Would You Rather Live For A Week As (1) Epicurus During the Last Week of His Life or (2) An Anonymous Shepherd Laying In The Grass In The Summertime With No Pain At All?

In going back to Eikadistes 's compilation and looking at the Greek construction of the "if" clauses, I think Hicks gives the proper paraphrase:

Quote from Hicks, PD09 (emphasis added)

9. If all pleasure had been capable of accumulation,--if this had gone on not only by recurrence in time, but all over the frame or, at any rate, over the principal parts of man's nature, there would never have been any difference between one pleasure and another, as in fact there is.

It seems to me (check my Greek, please!) that the specific construction of PD09 falls under the unreal present as defined in that Wikipedia article and elsewhere:

Present unreal conditions

Unreal (counterfactual) conditions referring to present time are made with εἰ (ei) followed by the imperfect indicative in the protasis, and the imperfect indicative combined with the particle ἄν (án) in the apodosis

[142] [ιχ.] Εἰ κατεπυκνοῦτο πᾶσα ἡδονή, καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ περὶ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα ὑπῆρχεν ἢ τὰ κυριώτατα μέρη τῆς φύσεως, οὐκ ἄν ποτε διέφερον ἀλλήλων αἱ ἡδοναί.

"The unreal conditionals either describe a situation which is contrary to fact, or which is unlikely to happen." (Source)

So, my contention is that, while PD09 is worded rather idiosyncratically, Epicurus is basically saying that pleasures do differ from each other and they can't actually be condensed. Which makes sense to me since he says elsewhere in PD18 that: 18. "Pleasure in the flesh admits no increase when once the pain of want has been removed ; after that it only admits of variation..." How could there be variation if all pleasures were the same?

Quote from Cassius

(But I see that the guys at the Epicurus Wiki did not follow hicks) http://wiki.epicurism.info/Principal_Doctrine_9/

They seem to agree with Hicks without adding the necessary parenthetical statement at the end like Hicks. It's the use of those two imperfect verb forms that clinches the idea:

Quote from Epicurus Wiki

Yet the pleasures do differ, Epicurus implies, since they cannot be thus condensed -- another syllogism by negative hypothesis, demonstrating that the opposite is in fact true.

Quote from Cassius

Or is there possibility of error in the WIkipedia analysis?

The Wikipedia outline is correct and corroborated elsewhere. It's just is the cleanest and most straightforward presentation I found. I think this same analysis goes for PD10 and PD11 but I'm holding off on those for now.

Of course, we can never know what was happening in Epicurus's mind. That said...

Epicurus spent his life cultivating his peace of mind, banishing the fears of death and the gods. Ataraxia is the quality of having a mind free from turbulence, free from fear, free from anxiety. Given that definition, Epicurus undoubtedly experienced ataraxia. He had come to accept there was no life after death. He had no fear of some divine punishment. He had memories from the past and a company of friends in the present to comfort him. He was well aware of his physical illness and its outcome. There was undoubtedly times where physical pain overwhelmed him. But I don't think that means he didn't experience ataraxia in his mind. He felt the unimaginable pain, but didn't need to accompany that pain with anxiety, needless mental suffering, or similar turbulence in his psykhē, his "soul."

Just to be clear, am I correct in saying that pleasures do differ, but only in intensity, duration and breadth? This is both how I read PD09 and how I reason it out.

For instance, pleasure/pain in the toe is different from pleasure/pain of equal intensity and duration in the tongue, because of the different nerve endings in the two locations. If we could spread each of these instances of pleasure/pain over both the toe and the tongue, they would be the same. But as long as that doesn't happen, they're different. This, then, becomes a formula for how pleasures/pains vary.

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don

Given that definition, Epicurus undoubtedly experienced ataraxia.

To drill down on this, was Epicurus experiencing ataraxia during that last week of his life?

According to my understanding: Yes.

At the risk of taking my reasoning too far, "breadth" also explains why pleasures differ from person to person. "Breadth" refers to location, and each person is a different location with different influences and slightly different anatomy.

Quote from Godfrey

Just to be clear, am I correct in saying that pleasures do differ, but only in intensity, duration and breadth? This is both how I read PD09 and how I reason it out.

For instance, pleasure/pain in the toe is different from pleasure/pain of equal intensity and duration in the tongue, because of the different nerve endings in the two locations. If we could spread each of these instances of pleasure/pain over both the toe and the tongue, they would be the same. But as long as that doesn't happen, they're different. This, then, becomes a formula for how pleasures/pains vary.

Pleasure do differ, that's my interpretation of PD09 from the grammar. But I'm still not sure I understand where you're getting the specific parameters of intensity, duration, and breadth from the words that are in PD09.

From what I read, Epicurus is specifically saying "Every pleasure *cannot* condensed nor be present at the same time and in the whole of one's nature or its primary parts." The "if.." clause cannot happen, and so the pleasures do differ from one another.

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Plantpierogi

If I wanted to be a lay in the grass in the summertime for a week, I would simply wait 9 months. Besides, a shepherd's life never appealed to me, anyway.

Great thoughts in that post Plantpierogi and good to see back you on the forum again!

Great to be back . I want to try and pop in every now and then. Hopefully, I'll make participation here more of a habit.

Did you want to open up a different thread to discuss the ataraxia issue or just keep going here? I have thoughts (of course)

Quote from Don

Pleasure do differ, that's my interpretation of PD09 from the grammar. But I'm still not sure I understand where you're getting the specific parameters of intensity, duration, and breadth from the words that are in PD09.

From what I read, Epicurus is specifically saying "Every pleasure *cannot* condensed nor be present at the same time and in the whole of one's nature or its primary parts." The "if.." clause cannot happen, and so the pleasures do differ from one another.

Intensity: Hicks uses the word "accumulation", Bailey uses "intensified", DeWitt uses "condensed", White uses "concentrated"; the other translations in Nate's compilation use variations of these. I'm interpreting these English words as describing intensity of pleasure, and, to me, it's clear that pleasures can vary in intensity.

Duration: all of the translations use "time", "duration", "lasted", or similar references to time. I'm calling these "duration".

Breadth: the translations all refer to "parts"; I'm using "breadth" to describe the idea that pleasures can vary in the number of "parts" that they affect. These include toes, tongues, mind: various body parts and various states of mind.

I don't interpret Epicurus' "if" as referring to "condensed". I interpret it as referring to maximizing particular pleasures in all three aspects of intensity duration and breadth. If this could be done, then the pleasures wouldn't differ from each other. They can't be maximized in such a way, so they do differ. But by using intensity, duration and breadth as the three criteria in this statement he is telling us that those are the three variables which affect pleasures and differentiate between them.

Quote from Godfrey

Hicks uses the word "accumulation", Bailey uses "intensified", DeWitt uses "condensed", White uses "concentrated"; the other translations in Nate's compilation use variations of these.

The word used there in the PD09 is κατεπυκνοῦτο which means "force into a small compass, compress, condense." Another translation seems to be "to be thickly planted" and "consolidate."

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, καταπυκν-όω

It's related directly to πυκνόω which means "pack close together, contract, condense, compress" and can even be used to refer to frozen water.

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, πυκν-όω

Quote from Cassius

Well I was about to say a separate thread, but as I think about it (and as the Facebook comment implies) the question is probably tightly tied to ones idea of how to spend ones time in the best way, so let's say here.

Sounds good.

Quote from Cassius

Don: unless ataraxia is limited to "mental" disturbance I cannot see how Epicurus experienced ataraxia during his last week, given his pain , and I am not sure I would say he did experience ataraxia at that time even if the definition of ataraxia were limited to mental issues, just as I think aponia is not limited to bodily pains.

...

I would see human ataraxia as denoting real experience delimited in time and not a lifetime sum.

We first have to come to an understanding of what we both mean by "ataraxia." And I'm not saying we both have the *same* understanding, or that either of us has the correct understanding. Here's my understanding.

I completely agree with your mention of "not a lifetime sum." I apologize if I implied that in my saying "Epicurus spent his life cultivating his peace of mind, banishing the fears of death and the gods." What I meant to convey was that you don't just experience ataraxia ex nihilo. Ataraxia grows out of ones practice and study to eradicate the fears and anxiety of death, the gods, and so on.

Ataraxia is the pleasure of experiencing a mind free from anxiety, fear, etc. It is a mind (psykhe) without ταραχή (tarakhe) "trouble, disorder, confusion." So, αταραξία (ataraksia) conveys a mind "without trouble, without disorder, without confusion." Consider another instance of αταραξία in Fragment 519: "The greatest fruit of justice is serenity." (δικαιοσύνης καρπὸς μέγιστος ἀταραξία.) If we act justly, we don't have to have anxiety, fear, and worry about our fellow humans. This is echoed in PD17: "One who acts aright is *utterly steady and serene* (ἀταρακτότατος ataraktotatos), whereas one who goes astray is full of *trouble and confusion* (ταραχῆς tarakhes)."

Ataraxia is experienced as a mind untroubled by fear of the gods, anxiety about death, trust in that you are treating people justly and can expect the same in return. Once those fears and anxieties are rooted out, they don't return. One characteristic of an Epicurean sage (which we can assume Epicurus himself would have been as close as possible to as anyone) is "once the sage has become wise, they will no longer fall back into the opposite (of wisdom)."

For me, ataraxia is not some "special" state one achieves in special circumstances, not some kind of meditative tranquility, not some kind of transitory fleeting feeling. Ataraxia is the prolonged/persistent feeling of a mind untroubled by fear, anxiety, and so (as outlined above). It is the solid foundation of a state of mind through which one can experience the world free from those fears, anxieties, and so on. On Piety by Philodemus provides the line (1532-3) "...we (Epicureans) all regard our doctrines/teachings (dogmata) as the true cause of our own tranquility (ataraxia)."

Which brings me back to your original question: "Was Epicurus experiencing ataraxia during that last week of his life?" Given *my* understanding of ataraxia as outlined here, my answer would be "yes... to the extent that he was in possession of his mental faculties between bouts of severe pain." But even when in pain, I would say he still experienced the world with his mind grounded in ataraxia. He would have had no anxiety about the gods. He would have had no fear of death. He knew he treated people fairly and that we was surrounded by friends. He had made as many preparations for the future of his school as was possible and took pleasure in imagining his friends and students continuing on after he ceased to exist. That to me is the textbook experience of ataraxia, so, yes, Epicurus was experiencing ataraxia during the last week of his life to the extent that his failing body would allow him to be cognizant of it.

The words used in the letter to Idomeneus are ψυχὴν χαῖρον (psykhē khairon) "gladness/joy of mind". χαῖρον is "rejoice at, take pleasure in a thing" which is a form of the word χαρά, one of the kinetic pleasures listed with euphrosyne. So, he's specifically saying he places the joy of his memories against the pain of his illness there in the letter. But that doesn't preclude an experience of ataraxia with respect to fears and anxiety.

Hicks at Perseus: 22] Ἤδη δὲ τελευτῶν γράφει πρὸς Ἰδομενέα (Idomeneus) τήνδε ἐπιστολήν:

"Τὴν μακαρίαν ἄγοντες καὶ ἅμα τελευταίαν ἡμέραν τοῦ βίου ἐγράφομεν ὑμῖν ταυτί. στραγγουρία τε παρηκολουθήκει καὶ δυσεντερικὰ πάθη ὑπερβολὴν οὐκ ἀπολείποντα τοῦ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μεγέθους. ἀντιπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμῃ. σὺ δ᾽ ἀξίως τῆς ἐκ μειρακίου παραστάσεως πρὸς ἐμὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιμελοῦ τῶν παίδων Μητροδώρου."