Does Happiness Require a Non-Epicurean Decision Procedure?

Choices and avoidances are done according to hedonic calculus as explained in the middle portion of the Epistle to Menoeceus. I recommend that you read this:

https://theautarkist.wordpress.com/2018/05/20/hap…ics-the-ethics/

Another source: Principal Doctrine 5 says a life of pleasure must be lived honorably, justly, and wisely. These are precise words. Virtue is not used here, likely because this word is not precise. And we know justice is based on mutual advantage, so the matter of divorcing one's spouse and moving to Costa Rica, if it is mutually advantageous for both, then the contract that binds them should be rewritten or abolished. If it isn't, then dialogue among the two contracted parties is needed. If you read the last ten Principal Doctrines you'll be better acquainted with Epicurean concepts of justice, and remember: a pleasant life is just, therefore relationships should be based on MUTUAL advantage (not the advantage of only one party, which is predatory, unfair, and would produce a miserable life).

On the choice and avoidance problem you present: Norman DeWitt said "an unplanned life is not worth living".

If your job AND your family make you miserable, then maybe a new job and a divorce can be planned diligently. But the question of leaving your family would require hedonic calculus. Are they sociopaths, or are they a danger to your safety? Is your wife doing something illegal that may get you into trouble? If so, this might pass hedonic calculus. Otherwise, probably not.

On whether relationships are means or ends, this is a frequent accusation. The ancient Epicureans observed that initially ALL friendships emerge naturally from mutual advantage, but later the relationship become strong and a friend may even give his life for a friend. This is a natural process.

Pivot I agree with Hiram's post but would add this. If indeed your calculation of how to pursue happiness ends up not achieving happiness, then you have by definition miscalculated your means. And by concluding that there are a certain set of tools that should be pursued in themselves, rather than with your eye on the goal, then you are again making the classic mistake of putting means before the end, guaranteeing that you will in fact miss the mark (since the mark is not your goal).

It sounds like you have probably read the extended discussion of this topic under the name of Torquatus in "On Ends" or at Epicurus.net but if you have not that is one of the best explanations of this issue.

The essential point is that there is really no contradiction in the Epicurean procedure. Happy living is pleasurable living - the dominance of pleasure over pain over the course of a lifetime. And that includes all kinds of pleasure, both physical and mental -- every kind you can think of, including the pleasures of the relationships you are talking about. If you walk away from your relationships to pursue short-term hedonism, then you will be plagued with the regrets and emotional pains of the consequences of your action for the rest of your life. Epicurus also indicates that for example if you betray a friend your life will be thrown into such disarray at times you should give up your own life for that of a friend.

So I think an Epicurean would respond to your analysis by affirming two points: (1) that Epicurus was very clear that we are talking about long term net pain over time - not the pleasures of the moment, and (2) that Epicurus was also very clear that pleasure means ALL KINDS of pleasure, including mental/emotional pleasures of all kinds, and that indeed mental / emotional pleasures can often be more intense and of greater concern that physical pleasures.

So your conclusion that "virtue ethics" are of use to you in attaining happiness does not contradict Epicurus at all, as you would already suspect due to PD5 "It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and honorably and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and honorably and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the man is not able to live wisely, though he lives honorably and justly, it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life."

But if you ever make the mistake of forgetting that virtue ethics are a means to the greater end of pleasure, and not an end in themselves, then you are setting yourself up for disappointment by "freezing in" intermediate tools that may work at one moment, but be disastrous at the next moment. And it is inevitable that no tool is ALWAYS going to work, because there is no "fate," no "god-given laws" that apply at all times and places and to all people.

And all this is why we quote Diogenes Laertius' formulation so often:

"If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end. Let us therefore now state that this is true, making it our starting-point."

Please follow up with us on your thoughts in response to these points because this is one of the most important aspects of Epicurean philosophy.

Hi Pivot - You addressed Hiram but I will go ahead with my own comments to your post.

As to each of your analogies - ( the husband leaving the family; the wallet in the dark alley; the sociopath who escapes detection) all of those are difficult cases, but still not exceptions to the rule.

Let's up the ante - a sociopath develops a method of spending his entire life killing innocent babies for fun, but due to his method is never caught.

Does that change the fact of nature that there is no supernatural god? Does that change the fact of nature that there is no evidence to support any kind of "ideal form" or "essences" or "virtue in the air" to which to look for a standard, those remain invalid reference points.

What Epicurus was saying was that in the absence of valid "absolute" reference points we must look to whatever Nature gives us as a guide, and ultimately she gives us nothing more than pleasure and pain by which to judge the desirability of all things.

So in each of your examples it is entirely possible that results that we consider "bad" may take place, but that doesn't mean that there are gods or absolutes of any kind that tell us that we are right and the "bad actor" in any of those cases are wrong. If we think that some mechanism ought to be in place to discourage those results, then we organize communities and nations and police forces and armies, to enforce those rules, but in the absence of our doing so, there are no absolute forces anywhere which will enforce our preferences for us.

So that is one major aspect of what is going on here, about which Epicurus was realistic.

And so when you reach points such as "It just seems like this sort of valuation, as a means to an end, is the wrong kind." The key issue there is "wrong kind" - and the question is "Wrong by what standard?" Epicurus rejects false standards that do not really exist except in our minds, and Epicurus suggests that if we wish to look for "justification" for our own view of right and wrong, we can look nowhere else but to Nature if we
want some kind of sanction outside ourselves. And the only guidance Nature has provided - to all living things - is the faculty of pleasure and pain.

On rationality, it is a tool, not an end. Reason does not furnish data from nature. It merely calculates from the data.

Our faculties of pleasure and aversion furnish data from nature on what is choice worthy and avoidance worthy, and we calculate based on that data. If we err, it is in the calculation. But there is no “error” in the data furnished (just as with the senses) because it came directly, unmediated, from nature.

The pleasure faculty, and the senses, are part of what we call the canon. Here’s a book on it:

https://newepicurean.com/other-resource…ripod-of-truth/

Also I wish to address your worship of virtue separately. You will find this quote in “A Few Days in Athens”:

“Of all the thousands who have yielded homage to virtue, hardly one has thought of inspecting the pedestal she stands upon.“

This pedestal is pleasure.

How you deal with anger and other emotions determines if you are really Epicurean or Stoic or something else. To us, anger can be virtuous if channeled and made productive in such a way that it leads to a long-term pleasant life. Anger can be (un)natural, it can also be (ir)rational. So virtues, to us, are circumstancial. All our choices and avoidances require context to be carried out successfully and lead to pleasure.

http://societyofepicurus.com/reasonings-on-philodemus-on-anger/

Pivot i am going to be delayed in responding to your most recent post but I wanted to think you for taking the time to write it. As far as i am concerned you are right over the target in seeing these as the issues which must be decided.

But for now when you say: "There must be intuitive truths about how humans ought to conduct behavior toward one another that goes outside the limit of the hedonistic calculus." I would ask why is that the case. If you are suggestiing that there may be inborn dispositions to certain types of behavior, that can be encompassed under the Epicurean theory of "anticipations," but as for the desirability or undesirability of those actions there is no automatic gauge but pleasure and pain.

It seems that you are suggesting that there is a foolish Epicurean and an intelligent Epicurean, but to the extent someone sets a goal with anything other than ALL the effects (including over time) in his calculation, then that person is not accurately following the teachings of Epicurus.

"Now if we accept rationality as a guide for action, along with pleasure and pain, we may get sucked into a Kantian ethical theory which decides to take rationality as the guiding principle of action, instead of pleasure and pain... But that's a bit off-topic (would be interesting to explore elsewhere)." >>> I think you are exactly correct in your prediction where that would lead, so it is not off topic. Ultimately, as Hiram says, rationality can assist us in making all sorts of important calculations, but rationality cannot tell us what "better" means.

All I have time for at the moment but look forward to continuing.

I hope we can try to reduce the argument down to those specific points which are the keys. This is an important one, but I don't quite think that this is it "There must be intuitive truths about how humans ought to conduct behavior toward one another that goes outside the limit of the hedonistic calculus."

I think Pivot that you are making a point more closely related to the "role of reason" but I am no quite sure that is it either. Not trying to short-circuit the discussion, but do you have a suggestion Pivot on how to most concisely state the ultimate point at issue?

Yes I think you are correct as to issue two, in that Epicurus would say that the only standard for what is "horrible" is ultimately pain and pleasure, and thus the appeal to any other standard makes no sense (as they do not exist). I think we are pretty clear on that one.

I am not clear, however, on your issue one, and the assertion that Epicureans cannot have deep friendships and strong ambitions. I think Epicurus would define deep friendships and strong ambitions by the intensity of the feelings involved, rather than by any other standard of what a friend "should do" under any particular situation. Same would go for ambitions. For a cite in support of depth of emotion I would include this from Diogenes Laertius: "He [the wise man] will be more susceptible of emotion than other men: that will be no hindrance to his wisdom."

So I presume that you are stating as the basis for your first assertion your definitions that you believe altruistic sacrifices are necessary for strong friendship and strong ambitions. I am familiar with the first part as to friendship, but I don't think I have ever seen anyone assert that altruistic sacrifices are necessary for strong ambitions.

Can you state with any greater clarity the basis for those assertions?

As for issue two, where you conclude that "certain horrible acts are not unjust" that is definitely the Epicurean viewpoint, and you could probably expand it from "certain" to "many." But just so I understand your point, to what authority or source are you appealing to argue that they should be considered "unjust?" Stating that source will bring us even more clearly to the point in dispute.

Ok we are making good progress -

1) When you write: "However, my point is this: if happiness is the sole consideration for one's decisions, he is not likely to embark on ambitions which require great long-term sacrifice. "Whatever is natural is easily procured and only the vain and worthless hard to win." <<< You are pointing out a perceived contradiction between the natural and necessary discussion and any pleasure which requires lots of exertion to obtain. I agree that someone who interprets the "natural and necessary" passages too rigorously is going to make that error, but I don't think it is necessary to lay that error at the feet of Epicurus. This point fits very closely with my argument about the part of the letter to Menoeceus that says "By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul." Yes I know the translations say that, and maybe they are even accurate to what Epicurus did write, but I think both of these issues (natural/necessary and pleasure=absence of pain) have to be taken in the overall context of the philosophy that would have been firmly established in the mind of any Epicurean student before he read that letter.

Even within the letter to Menoeceus itself there are other passages that also taken separately would totally contradict the ascetic interpretation of those passages, and so what we're getting at here is that it is essential to take the philosophy as a whole and to interpret any apparent ambiguities or apparent contradictions in a way that is consistent with the message of the whole. So I agree that a standard academic interpretation of Epicurus is going to be vulnerable to the charge you are making. I simply think that the standard academic interpretation of Epicurus is largely worthless and not worth defending, so I take the DeWitt approach as amplified by Gosling & Taylor, Nikolsky, and Wentham on the nature of Epicurean pleasure.

2) I would argue that death alone is probably a "misfortune" so I would have no issue with argument based on that. It's definitely not something to be desired expect at those times when future pain will outweigh future pleasure. This is another issue where I would deviate from what I gather to be the academic consensus. They take the position you suggest, but I think that Epicurus would definitely say that the longer life can contain greater pleasure so would generally be preferred than the shorter life. That's another extremely interesting issue to discuss and develop over time. But the heart of the issue is this:

"Using your example, the murderer who tortures babies: surely this is unjust. If the definition of injustice does not include horrible acts such as this, we should think the definition is improper." << in a universe where "fate" and absolute principles do not exist, i do not believe you are safe in saying "surely." The "surely" implies facts not in evidence. Would it be possible to say that torture is *always* improper? There are lots of people who would argue that torture of one terrorist to save an innocent city from an atomic bomb would be totally proper. Can we "surely" say that torture of the terrorist's baby, or five or ten or any number of terrorist babies, to save that innocent city from atomic bombing would be improper? I doubt we can - at least I would be willing to entertain it myself, and I won't admit that that makes me a monster.

Now you are returning to " intuition based in reason" for your sanction. As you know I think that there are very interesting questions revolving around the nature of anticipations in Epicurean thought, and to what extent they are related to intuitions. I know DeWitt rather strongly saw them as analogous. And there are related issues in regard to the faculty of pleasure -- from where does the programming that decides what we find pleasurable and painful come? So I think there is potential for common ground on "intuition" playing a role here, so long as the suggestion is not that intuition is programmed by supernatural gods, or by ideal forms existing in another dimension. But as to "reason" I would strongly insist with Epicurus that "with the assistance of reason" is the best that can be said for reason. Computers have no feelings of pleasure or any other "goal" other than what is given to them by their programmers. I see reason as a "tool" not unlike hammers and screwdrivers and compasses and plumb lines and the rest -- all very valuable to assisting us in projecting out consequences of future actions, but never providing in themselves any motivation to pursue any of those future actions.

Quote from Pivot

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3. Deep relationships and strong ambitions require altruistic sacrifices.

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Issue 2: Horrible acts are considered permissible under Epicurean thought

Issue 1. I think I remember Philodemus saying that sometimes in order to keep or help a friend or loved one we suffer through many things (sacrifices, in your parlance) because the PAIN of not having the friend with us is much greater than the pain we go through assisting them.

So the key here is that it needs to pass hedonic calculus, and it does but only for people whom we truly love or who are truly worthy of our pain. Bob Marley once said there will always be people who will make you cry, and you have to choose to love the ones who are worth crying for. So two things:

1. You, if you are wise, will make the sacrifices for people who are worthy of your love.

2. You will also set BOUNDARIES with those of lesser worth. And this is JUST as important for your ataraxia. See what Michel Onfray says about eumetry.

Issue 2 - the problem is that this is not only the case for Epicureans. Think of the predator priests in the Catholic Church, THEY'RE not using hedonic calculus or Epicurean ethics but they end up engaging in these acts because they think they can get away with it. Philodemus, I believe, said in one of his scrolls that it is indeed an uneasy question whether people do awful things if they can get away with it. This is a clear and accurate description of the problem we have in front of us. Gods or karma won't fix this problem because they do not exist.

"Justice" is that which produces mutual advantage, and an evil act that is not discovered is still unjust per Epicurean definitions. So if what we are saying is that injustices happen when no one is looking, then yes. That is accurate.

Elon Musk is a great example of how the hedonic calculus might work. It seems to me to be a process, a continuous feedback loop. As a person is considering embarking on a project, they consider the eventual fulfilment/happiness that they may obtain through working on and completing the project. For any project there is a relationship between ambition (or perhaps altruism) and happiness: something along the lines of "wouldn't it be awesome if I could put man on Mars?!" Or for another person "I'd really be happy if I could get out of bed and walk on the beach!" At this point there is a particular amount of data with which to perform a hedonic calculus, depending on the person's situation.

Once the project is started, the continual (as opposed to continuous?) feedback loop begins. How much hard work will bring the person happiness? Maybe more or less than they thought, so they make an adjustment. Maybe the plan is to sacrifice short term happiness for long term happiness. As more data accumulates, more decisions can be made. And so on.

If we were blessed with infallible reason we wouldn't need this process. But we use our reason to evaluate the data we acquire through the Canon. Then we act on that and discover where our reasoning, or the data, was incorrect. Then we adjust and carry on.

The beauty of this, to me, is that this is simply how life works. With EP, we're conscious of that and work with it. We're not trying to force our lives, and those of others, into a mental construct.

Framing a question is important because the frame limits the conclusions that one can reach. I read the original post and I realized that the way the question is framed does not fit with how I think about happiness. So I’d like to offer my frame as an alternative.

“But what if in striving solely for happiness as the ultimate goal, we end up not truly achieving it?” This frames happiness as the peak of some mountain that we are climbing and if the ultimate goal is to reach the top, then any means by which we can get there is fair game. A helicopter would be more efficient than climbing.

When we view happiness as the peak of a mountain we set ourselves up for failure. There is no such summit that can be reached that would mean lasting happiness simply because we got to the top, imho.

If instead, climbing is the goal, because we enjoy the climb, then our lives are complete even as we are climbing. In this frame, it doesn’t matter whether one reaches the top or not, the pleasure of the journey is what we are after. Our friends etc. are not means to an end, but part of what makes the climb enjoyable. The Epicurean would argue that not only do friends make the climb enjoyable, but that they are necessary for us to be able to enjoy the climb at all.

I think the second way of thinking about it also prevents us from thinking that happiness is something that we can achieve and then not move away from once it has been achieved – just sitting on top of that mountain for the rest of our lives. It removes the idea that just a little more money, or the next big achievement at work or something is going to be enough to get us to that peak and bring us lasting happiness. It won’t.

The way I approach happiness is not to find a goal or something that I think will make me happy if I achieve it/acquire it, but rather to ask myself what makes the everyday enjoyable.

My analogy is not perfect, and I’m sure you can poke holes in it, but it is sufficient for my happiness. I also do not have any reason to think this is an Epicurean stance, it is just my opinion.

In the example of Elon Musk, I would argue that anyone who works so hard for the sake of the end goal is not a happy person. Achieving the end goal rarely, if ever, provides lasting happiness. BUT, if Elon Musk does what he does because he loves the challenge of figuring out how to make these things happen and enjoys the process, then he is focused on the climbing and not the end goal and is likely a very happy person.

Outstanding point JAWS. "When we view happiness as the peak of a mountain we set ourselves up for failure. There is no such summit that can be reached that would mean lasting happiness simply because we got to the top, imho." That calls to mind a LOT of the problem that happens when we try to fit Epicurean into theistic paradigms. How COULD there be a summit, or a point of final rest, in a universe which has no center and is constantly in motion. The very thought of such a point is inconceivable, so when Epicurus discusses "happiness" as "the goal" (Torquatus did, but did Epicurus ever really use that construct?) we have to understand happiness as only snapshot along the path, and not in any sense a final ending point or summit.

I will have to come back later to respond to the main material but no worries as to the "intent" - deep discussion like this is how we make progress in reconstructing.