Confusion: "The feelings are only two"

Great questions. I'll compose a lengthier response and get back to you. To some extent this issue came up in our Zoom last Wednesday night and i am not sure we have addressed it adequately in writing here on the forum. Bryan and I touched on it in reference to a statement made about Epicurus' use of "definition," but we did not get a chance to elaborate. This will give Bryan and I and others a change to write more on this.

There's no doubt in my mind but that Epicurus did in fact divide all feelings into two -- Diogenes Laertius states that explicitly and so does Torquatus in Cicero's On Ends.

However this is also the point to which Cicero vigorously rejects, and which many people - even some here - find counter-intuitive and mysterious. So we need to be able to state the justification explicitly -- and I can tell you now that you shouldn't expect everyone here to give or accept the same answer.

I think I'll tag Don and Josh too because this is question that's going to turn into a FAQ over time - if it isn't already.

Cicero makes that objection in book two of On Ends: this is from the Reid translation;

Quote

But Epicurus, I imagine, neither lacks the desire to express himself lucidly and plainly, if he can, nor deals with dark subjects, as do the physical writers, nor with technical matters, like the mathematicians, but speaks on a doctrine which is perspicuous and easy and which has already spread itself abroad. Still you do not declare that we fail to understand what pleasure is, but what he says of it, whence it results not that we fail to under- stand the force of the word in question, but that he speaks after a fashion of his own and gives no heed to ours. If indeed his statement is identical with that of Hieronymus, who pronounces that supreme good consists in a life apart from all annoyance, why does he prefer to talk of pleasure rather than of freedom from pain, as Hieronymus does, who well understands what he is describing? And if he thinks he must add to this the pleasure which depends on agitation (for he thus speaks of this sweet kind of pleasure, as consisting in agitation, and of the other, felt by a man free from pain, as consisting in steadiness) why does he fight? He cannot bring it about that any man who knows him- self, I mean who has thoroughly examined his own constitution and his own senses, should think that freedom from pain is one and the same thing with pleasure. It is as good as doing violence to the senses, Torquatus, to uproot from our minds those notions of words which are ingrained in us. Why, who can fail to see that there are, in the nature of things, these three states, one when we are in pleasure, another when we are in pain, the third, the state in which I am now, and I suppose you too, when we are neither in pain nor in pleasure; thus he who is feasting is in pleasure, while he who is on the rack is in pain. But do you not see that between these extremes lies a great crowd of men who feel neither delight nor sorrow?’ ‘Not at all” said he; ‘and I affirm that all who are without pain are in pleasure and that the fullest possible.’ ‘Therefore he who, not thirsty himself, mixes mead for another, and he who, being thirsty, drinks the mead, are in just the same state of pleasure?’

And in the first book, the Epicurean Torquatus touches on the problem of "Chrysippus' Hand", which deals with the same question;

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Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension. But actually at Athens, as my father used to tell me, when he wittily and humorously ridiculed the Stoics, there is in the Ceramicus a statue of Chrysippus, sitting with his hand extended, which hand indicates that he was fond of the following little argument: Does your hand, being in its present condition, feel the lack af anything at all? Certainly of nothing. But if pleasure were the supreme good, it would feel a lack. I agree. Pleasure then is not the supreme good. - My father used to say that even a statue would not talk in that way, if it had power of speech. The inference is shrewd enough as against the Cyrenaics, but does not touch Epicurus. For if the only pleasure were that which, as it were, tickles the senses, if I may say so, and attended by sweetness overflows them and insinuates itself into them, neither the hand nor any other member would be able to rest satisfied with the absence of pain apart from a joyous activity of pleasure. But if it is the highest pleasure, as Epicurus believes, to be in no pain, then the first admission, that the hand in its then existing condition felt no lack, was properly made to you, Chrysippus, but the second improperly, I mean that it would have felt a lack had pleasure been the supreme good. It would certainly feel no lack, and on this ground, that anything which is cut off from the state of pain is in the state of pleasure.

XII. Again, the truth that pleasure is the supreme good can be most easily apprehended from the following consideration. Let us imagine an individual in the enjoyment of pleasures great, numerous and constant, both mental and bodily, with no pain to thwart or threaten them; I ask what circumstances can we describe as more excellent than these or more desirable? A man whose circumstances are such must needs possess, as well as other things, a robust mind subject to no fear of death or pain, because death is apart from sensation, and pain when lasting is usually slight, when oppressive is of short duration, so that its temporariness reconciles us to its intensity, and its slightness to its continuance. When in addition we suppose that such a man is in no awe of the influence of the gods, and does not allow his past pleasures to slip away, but takes delight in constantly recalling them, what circumstance is it possible to add to these, to make his condition better? Imagine on the other hand a man worn by the greatest mental and bodily pains which can befall a human being, with no hope before him that his lot will ever be lighter, and moreover destitute of pleasure either actual or probable; what more pitiable object can be mentioned or imagined? But if a life replete with pains is above all things to be shunned, then assuredly the supreme evil is life accompanied by pain; and from this view it is a consistent inference that the climax of things good is life accompanied by pleasure.

We discussed the passage from book two in episode 201 of Lucretius Today, which I remember being one of our better efforts...

Thanks Joshua. Here is my current list of the quotes that are central to this:

Diogenes Laertius X-34 : ”The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined.“

1. On Ends Book One, 30 : ”Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?
2. On Ends Book One, 38 : Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“
3. On Ends Book One, 39 : For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.
4. On Ends Book One, 56 : By this time so much at least is plain, that the intensest pleasure or the intensest annoyance felt in the mind exerts more influence on the happiness or wretchedness of life than either feeling, when present for an equal space of time in the body. We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain. [57] But as we are elated by the blessings to which we look forward, so we delight in those which we call to memory. Fools however are tormented by the recollection of misfortunes; wise men rejoice in keeping fresh the thankful recollection of their past blessings. Now it is in the power of our wills to bury our adversity in almost unbroken forgetfulness, and to agreeably and sweetly remind ourselves of our prosperity. But when we look with penetration and concentration of thought upon things that are past, then, if those things are bad, grief usually ensues, if good, joy.
5. On Ends Book One, 62 : But these doctrines may be stated in a certain manner so as not merely to disarm our criticism, but actually to secure our sanction. For this is the way in which Epicurus represents the wise man as continually happy; he keeps his passions within bounds; about death he is indifferent; he holds true views concerning the eternal gods apart from all dread; he has no hesitation in crossing the boundary of life, if that be the better course. Furnished with these advantages he is continually in a state of pleasure, and there is in truth no moment at which he does not experience more pleasures than pains. For he remembers the past with thankfulness, and the present is so much his own that he is aware of its importance and its agreeableness, nor is he in dependence on the future, but awaits it while enjoying the present; he is also very far removed from those defects of character which I quoted a little time ago, and when he compares the fool’s life with his own, he feels great pleasure. And pains, if any befall him, have never power enough to prevent the wise man from finding more reasons for joy than for vexation.
6. On Ends Book Two, 9 : Cicero: “…[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same thing as 'pleasure.'” Torquatus: “Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be.”
7. On Ends, Book Two, 11: Cicero: Still, I replied, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?” Torquatus: “Clearly the same, he says, and indeed the greatest, beyond which none greater can possibly be.” (Plane idem, inquit, et maxima quidem, qua fieri nulla maior potest. Cic. Fin. 2.11)
8. On Ends Book Two, 16 : “This, O Torquatus, is doing violence to one's senses; it is wresting out of our minds the understanding of words with which we are imbued; for who can avoid seeing that these three states exist in the nature of things: first, the state of being in pleasure; secondly, that of being in pain; thirdly, that of being in such a condition as we are at this moment, and you too, I imagine, that is to say, neither in pleasure nor in pain; in such pleasure, I mean, as a man who is at a banquet, or in such pain as a man who is being tortured. What! do you not see a vast multitude of men who are neither rejoicing nor suffering, but in an intermediate state between these two conditions? No, indeed, said he; I say that all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too. Do you, then, say that the man who, not being thirsty himself, mingles some wine for another, and the thirsty man who drinks it when mixed, are both enjoying the same pleasure?”

So we can cite quotation after quotation that establishes that Epicurus did in fact divide the feelings into two, and that he stated that if we are feeling anything then we are feeling one or the other and there is no neutral state.

However, What was his justification for doing so? Is the question that needs elaboration.

As far as the "feelings are two," I fall back on the modern psychological research on valence and activation. You'll see some of this on this forum if you search for circumplex or Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett, https://lisafeldmanbarrett.com/

There's also some research here:

Russell’s (1980) Circumplex Models – Psychology of Human Emotion: An Open Access Textbook

My basic understanding, both Epicurean and modern, is that if you are alive, you are feeling something. There is no neutral state. It may be intense (high activation) or mild (low activation); and there will be an unpleasantness/pleasantness dimension (valence). But you never feel neutral if you're being honest with yourself.

Here is my first effort to synthesize what Bryan and I were discussing last week.

The division of the feelings into two, and not more than two, is based on both feeling and philosophical reasoning:

1. We find through our own pre-rational feeling that all experiences in life naturally fall into positive (pleasure) and negative (pain) categories, and
2. We can and should through reason and logic affirmatively identify the healthy normal functioning of the mind and body (even when they are not being "stimulated") as pleasure.

If we did not hold point (1) to be true, then point (2) would not be justified. Insisting on the truth of point (1) separates Epicurean philosophy, which is based on the evidence of natural sensation (feeling), from Platonism, Stoicism, religion, etc which says reason and logic or divine inspiration alone, without the evidence of sensation, is sufficient.

If we did not hold Item (2) to be true, then we would not recognize as pleasure those experiences in life when we are not being stimulated. We would be like Cicero and Plato and believe that pleasure is not always available, pleasure cannot always serve as the guide of life, and that it is impossible for us to identify a life of happiness as a life of pleasure because pleasure supposedly requires constant stimulation, which is impossible to achieve.

It seems to me that an approach somewhat similar to this is probably where Epicurus was coming from in dividing the feelings into two. Some people will say my point one above is self-evident and all that is needed. I don't think that's the case - I think that the philosophical understanding is also necessary to understand why the division makes sense, and in support of that I would cite the quote from Lucretius:

1:146:

Hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest non radii solis neque lucida tela diei discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque.

Bailey:
This terror then, this darkness of the mind, must needs be scattered not by the rays of the sun and the gleaming shafts of day, but by the outer view and the inner law of nature; whose first rule shall take its start for us from this, that nothing is ever begotten of nothing by divine will.

Quote from Don

As far as the "feelings are two," I fall back on the modern psychological research on valence and activation. You'll see some of this on this forum if you search for circumplex or Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett, https://lisafeldmanbarrett.com/

And while I am glad to have any argument in support of Epicurus, modern research manifestly cannot have been on Epicurus' mind when he formulated his philosophy.

Quote from Rolf

Why is this? If the absence of pain is pleasurable, then shouldn't the absence of pleasure be painful, by necessity? When pleasure simply fades away, what are we left with if not pain?

Given Epicurus' framework, I think it is clear that Epicurus would say that 'absence of pleasure' equals pain.

Quote from Rolf

How would this look in practice?

In practice, when you view life as Epicurus suggests, you can find pleasure in all sorts of places and all sorts of things, so you're not going to normally find a "total absence of pleasure" situation. if you're absolutely unable to find pleasure, even using Epicurus' perspective, for some extreme reason, then you're probably approaching a "time to exit the stage" analysis because boy has the play really ceased to please you! But as Epicurus says that's an extreme and unusual situation, unless you want to count the state that all of us will eventually get to -- when we are at a limit of frailty of mind and body from old age. But most of the time long before that we meet our end from some other cause.

I'd say you could also simply recognize that any painful experience can justifiably be called an 'absence of pleasure' experience.

Quote from Rolf

If the removal of pain is always pleasurable, why is the removal of pleasure not always painful? In practical, not theoretical, terms.

Rolf your questions are the reason that I think that both of the two factors I listed are essential -- I do not think that you can reach Epicurus' conclusion without theoretical analysis on top of the actual evidence. If you do not consciously identify "absence of pain" as pleasure in your mind, then your body will not conclude that this labeling is appropriate.

To me, these doctrines point to the reasoning as a decisive, necessary element:

PD18. The pleasure in the flesh is not increased when once the pain due to want is removed, but is only varied: and the limit as regards pleasure in the mind is begotten by the reasoned understanding of these very pleasures, and of the emotions akin to them, which used to cause the greatest fear to the mind.

PD19. Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures, by reason, the limits of pleasure.

PD20. The flesh perceives the limits of pleasure as unlimited, and unlimited time is required to supply it. But the mind, having attained a reasoned understanding of the ultimate good of the flesh and its limits, and having dissipated the fears concerning the time to come, supplies us with the complete life, and we have no further need of infinite time; but neither does the mind shun pleasure, nor, when circumstances begin to bring about the departure from life, does it approach its end as though it fell short, in any way, of the best life.

PD21. He who has learned the limits of life knows that that which removes the pain due to want, and makes the whole of life complete, is easy to obtain, so that there is no need of actions which involve competition.

There is a lot of good stuff here is this thread - I'll need to re-read. (I've struggled with these ideas myself.)

It almost seems that "satisfaction" is the goal...

---> satisfaction which arises with the removal of pain

---> satisfaction which arises from easy pleasures that are not harmful or cause bad consequences

---> satisfaction with the types of pleasures that are available (through-out a given day it is mostly mental pleasures, with a few moments of pleasurable bodily sensations).

How's this for a caveat:

As of the afternoon of May 26, 2025, unless and until someone like Don or Bryan or Joshua or otherwise convinces me I am wrong, that's the way it seems to me that the statements of Epicurus as recorded by Torquatus, Diogenes Laertius, the Principal Doctrines, Lucretius, Diogenes of Oinoanda, and Epicurus' own letters best fit together. It takes the study of nature and a scheme of systematic understanding to reach these conclusions and have confidence that they are correct. Neither feeling nor reason alone can do it - you have to combine the two into a rational system where the one supports the other.

To return to Don's point, it is interesting that current researchers tend to reach the same conclusion, but given that they didn't have access to this information I can't see that the ancient Epicureans approached things that way. My first goal is understanding their position before I evaluate whether I think they were on solid ground. So I want to try to put myself in their shoes.

And as for their shoes, it seems to me that they were in the heat of battle with the Platonists and others to develop a philosophy of life that made sense and allowed them to confidently beat back the anti-Pleasure / pro-mysticism assertions of the other schools. Such a philosophy has to be both in touch with practical reality AND logically consistent and persuasive.

Fitting the feeling of pleasure together with sound reasoning in philosophy in this way leads to a logically coherent worldview that accomplishes that goal. it's not magic and it doesn't transform the world into a constant parade of champaign and caviar. But it does allow you to view the universe in a way in which you can live happily and refute the challenges of those who say that you have to rely on supernaturalism.

And thus DeWitt's statement - reason justifies the application of the concepts of pleasure and pain in this way, and humans are happier if they adopt this perspective:

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“The extension of the name of pleasure to this normal state of being was the major innovation of the new hedonism. It was in the negative form, freedom from pain of body and distress of mind, that it drew the most persistent and vigorous condemnation from adversaries. The contention was that the application of the name of pleasure to this state was unjustified on the ground that two different things were thereby being denominated by one name. Cicero made a great to-do over this argument, but it is really superficial and captious. The fact that the name of pleasure was not customarily applied to the normal or static state did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing.

Quote from “Epicurus And His Philosophy” page 240 - Norman DeWitt (emphasis added)

Quote from Rolf

Why is this? If the absence of pain is pleasurable, then shouldn't the absence of pleasure be painful, by necessity? When pleasure simply fades away, what are we left with if not pain?

Quote from Cassius

We can and should through reason and logic affirmatively identify the healthy normal functioning of the mind and body (even when they are not being "stimulated") as pleasure.

Rolf , I too had a hard time understanding that Epicurus did not allow for a neutral third state; only pleasure or pain. What I have come to learn from all these Epicurean writings is that if there is no pain (body aches or mental anxiety), there is always pleasure present. You just have to tune your mind in to the small pleasures that your body is experiencing when it is just operating normally. This is also what has been described as your body operating in homeostasis, or in eustatheia (psychosomatic balance).

When sitting, standing, or walking in a neutral state, your mind can find many pleasures, just by tuning into your body's senses. The practice of "being present" is a good way to acknowledge natural pleasures; feel a soft breeze, hear a bird signing, see a beautiful photo.