Thanks Don --- the second link worked fine but not the first -- looks like there's maybe an error in "entry=a)reth" in that link?
Try it now. Thanks!
Thanks Don --- the second link worked fine but not the first -- looks like there's maybe an error in "entry=a)reth" in that link?
Try it now. Thanks!
Don -- I guess we don't have the Greek to compare to this, but whatever the ambiguity of the word virtue is, it looks like the dispute crystallized, maybe after Epicurus himself was dead, into what Diogenes of Oinoanda is discussing at Fragment 32. I note that the word is used in the plural in this translation. I am thinking that this aspect (which is the means and which is the end) is what people most want us to discuss. Also, I've never been entirely sure whether these European quote marks << >> are supposed to indicate quotes within the text, or missing data which Martin Ferguson Smith has reconstructed. In this case I don't gather that its reconstructed, but rather intended to set off certain sections of text as being referenced rather than being the words of Diogenes himself, but I'm just not sure.
QuoteFr. 32
... [the latter] being as malicious as the former.
I shall discuss folly shortly, the virtues and pleasure now.
If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end.
Let us therefore now state that this is true, making it our starting-point.
Suppose, then, someone were to ask someone, though it is a naive question, «who is it whom these virtues benefit?», obviously the answer will be «man.» The virtues certainly do not make provision for these birds flying past, enabling them to fly well, or for each of the other animals: they do not desert the nature with which they live and by which they have been engendered; rather it is for the sake of this nature that the virtues do everything and exist.Each (virtue?) therefore ............... means of (?) ... just as if a mother for whatever reasons sees that the possessing nature has been summoned there, it then being necessary to allow the court to asked what each (virtue?) is doing and for whom .................................... [We must show] both which of the desires are natural and which are not; and in general all things that [are included] in the [former category are easily attained] .....
Works great -- thanks ----
Also, we crossposted so please note my comment about Oinoanda.
Another general comment --
in discussing "virtue" as a collective noun vs "the virtues" as particular virtues, I am afraid we are back in the territory of the relationship between "the one" and "the many" in terms of what is it that all virtues share that makes them virtuous.
There's way too much to cover in one episode but in terms of what virtue is, I suppose that's one way of getting at the question: what is it that all "the virtues" share that makes them "virtue"?
Just finishing lunch at work. For later reference...
In this case I don't gather that its reconstructed, but rather intended to set off certain sections of text as being referenced rather than being the words of Diogenes himself, but I'm just not sure.
That is correct, this is a well preserved section. There are a few letters missing here and there, but what is in quotes is present in the ancient Greek.
An interesting take on Cicero's criticism a regards virtue
Yes it is an interesting take, and well written, focused more on the military aspect of Rome than you usually see. He's more negative on the military aspect than I would be, but those issues are certainly debatable. Someone is going to feel a lot differently about Rome's military depending on whether they are Roman or Carthaginian.
I suspect that going too far in trying to take social positions ends up being more of a debate about Greco Roman politics than about philosophy. That's one reason I hesitate to weigh in on the dispute between Julius Caesar and Cassius Longinus. There seem to have been Epicureans on both sides of the civil war, and I am not sure which side I would take personally - probably that's another example of how contextual so many issues are. There seem to be Epicurean texts saying kingship can be ok and democracy not so ok.
It's all well and good to focus on local community welfare when you have a stable society, but when the Persians are on the march to Greece, or some Ghengis Khan or fundamentalist religion tries to conquer your society by force, then it's nice to have a viable military.
Good food for thought about the contextual nature of Virtue.
About 17 hours from now we will be recording our "Virtue" extravaganza episode. We'll be talking live so there's no telling what topics the final episode will cover, but I've further refined the "talking points" I'd like to see us cover at the link below. If anyone has any last minute quotations to submit or suggestions for topics, there's still time to let us know in this thread.
Virtue Is Not Absolute Or An End In Itself Because All Good And Evil Consists In Sensation
fwiw - Here is my (on-going!) look at Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics in light of Epicureanism:
For example, (an excerpt):
QuoteAt 1097b, Aristotle states “What is always chosen as an end in itself and never as a means to something else is called final in an unqualified sense. This description seems to apply to happiness above all else: for we always choose happiness as an end in itself and never for the sake of something else. Honor, pleasure, intelligence, and all virtue we choose partly for themselves – for we would choose each of them even if no further advantage would accrue from them – but we also choose them partly for the sake of happiness, because we assume that it is through them that we will be happy. On the other hand, no one chooses happiness for the sake of honor, pleasure, and the like, nor as a means to anything else.”
First, the word translated happiness here is εὐδαιμονία eudaimonia which I prefer to translate as “well-being.” LSJ provides various translations within its short entry: prosperity, good fortune; true, full happiness. The interesting issue is that Epicurus also made liberal use of the word eudaimonia as well. But did he identify it with The Good or the ultimate, final end? A quick search of writings brings up:
Vatican Saying 33. The body cries out to not be hungry, not be thirsty, not be cold. Anyone who has these things, and who is confident of continuing to have them, can rival the gods for happiness. σαρκὸς φωνὴ τὸ μὴ πεινῆν, τὸ μὴ διψῆν, τὸ μὴ ῥιγοῦν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχων τις καὶ ἐλπίζων ἕξειν [hope or expect to have] κἂν <διὶ [dative of Zeus]> ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας μαχέσαιτο. [contend/compete]
Fragment 548. Happiness and bliss are produced not by great riches nor vast possessions nor exalted occupations nor positions of power, but rather by peace of mind, freedom from pain, and a disposition of the soul that sets its limits in accordance with nature. τὸ εὔδαιμον καὶ μακάριον [happiness and blessedness, latter same word as in PD1] οὐ χρημάτων πλῆθος οὐδὲ πραγμάτων ὄγκος οὐδʼ ἀρχαί τινες ἔχουσιν οὐδὲ δυνάμεις, ἀλλʼ ἀλυπία καὶ πραότης παθῶν καὶ διάθεσις ψυχῆς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ὁρίζουσα.
....[and so on with several other Epicurean citations, commentary, etc.]
And on a later page in my admittedly snarky commentary...
QuoteDisplay MoreAristotle then gets to the heart of his definition of virtue, quoting Ostwald:
"Virtue or excellence is a characteristic involving choice, and that it consists in observing the mean relative to us, a mean which is defined by a rational principle, such as a man of practical wisdom would use to determine it. It is the mean by reference to two vices: the one of excess and the other of deficiency... virtue is a mean, but in regard to goodness and excellence it is an extreme. " (1106b-1107a)
LOL! There is SO much that is problematic here from my perspective. Allow me to break down my issues with Aristotle's exhortations.
He defines "virtue" (excellence, αρητη arete) as a characteristic/disposition (ἕξεις hexeis) which remember is a "trained habit, skill, state or habit of mind" determining the choice of actions. We choose actions all the time! Epicurus puts great importance on our responsibility to choose our actions and that which we reject. The "choice" Aristotle uses here is προαίρεσις (proairesis), ‘choice’ or ‘purpose’, which he discusses in Book 3.2. It is obviously connected with the the word Epicurus uses, hairesis, but we'll leave more discussion until Book 3. So, the fact that "virtue" is connected with choices, yeah, okay, that seems mildly non-controversial. Go on...
But the mean/middle is "defined" (and we're using that word loosely, Aristotle) by a "rational principle" such as a person using practical wisdom would use to determine it! LOL! So, virtue is something that we choose by using practical wisdom - phronesis? So, far, I don't think we've defined practical wisdom either. Epicurus also places great importance on practical wisdom: It's one of the three things without which we can't experience a pleasurable life. It helps us make prudent decisions on which actions to choose and which to avoid. But Aristotle is going MUCH further in defining "virtue" in relation to this without even giving as much description as Epicurus!
And I love the last part! Virtue is a mean between extremes BUT "in regard to goodness and excellence it is an extreme"! Aristotle is attempting once again of trying to have it both ways. It sounds circular, self-refuting, and ridiculous. I am not impressed.
The next part makes me laugh as well! He goes to great length here of trying to define virtue as that elusive mean (that is actually an extreme of goodness remember) between two extremes, but then says...
"Not every action nor every emotion admits of a mean... Some actions and emotions "whose very names connote baseness, e.g., spite, shamelessness, envy; and among actions, adultery, theft, and murder."
Those are just actions to my understanding. He's trying to say you can't "virtuously" commit adultery, theft, and murder. Duh! Epicurus would say those things do harm to others and so aren't just. They disrupt society or harm relationships. However, is it just to steal bread to feed your starving children? Is it "murder" if you kill someone while defending yourself? Someone may still have to be punished for the good of society BUT maybe not? Context and social contracts are key to Epicurus's discussion of justice... I'm not as sure he's getting hung up on "virtue."
Aristotle goes on to list some of these extremes, means, and deficiencies (1107b), but - egads! - "many virtues and vices have no name" as in not all excesses or deficiencies actually have a name. So, he's going to make up things that have no name, are not referred to in regular speech, don't actually exist, but for the sake of his argument, we're supposed to pretend they exist. Methinks he's starting to use unicorns and centaurs.
That's consistent with my current understanding that the real problem here got launched by the Stoics, which is a point that Cicero seems to me in On Ends, where his treatment of Stoicism is pretty slashing.
Aristotle's problem doesn't seem to be so much an overfocus on virtue but his supernatural prime mover orientation and evasion of pleasure as the basis of happiness.
KD 17 Ὁ δίκαιος ἀταρακτότατος, ὁ δ’ ἄδικος πλείστης ταραχῆς γέμων.
One who is just, moral, and virtuous has peace of mind; but one who is unjust is overflowing with agitation, confusion, and uncertainty. (ταραχῆς, i.e., the opposite of αταραξία).
This Principal Doctrine just makes sense. If you are just in your dealings with other people, moral in your actions, and do your best to display fair behavior, you have no need to be troubled. You've done your best. Don't get me wrong. Bad things will happen to you, and some people still won't like you. But you don't control that. Your mind can be at peace. On the other hand, if you treat people poorly, display amoral behavior, and are basically an objectively poor excuse for a human being, you have reason to be troubled! People will be out to get you. If you're the latter, you need to have some frank speech with yourself and get on the right track. To paraphrase Wil Wheaton: Don't be a jerk! If you take his advice, you and all of us who interact with you will be the better for it.
Show Notes
Serafino de' Serafini, Allegory of St. Augustine as Master of the Order
St. Augustine as Master of the Order
Nature's God; The Heretical Origins of the American Republic
Nature's God: The Heretical Origins of the American Republic
Cicero, On Ends
QuoteIt is however my opinion that if I shew there is something moral, which is essentially desirable by reason of its inherent qualities and for its own sake, all the doctrines of your school are over- thrown. So when I have once briefly, as our time requires, determined the nature of this object, I will touch upon all your statements, Torquatus, unless perchance my recollection fails me. Well, by what is moral we understand something of such a nature that, even if absolutely deprived of utility, it may with justice be eulogized for its own qualities, apart from all rewards or advantages. Now the nature of this object cannot be so easily understood from the definition I have adopted (though to a considerable extent it can) as from the general verdict of all mankind, and the inclinations and actions of all the best men, who do very many things for the sole reason that they are seemly, right and moral, though they see that no profit will follow.
*************
‘How I wish, said he, ‘that you had felt a bent towards the Stoic school! It was surely to be expected of you, if of any one, that you would place in the category of good nothing but virtue.’ ‘Look well to it, said I; ‘perhaps it was rather to be expected of you, inasmuch as your views substantially agreed with mine, that you would not force upon the doctrines new titles. Our principles are at one, and only our language is at variance.’ ‘Our principles are very far from being at one,’ said he, ‘for whatever that thing may be over and above morality, which you declare to be desirable, and reckon among things good, you thereby quench morality itself, which we may liken to the light cast by virtue, and virtue too you utterly overthrow.’ ‘ Your words, Cato,’ said I, ‘are grandiose; but do you not see that you share your high- sounding phraseology with Pyrrho and Aristo, who are thorough- going levellers? I should like to know what you think of them.’ ‘Do you ask what I think of them?’ said he. ‘I think that all the good staunch upright soberminded statesmen of whom we have been told, or whom we have ourselves seen, who without any learning and merely following nature’s guidance, have performed many meritorious exploits, were better trained by nature than they could possibly have been trained by philosophy, if they had accepted any other doctrine than that which regards nothing save morality as belonging to the category of good, and as belonging to the category of evil nothing save baseness; as to the remaining philosophical systems which, no doubt in different degrees, but still all of them to some extent count as good or as evil some object unconnected with virtue, they, as I think, not only fail to aid us or strengthen us in the struggle to become better, but actually corrupt nature.
-Translated James Reid
My chart on Ethics
Diogenes of Oenoanda
QuoteIf, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end. Let us therefore now state that this is true, making it our starting-point.
Suppose, then, someone were to ask someone, though it is a naive question, «who is it whom these virtues benefit?», obviously the answer will be «man.» The virtues certainly do not make provision for these birds flying past, enabling them to fly well, or for each of the other animals: they do not desert the nature with which they live and by which they have been engendered; rather it is for the sake of this nature that the virtues do everything and exist.
Diogenes of Oinoanda Fragment 32 (Martin Ferguson Smith)
Episode 267 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today's episode is entitled: "Virtue Is Not Absolute Or An End In Itself - All Good And Evil Consists In Sensation"
You know in listening to this episode and particularly our discussion of PD05 as compared with Torquatus' statements about how his own family's exploits can be reconciled with pleasure as the goal:
I think sometimes it might be tempting to think that every moment of living prudently, honorably, and justly can somehow be a kind of pleasure in itself. Just as some people see "absence of pain" as a special kind of pleasure, it might be tempting to say that every moment of "living justly" is somehow pleasurable.
But I think Torquatus' examples make very clear is that while the *end result* is more pleasure or less pain, there are certainly times when you are acting virtuously that those experiences are in themselves painful.
Certainly the Torquatus ancestor who executed his own son for disobeying orders was not experiencing some kind of transcendent pleasure at the moment of watching his son's execution.
I make these comments because it seems very clear that pursuing pleasure as the goal of life is a "NET / ON BALANCE" affair -- we can't expect that every moment of physical and mental experience is to be pleasurable, but what we can expect is that "on balance" the pleasures of life (both stimulative and non-stimulative) will outweigh the pains.
So anyone who thinks that there it makes sense to calculate every mental and physical action - for example by living as minimally and ascetically as possible so that you never experience even the briefest moments of pain -- is not on the right track. To pursue such a path ignores how it is right and proper that we sometimes choose pain to live the most pleasant life possible to us.
The word "utilitarian" was used in the podcast regarding this particular Torquatus ancestor's action. (I think this was in a translated quotation.) To me, this word was well chosen, and is a good launching pad for further discussion. Such a discussion could include the utility of pleasure, as well as how EP and Utilitarianism aren't the same thing.
Excellent episode!