The Axiology of Pain and Pleasure (are they intrinsic good/bad ? )

Quote from Little Rocker

That leaves a person who contends that men should aim for fidelity two options--show that cheating is not actually adaptive (i.e. challenge the scientist's empirical claim) or decide that what is good for us/right for us is not governed by what is evolutionarily advantageous.

Quote from Godfrey

Might one also contest the evolutionary biology approach by pointing out that evolution occurs over such a large span of time as to be meaningless for practical human ethics?

It seems to me that Little Rocker and Godfrey are both onto something. While we are the products of evolution, we don't make choices and rejections based on evolutionary considerations in the here and now in this one life that we have. In this life, infidelity can (and likely will) lead to pain, both in an individual relationship and rippling through societal relationships. If someone is unfaithful to another in a relationship, that unfaithful person can be seen by others as being untrustworthy; hence leading to more pain for the unfaithful partner. There is a chance that there may also be actual physical pain involved should the other party in the relationship exact "revenge" on the unfaithful party. And if not revenge right away, there may be revenge later. It may be easy to commit infidelity undetected, but impossible to be sure that you have escaped detection... to paraphrase a Vatican Saying.

PS...

Quote from Little Rocker

‘Men are naturally prone to infidelity because it’s not evolutionarily advantageous for them to be monogamous....

This got me thinking of animals that do pair bond as part of their natural behaviors. And I realize one can't necessarily extrapolate among all these species nor does the concept of "infidelity" translate across species, but a purely "it's natural" (above and beyond the universal feelings of pleasure/pain) is not the slam -dunk argument some feel it is. There are societal and cultural considerations. Which is why, it seems to me, the last few seconds of Principle Doctrines talks about justice and living in a social setting.

6 Animal Species that Mate for Life

Mating for life is relatively uncommon in the animal kingdom. Find out which animals, from gray wolves to macaroni penguins, are in it for the long haul.

www.britannica.com

https://www.bbcearth.com/news/seven-animals-who-mate-for-life

(Oh, and Godfrey , you're welcome to reconsider your after I added my PostScript )

Confession: I have been distracted and not read each post in this thread thoroughly. However I did read Don's last post and had this immediate question:

Quote from Don

While we are the products of evolution, we don't make choices and rejections based on evolutionary considerations in the here and now in this one life that we have.

Would that not be better worded with some kind of caveat that "we need to be cautious in making choices based on evolutionary considerations..." rather than "we don't...." because:

- in fact many people often "do" make choices that way, even though it "may" be shortsighted.... and

- in an Epicurean perspective without fate or necessity or a providential god force, '"sometimes" a decision to go against the generally-observable rule (I gather we all agree that the general rule is to the effect that blindly following evolution in every case is generally a bad idea) will in fact work out and be the proper choice in some circumstances?

I suspect Don's wording in context probably presumes that this is a "general rule" and not an "ironclad rule" but I tend to worry that there are too many people who think that Epicurus' observations about how behavior generally but not always leads to particular results are intended to be "ironclad" rules from which never to deviate, which I think would not be likely to be the way he intended them.

I also say this in context that I think Don and I sometimes come across as interpreting PD10 differently on this very point I am bringing up here, even though I don't think our positions are actually very different. I see PD10 as emphasizing the very point that I want to be sure is not misunderstood here.

Also, for those who were on the Zoom call last night, I raise this also because of the example we discussed about the current Boeing astronauts who are having difficulty getting launched into space. We "generally" don't undertake high-risk activities that could lead to death, but "sometimes" we consider the reward in pleasure / reduction of pain worth the risk, even of death.

I suspect Don and I here too are in full agreement, but we express the issue slightly differently.

Quote from Cassius

Would that not be better worded with some kind of caveat that "we need to be cautious in making choices based on evolutionary considerations..." rather than "we don't...." because:

- in fact many people often "do" make choices that way, even though it "may" be shortsighted.... and

I'm not sure I necessarily agree that that's better wording; however, I may not be conveying what I'm trying to convey. What I'm trying to convey is that humans don't make decisions based on "evolutionary" considerations. Humans make decisions based primarily on self-interest, or perceived self-interest, what they feel will lead to pleasure for them. That's the root of psychological hedonism as I understand it. People may use "evolution made me do it" as a rationalization or justification post facto. But I doubt anyone is making a decision solely for by saying "My evolution dictates that I do this thing." People make decisions on the spur of the moment all the time based on instinct and fight/flight responses ingrained by biological evolution. So, in that sense, they "do" make choices that way, and, yes, these "may" be short-sighted... but that's saying - it seems to me - that they were necessitated or were inevitable, when Epicurus states clearly that decisions should be made using practical wisdom and not soley on ingrained, biological urges or proclivities.

Quote from Cassius

- in an Epicurean perspective without fate or necessity or a providential god force, '"sometimes" a decision to go against the generally-observable rule (I gather we all agree that the general rule is to the effect that blindly following evolution in every case is generally a bad idea) will in fact work out and be the proper choice in some circumstances?

I added emphasis on your word "choice". It's not a "choice." In fact, it seems to me to be the opposite of a choiceif one is "blindly following." And, yes, sometimes things work out by dumb luck, but, according to Epicurus, "it is better to be unfortunate rationally than fortunate irrationally."

And, yes, we've gone round and round on PD10 in the past. To state my position, I think PD10 is cautionary. To review:

If the things that produce the delights of those who are decadent washed away the mind's fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering, and furthermore if they taught us the limits of our pains and desires, then we would have no complaints against them, since they would be filled with every joy and would contain not a single pain or distress (and that's what is bad). (Saint-Andre translation)

I see this as cautionary and not necessarily proscriptive. Sure, you can engage in the delights of the decadent, but it's not going to "wash away the mind's fears" IF it did, we'd have no problem with it... but it doesn't. I'm also looking at the verb tenses here in Greek. That's one reason for my conclusion, but also just the general tenor of the statement and what he says in the Letter to Menoikeus.

I'll assume I've cleared up nothing and merely muddied the waters with this reply

I think before I comment further I better read back into the history of the thread more closely because:

Quote from Don

What I'm trying to convey is that humans don't make decisions based on "evolutionary" considerations. Humans make decisions based primarily on self-interest, or perceived self-interest, what they feel will lead to pleasure for them. That's the root of psychological hedonism as I understand it.

And yes psychological hedonism came up last night too so I definitely see that term as related, but I continue to find the term confusing at best. Just because people make decisions based on what they think is in their self-interest does not in my mind advance the analysis of whether they are in fact acting to pursue "pleasure." And the analysis of whether they are in fact acting to pursue pleasure, rather than in pursuit of "duty" or "piety" or some other consideration, is the main issue worth discussing because it's the way to practical changes in behavior. We can discuss "duty" or "piety" in terms of the pleasure they bring all day long, but in the end what we're trying to accomplish is to decide if "duty" or "piety" are in themselves pleasurable, or whether they or anything else is worth pursuing only because they bring pleasure as a result of pursuing them.

Yes this whole sidebar discussion may be more confusing and awkward than it is worth.

Quote from Cassius

Yes this whole sidebar discussion may be more confusing and awkward than it is worth.

On the contrary, I think it's right on point.

Quote from Cassius

We can discuss "duty" or "piety" in terms of the pleasure they bring all day long, but in the end what we're trying to accomplish is to decide if "duty" or "piety" are in themselves pleasurable, or whether they or anything else is worth pursuing only because they bring pleasure as a result of pursuing them.

I think this strikes right at the heart of why Epicurean and not Stoic philosophy. I don't think anything is inherently pleasurable in and of itself. That strikes me as almost Platonic. Pleasure and Pain are subjective feelings. Pain less so (eg., hand on a hot stove) but still its in the mix. "Duty" and "piety" are instrumental to a pleasurable life, see PD05 et al. They are worth pursuing ONLY because they bring pleasure. Someone may say they're doing it because of "duty" but my contention will continue to be that they're doing because it feels good to say "I did my duty."

Quote from Don

Someone may say they're doing it because of "duty" but my contention will continue to be that they're doing because it feels good to say "I did my duty."

Yes your contention will remain that, and the professor of psychological hedonism can say that to his patient all day long as a means of diagnosing that person's psychology. And in turn the person who is being accused of being a "psychological hedonist," but who in fact sees himself as a person of strong religious or humanist belief, can deny that label all day long.

In the meantime, in the real world of people who want to think about options as to how they can change their beliefs and thought processes in order to live better, rather than just talk past each other, it is useful first and foremost make this basic conceptual / philosophical point:

1. Duty is not inherently pleasurable.
2. Piety is not inherently pleasurable.
3. Virtue is not inherently pleasurable.
4. Only pleasure is inherently pleasurable.

Then afterwards if a professor wants to discuss a clinical diagnosis of erroneous behavior, for example as to why a person might consider himself to be devoted to "duty," then terms like "psychological hedonism" will allow that professor to write cool articles for "Psychology Today."

But for ordinary people who just want plain talk about how to live better, the approach found in pages of "Psychology Today" are not the first place to start. The writers in Psychology Today will talk themselves in circles about different ways to diagnose conditions, without ever taking a firm position on what "mental health" actually looks like.

The place to start is for example the letter to Menoeceus: "[129] And for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good."

Clarification: I am not criticizing your particlar use of the term, Don, or saying that you are talking past anyone. I have this same problem whenever the term "psychological hedonism" comes up in any context. It seems to me that applying the term "psychological hedonism" rarely if ever leads to anything useful. For much the same reason I really don't like the term "hedonism" either. It conveys all the wrong implications in modern usage that even the word "pleasure" does not have, so I personally never like to talk about Epicurean philosophy as "hedonism" or "hedonist." I understand the technical labels in a technical context but I find them very harmful in regular usage. Adding "psychological" to "hedonism" to me just adds a "deterministic" overlay that, from an Epicurean point of view, just digs the hole deeper.

These are some half-baked thoughts, but I agree with Cassius that the worry about psychological hedonism is that it seems nearly unfalsifiable, and it's not going to convince the person who insists they act for reasons other than pleasure/advantage. If the point is convincing others, then asserting psychological hedonism is almost tantamount to begging the question, even if it turns out to be empirically correct.

I wonder sometimes whether the root question is whether people think duty and virtue should make them miserable or whether they hope to be pleased, or at least satisfied, to be a dutiful and virtuous person. And if they say, 'I want to be the sort of person for whom doing my duty makes me miserable,' then I would find that strange.

I've never quite known what to do with Epicurus' insistence that virtuous people will experience the greatest pleasure and that people who experience the greatest pleasure must be virtuous. But I'm not entirely sure it's all that different than the Stoic view that the virtuous person will enjoy their virtue. So in my mind, people might insist they are motivated by duty, and for all I know they are in their own cognitive economy, but it would be/should be a grave disappointment to them if that motivation did not terminate in some fashion in a sense of satisfaction with themselves. And I tend to think, as an Epicurean, and as reflected in the word 'terminate,' that people actually infer backwards from 'what will give me the feeling about myself and my aims that I want' to 'duty' or 'virtue.' Which means that the final aim is the feeling, and I'm with Don--it seems reasonable to call that feeling (at least a kind of) pleasure. And virtue is the instrument, not the aim.

Okay, I think I follow you.

I'm using "psychological hedonism" as an expedient shorthand for "pleasure is the guide, goal, and end of all our actions."

From my perspective...

People are dutiful, because it ultimately brings them pleasure.

People are pious because it ultimately brings them pleasure.

Continually asking "Why do you do that?" will, if the person is honest, ultimately result in the answer "Because it makes me feel good." Otherwise, I believe people are fooling themselves... Sometimes quite effectively and thoroughly, but fooling themselves nonetheless.

Yes Don and I sound like we are very far apart but I don't think we really are. I think we're mainly talking "context" of when certain words are appropriate and when they are not.

Quote from Little Rocker

I've never quite known what to do with Epicurus' insistence that virtuous people will experience the greatest pleasure and that people who experience the greatest pleasure must be virtuous.

I can't figure out any way to reconcile that other than to conclude that Epicurus is drastically modifying the usage of the term "virtue" just like he is drastically modifying the usage of the terms "gods" and "pleasure." It seems to me that the only way to make sense of it is that Epicurus is deleting the "absolute" aspect that everyone else alleges to be a requirement of virtue, and declaring classification of a thing as virtuous to be relative to the result that it brings. His view seems to me to be that If an action does not in fact lead to "pleasure," then that action is by Epicurean definition not "wise," or "just," or "courageous," or any other usage of a term of virtue.

Don I wish you had been at our Zoom last night to discuss with Kalosyni her Boeing astronaut / rocket ship question. Pursuing that at some point would advance this discussion too, because she has a position on what Epicurus would say to those astronauts that raises a lot of questions.

I think this current issue of how to look at virtue and psychological hedonism is in the same category.

It appears to me that we have to accept that Epicurus was using the terms "pleasure" and "gods" and even "virtue" in a totally nonstandard way, and that he was asserting that changing the paradigm on how those terms are used is essential for happy living.

That's why I see the "logical extreme" interpretation of PD10 as so important -- I see Epicurus as saying that "IF we look at things his way," then a "pleasurable life" is a "pleasurable life" no matter what type of pleasure it contains, because we are using the term pleasure in a logically consistent way. From that perspective PD10 is an in-your-face assertion that pleasure is pleasure is pleasure.

I interpret your view of PD10 as focusing on the "but it won't work because it is not possible part." Yes in practical terms that is true, but stopping there does not advance the philosophical argument.

Looking at things in a conceptually rigorous way, "IF a life of debauchery did in fact bring a pleasurable life" means that for purposes of discussion we are accepting that result -- and thus we would have no problem with such a person.

Staying with the "But it won't work" never gets you to the point - which is that pleasure must be seen as pleasure no matter what type of pleasure it is, if we are going to be able to discuss these things coherently.

Similarly, "gods" must be seen as non-supernatural and non-omniscient and non-omnipotent, no matter how many people disagree.

"Pleasure" must be seen as *every* experience of life that is not specifically painful, no matter how vigorously Cicero disagrees.

And "virtue" must be seen as totally contextual (that action which leads to pleasure) regardless of how strongly the religious and rationalist absolutists object.

Quote from Cassius

That's why I see the "logical extreme" interpretation of PD10 as so important -- I see Epicurus as saying that "IF we look at things his way," then a "pleasurable life" is a "pleasurable life" no matter what type of pleasure it contains, because we are using the term pleasure in a logically consistent way. From that perspective PD10 is an in-your-face assertion that pleasure is pleasure is pleasure.

I'll have to dig back in, but I don't think the language supports that interpretation, especially in light of the letter to Menoikeus. It seems to me he's giving practical advice in PD10, not necessarily making a grand philosophical point. I see this as directly countering the Cyrenaic position.

But I'll need to revisit this tonight after work.

Quote from Don

I don't think the language supports that interpretation, especially in light of the letter to Menoikeus. It seems to me he's giving practical advice in PD10, not necessarily making a grand philosophical point. I

Yes, that is exactly the point we have generally differed in the past, and continue to differ (respectfully!) While I agree with the practical observation that a life of profligacy will not generally lead to a good result, to me the "grand philosophical point" (a good way to describe it) is the overriding "take-away" that justifies its inclusion as a principal doctrine.

PS - I am not sure who Epicurus would have pointed to as someone who at least seems to provide such an example of profligacy being rewarded, but I gather that some later Romans might have cited Sulla, who apparently lived a pretty dissolute life and yet arguably never suffered for it, at least not in any proportion as he apparently deserved.

Quote

As promised, when his tasks were complete, Sulla returned his powers and withdrew to his country villa near Puteoli to be with his family. Plutarch states in his Life of Sulla that he retired to a life spent in dissolute luxuries, and he "consorted with actresses, harpists, and theatrical people, drinking with them on couches all day long." From this distance, Sulla remained out of the day-to-day political activities in Rome, intervening only a few times when his policies were involved (e.g. the execution of Granius, shortly before his own death).^[143][144]

His public funeral in Rome (in the Forum, in the presence of the whole city) was on a scale unmatched until that of Augustus in AD 14. Sulla's body was brought into the city on a golden bier, escorted by his veteran soldiers, and funeral orations were delivered by several eminent senators, with the main oration possibly delivered by Lucius Marcius Philippus or Hortensius. Sulla's body was cremated and his ashes placed in his tomb in the Campus Martius.^[150] An epitaph, which Sulla composed himself, was inscribed onto the tomb, reading, "No friend ever served me, and no enemy ever wronged me, whom I have not repaid in full."^[151] Plutarch claims he had seen Sulla's personal motto carved on his tomb on the Campus Martius. The personal motto was "no better friend, no worse enemy."

Quote from Cassius

I interpret your view of PD10 as focusing on the "but it won't work because it is not possible part." Yes in practical terms that is true, but stopping there does not advance the philosophical argument.

I don't want to be Pollyanna here, but it seems you can both have this point--pleasure is pleasure, and all of it is good in itself--but only some strategies for pursuing it consistently bring about and sustain the most desirable state. As in the Letter to Menoeceus, all pleasures are good, but only some are choiceworthy. And it's true that a pleasure that is not choiceworthy in one context (participating in politics) can become choiceworthy in another (participate or die/break trust). So what counts as choiceworthy varies--it might very well be that in some contexts, flying to the moon on a whim and a prayer is choiceworthy.

Yet I think I'm with Don on PD 10, at least when coupled with PD 11. They have a remarkably similar structure, and they both seem to suggest that the people in question are not studying some important variety of natural science (the kind that, among other things, dissolves fears of death and of heavenly phenomena and also sets limits on our desires). I can't see Epicurus considering natural science negotiable.

Quote from Little Rocker

I don't want to be Pollyanna here, but it seems you can both have this point--pleasure is pleasure, and all of it is good in itself--but only some strategies for pursuing it consistently bring about and sustain the most desirable state. As in the Letter to Menoeceus, all pleasures are good, but only some are choiceworthy.

Yes, I agree, BOTH points are true, but I do think it is important to observe that BOTH points are true.

And I agree that you are right that both 10 and 11 are parallel - but I would say that depending upon whether one is debating philosophy, or giving personal advice to a friend, either perspective could be appropriate to emphasize.

And if I were an Epicurus or a Diogenes of Oinoanda seeking to etch "in stone" a summary of my message to all future generations, and to point out why virtually everyone else has things upside down, I'd find at least as much reason to come at this from a "grand philosophical point" perspective as I would from a "here's my personal observation, your mileage may vary" perspective.

In light of the text that there were no individual PDs in the original, I think PD10, 11, and 12 need to be read as a unit. Both 10 and 11 start out "if .." 12 then talks about the impossibility of getting rid of the fears discussed in 10 and 11.

Lunchtime over... Back to work.

Quote from Cassius

And if I were an Epicurus or a Diogenes of Oinoanda seeking to etch "in stone" a summary of my message to all future generations, and to point out why virtually everyone else has things upside down, I'd find at least as much reason to come at this from a "grand philosophical point" perspective as I would from a "here's my personal observation, your mileage may vary" perspective.

I think I've gotten a bit turned around here because you and Don have a history and I feel slow on the uptake today. Cassius, can you perhaps restate the 'grand philosophical point'?

Quote from Don

I'm using "psychological hedonism" as an expedient shorthand for "pleasure is the guide, goal, and end of all our actions."

From my perspective...

People are dutiful, because it ultimately brings them pleasure.

People are pious because it ultimately brings them pleasure.

Continually asking "Why do you do that?" will, if the person is honest, ultimately result in the answer "Because it makes me feel good." Otherwise, I believe people are fooling themselves... Sometimes quite effectively and thoroughly, but fooling themselves nonetheless.

Yes, and I think Epicurus *is* a psychological hedonist of the sort you articulate here. I just find myself sympathetic to what I take to be Cassius' point that arguing about the empirical truth of psychological hedonism might not be the best dialectical strategy for convincing people to be Epicureans. I admit that I feel like I've reached a point where every time I hear a passionate argument about altruism I cry a little on the inside, even though I recognize that the possibility of altruism really matters to a lot of people. I think I've just lost sight of why it does.

The term "grand philosophical point" was introduced by Don in post 31:

Quote from Don

I'll have to dig back in, but I don't think the language supports that interpretation, especially in light of the letter to Menoikeus. It seems to me he's giving practical advice in PD10, not necessarily making a grand philosophical point. I see this as directly countering the Cyrenaic position.

Here's the way I would unwind the reason this dance seems to continue, because I think it's a deep issue that we see in many forms, including the nearby "astronaut" discussion.

As I perceive why Don used that term, there is an ongoing perspective question about Epicurus' use of concepts and whether he is primarily making practical points or clinical points. Is he giving personal advice about pleasure and how to pursue it moment by moment, or is he giving philosophical advice about how Plato et al are wrong, so that by examining the words that people are using we can make the differences between the schools clear. Or is he (more likely) working on both goals, since the statements he is making can be seen as true on both levels.

The point that I think generates the controversy is that there is a certain perspective held by many people that manifests itself (rightly!) in the reluctance to engage in hypotheticals or to adopt non-standard usages of words. Epicurus himself apparently refused to acknowledge the necessity to prove the desirability of pleasure, presumably for that very reason. On the other hand, Epicurus insisted on talking about "gods" as really existing, even though he sliced away from them most of the defining characteristics that most people consider to be essential about them (supernatural, omniscient, omnipotent).

It seems to me that Epicurus clearly did "both" because f you're going to engage in philosophy you've got to explain your terms to at least some degree. Right after Torquatus noted Epicurus' reluctance to prove the desirability of pleasure by logical philosophical debate, he goes off on a long discourse that sounds very much like a logical philosophical argument. I would say that's a necessity of engaging in philosophical debate, rather than a departure from Epicurean precedent, and that Epicurus himself was doing the exact same kind of combination of logic and "pointing attention to" in statements like PD10-12, and the letter to Menoecus.

It seems to me that this is the only realistic way to account for the "flatness" of Epicurus' choice to categorize all the many shades of feelings (which Cicero and everyone else in the world recognizes as different from each other) into only one of two categories, pleasure or pain. It seems to me that this flatness is a logical necessity when you accept the challenge of using only a single word to distinguish what is desirable, and a single word to distinguish what is undesirable. Rather than "virtue" or "piety," "pleasure" has to stand in that position of the single word that constitutes the placeholder for all that is desirable.

That's how it seems to me it makes most sense to read these flat "either-or" positions:

Diogenes Laertius 10:34 : ”The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined.“

And I see that as the only reasonable way to understand the flatness of the exchanges between Torquatus and Cicero in On Ends:

On Ends 1:30 : ”Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?

On Ends 1:38: Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“

On Ends 1:39 : For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.

On Ends 2:9 : Cicero: “…[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same thing as 'pleasure.'” Torquatus: “Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be.”

On Ends 2:11: Cicero: Still, I replied, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?” Torquatus: “Clearly the same, he says, and indeed the greatest, beyond which none greater can possibly be..”

Those are flat uses of the word "pleasure" that defy common usage, and yet they are logically consistent with defining pleasure as "everything in life that is desirable" as opposed to "everything in life that is undesirable."

Since Torquatus seemed to take the position that it is essential to use the terminology in this way, and since Torquatus had access to the teachers and the books that we do not, it seems to be it is reasonable to interpret the letter to Menoeceus, the PD's, and the other original writings in the same way that they were being interpreted by the people who had reason to know the intent behind them.

----

But I will agree that taking words in these unusual ways is a tough nut for a lot of people to follow. It's normal to object to hypotheticals, and normal to object to non-standard uses of words. In the end I think we're really wrestling with questions of how to communicate when we are using words in non-standard ways. One logical way to do that is to state things in extremes: we come up with formulations that sound like We have no cause for complaint about those who actually achieve pleasure even if we consider that pleasure to be depraved. This second statements rings the same way: We woud have no need for anything - even natural science that we all love - and which I've told you brings me my greatest pleasure - if we were to be able to achieve a life of pleasure without it. Those seem to me to be stated in extreme ways, not to focus on the practical (there are a lot better ways to give practical advice than to cite extreme situations) but to make exactly the point that "pleasure" should be understood in the widest possible way as everything in life that is desirable, and pain everything in life that is undesirable.

Extreme and hypothetical formulations appear absurd to those who focus on the "practical" side alone, but maintaining the philosophical side is essential to understanding the difference between the schools is really as deep as it is - it's the only way to come up with a logically rigorous worldview.

The "astroanaut" hypothetical comes into play because the common perception is that Epicurus is all about being satisfied with what you have and not asking "too much" out of life -- which I don't think is an accurate characterization, but if accepted would make it extremely unlikely that anyone would strap themselves onto the top of a rocket -- even one made by a manufacturer with better recent luck than Boeing!

So to wrap this into a bow, one way of looking at the "grand philosophical point" is how to view Epicurus' use of the term "pleasure." When Epicurus was using it was he focusing on describing specific feelings of the moment at particular times and places, or was he using it philosophically (as his "grand philosophical point") to represent the ultimate good, as against the opposing alternatives of "virtue" or "piety" or "reason," or was he doing both?

Quote from Little Rocker

I admit that I feel like I've reached a point where every time I hear a passionate argument about altruism I cry a little on the inside, even though I recognize that the possibility of altruism really matters to a lot of people. I think I've just lost sight of why it does.

Just some off-the-cuff thoughts:

For me, altruistic acts – from an Epicurean view – can be important from two different points of view: (1) they give me pleasure (the Stoics might deny that as a criteria, but I think they tend to delude themselves with regard to their own pleasure/satisfaction on this score – as Don said); and (2) both in terms of local community and friendship, and in terms of a more extended social fabric – based on a social contract to prevent harm by means of preserving an amenable social context in which we perforce live – as instrumentally choiceworthy, even if any reciprocity is not immediately expected. In today’s world, that social fabric likely includes at least some global considerations.

And perhaps pleasureable feelings of empathy are evolutionarily derived, supporting humans ability to live in any sense of community – and are still valid pathé today in that sense.

None of that relies on some abstract ideal of virtue or “command-morality” (as in the Stoics and Kant, say), which I heartily reject. And, it seems to me, it is the practical instrumentality that those idealists find objectionable.

It does, of course, depend on how narrowly or broadly one thinks of that term “altruism.” But Epicurus did say that one might reasonably die for one’s friends.

At least that’s my personal reflection …

Quote from Little Rocker

you and Don have a history

This made me chuckle... I don't know whether I'd phrase it in quite that same way, but point taken I went back and looked, and our "history" goes all the way back to 2020 (and back when I was using a nom de plume... or de guerre, as the case might be )!

Quote from Cassius

(respectfully!)

Fully agree we need keep this difference of opinion/perspective respectful and civil!

I agree with both Little Rocker and Cassius that using terms like "psychological hedonism" don't advance the conversation in a meaningful way, and the phrase wouldn't be a useful explanation to the general reader or someone curiously coming across Epicurean philosophy. That said, I stand by my conviction outlined in post #28 above: Humans are "psychological hedonists" and one of Epicurus's significant "discoveries" was to point this out and try to harness this tendency to allow us to live more pleasurable lives.

Quote from Cassius

Looking at things in a conceptually rigorous way, "IF a life of debauchery did in fact bring a pleasurable life" means that for purposes of discussion we are accepting that result -- and thus we would have no problem with such a person.

IF! This is all a re-hash of my position back in 2020, for the most part. The key word there is "IF". IF x, then y. IF it was the case...*then* we would have no problem. And, yes, IF it was the case the things that produce the delights of the life of "one having no hope of safety, in desperate case; one who is, in a moral sense, abandoned; profligate" did what? If those things "washed away the mind's fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering, and furthermore if they taught us the limits of our pains and desires" *then* we'd have no problem with them. But those *things* don't wash away the fears. They're pleasurable activities, and Epicurus never denies that. But those things alone won't get us down the road to dispelling fears. It seems to me he's saying you have get the fears dispelled first... then you can enjoy various "delights" unencumbered by those fears.

PD10-12 has to be read in the context of the Letter to Menoikeus (my translation):

Therefore, whenever we say repeatedly that "pleasure is the goal (τέλος)," we do NOT say the pleasure of those who are prodigal* and those stuck in delighting in pleasures arising from circumstances outside of ourselves like:

• those who are ignorant
• those who don't agree with us, or
• those who believe wrongly;

but we mean that which neither pains the body nor troubles the mind. [132] For it is NOT an endless string of drinking parties and festivals, and NOT taking advantage of slaves and women, nor does an extravagant table of fish and other things bring forth a sweet life but self-controlled reasoning and examining the cause of every choice and rejection and driving out the greatest number of opinions that take hold of the mind and bring confusion and trouble. (emphasis added)

*ἄσωτος This is the same exact word in the Greek that is used in PD10.

That section of the letter, to me, clearly states "we do NOT say the pleasure of those who are profligate" when we say "pleasure is the goal (τέλος)." There's no equivocation and no hypothetically-speaking. οὐ τὰς τῶν ἀσώτων ἡδονὰς = not the pleasure of the profligate.

Quote from Cassius

whether he is primarily making practical points or clinical points. Is he giving personal advice about pleasure and how to pursue it moment by moment, or is he giving philosophical advice about how Plato et al are wrong, so that by examining the words that people are using we can make the differences between the schools clear. Or is he (more likely) working on both goals, since the statements he is making can be seen as true on both levels.

From my perspective, Epicurus does both but in different writings and in different contexts. Principal Doctrines was meant to give an overview of the philosophy and advice on how to apply and understand the philosophy, I'm assuming, primarily for students of the Epicurean school and as a quick primer for those curious about the school. Same for the letters: hit the high points and provide instruction on how to apply the philosophy to struggling students. I don't necessarily think he needs to be working on both goals in every piece of writing.

Quote from Cassius

It seems to me that this is the only realistic way to account for the "flatness" of Epicurus' choice to categorize all the many shades of feelings (which Cicero and everyone else in the world recognizes as different from each other) into only one of two categories, pleasure or pain.

It took me a minute to understand what you meant by "flatness" but I get it: You're referring to the "flat" hierarchy of two feelings: pleasure/pain. There's only two branches of the tree. I would rather characterize it as an expansive inclusion within those two feelings. This still makes sense the more I think about it: When you're alive, you're either feeling pleasure or pain, because you're always feeling *something*... If you didn't you'd be dead. It may be subtle, it may be sharp, it may be intense... but you're always feeling something. There are innumerable "feelings" and emotions within those two categories, but every sensation is either pleasurable or painful. That seems to be a very insightful discovery, and seems to be born out by current psychological affective research... but we're not going down that road

Finally, I don't think Epicurus is necessarily redefining "virtue". It seems to me that "virtue" to Epicurus still means generally "to do what society feels is the excellent/noble thing to do" but for Epicurus we do it because it brings us pleasure, both as the feeling and leading to a more pleasurable life (i.e., PD05) Virtue has no intrinsic value *other than* to serve as an instrument leading to pleasure. And now pleasure is widely defined!

Cassius : I know you feel strongly about these points you're making, and I can respect that passion. I don't expect to "change your mind." But, I'll admit, after reading my thread from 2020, I seem to be a little pig-headed (Epicurean pun firmly intended) in the opinion I hold.

Quote from Don

If those things "washed away the mind's fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering, and furthermore if they taught us the limits of our pains and desires" *then* we'd have no problem with them. But those *things* don't wash away the fears. They're pleasurable activities, and Epicurus never denies that. But those things alone won't get us down the road to dispelling fears. It seems to me he's saying you have get the fears dispelled first... then you can enjoy various "delights" unencumbered by those fears.

Another point of view, which I may have expressed sometime since 2020, is that it's possible for pleasures of the prodigal to teach us some of these things. I presume that many of us have stories of pursuing excessive pleasures in our youth, only to begin to discover the limits of our pains and desires in the process. Or for them to teach us about death, or our place in the world pertaining to astronomical phenomena (perhaps a stupidly near-death experience, or staring at the night sky while in a state of inebriation).

To me this can be a description of learning by experience and book learning. As psychological hedonists, this is how we learn (sorry, I couldn't resist tossing that out there 😉). So I don't read this as literally as Don , but I also don't read it as an endorsement of sex, drugs and rock 'n' roll. More as a description of the way things are. And with the caveat that I'm limited to reading it in English....

Some (most?) of us, for better or for worse, need to make mistakes before we get to a place where the fears are dispelled and replaced with understanding.