What Are The Possible Reasons (And Of These, The Most Likely) Why The List of 40 Principal Doctrines Does Not Feature A Statement Explicitly Stating Pleasure To Be The Goal of Life?

    I don't know that we have discussed this before, but I think the long title of the thread states an interesting question worthy of exploration:


    "What Are The Possible Reasons (And Of These, The Most Likely) Why The List of 40 Principal Doctrines Does Not Feature A Statement Explicitly Stating Pleasure To Be The Goal of Life?"


    Before we settle on one or more as the most likely, it would be very helpful to see if we can come up with a list of reasonable possibilities. I doubt it makes sense to try to separate "goal" from "greatest good" in this discussion, in part because it's also interesting to note that neither "ataraxia" or "katastematic pleasure" or any other term which some might promote are explicitly stated to be the goal or greatest good either.


    1. Was the list not prepared by Epicurus himself? (Was it prepared by later followers as a compilation, much as we think is the origin of the Vatican Sayings?)
    2. Was it originally in the form of a letter to which we no longer have the introduction?
    3. Was Epicurus opposed to identifying a "greatest good"?
    4. Was Epicurus opposed to defining "good" in terms that would imply that the number of goods are limited?
    5. Was the view that pleasure is the good so clearly a part of every Epicurean discussion that it became a habit to omit the statement as repetitive and taken for granted?
    6. Is PD01 not supposed to refer only to "gods," but to the conception of the goal / greatest good for humans or any other form of life? In other words, was "immortal" not meant to apply only to the gods but to the best life to which we should all aspire, and the "knows no trouble" meant to be a synonym for experiencing nothing but pleasure (since there are only two feelings and the absence of one is the presence of the others, as stated in the second sentence of PD03)? One reason that might support the backhanded way of emphasizing pleasure in this way might be the desire not to identify any single type of pleasure as the most important type. I think this occurs to me because I woke up from sleep thinking about this, and it now strikes me for the first time as a possibility due to comments DeWitt makes about "immortal" sometimes being a term of high praise rather than just a reference to deathlessness - similar to "gods among men" and such.
    7. Is PD08 (no pleasure is a bad thing in itself) supposed to be read as an explicit statement that pleasure is the good?


    Of these, I have traditionally considered (5) to be among the most likely, but I am not at all sure that I don't favor many of the others in this preliminary list as equally or more possible, and I am sure I have not exhausted the good possibilities.


    This is only a very preliminary list intended to spur discussion. We may not have talked about this all that much, but it is certainly a question that a newcomer to Epicurus would ask, and it deserves the best answer we can give to it.

  • Cassius

    Changed the title of the thread from “What Are The Possible Reasons (And Of These, The Most Likely) Why The List of 40 Principal Doctrines Does Not Feature A Statement Emphasizing Pleasure As The Goal of Life?” to “What Are The Possible Reasons (And Of These, The Most Likely) Why The List of 40 Principal Doctrines Does Not Feature A Statement Explicitly Stating Pleasure To Be The Goal of Life?”.
    Quote from Cassius

    Was the view that pleasure is the good so clearly a part of every Epicurean discussion that it became a habit to omit the statement as repetitive and taken for granted?

    From Diogenes Laertius, Book 10:


    "It is observed too that in his treatise On the Ethical End he writes in these

    terms11 : "I know not how to conceive the good, apart from the pleasures of taste, sexual pleasures, the pleasures of sound and the pleasures of beautiful form."

    Quote from Kalosyni

    It is observed too that in his treatise On the Ethical End he writes in these

    terms11 : "I know not how to conceive the good, apart from the pleasures of taste, sexual pleasures, the pleasures of sound and the pleasures of beautiful form."

    Very good observation!

    Also as to the possibility that PDO1 is intended to refer to more than just the Epicurean gods even though the term "immortal" is used, there is this:


    VS78. The noble soul occupies itself with wisdom and friendship; of these, the one is a mortal good, the other immortal.


    Don, as our resident Greek expert, what is your assessment of the possibility that PD01 is not a reference to the gods alone, but is intended to be a reference to the best life for humans as well as gods, and thus serves as a reference to pleasure (the opposite of pain as stated in PDO3) being the goal?

    Quote from Cassius


    Don, as our resident Greek expert, what is your assessment of the possibility that PD01 is not a reference to the gods alone, but is intended to be a reference to the best life for humans as well as gods, and thus serves as a reference to pleasure (the opposite of pain as stated in PDO3) being the goal?

    It's possible... Maybe. But I'd also reference DL 10.121:

    121] Two sorts of happiness (eudaimonia) can be conceived, the one the highest possible, such as the gods enjoy, which cannot be augmented, the other admitting addition and subtraction of pleasures.

    121] Τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν διχῆ νοεῖσθαι, τήν τε ἀκροτάτην, οἵα ἐστὶ περὶ τὸν θεόν, ἐπίτασιν οὐκ ἔχουσαν: καὶ τὴν <κατὰ τὴν> προσθήκην καὶ ἀφαίρεσιν ἡδονῶν.

    Quote from Don

    121] Two sorts of happiness (eudaimonia) can be conceived, the one the highest possible, such as the gods enjoy, which cannot be augmented, the other admitting addition and subtraction of pleasures.

    I wonder if that means that the happiness that the gods enjoy is necessarily greater that the top level that can be enjoyed by non-gods. Meaning, just because the happiness of the gods never increases or decreases, does that mean that the top level enjoyable by non gods is less than that when it is at its top level?


    Further and rephrased: I wonder if that passage about competing with the gods for happiness indicates that the changing level available to non-gods, when it is at its highest level, can be equal the unchanging level of the gods, with the only difference being the limitation in time available to the non-gods?

    The word translated "highest" is the superlative of άκρος akros:

    • At the edge, extreme, beginning, end: outermost (especially of the top)
    • Being the most of any characteristic: best, oldest, first

    I get the idea that the sense of well-being of the gods is unchanging and constant and so at the "most extreme edge" of the spectrum of how eudaimonia is experienced. Non-gods experience the addition and subtraction (subtraction of pleasures = pain??) in their lives.

    Quote from Cassius

    Further and rephrased: I wonder if that passage about competing with the gods for happiness indicates that the changing level available to non-gods, when it is at its highest level, can be equal the unchanging level of the gods, with the only difference being the limitation in time available to the non-gods?

    VS 33. The body cries out to not be hungry, not be thirsty, not be cold. Anyone who has these things, and who is confident of continuing to have them, can rival the gods for happiness. σαρκὸς φωνὴ τὸ μὴ πεινῆν, τὸ μὴ διψῆν, τὸ μὴ ῥιγοῦν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχων τις καὶ ἐλπίζων ἕξειν [hope or expect to have] κἂν <διὶ [dative of Zeus]> ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας μαχέσαιτο. [contend/compete]


    So, it does say contend or compete. It doesn't say equal.

    So what about the word translated as "blessed?". Does it have connotations so strong that it cannot be applied to humans? If "immortal" can be applied to human activities, then can "blessed" be less flexible?

    Quote from Cassius

    So what about the word translated as "blessed?". Does it have connotations so strong that it cannot be applied to humans? If "immortal" can be applied to human activities, then can "blessed" be less flexible?

    Τὸ μακάριον is used in connection with humans, too, one example being PD27

    PD1 - blessed, fortunate, wealthy, “well-off”. There appears to me no certain etymology of [makar] or the longer form [makarios/on].It appears to have something to do with being wealthy (both literally and figuratively?).

    See also https://books.google.com/books…makar%20etymology&f=false

    Notes on MAKARIOS - Blessed

    MENO* - Greek Thoughts- Language Studies - StudyLight.org


    Also

    PD27 Ὧν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου μακαριότητα, πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτῆσις.


    DB - That which wisdom provides with regard to the complete/fulfilled blissful life, by far the best is the gaining of friendship.

    And from the letter to Menoeceus passage translated as Please is the alpha and Omega of the blessed life...". Same word?


    And if so that would mean that each of the descriptors if the beings referenced in PD01, which commentators seem to consider as referencing only gods, are also terms that Epicurus uses when discussing humans?



    Combine these comments with those we have repeatedly made that the numbering is later addition and induces an artificial sense of separation between the lines and the possibilities for deeper interpretation of PD01 are intriguing.


    We don't talk about it often, maybe in part because it seems "over the top," but that "live as a god among men" reference surely could be related to this too.

    Quote from Cassius

    And from the letter to Menoeceus passage translated as Please is the alpha and Omega of the blessed life...". Same word?

    τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν. Yep. It's used there. "pleasure is the foundation and fulfillment of the blessed life." But there's the blessed life open to mortals which has pleasure and pain and the blessed life of the gods with no pain.

    Quote from Cassius

    And if so that would mean that each of the descriptors if the beings referenced in PD01,

    Is immortal/incorruptible used to refer to humans? Or to "goods" like friendship? That's a difference that seems significant to me.

    I like where this is going, and it brings to mind the "idealist" interpretation of the gods. I'm curious if any of the articles on that subject mention PD01 or any other PDs that might be relevant.

    Surely there are articles out there that make this comparison so I will see what I can find.


    I would certainly not suggest that PDO1 is not of relevance to the gods, but if it in fact has wider application, then the aspect that relates to the gods would be only a part of the intended meaning, and maybe not the most important part.


    Do not in fact every one of the other principal doctrines refer to human affairs? Maybe the primary Epicurean contentions about the gods are as stated in Herodotus and Pythocles as a matter of physics, the important aspect of which is that the gods are not supernatural and did not create the universe. If one sees PDO1 as only a statement about the nature of the gods alone, that would make it an exception to the subject of all the rest. Epicurus shows in the letter to Menoeceus that he very capable of being clear about the nature of the gods being different from what we think of them.


    And I would relate this to another opinion that I think a lot of people here would share, especially when we consider Lucian's "True Story."


    Can anyone here see Epicurus as being the kind of person who would say: "Humans do not have wings so they will never fly?" Lucian thought of humans going to the moon, so why would Epicurus lock himself into a position of declaring that it is "impossible" for beings elsewhere in the universe, even in other "worlds" to travel between them? We know that he accepting the idea that we receive images of the gods, apparently from the intermundia. I would say that the central important theme of Epicurean philosophy is that the gods are not supernatural and did not create the universe, and that Epicurus would not lock himself into stating flatly that beings on other planets/worlds, like Lucian envisioned as to the moon, might not be capable of traveling around between them.


    So there are numerous ways of coming at this, but the bottom line is I see no reason not to interpret PD01 as applicable to all life everywhere, of which both we and the gods are but natural parts, and not just a reference for not "fearing" the gods -- especially since the reverse - benefiting from their images - seems to be an important part of Epicurean philosophy but is not mentioned in PD01.

    Going back to the original question: What are the possible reasons why the list of 40 Principal Doctrines does not feature a statement explicitly stating pleasure to be the goal of life?


    It is possible that there were more Doctrines than just 40? So that what we have from Diogenes Laetrius is incomplete?


    It looks to me that Diogenes Laertius lists two goals -- and this excerpt shows a conflict. On one hand there is "health of the body and tranquility of the mind" but further down "pleasure is the alpha and omega".

    Letter from Menoeceus (R.D Hicks):

    Quote from Cassius

    So there are numerous ways of coming at this, but the bottom line is I see no reason not to interpret PD01 as applicable to all life everywhere

    My reservation on that would be the latter part of PD01 where neither anger not favor/gratitude affects the one who is blessed and incorruptible. Epicurus is clear that gratitude is important for humans to live a pleasurable life.

    For what it's worth, here are my verses 128-9 from that section of the letter to Menoikeus:

    Quote

    [128] The steady contemplation of these things equips one to know how to decide all choice and rejection for the health of the body and for the tranquility of the mind (<τῆς ψυχῆς> ἀταραξίαν ataraxia), that is for our physical and our mental existence, since this is the goal of a blessed life. For the sake of this, we do everything in order to neither be in bodily or mental pain nor to be in fear or dread; and so, when once this has come into being around us, it sets free all of the calamity, distress, and suffering of the mind, seeing that the living being has no need to go in search of something that is lacking for the good of our mental and physical existence. For it is then that we need pleasure, if we were to be in pain from the pleasure not being present; but if we were to not be in pain, we no longer desire or beg for pleasure. And this is why we say pleasure is the foundation and fulfillment of the blessed life. [129] Because we perceived pleasure as a fundamental good and common to our nature, and so, as a result of this, we begin every choice and rejection against this, judging every good thing by the standard of how that pleasure affects us or how we react to considering experiencing that pleasure. And because pleasure is the fundamental and inborn good, this is why not every pleasure is seized and we pass by many pleasures when greater unpleasant things were to result for us as a result: and we think many pains better than pleasures whenever greater pleasure were to follow for a longer time by patiently abiding the pain.

    Quote from Don

    My reservation on that would be the latter part of PD01 where neither anger not favor/gratitude affects the one who is blessed and incorruptible. Epicurus is clear that gratitude is important for humans to live a pleasurable life.

    That's a very good point, Don. That would mean that the subtlety would have to extend to the observation that because men are not gods, they are subject to anger and favor, both of which are necessary to sustain their lives at times given that we do not live in the intermundia.


    Perhaps related to this is that I have always found it interesting that Diskin Clay, in his article on Epicurus' last will and testament, suggested that this PDO1 was really one of the Twelve Fundamentals (in which he agreed with many of DeWitt's suggestions but not all). I can definitely see an analogy to atoms in that an atom has no possibility of being "weak" and breaking apart, and there therefore selfsufficient, but on the other hand atoms are not gods - there's just that analogy that they are not weak.


    So in pointing out correctly that gratitude (and I would say anger/ability to use force against at least some types of enemies too as per PD06) is in fact a necessary part of human life, this is perhaps the offsetting balance against the first assertion that a perfect being knows no trouble and give no trouble (why "trouble" and not "pain"?), like many of the other doctrines seem to start with an assertion and then finish with a second "offsetting" assertion.


    PD08. No pleasure is a bad thing in itself; but the means which produce some pleasures bring with them disturbances many times greater than the pleasures.


    PD09. If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted, and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.



    And as Kalosyni mentioned in terms of "getting back to the original question" there is something odd about the way the list is written. Epicurus obviously could string together a narrative such as in his letters. How did this document end up being so disjointed? And as per the original question too, it would have been so easy to lift from the letter the Meneouceus or presumably many other places as statement like: "We recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good."


    Even if PD01 is dual purpose as per this recent exchange, why is that ethical point not stated more explicitly? Would Epicurus himself likely have left it out?


    It's almost like Kalosyni said that the document has been lifted from some other context without an introduction (such as Torquatus gave when he started talking about the best life) .

    I have to think of "St. Paul and Epicurus" where DeWitt indirectly suggests St. Paul is opening a path to the heavens. Consequently, the gods would experience something more valuable than our current pleasures. I personally think it has to do with their physics, being made of a different kind/quality of atoms.