishes his annual revolutions. The moon, receiving her light from the sun, completes the same course in the space of a month. The five planets in the same circle, some nearer, others more remote from the earth, begin the same courses together, and finish them in different spaces of time. Did you ever observe anything like this, Epicurus? So that, according to you, there can be neither sun, moon, nor stars, because nothing can exist but what we have touched or seen. What! have you ever seen the Deity himself? Why else do you believe there is any? If this doctrine prevails, we must reject all that history relates or reason discovers; and the people who inhabit inland countries must not believe there is such a thing as the sea. This is so narrow a way of thinking that if you had been born in Seriphus, and never had been from out of that island, where you had frequently been in the habit of seeing little hares and foxes, you would not, therefore, believe that there are such beasts as lions and panthers; and if any one should describe an elephant to you, you would think that he designed to laugh at you.

XXXII. You indeed, Velleius, have concluded your argument, not after the manner of your own sect, but of the logicians, to which your people are utter strangers. You have taken it for granted that the Gods are happy. I allow it. You say that without virtue no one can be happy. I willingly concur with you in this also. You likewise say that virtue cannot reside where reason is not. That I must necessarily allow. You add, moreover, that reason cannot exist but in a human form. Who, do you think, will admit that? If it were true, what occasion was there to come so gradually to it? And to what purpose? You might have answered it on your own authority. I perceive your gradations from happiness to virtue, and from virtue to reason; but how do you come from reason to human form? There, indeed, you do not descend by degrees, but precipitately.

Nor can I conceive why Epicurus should rather say the Gods are like men than that men are like the Gods. You ask what is the difference; for, say you, if this is like that, that is like this. I grant it; but this I assert, that the Gods could not take their form from men; for the Gods always existed, and never had a beginning, if they are to exist eternally; but men had a beginning: therefore that form, of which the immortal Gods are, must have had existence before mankind; consequently, the Gods should not be said to be of human form, but our form should be called divine. However, let this be as you will. I now inquire how this extraordinary good fortune came about; for you deny that reason had any share in the formation of things. But still, what was this extraordinary fortune? Whence proceeded that happy concourse of atoms which gave so sudden a rise to men in the form of Gods? Are we to suppose the divine seed fell from heaven upon earth, and that men sprung up in the likeness of their celestial sires? I wish you would assert it; for I should not be unwilling to acknowledge my relation to the Gods. But you say nothing like it; no, our resemblance to the Gods, it seems, was by chance. Must I now seek for arguments to refute this doctrine seriously? I wish I could as easily discover what is true as I can overthrow what is false.

Transcript

Lucretius Today Episode 245 is now available: "Right, Wrong, Or Incomplete?" This week we continue to play Epicurean views of the gods in the context of their place in the overall framework of Epicurean reasoning.

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All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

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In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

"Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt

The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.

"On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"

"Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky

The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."

Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section

Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section

The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation

A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright

Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus

Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

"The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).

Welcome to the forum!

Quote from Eric

Warning: Sometimes the pleasure get's too high and things get a little psychotic. The Epicurean should be prepared and watch out for this and manage this properly to keep their peace of mind.

Yes I've always thought that the major reason for Epicurus' concern was the damaging things that might result from doing things without thinking about the results, much as with alcohol or other drugs.

"Yet, once the withdrawals are over, the desire for sex gets weaker and people report that they experience long-term benefits such as more enjoyment from other things, increased mental/physical fortitude and most importantly, their lives become more pleasurable (I've been there many times)."

- In that context I would also think that "age" is a big factor to consider. All sorts of changes take place with age.

Glad to have you with us!

Thanks Joshua! I saw the Lucian cite but did not see the one's afterwards.

Conclusion of the paper to which Kalosyni linked:

Conclusions

Unexpected observations, such as the 𝐻0 tension and galaxies that according to the current theories are expected to be older than traditional galaxy formation models predict, are challenging the standard cosmological model. If the cosmological model is complete and fully accurate, the distance measurements and, primarily, the redshift are biased. If the redshift is fully accurate then the standard cosmological model and basic theories regarding galaxy formation and the history of the Universe are incomplete. In any case, the redshift as used currently and the existing basic cosmological theories cannot co-exist without modifications.

This paper presents empirical observations that show that the redshift model may be biased and that the bias might be driven by the rotational velocity of the Milky Way galaxy relative to the rotational velocity of the observed galaxies. The observed bias is consistent across different telescopes and different annotation methods, and it shows very similar bias at both ends of the galactic pole. It is also consistent in catalogs that were collected for other purposes by different research teams.

The empirical observations described in this paper are provided with the data to ensure that the results can be reproduced. It has been shown that the vast majority of the scientific results cannot be reproduced [74], introducing the challenge known as the “reproducibility crisis” in science [75,76,77,78]. The ability to access the data and reproduce the results allows us to advance science in a transparent manner and to avoid errors that might not be noticeable to a reader unless they have access to the data.

In current astrophysics and cosmology practices, the redshift is used in most cases by ignoring the rotational velocity of the Milky Way, as the rotational velocity is far lower than the linear velocity and can, therefore, be considered negligible. But it should be noted that the physics of galaxy rotation and, in particular, the rotational velocity of galaxies are still not fully understood [22,26,33,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,49,79,80,81,82,83,84,85]. Theories such as dark matter [23] or MOND [25] have been proposed to explain the anomaly of the rotational velocity of galaxies, but several decades of research still have not led to a proven explanation for the provocative nature of the rotational velocity of galaxies.

It is difficult to identify an immediate explanation for the link between the rotational velocity and the redshift as observed from Earth. A possible explanation is the tired-light theory. But, as mentioned above, the physics of galaxy rotation in general are difficult to explain without making unproven assumptions. Since the redshift is the most common distance indicator in cosmological scales, a bias in the redshift can impact a large number of other studies that make use of the redshift.

Because the bias tends to become larger when the redshift gets higher, it is possible that such bias can explain anomalies, such as galaxies that according to the existing theories are expected to be older than traditional galaxy formation models predict. The experiments described here were based on relatively low redshift ranges and, therefore, it is still unclear whether higher redshift will have significant redshift bias. Studying the bias in higher redshift would require using a large number of galaxies with redshift imaged by space-based instruments, such as JWST, at around the galactic pole.

Because 𝐻0 is determined by using the redshift, a redshift bias can also explain the observed 𝐻0 tension. For instance, when using the SH0ES catalog [86] of Ia supernovae, by just selecting the galaxies that rotate in the same direction as the Milky Way, 𝐻0 drops from ∼73.7 to ∼69.05 km/s Mpc⁻¹ [87], which is within the statistical error from 𝐻0 as observed by the CMB. When using only the SH0ES galaxies rotating in the opposite direction relative to the Milky Way, 𝐻0 increases to ∼74.2 km/s Mpc⁻¹ [87]. Although SH0ES contains a relatively small number of Ia supernovae with their host galaxies, this suggests that redshift as a distance indicator may depend on the rotational velocity relative to the rotational velocity of the Milky Way. This observation is also aligned with the contention that the 𝐻0 tension may require new physics that apply to the entire Universe, rather than certain changes in the physics of the early Universe [88]. Because 𝐻0 is determined by using the redshift, redshift bias can also be related to the observed 𝐻0 anisotropy [89,90,91,92,93], which is another puzzling observation that does not have an immediate explanation.

It is also possible that the redshift difference is not a bias, and that galaxies that rotate in the opposite direction relative to the Milky Way are indeed closer to Earth compared to galaxies that rotate in the same direction relative to the Milky Way. In that case, the alignment with both ends of the galactic pole is merely a coincidence. Such large-scale alignment is far larger than any known cluster, super-cluster, or filament in the cosmic web. That may be in agreement with numerous other observations that suggest that the cosmological principle is violated [93].

Although alignment in galaxy spin directions is expected [94,95], it is not expected to form a cosmological-scale axis. If such an axis indeed exists and it is not driven by the impact of the rotational velocity on the redshift measurements then it can be linked with theories such as dipole cosmology [96,97,98,99,100] or the rotating Universe [101,102,103,104,105]. Theories that assume a Universe rotating around a cosmological-scale axis include black hole cosmology [106,107,108,109,110,111,112,113,114,115] and ellipsoidal Universe [116,117,118,119,120].

Tensions between the expected age of some galaxies and the age of the Universe, as well as other cosmological-scale anisotropies and observations, such as the 𝐻𝑜 tension, challenge our understanding of the Universe. It is clear that the current theories cannot co-exist with the redshift model as it is used currently, and, therefore, if the current theories are complete then this means that the redshift as a distance indicator is incomplete. This paper shows consistent evidence that the redshift depends on the rotational velocity of the Milky Way relative to the observed objects. The bias is small, but if it increases in the redshift ranges of the JWST deep fields then this would potentially explain the existence of mature galaxies in the early Universe.

Direct link to the new paper: https://www.mdpi.com/2571-712X/7/3/41

From Wikipedia:

Zwicky was critical of religion and considered it unacceptable to attribute natural phenomena to God.^[14]

He is remembered as both a genius and a curmudgeon.^[15] One of his favorite insults was to refer to people whom he did not like as "spherical bastards", because, as he explained, they were bastards no matter which way one looked at them.^[16]

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But the wikipedia article does not seem to be clear on Zwicky's ultimate stance on Big Bang theory.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fritz_Zwick

This article might be on point - https://ui.adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2017JAHH...20....2K/abstract

Direct link to article: https://www.narit.or.th/files/JAHH/201…...20...02K.pdf