Why pursue unnecessary desires?

I'm going to push back hard on this line. Yes, it's the same word but with different connotations.

The Void is empty. Yes, it allows for movement by atoms, but the important thing is that it's empty. It's the emptiness that allows the unimpeded movement.

Empty beliefs, metaphorically, are devoid of any substance. There's nothing that supports them. They arise not from philosophical understanding but from misunderstanding or disregard of the goal of life.

I'll let Epicurus take it from here...

U116. I summon you to unceasing joy and not to empty and trifling virtues, which destroy your confidence in the fruits of what you have. ἐγὼ δʼ ἐφʼ ἡδονὰς συνεχεῖς παρακαλῶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπʼ ἀρετὰς κενὰς καὶ ματαίας καὶ ταραχώδεις ἐχούσας τῶν καρπῶν ἐλπίδας.

U202. He who follows nature and not groundless opinions is completely self-reliant. With regard to what is enough by nature, everything he owns is a source of wealth; whereas with regard to unlimited desires, even the greatest wealth is poverty. ὁ οὖν τῇ φύσει παρακολουθῶν καὶ μὴ ταῖς κεναῖς δόξαις ἐν πᾶσιν αὐτάρκης· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ τῇ φύσει ἀρκοῦν πᾶσα κτῆσίς ἐστι πλοῦτος, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἀορίστους ὀρέξεις καὶ ὁ μέγιστος πλοῦτός ἐστι πενία.

U221. A philosopher's words are empty if they do not heal the suffering of mankind. For just as medicine is useless if it does not remove sickness from the body, so philosophy is useless if it does not remove suffering from the soul. κενὸς ἐκείνου φιλοσόφου λόγος, ὑφʼ οὗ μηδὲν πάθος ἀνθρώπου θεραπεύεται· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἰατρικῆς οὐδὲν ὄφελος μὴ τὰς νόσους τῶν σωμάτων ἐκβαλλούσης, οὕτως οὐδὲ φιλοσοφίας, εἰ μὴ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκβάλλει πάθος.

U422. We need pleasure when in pain because of its absence; but when we are not experiencing such pain, and are perceiving stably, then there is no need for pleasure. For it is not the needs of nature which, from outside us, create harm, but desire driven by groundless opinions. τότε χρείαν ἔχομεν τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ παρεῖναι αὐτὴν ἀλγῶμεν· ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο μὴ πάσχωμεν ἐν αἰσθήσει καθεστῶτες, τότε οὐδεμία χρεία τῆς ἡδονῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἡ τῆς φύσεως ἔνδεια τὴν ἀδικίαν ποιεῖ ἔξωθεν, ἀλλʼ ἡ περὶ τὰς κενὰς δόξας ὄρεξις.

U423. What brings unsurpassed joy is the removal of a great evil; and this is the nature of the good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about chattering emptily. τὸ γὰρ ποιοῦν ἀνυπέρβλητον γῆθος τὸ πάραυτα πεφυγμένον μέγα κακόν· καὶ αὕτη φύσις ἀγαθοῦ, ἄν τις ὀρθῶς ἐπιβάλῃ. ἔπειτα σταθῇ, καὶ μὴ κενῶς περιπατῇ περὶ θρυλῶν.

U471. It is rare to find a man who is poor with regard to the aims of nature and rich in groundless desires. For a fool is never satisfied with what he has, but instead is distressed about what he doesn't have. Just as those who are feverish through the evil of their sickness are always thirsty and desiring the opposite of what they should, so those whose souls are in a bad condition are always poor in everything and through their greed fall into ever-changing desires. σπάνιόν γε εὑρεῖν ἄνθρωπον <πένητα> πρὸς τὸ τῆς φύσεως τέλος καὶ πλούσιον πρὸς τὰς κενὰς δόξας. οὐδεὶς γὰρ τῶν ἀφρόνων οἷς ἔχει ἀρκεῖται, μᾶλλον δὲ οἷς οὐκ ἔχει ὀδυνᾶται. ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ πυρέττοντες διὰ κακοήθειαν τῆς νόσου ἀεὶ διψῶσι καὶ τῶν ἐναντιωτάτων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, οὕτω καὶ οἱ τὴν ψυχὴν κακῶς ἔχοντες διακειμένην πένονται πάντων ἀεὶ καὶ εἰς πολυτρόπους ἐπιθυμίας ὑπὸ λαιμαργίας ἐμπίπτουσιν.

U485. Unhappiness is caused by fears, or by endless and empty desires; but he who is able to rein these in creates for himself a blissful understanding. ἢ γὰρ διὰ φόβον τις κακοδαιμονεῖ ἢ διʼ ἀόριστον καὶ κενὴν ἐπιθυμίαν· ἅ τις χαλινῶν δύναται τὸν μακάριον ἑαυτῷ περιποιῆσαι λογισμόν.

U486. Pain does not consist in being deprived of things, but rather in bearing the avoidable distress caused by groundless opinion. οὐκ ἀπορεῖν τούτων πόνος ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ φέρειν μᾶλλον τὸν ἀνόνητον ἐκ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν πόνον.

SIDEBAR: In looking at the Vatican Sayings above, I made the following delightful discovery.

Quote

U471. ...through their greed fall into ever-changing desires. ...καὶ εἰς πολυτρόπους ἐπιθυμίας ὑπὸ λαιμαργίας ἐμπίπτουσιν.

The word translated here as "ever-changing" is πολυτρόπους (polytropous).

My delightful discovery part is that πολυτρόπος is the first word used to describe Odysseus in the first line in Homer's Odyssey: ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, μοῦσα, πολύτροπον, ὃς μάλα πολλὰ "Sing to me, O Muse, of the man of twists and turns,..."

πολυτρόπος has a myriad of interpretations, which is appropriate. It is literally formed of πολυ (poly) "many" + τρόπος (trópos) "a turn, direction, course, way; a way, manner, fashion; of persons, a way of life, habit, custom"

So, in VS471 the πολυτρόπους ἐπιθυμίας " 'polytropic' desires " conveys the meaning of desires that are ever-turning, always changing direction, taking many courses or directions. To me, it conveys a sense of never being satisfied, always changing ones mind as to what they want, and so on.

I can hear the objections like "We shouldn't just be satisfied. What happens to ambition?" and so on. I simply point to VS35. Don't ruin the things you have by wanting what you don't have, but realize that they too are things you once did wish for.

Very interesting, Don! Lucretius refers to Homer himself as "ever-flourishing", semper florentis.

For the threefold division, it seems that "empty" has a negative connotation in Epistemology and Ethics, but is neutral in Physics.

Quote from Don

VS423.

I think you want U423, and so for the rest.

Is that from a version that has the Greek and English already paired?

Quote from Bryan

I think you want U423, and so for the rest.

Exactly! Thanks, Bryan ! I was switching back and forth between VS and Fragments. (Corrected above now)

Selected Fragments, by Epicurus

This one has the Greek and English side by side.

And

Epicurus: Fragments - translation (3)

423. What brings unsurpassed joy is the removal of a great evil; and this is the nature of the good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about chattering emptily. [note] τὸ γὰρ ποιοῦν ἀνυπέρβλητον γῆθος τὸ πάραυτα πεφυγμένον μέγα κακόν· καὶ αὕτη φύσις ἀγαθοῦ, ἄν τις ὀρθῶς ἐπιβάλῃ. ἔπειτα σταθῇ, καὶ μὴ κενῶς περιπατῇ περὶ θρυλῶν.

***

[ U423 ]

Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 7, p. 1091A: Not only is the basis that they assume for the pleasurable life untrustworthy and insecure, it is quite trivial and paltry as well, inasmuch as their "thing delighted" – their good – is an escape from ills, and they say that they can conceive of no other, and indeed that our nature has no place at all in which to put its good except the place left when its evil is expelled. … Epicurus too makes a similar statement to the effect that the good is a thing that arises out of your very escape from evil and from your memory and reflection and gratitude that this has happened to you. His words are these: "That which produces a jubilation unsurpassed is the nature of good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about {a jibe at the Peripatetics}, prating meaninglessly about the good."

Ibid., 8, p. 1091E: Thus Epicurus, and Metrodorus too, suppose {that the middle is the summit and the end} when they take the position that escape from ill is the reality and upper limit of the good.

Quote from Rolf

The classifications are like priorities.

Quote from Rolf

We should probably rarely, if ever, sacrifice natural necessary desires for unnatural necessary ones, when keeping long term pleasure in mind.

I started to just click "like" and move on, but on second thought I am not sure this - even with the rarely caveat - does not just restate the problem. *Are* these classifications priorities, or are they just predictions of the relative cost in pain?

I wanted to make an exception for "those things necessary to remain alive," but even that isn't absolute -- Don't we sometimes give our lives for a friend?

The "rarely, if ever" helps, but isn't that the question you are asking? What is the rule that allows you to know when those exceptions would apply, other than that this is a personal decision involving the way you personal estimate the final outcome in terms of net pleasure of all kinds over net pain of all kinds?

As a generalization I think we all can see that the classification makes sense. However you're asking the right question -- when do the exceptions apply, to to know that you have to know what *really* is the overriding analysis. I don't think we find the ultimate analysis here in this classification alone. The ultimate question is always going to be the external consideration of expected result that isn't stated in full just by stating the classes, or by stating that those desires which don't bring pain - if unfulfilled - are "empty."

Maybe another way of stating this is that the Epicureans never stated that the ultimate goal of life is "the pleasures achieved through natural and necessary desires." The goal is "pleasure," and the reason there can be no qualification is that everyone's situation is going to be different. Is it possible to generalize? Yes, definitely. But generalizing is not the same as a hard and fast rule, even of "priorities." I think Don and maybe others have given good examples of the exceptions (such as "holding your breath to dive to get out of the cave" or whatever.)

Quote from Cassius

those desires which don't bring pain - if unfulfilled - are "empty."

In part (or in full?), empty desires, from my perspective, are those that cannot - by definition - ever be satisfied. I want more money, I want more power, and so on. I'd be curious for others' examples. Power and money have their place. Philodemus talks about "natural wealth." But greed - without limits - can never be satisfied. That's an empty - think bottomless - desire.

Quote from Rolf

We should probably rarely, if ever, sacrifice natural necessary desires for unnatural necessary ones, when keeping long term pleasure in mind.

I don't think there are unnatural but necessary desires (per Epicurus' categories).

Yes Don it's time to reinforce that and confirm that we count to three rather than four. I seem to remember Cicero questioning this in On Ends, and perhapes Aulus Gellius defends Epicurus, on the same point:

1 - Natural and Necessary

2 - Natural but not Necessary

3 - Necessary but not Natural ???????

4 - Neither Natural Nor Necessary

Quote from Cassius

Yes Don it's time to reinforce that and confirm that we count to three rather than four. I seem to remember Cicero questioning this in On Ends, and perhapes Aulus Gellius defends Epicurus, on the same point:

1 - Natural and Necessary

2 - Natural but not Necessary

3 - Necessary but not Natural ???????

4 - Neither Natural Nor Necessary

If you have Cicero's citation handy, that would be handy.

That's one reason I like natural, necessary, and empty.

Epicurus' categories are not a strict permutation of the words un-natural and un/necessary.

Quote from Rolf

Quote from Don

don't think there are unnatural but necessary desires (per Epicurus' categories).

Ah sorry, I meant natural but unnecessary

Sorry as well for my assumption.

That said, Cassius and my comments about the number of categories is always a good topic.

This is Torquatus in Book 1, Section 13. I need to find Cicero's criticism:

Quote

And the consequence of this is, to make life thoroughly wretched; so that the wise man is the only one who, having cut away all vanity and error, and removed it from him, can live contented within the boundaries of nature, without melancholy and without fear. For what diversion can be either more useful or more adapted for human life than that which Epicurus employed? For he laid it down that there were three kinds of desires; the first, such as were natural and necessary; the second, such as were natural but not necessary; the third, such as were neither natural nor necessary. And these are all such, that those which are necessary are satisfied without much trouble or expense: even those which are natural and not necessary, do not require a great deal, because nature itself makes the riches, which are sufficient to content it, easy of acquisition and of limited quantity: but as for vain desires, it is impossible to find any limit to, or any moderation in them.

Cicero Book 2, Section 9:

Quote

IX. We must then discard pleasure, not only in order to follow what is right, but even to be able to talk becomingly. Can we then call that the chief good in life, which we see cannot possibly be so even in a banquet?

But how is it that this philosopher speaks of three kinds of appetites,—some natural and necessary, some natural but not necessary, and others neither natural nor necessary? In the first place, he has not made a neat division; for out of two kinds he has made three. Now this is not dividing, but breaking in pieces. If he had said that there are two kinds of appetites, natural and superfluous ones, and that the natural appetites might be also subdivided into two kinds, necessary and not necessary, he would have been all right. And those who have learnt what he despises do usually say so. For it is a vicious division to reckon a part as a genus. However, let us pass over this, for he despises elegance in arguing; he [pg 138] speaks confusedly. We must submit to this as long as his sentiments are right. I do not, however, approve, and it is as much as I can do to endure, a philosopher speaking of the necessity of setting bounds to the desires. Is it possible to set bounds to the desires? I say that they must be banished, eradicated by the roots. For what man is there in whom appetites30 dwell, who can deny that he may with propriety be called appetitive? If so, he will be avaricious, though to a limited extent; and an adulterer, but only in moderation; and he will be luxurious in the same manner. Now what sort of a philosophy is that which does not bring with it the destruction of depravity, but is content with a moderate degree of vice? Although in this division I am altogether on his side as to the facts, only I wish he would express himself better. Let him call these feelings the wishes of nature; and let him keep the name of desire for other objects, so as, when speaking of avarice, of intemperance, and of the greatest vices, to be able to indict it as it were on a capital charge. However, all this is said by him with a good deal of freedom, and is often repeated; and I do not blame him, for it is becoming in so great a philosopher, and one of such a great reputation, to defend his own degrees fearlessly.

The Aulus Gellius defense of Epicurus is at the link below, but it does not concern natural and necessary desires.

Gellius • Attic Nights — Book II