Posts by Cassius

I just watched the miniseries adaptation (with which I was not particularly impressed) of "The Martian Chronicles" and so maybe my comment is colored by my reaction to that movie. I'm referring to the third installment of that show, where the Martians were portrayed as implicitly "ghosts," or at the very least time or dimension travelers without solid existence that the earth astronaut (Rock Hudson) could touch. If I recall correctly, the Martian seemed to be viewing Rock Hudson as similarly "ghostlike."

I know you're likely speaking figuratively in including the word "ghost," and that you take the ideas here very seriously. But when that term is used those opposed to Epicurus' views to disparage the theory (as if it is no more substantive than children making up ghosts for Halloween) I don't think it's giving Epicurus proper credit at all.

I think you're right that there's no necessary reason that such beings would have to live "between worlds." The only logical requirement is that they have as means of self-regenerating in whatever environment in which they might exist.

And I'll bet we'll eventually find what you are looking for in terms of additional text references, and my wager is that when we do we'll see them being treated like atoms or the swerve -- as things that we deduce "must" exist due to things that we do observe. But I would expect that the analysis will recognize that for the same reason that we think that atoms have a limit in size (the reason is at least in part that we have never observed one), the Epicureans thought that these gods live either (1) very far away in the "intermundia," or(2) in that "parallel dimension" you're talking about (again for the reason that ourfive senses give us no direct feedback of them).

I am adding this here as additional background both on Gyges and for Cicero's commentary on hypotheticals. Its from On Duties Book 3:

LacusCurtius • Cicero — De Officiis III.35‑95

37 Away, then, with questioners of this sort (for their whole tribe is wicked and ungodly), who stop to consider whether to pursue the course which they see is morally right or to stain their hands with what they know is crime. For there is guilt in their very deliberation, even though they never reach the performance of the deed itself. Those actions, therefore, should not be considered at all, the mere consideration of which is itself morally wrong. Furthermore, in any such consideration we must banish any vain hope and thought that our action may be covered up and kept secret. For if we have only made some real progress in the study of philosophy, we ought to be quite convinced that, even though we may escape the eyes of gods and men, we must still do nothing that savours of greed or of injustice, of lust or of intemperance.

9 38 By way of illustrating this truth Plato introduces the familiar story of Gyges: Once upon a time the earth opened in consequence of heavy rains; Gyges went down into the chasm and saw, so the story goes, a horse of bronze; in its side was a door. On opening this door he saw the body of a dead man of enormous size with a gold ring upon his finger. He removed this and put it on his own hand and then repaired to an assembly of the shepherds, for he was a shepherd of the king. As often as he turned the bezel of the ring inwards toward the palm of his hand, he became invisible to everyone, while he himself saw everything; but as often as he turned p307 it back to its proper position, he became visible again. And so, with the advantage which the ring gave him, he debauched the queen, and with her assistance he murdered his royal master and removed all those who he thought stood in his way, without anyone's being able to detect him in his crimes. Thus, by virtue of the ring, he shortly rose to be king of Lydia.

Now, suppose a wise man had just such a ring, he would not imagine that he was free to do wrongly any more than if he did not have it; for good men aim to secure not secrecy but the right.

39 And yet on this point certain philosophers, who are not at all vicious but who are not very discerning, declare that the story related by Plato is fictitious and imaginary. As if he affirmed that it was actually true or even possible! But the force of the illustration of the ring is this: if nobody were to know or even to suspect the truth, when you do anything to gain riches or power or sovereignty or sensual gratification — if your act should be hidden for ever from the knowledge of gods and men, would you do it? The condition, they say, is impossible. Of course it is. But my question is, if that were possible which they declare to be impossible, what, pray, would one do? They press their point with right boorish obstinacy, they assert that it is impossible and insist upon it; they refuse to see the meaning of my words, "if possible." For when we ask what they would do, if they could escape detection, we are not asking whether they can escape detection; but we put them as it were upon the rack: should they answer that, if impunity were assured, they would do what was most to their selfish interest, p309 that would be a confession that they are criminally minded; should they say that they would not do so they would be granting that all things in and of themselves immoral should be avoided.

But let us now return to our theme.

Welcome to Episode 262 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week we are continuing our review of the key doctrines of Epicurus that are featured here at Epicureansfriends on the front page of our website.

This week we will address "He Who Says 'Nothing Can Be Known' Knows Nothing"

Discussion Outline (work in progress!) - "He Who Says 'Nothing Can Be Known' Knows Nothing"

FWIW here is a link to page 75 in the text where that appears:

Philodemus On Methods Of Inference De Lacey : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

On Methods of Inference or On Signs

archive.org

There's a lot more context but here is part of it:

Quote

Thus we shall use successfully the inference from living beings, when we consider that nothing prevents god from being similar in body to man since man alone of living beings in our experience is capable of thought. For god cannot be conceived apart from thought; and even though god was not born, yet he is composed of soul and body and with this nature he is necessarily a living creature.

I personally don't have as negative a view of "convention" as I have of "illusion."

By convention we drive on the right-hand side of the road, and it is no offense to me if the Brits drive on the other side.

But by "illusion" i am told that it is impossible to know a "truth" about anything.

It's at the deepest level of confrontation where the stakes are the highest in these arguments with other viewpoints.

And for the old-timers' music club here's a Brit talking about "illusion," rather than "convention," as to color:

You know when I combine in my mind the assertions that motion is an illusion, that time is an illusion, that everything our senses show us is nothing more than the illusions caused by shadows flickering on the wall of Plato's cave, it's hard to shake the feeling that this is the real heart of Epicurean philosophy.

Yes you end up with some conclusions about pleasure and pain after you apply your conclusions to those issues, but you'd never reach the same opinions if you didn't start with the confidence that the world your senses allow you to perceive is real, and not an illusion.

I'm not sure most people today who read Epicurus have any inkling of this.

They jump right to the pleasure analysis as if none of the rest makes any difference, when the truth is that the pleasure analysis makes no sense at all without the initial grounding that pleasure and pain and the rest of the canonical faculties are the true measure of what's real and what's not real.

Many people in the last 100 years are awake to the idea that the supernatural religions push this fraudulent idea (that what the senses reveal is not real) because the religions are pushing supernatural gods who are completely unverifiable by the senses in this world. That's easy enough to understand, though even that I don't think they take fully to heart.

But very few people who read Epicurus are awake to how the "secular" philosophers (other than Epicurus) are doing much the same thing. In my view, the motivation of the secular class in pushing "skepticism" is ultimately "power." "Power" is the motivation of the religious class too, even though I grant to many of the religious class that they are sincere. But I think a good argument can be made that the secular skeptical philosophers are more to be condemned as "liars" than are the religionists (the accusation included in David Hume's Dialoges Concerning Natural Religion that"...the Sceptics are not a sect of philosophers: They are only a sect of liars.) So I can see why Epicurus would have concluded that giving in to physics-based determinism is even worse than giving in to supernatural religion.

If you don't have confidence in the senses (the canonical faculties) you don't have anything at all. And that's the place to start in understanding pleasure and everything else.

I also want to commend Joshua's second link for bring out the point I will underline in the quote here. This refers to Parmenides' argument that motion is impossible, but I point it out because this illustrates how these abstract logical assertions can have highly practical (in this case damaging) implications:

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Nevertheless the above arguments seem rationally compelling. We are thus faced with a dilemma:

Either the arguments, despite their persuasiveness, conceal a fallacy.

Rationale: Since valid arguments can never yield a false conclusion, an argument that yields a false conclusion must be invalid. But change is real, because it is so strongly attested by the evidence of our senses so that the conclusion led to by these arguments is false. Hence the argument must be invalid.

Project for the future suggested by this option: discover what this fallacy consists in, and display it to others. (This might mean making some progress in the philosophy of mathematics.)

Or our senses are constantly deceiving us when they register change and motion.

Rationale: There is no fallacy to be discovered in the above arguments, and the conclusion of any valid argument must be true.

Project for the future suggested by this option: practice those disciplines that help us progressively to detach us from the senses -- from our body in general. (This might mean practicing some form of asceticism.)

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With this conclusion:

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Parmenides is reported to have chosen the latter option. It was his view that the testimony of reason was stronger than the testimony of the senses (reasons tell us what can and cannot be the case). Accordingly, he is associated with the view that motion, change, time (all embraced under the term "Becoming") are illusions, and that reality ("Being") is One and Eternal.

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This position is congenial to those who are inclined to identify this Being with God, and to relegate all else (the many and the changing) -- hence, the material world testified to by the bodily senses, but also any individual personal identity, and hence the supposed experiences of all such entities -- to the category of unreal appearance. God, on this view, is the only reality.

Note that suffering of any sort, because it involves conflict, falls into the domain of the many and the changing. Hence the identification of God with the Parmenidean One can be made to serve the purposes of theodicy. If we classify theodicies by the different kinds of strategies they adopt for solving the problem of evil, then the "Parmenidean" varieties form a group within the larger family of theodicies that deny the reality of evil.

For what it is worth as to the origin of this thread, I think many of us are familiar with the philosophic dispute over whether motion is possible, or is an illusion.

The question of "time" came up in our discussion of 12/25/24 as to whether Epicurus was addressing time because it was controversial in the same way, and for much the same reason.

From Joshua's first link above:

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Parmenides = the past and future are illusions, the Universe is timeless and unchanging.

Heraclitus= endless process of creation, destruction and change.

Plato = time is a reflection of the rotation of the heavenly spheres.

Aristotle = time is rooted in motion and is meaningful only with respect to events embedded in its flow. Yet time is not motion, it is everywhere.

Hebrew/Christian theology = developed linear time versus Stoic time which is cyclical.

Also:

Quote

There are basically three theories of time: 1) realist, 2) relational and 3) idealist.

The realist view of time believes that time is a physical characteristic of the Universe, independent of other physical properties. Time would exist even if the Universe were empty of matter and people (a de Sitter-Einstein Universe). The block Universe of relativity is an example of this view.

The relational view of time states that time depends on the succession of physical events in the Universe, such that time would not exist in an empty Universe. Where the realist states that the Universe has a clock, a relationalist states the Universe is a clock.

The idealist view is that time is a property of the human mind and therefore is an illusion. The passage of time is depends on human observers. In some sense, the block Universe is both realist and idealist as time is embedded in the Universe and that reality is a timeless, unchanging thing (Parmenidean).

Frequently, the discussion of time focuses on the passage of time where our views are divided into the Parmenidean versus Heraclitean view. Parmenides believed that stasis is fundamental and change is an illusion. Heraclitus emphasizes flux such that only change is real, permanence is an illusion. By Plato's era, time is associated with cosmic regularity (motion of the Sun and Moon), although Aristotle objects to this framework since motion is measured in time and time cannot be measured by motion.

Anyone want to suggest whether Epicurus is in one of these three categories, or that is view is distinguishable from all three?

Happy Birthday to Frank1939! Learn more about Frank1939 and say happy birthday on Frank1939's timeline: Frank1939

Lucretius Today Episode 260 is now available: "The Universe is Infinite And Eternal And Has No Gods Over It"

Perhaps this:

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Definitions

Definition 1.

A point is that which has no part.

Definition 2.

A line is breadthless length.

http://aleph0.clarku.edu/~djoyce/elements/bookI/bookI.html

So the objection is that his definitions (a point with no part; a line with no breadth) is "inconceivable" - because we judge what is conceivable by what the senses tell us?) or otherwise not something that we can observe in reality, and thus not relevant to us (?)

Quote from Page 191 of the article

3. The Epicurean Position
For the Epicureans, both issues (1) and (2) in Section 2 were objectionable. Issue (1) was perhaps the reason why mathematics was not part of the Epicurean curriculum, as it did not accord with Epicurean empiricism.

At risk of getting drawn in too far when I should be doing other things (which I suspect is the real objection), what are "issues 1 and 2 in Section 2".....?

I am sure at some point that someone is going to make some insightful observations after reading that article.

That someone is unlikely to be me.

What I will say is that my gut tells me that people who go down the rabbit whole too far in mathematical theory are never going to accept that no matter how internally consistent their systems might be, Epicurus was going to reject any aspect of it that did not yield practical benefit, or that seemed to contradict the trustworthiness of the senses. I suspect that he was or would have been more than happy to accept any practical benefits that mathematical calculations produced, but to the extent those calculations couldn't be linked to practical benefit, he just wasn't interested in spending his time that way. Nor would he have recommended anyone else do so, unless they experienced pleasure in the chase of the calculations. I understand that's possible - mathematical puzzles can be fun. But i really get the sense that criticism of Epicurus' position is based more on wanting to make him look "anti-knowledge," or the result of the critic feeling hurt for having his or her pet interest disparaged. Just like the rest of the criticism that Epicurus was "anti-science" or "anti-knowledge," those criticisms to me seem vastly overblown.

EDIT - I do however think that it would be very helpful to pin down some of the comments in the article about exactly where Epicurus' first objection to the system started. The article points to one or more initial axioms that Epicurus rejected, and it would probably help to identify what those were. Identifying the initial dealbreaker would be good to keep in memory, while any additional objections would probably be superfluous because once the foundation was rejected the rest would go out the window too. Was it the "indivisibility" assertion or something else? I kind of suspect something else about the presumptions behind the initial setup leading to indivisibility.

Thanks for the input on Don's article Pacatus. Just now starting to scan it now and will probably have to come back to it. It is interesting to see that Plato's Philebus is cited early in the article:

According to Karasmanis, the roots of the connection between the latter two concepts are found in Plato’s Philebus in his notion of “apeiron” (“indeterminate”): “Plato’s approach to apeiron is rather mathematical. He ap- proaches magnitudes via incommensurability and not via infinite divisibility. Of course, all magnitudes are infinitely divisible in the Zenonian sense, and therefore continuous. But magnitudes are also dense, in the sense that they include incommensurable cuts. Is there any relation between infinite divisibility and incom- mensurability? Let me continue my reasoning beyond the text of Philebus.

Welcome to Episode 261 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week we are continuing our review of the key doctrines of Epicurus that are featured here at Epicureansfriends on the front page of our website.

This week we will address "Death Is Nothing To Us"

Discussion Outline (work in progress!) -

Death Is Nothing To Us

At present we don't have a forum dedicated to Euclid - we may eventually set one up later. In the meantime we can use this thread to get started as needed. It does not appear that Euclid was an influence on the ethics of pleasure, but that Euclid's approach to deductive reasoning was influential.

Google says (my underlining)

"Euclid is considered the "father of geometry" because his work, particularly his book "Elements," established the foundation for deductive reasoning in mathematics by presenting geometric principles through a system of axioms and postulates, where theorems are logically derived from these basic truths, setting a standard for rigorous proofs in mathematics; essentially, he demonstrated how to build complex geometric concepts through a step-by-step process of logical deduction."

Here are some of the references to Euclid in DeWitt, followed by other references and links:

Chapter 1 - "As an educator Epicurus adopted the procedures of Euclid, parting company with both Plato and the Ionian scientists. The chief mistake in this instance is to foist upon him the method of inductive reasoning; his chief reliance was upon deduction. As for the influence of Euclid, it is regularly overlooked."

"Isocrates, a great teacher, had inaugurated a shift of emphasis from artistic speech for the benefit of listeners to artistic writing for the benefit of readers and his example was followed up by his admirer Praxiphanes, who became the teacher of Epicurus. The young man seems to have fallen under this spell for a time, and his extant letter to Menoeceus is artfully composed in the Isocratean manner. This fashion, however, was subsequently abandoned in favor of the bald style of Euclid, of which the sole merit was clarity. Along with this unadorned style came the adoption of the textbook form and the deductive procedures. Euclid himself, of course, was merely bringing to perfection a technique of book-making which had gradually taken shape in the circle of geometers. His name is here used to stand for a trend which Epicurus manifestly followed. The school textbook was just beginning to emerge as a distinct type."

Chapter 2 - "It should also be remembered that this study during the youth of Epicurus was enjoying a vogue not incomparable to that of Newtonian physics in the eighteenth century and nuclear physics at the present time. Euclid himself was a contemporary and his influence upon Epicurus is manifest. It should be observed that his work on geometry is really an epitome and is entitled Elements. Similarly, Epicurus produced among other epitomes a syllabus of his books on physics, which he called The Twelve Elementary Principles. Moreover, as will be shown later, his method of procedure, like that of Euclid, is from first principles to particulars. He states each principle as a theorem and then adduces the proof. Lastly, it was the geometers who quite properly, although surrounded by rhetoricians, developed a style of writing unsurpassed for its baldness. Epicurus, again, though partial to rhetoric in his earlier years and capable of writing artfully, reversed himself and turned to the style of the geometers, abjuring all figures of speech.⁴⁰ It was his mature view that clearness was the only requisite and that the study of physics, "physiology" to him, would show men how they should write.^"

- Thanks to Don for this link to "Some Thoughts on the Epicurean Critique of Mathematics"

- Also - Diskin Clay in "Epicurus' Last Will and Testament" -

"Each of the terms of Epicurus’ philosophical testament requires careful interpretation, but taken massively the first paragraphs of the Letter to Herodotus show that Epicurus in ordering, condensing and refining his earlier thought, fashioned a stoicheiosis whose aim is elegantly, if not completely expressed by the requirements Proclus found perfectly fulfilled in Euclid's Elements. Apassage from Proclus’ introduction to the first book of Euclid does not set out all that Epicurus required of his own stoicheiosis, but it deserves study for bringing Epicurus closer to his contemporaries, especially the geometers of the IV century who were at work securing and refining the work of their predecessors. Such an alignment might well seem odd, if not bizarre. A Stoic claimed that the Epicureans never stirred up the “learned dust” (emditus pulver) of geometry“, which goes too far. Such an alignment will not make Epicurus seem a physiologist among geometers. But in his concern for the methodic ordering and presentation of his thought, it does make him a geometer among physiologists."

I see Diskin Clay also mentions the Euclid parallel:

Each of the terms of Epicurus’ philosophical testament requires careful interpretation, but taken massively the first paragraphs of the Letter to Herodotus show that Epicurus in ordering, condensing and refining his earlier thought, fashioned a stoicheiosis whose aim is elegantly, if not completely expressed by the requirements Proclus found perfectly fulfilled in Euclid's Elements. Apassage from Proclus’ introduction to the first book of Euclid does not set out all that Epicurus required of his own stoicheiosis, but it deserves study for bringing Epicurus closer to his contemporaries, especially the geometers of the IV century who were at work securing and refining the work of their predecessors. Such an alignment might well seem odd, if not bizarre. A Stoic claimed that the Epicureans never stirred up the “learned dust” (emditus pulver) of geometry“, which goes too far. Such an alignment will not make Epicurus seem a physiologist among geometers. But in his concern for the methodic ordering and presentation of his thought, it does make him a geometer among physiologists.

I interpret the 'of course' to mean that a Euclidean approach clearly involves chains of deductions.

It is also clear from reading Lucretius and Herodotus that Epicurean physics involves a chain of deductive reasoning, starting with nothing come from nothing as the first deduction.

DeWitt is not the only commentator to take the position that there were twelve fundamentals and attempt to enumerate them - so does Diskin Clay, someone who is well recognized among mainstreatm commentators. His list is much the same, though not identical, to DeWitt's. See Clay's "Epicurus Last Will and Testament."

Also, the reason for the relevance of this is that we singled out "Nothing comes from nothing" so that we could spend more time in the episode on the deductive reasoning process, to illustrate that deductive reasoning, and not "if I can't see it I won't believe it" empiricism, is a major basis of Epicurean physics and therefore the rest of the philosophy as well.

We had good recording today, and I hope to get this one issued by midweek. However, from the editing I have done already I have to take a tangent:

I know we've discussed this before, but it seems to me that there is a very important parallel between Epicurus' analysis of atoms and pleasure.

First, Epicurus' method of reasoning in physics is based on facts derived from the senses, but it is ultimately logical in the way it uses those observations:

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Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus 41—2 (1) Moreover, the totality of things is infinite. (2) For that which is finite has an extremity, and that which is an extremity is viewed as next to some further thing. Therefore having no extremity it has no limit. And not having a limit it would be infinite [literally 'unlimited'] and not finite. (3) Indeed, the totality of things is infinite both in the number of the bodies and in the magnitude of the void. (4) For if the void were infinite but the bodies finite, the bodies would not remain anywhere but would be travelling scattered all over the infinite void, for lack of the bodies which support and marshal them by buffering. (5) And if the void were finite, the infinite bodies would not have anywhere to be.

Epicurus builds logical theories on the evidence that is existing. He take the evidence and applies logic to deduce a high level conclusion about what "must" be. He isn't primarily talking anything that we would today consider to be chemistry or physics after 2000 years of applied study of details.

He's talking something more important than any set of sensations: he's talking about how to take sensations to reach conclusions. He's talking in an "If A + B = C then If C - A must equal B" kind of way. He could just as well be talking about monkeys or bananas as atoms or planets. The logical truth of the formulation applies at all levels.

To continue.... the universe is (1) bodies and (2) space --- nothing else:

Quote from Letter to Herodotus

Moreover, the universe is bodies and space: for that bodies exist, sense itself witnesses in the experience of all men, and in accordance with the evidence of sense we must of necessity judge of the imperceptible by reasoning, as I have already said....

[40] And if there were not that which we term void and place and intangible existence, bodies would have nowhere to exist and nothing through which to move, as they are seen to move. And besides these two, nothing can even be thought of either by conception or on the analogy of things conceivable such as could be grasped as whole existences and not spoken of as the accidents or properties of such existences. Furthermore, among bodies some are compounds, and others those of which compounds are formed.

This means that EVERYTHING is composed of bodies made of atoms and space. Sure there are innumerable types of bodies moving through innumerable areas of space -- but at the highest level of analysis, besides these two - bodies and space - nothing else is conceivable.

In ethics, Epicurus is transferring that kind of analysis to "feeling." He is stipulating that ALL feelings are ultimately reducible to either pleasure or pain. Besides the two categories of feelings -- pleasure and pain -- nothing else is conceivable because that is the way we have defined the playing field. We frequently gloss over the question of whether he was right to do this - right to divide every feeling into pain and pleasure, but Epicurus feels himself justified in doing so in the same kind of way he is justified in dividing every thing into atoms and void. That's philosophy more than it is an applied science - it is the assignment of a definition to a word.

Epicurus was making a statement about pleasure ("where there is pleasure there is no pain") that is absolutely true within the Epicurean framework of there being only two feelings, pleasure and pain. This is highly parallel to making the statement that "where there is an atom is no space." That is absolutely true within the atomist framework, but ultimately it is a deduction, not an observation that is validated directly by the senses.

Such a high a level of abstraction helps us tremendously in understanding how pleasure can be seen as absence of pain, and pain can be seen as absence of pleasure. In the same way we can consider all of nature to be divided between atoms and space: we can consider an atom to mean the absence of space, and space to mean the absence of body in that location.

But those are high level abstractions! We deduce them to be true based on the evidence of the senses, but they are deductions, not particular sensations. To take "absence of pain" to refer to a particular type of pleasure would be as absurd as taking "absence of space" to refer to a particular type of body. Neither describe actual sensations!

High level abstractions have very important uses, but they tell you absolutely nothing further about the particular pleasure or the particular body being described. We have to stop at the limit of what is being asserted, and not make the mistake that we are asserting something more than logic can conclude. Logic cannot tell us what experience is most pleasant to us in every respect, but only in the respect that what we are talking about is "pure" and "unadulterated."

If this perspective is correct, as I think it is, then in referring to "absence of pain" Epicurus and Torquatus were talking about pleasure in general rather than describing a particular type or experience of pleasure. Logic cannot fully describe a particular pleasure or a particular atom. Logic can only give us what we put into it, and in the expression "pleasure is the absence of pain" we have put nothing into it other than the principles that (1) one is desirable and the other undesirable, and (2) the existence of one is to the exclusion of the other. At the end of the analysis we have principles, not descriptions of specific pleasures or specific atoms.

It is impossible that Cicero did not realize this, and that's why DeWitt was justified in indicting Cicero for acting maliciously. (Dewitt's accusation, without looking it up, was to the effect that Cicero could not have misrepresented Epicurus so effectively had he not understood Epicurus so well.)

Cicero knew that Epicurus and Torquatus were speaking at the level of the general (pleasure as an abstraction), but Cicero refused to let Torquatus explain the difference between the general and the particular. Torquatus was allowed no real opportunity to explain that connection.

Cicero thereby led his readers to think that "absence of pain" was meant as a description of a particular experience rather than an abstraction. Cicero rightly understood that readers who were not already familiar with Epicurus would fail to see through the deception. And Cicero encouraged his readers not to try to understand Epicurus. After all, as Cicero said, if he himself (Cicero) could not understand Epicurus' meaning, how could anyone else expect to?

Are we focused on different lines perhaps?