Episode 251 - Cicero's OTNOTG 26 - How Niagara Falls Helps Us Understand the Flux, the Heap, and the Epicurean Gods

Welcome to Episode 251 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we have a thread to discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

Today we are continuing to review Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," which began with the Epicurean spokesman Velleius defending the Epicurean point of view. This week will continue into Section 39 as Cotta, the Academic Skeptic, continues to attack the Epicurean view of the nature of divinity.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here at Archive.org. The text which we include in these posts is available here. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of arguments presented will eventually be put together here.

Today's Text

XXXIX. The whole affair, Velleius, is ridiculous. You do not impose images on our eyes only, but on our minds. Such is the privilege which you have assumed of talking nonsense with impunity. But there is, you say, a transition of images flowing on in great crowds in such a way that out of many some one at least must be perceived! I should be ashamed of my incapacity to understand this if you, who assert it, could comprehend it yourselves; for how do you prove that these images are continued in uninterrupted motion? Or, if uninterrupted, still how do you prove them to be eternal? There is a constant supply, you say, of innumerable atoms. But must they, for that reason, be all eternal? To elude this, you have recourse to equilibration (for so, with your leave, I will call your Ἰσονομία), and say that as there is a sort of nature mortal, so there must also be a sort which is immortal. By the same rule, as there are men mortal, there are men immortal; and as some arise from the earth, some must arise from the water also; and as there are causes which destroy, there must likewise be causes which preserve. Be it as you say; but let those causes preserve which have existence themselves. I cannot conceive these your Gods to have any. But how does all this face of things arise from atomic corpuscles? Were there any such atoms (as there are not), they might perhaps impel one another, and be jumbled together in their motion; but they could never be able to impart form, or figure, or color, or animation, so that you by no means demonstrate the immortality of your Deity.

XL. Let us now inquire into his happiness. It is certain that without virtue there can be no happiness; but virtue consists in action: now your Deity does nothing; therefore he is void of virtue, and consequently cannot be happy. What sort of life does he lead? He has a constant supply, you say, of good things, without any intermixture of bad. What are those good things? Sensual pleasures, no doubt; for you know no delight of the mind but what arises from the body, and returns to it. I do not suppose, Velleius, that you are like some of the Epicureans, who are ashamed of those expressions of Epicurus, in which he openly avows that he has no idea of any good separate from wanton and obscene pleasures, which, without a blush, he names distinctly. What food, therefore, what drink, what variety of music or flowers, what kind of pleasures of touch, what odors, will you offer to the Gods to fill them with pleasures? The poets indeed provide them with banquets of nectar and ambrosia, and a Hebe or a Ganymede to serve up the cup. But what is it, Epicurus, that you do for them? For I do not see from whence your Deity should have those things, nor how he could use them. Therefore the nature of man is better constituted for a happy life than the nature of the Gods, because men enjoy various kinds of pleasures; but you look on all those pleasures as superficial which delight the senses only by a titillation, as Epicurus calls it. Where is to be the end of this trifling? Even Philo, who followed the Academy, could not bear to hear the soft and luscious delights of the Epicureans despised; for with his admirable memory he perfectly remembered and used to repeat many sentences of Epicurus in the very words in which they were written. He likewise used to quote many, which were more gross, from Metrodorus, the sage colleague of Epicurus, who blamed his brother Timocrates because he would not allow that everything which had any reference to a happy life was to be measured by the belly; nor has he said this once only, but often. You grant what I say, I perceive; for you know it to be true. I can produce the books, if you should deny it; but I am not now reproving you for referring all things to the standard of pleasure: that is another question. What I am now showing is, that your Gods are destitute of pleasure; and therefore, according to your own manner of reasoning, they are not happy.

Quote from Cicero's Cotta speaking to Velleius

To elude this, you have recourse to equilibration (for so, with your leave, I will call your Ἰσονομία), and say that as there is a sort of nature mortal, so there must also be a sort which is immortal. By the same rule, as there are men mortal, there are men immortal; and as some arise from the earth, some must arise from the water also; and as there are causes which destroy, there must likewise be causes which preserve. Be it as you say;

This would appear to refer to isonomia, and there is little reason to doubt that Cotta/Cicero is applying it in a way that Velleius/Epicurus would not approve. I suspect the intentional distortion is that of failing to distinguish the possible from the impossible.

It seems likely to me that this is referring to an aspect of infinity. In an infinite universe things that are possible are going to recur an infinite number of times. The "infinite number of times" would account for the "equal" or "equitable" number. Given that presumption, you can deduce that things that *can* happen *will* happen an infinite numbers of times. Infinite = infinite so the number of occurrences is the same.

So I would presume that it's the "things that are possible" that Cotta/Cicero is evading. I'd say that's especially true when he says "by the same rule" and goes on to list scenarios that we see on earth do not occur at all. His references, in fact, (living beings springing from the air or sea) are similar to what Lucretius talks about do *not* happen due to the regular process of nature as governed by the atoms.

So I think we can dismiss earthlings being born in the earth and water as ruled out by uniform observation of earth-bound physics. But what might we infer about what Epicurus could have thought about equitable distribution of living things from mortal to deathless?

My first thought would be that humans (intelligent living things) have the ability to control their environments so as to extend their lives. The Greeks were certainly aware of medical treatments, and it was imaginable then, and readily predictable today, that medical technology will allow more and more transplants and replacements of body parts. It is easily conceivable that even brain transplants or rejuvenations, which are as yet impossible under current technology, will be attainable in the future.

As for survival past the destruction of Earth or any particular "world" due to the natural deterioration of all bodies over time that cannot fix themselves, there's no reason to think that Epicurus was dogmatic that it would be "impossible" for living beings to live in and travel through "outer space." For example, Lucian directly wrote about travel to the moon in "The True Story," and there's no reason to think that this obvious proposition was imaginable to many others. So as we are even about to do now in regard to travel to Mars, and then further on later outside the solar system, humanity will soon become "multi-planetary" to be followed by "interstellar" and then one day beyond our galaxy. Humanity will one day (if we stay on the current path) be able to survive any local supernovas or whatevers, and as a whole will achieve a sort of "species immortality" or "species deathless." One would expect that any technological civilization that can travel interstellar will also be able to master the deterioration of the human body.

I don't think any of that would have been beyond the ancient Epicureans to imagine, and therefore since they would deem such a thing to be "possible" within the laws of physics, they would have been able to imagine living beings which can continuously replace the atomic structure of their bodies, which is essentially what we have Velleius relaying and Cicero/Cotta ridiculing. That would allow for a "distribution" of life (at each stage, in infinite numbers) all the way from quickly-expiring primitive organisms to intelligent beings who are in fact essentially "deathless." The only requirement of deathlessness is totally natural - such a being has to be able to develop the technology to replace or rejuvenate their bodies so as to make death a matter of choice rather than necessity.

So something along these lines is what I would speculate the Epicureans were theorizing:

The impossible (such as anything supernatural) will not and can never occur. On the other hand, because the universe as a whole is infinite in space and eternal in time, all things that are possible will occur an equal (infinite) number of times. Intelligent living beings which develop the ability to control their experience have the possibility of extending their lives indefinitely. Species or individuals which do so are ultimately deathless, and there are the same number of them as there are being that are mortal.

Everything in this set of possibilities would be purely natural and involve nothing supernatural whatsoever.

As to paragraph 40, the first part is essentially the "action" vs "idleness" argument which with I think we are pretty well equipped to deal. It also argues that since Epicurus values bodily pleasure, and Cotta does not admit that the gods of Epicurus have real bodies, or even quasi-bodies, then the gods cannot experience the kind of pleasure that Epicurus praises. This latter argument is often met by the argument that what Epicurus really valued is "katastematic" pleasure rather than bodily pleasure, which I think is an argument that is totally off the mark.

First:

Epicurean pleasure is *not* "inaction," no matter how much some people (who essentially agree with Cicero and the Platonic argument that virtue and the mind are higher or more "noble" than the the ignoble pleasures of the body) might want to try to infer that based on the word "katastematic" or other arguments. Even mental thinking is a form of action, and the atoms of all living bodies are constantly moving. Only the living can experience pleasure of any kind, no matter how we slice up the numberless subtypes of "pleasure."

We've dealt with that a lot in the past so we should be able to present that clearly, but if anyone has ideas for illustrations or backup arguments please post.

Second:

Cotta refuses to admit that the contention that gods have quasi-bodies makes any sense, but that is the contention: the bodies of the gods are also made of atoms, but the atoms are continuously replenished indefinitely. Since the Epicurean gods do have bodies of a sort, there is no reason that the Epicurean gods cannot experience both "bodily" and "mental" types of pleasures, just as humans do.

I don't have any cites but I would expectthat the ancient Epicureans could well have been familiar with this example of bodily regeneration, which would be relevant to the possibility of continuous regeneration and therefore imperishability:

Starfish, or sea stars, are radially symmetrical, star-shaped organisms of the phylum Echinodermata and the class Asteroidea.^[1] Aside from their distinguishing shape, starfish are most recognized for their remarkable ability to regenerate, or regrow, arms and, in some cases, entire bodies. While most species require the central body to be intact in order to regenerate arms, a few tropical species can grow an entirely new starfish from just a portion of a severed limb.^[2] Starfish regeneration across species follows a common three-phase model and can take up to a year or longer to complete.^[2] Though regeneration is used to recover limbs eaten or removed by predators, starfish are also capable of autotomizing and regenerating limbs to evade predators and reproduce.^[2]

Quote

Due to their wide range of regenerative capabilities, starfish have become model organisms for studying how the regenerative process has evolved and diversified over time. While the overall morphological processes have been well documented in many starfish, little is known regarding the underlying molecular mechanisms that mediate their regeneration. Moreover, some researchers hope starfish may one day serve as inspiration for therapeutics aiming to expand the extent to which humans can repair and replace damaged cells or tissues.^[3]

Starfish regeneration - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Pliny discussing Starfish (but apparently not the regeneration quality):

CHAP. 86. (60.)—SEA-STARS.

In addition to what I have already stated, I find that authors, distinguished for their wisdom, express surprise at finding a star in the sea—for such, in fact, is the form of the animal, which has but very little flesh2845 within, and nothing but a hard skin without. It is said that in this fish there is such a fiery heat, that it scorches everything it meets with in the sea, and instantaneously digests its food. By what experiments2846 all this came to be known, I cannot so easily say; but I am about to make mention of one fact which is more remarkable still, and which we have the opportunity of testing by every day’s experience.

In case anyone is now thinking that Cassius thinks Epicurean god / aliens might look like Starfish, that's old hat from 1956!

Warning from Space - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Just to add this as a note for future thought and discussion, what we talk about in this podcast plays into our recent discussion of the sorites / heap question and how that is related both to the waterfall / bathing in the same river questions. And both of those play into the issue of seeing pleasure as both the composite ultimate good while also consisting of individual feelings of pleasure.

When Epicurus asked how he should recognize the good if not for the pleasures of sex, food, etc, that is essentially the same question as "how should he recognize a waterfall or a river if not for the drops of water that compose it?"

The point would not be that we should consider any individual drops of water to make up the whole waterfall, or any individual pleasures to make up the whole of good, but that the parts and the whole are both real and inseparably connected.

Our natural faculties allow us to assemble the notion of a "waterfall" or a "river" from the perceptions of the individual drops of which the waterfall or river is composed. Likewise, our natural faculties (perceptions and minds) allow us to assemble "the good" from the individual pleasures of which the notion of "the good" is composed. There is no conflict between saying that both individual drops and waterfalls exist and are real to us. Likewise it is proper to say that both individual pleasures and the overall concept of the good as pleasure exist and are real to us.

And just like a waterfall or a river or a heap exists through the movement of the particles that compose it, at least one type of living being could he held to exist indefinitely, analogous to a river or waterfall, if it could find a way to constantly replenish the movement of the particles that compose it.

But for the ethics question, which concerns more people today than the god question does, the point would be that the abstract good of pleasure can be said to exist only because it is a composite of all the constantly moving and changing particular pleasures that compose it. Were we to try to separate out all the individual physical and mental pleasures that compose it (such as sex, food, drink, calmness, delight, tranquility, etc) we would have nothing left by which to recognize the good. The concept of Pleasure as the good does not exist as a Platonic ideal, it exists and is recognized only by our perception of "Pleasure" as a composite many particular pleasures, in the same way that we perceive "heaps" or "waterfalls" or "rivers" as composites of many grains of sand or drops of water.

And applying that last observation about heaps and waterfalls to the statement in the letter to Menoeceus:

"When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality, as is supposed by some who are either ignorant or disagree with us or do not understand, but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind."

Given that we know that Epicurus DOES accept the pleasures of profligates and the pleasures of sensuality as pleasures, the better interpretation of what he is saying is incorporate Epicurus's position on the heap/river questions, to the effect that:

We should not identify the concept of pleasure as being limited ONLY to the particular pleasures of profligates or sensuality (such as sex, food, drink, etc) because that is not our definition of pleasure as the goal. The concept of Pleasure, which we take as our definition of the ultimate good, includes NOT ONLY those particular pleasures but ALSO all other pleasures, such as those of the mind, literature, art, calmness, etc. This "Pleasure as the good" does not exist as a Platonic ideal, it exists and is recognized only by our perception of many particular pleasures. The unifying characteristic of any set of particular pleasures is not that they reflect or partake of some ideal Platonic form or Aristotelian essence, but that we feel it to be pleasure, rather than feeling it to be pain.

It has always made sense to mentally insert an "ONLY" so as to read "When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean ONLY the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality..." given that we know that sensuality and even the things that profligates do are pleasurable. But placing this sentence in the context of the sorites/heap/waterfall/river question gives us a context in which to supply the missing "only." Waterfalls and rivers and heaps are not ONLY individual grains of sand or drops of water, they are a composite of the individual particles. Pleasure is not ONLY sensuality, but it is also all feelings of all experiences in life which are not painful, because that is a necessary deduction from there being only two feelings, pleasure or pain, into one of which category all feelings must be placed.

You can't recognize heaps or waterfalls or rivers without recognizing their components, and you can't recognize Pleasure as the good without recognizing all the individual pleasures of which the concept of Pleasure is composed.

Lucretius Today Episode 251 is now available: "How Niagara Falls Helps Us Understand the Flux, the Heap, and the Epicurean Gods"

Don I think our different perspective there parallels our different perspective on PD10. I don't think the passage can be reconciled with the rest of the philosophy without acknowledging that sensual pleasures are pleasure too. Therefore I think the danger is on the other side - that of reading this passage as a blanket condemnation of sensual pleasures - which I think is in fact is the way a lot of people are interpreting it so as to arrive at an ascetic interpretations of Epicurus.

Discussing this is very helpful cause I agree this is a critical issue.

Also: While I do think it is most clear to a modern reader to add in the "only," if we put the issue in a clearly philosophical context, such as the heap analogy, then the "only" isn't strictly necessary.

A heap "is not" any of the individual grains of sand that compose it. That can also be said as "A heap is not only the individual grains of sand that compose it, the heap is the combination of the grains of sand." I think that's the Epicurean position on the sorites question, and the reason for him saying that he would not know the good *without* the sensual pleasures. If someone understands that then the discussion we're having right now never comes up. But that's the problem, people are not thinking in terms of the sorites/heap issue. They are thinking generally from their preconceived Platonic/Humanist perspective that sensual issues are "bad," so they jump to conclude that that is what Epicurus is saying.

So I would say that it's not strictly necessary to say "Pleasure is not only the pleasures of sensuality and of the profligate...." because if you realize the the term "pleasure" is meant conceptually, then you automatically read into the sentence an understanding that the concept of pleasure is not identical with any individual pleasure -- you understand that as a matter of logic just like you understand that a heap is not the same as its parts. But very few ordinary people think that way, so they probably need the "only."

The real erroneous interpretation in my view is not that of adding in the "only," but in failing to see that the sentence structure makes clear that the blanket term "pleasure" is not identical with *any* particular pleasure. Once that is established then the meaning can be communicated in many ways. So I would say that the main error to be avoided would be any reading that separates "sensual pleasures" out of a list of "approved pleasures" as very many commentators today are doing. That interpretation sounds like "Pleasure does not include the pleasures of sensuality or the profligates," which I would maintain is clearly wrong.

Yes Epicurus was different from the Cyreniacs, but he was not different because he subtracted sensual pleasures from a list of approved pleasures, he was expanding the Cyreniac list of pleasures to include experiences that they did not consider to be pleasure.

Quote from Don

I don't think that's what Cassius is saying either, but I want to make it clear that - from what I read here in this text and elsewhere - Epicurus is not endorsing the "sex, drugs, and rock n roll" lifestyle of the ἄσωτος (Read the quote from my commentary on that word below). Did Epicurus engage in drinking, revelry, etc.? Sure, I got no problem with that. Did he go on binges of drinking to find himself hungover and nauseated? Definitely not, as far as I'm concerned.

Good point that the same question pops up here. I think (as you say) that both you and I *DO* endorse the pleasures of sex, rock'n'roll, and (sometimes) drugs So we could never accept an interpretation that these are blanketly forbidden. As you said, it's the overindulgence in these, or any other pleasure, even ice cream, that is the problem.

So the real problem is that the sentence as translated has a truncated structure that leaves it ambiguous in English as written, and it demands commentary, or else it will be exhibit number one - which it is what it has become - for those who make Epicurus out to be an ascetic.

Quote from Don

iistening to some fine music, and enjoying quality local brews.

Ah those sensual pleasures!