Bailey: 26. Of desires, all that do not lead to a sense of pain, if they are not satisfied, are not necessary, but involve a craving which is easily dispelled when the object is hard to procure, or they seem likely to produce harm.
**TΩΝ EΠΙΘΥΜΙΩΝ ****ΟΣAΙ ΜΗ EΠ AΛΓΟΥΝ EΠAΝAΓΟΥΣΙΝ ****EAΝ**
**ΜΗ ΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΩΣΙΝ ****ΟΥΚ EΙΣΙΝ AΝAΓΚAΙAΙ ****AΛΛ' **
**EΥΔΙAΧΥTΟΝ ****TΗΝ ΟΡEΞΙΝ EΧΟΥΣΙΝ ****ΟTAΝ ΔΥΣΠΟΡΙΣTΩΝ**
**[ῌ] Η ΒΛAΒΗΣ AΠEΡΓAΣTΙΚAΙ ΔΟΞΩΣΙΝ ****EΙΝAΙ. **
“All desires that lead to no pain when they remain ungratified are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid of, when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the desires seem likely to produce harm.” Yonge (1853)
“Some desires lead to no pain when they remain ungratified. All such desires are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid of when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the desires seem likely to produce harm.” Hicks (1910)
“All such desires as lead to no pain when they remain ungratified are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid of, when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the desires seem likely to produce harm.” Hicks (1925)
“Of desires, all that do not lead to a sense of pain, if they are not satisfied, are not necessary, but involve a craving which is easily dispelled, when the object is hard to procure or they seem likely to produce harm.” Bailey (1926)
“Those desires that do not bring pain if they are not satisfied are not necessary; and they are easily thrust aside whenever to satisfy them appears difficult or likely to cause injury.” Geer (1964)
“Those desires that do not lead to pain, if they are not fulfilled, are not necessary. They involve a longing that is easily dispelled, whenever it is difficult to fulfill the desires or they appear likely to lead to harm.” O'Connor (1993)
“The desires which do not bring a feeling of pain when not fulfilled are not necessary; but the desire for them is easy to dispel when they seem to be hard to achieve or to produce harm.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)
“All desires which create no pain when unfulfilled are not necessary; such desires may easily be dispelled when they are seen as difficult to fulfill or likely to produce harm.” Anderson (2004)
“Of desires, those which do not bring one to pain if they remain unfulfilled are not necessary; such desires are actually accompanied by appetites that are easily defused: indeed, [this is evidently what happens] when it is thought difficult to find the means to satisfy [unnecessary desires] or when the desires themselves are thought to be productive of harm.” Makridis (2005)
“The desires that do not bring pain when they go unfulfilled are not necessary; indeed they are easy to reject if they are hard to achieve or if they seem to produce harm.” Saint-Andre (2008)
“All desires that do not lead to physical pain if not satisfied are unnecessary, and involve cravings that are easily resolved when they appear to entail harm or when the object of desire is hard to get.” Strodach (2012)
“All desires that do not lead to pain when unfulfilled are unnecessary, and such cravings are easily dissolved when the desired objects are hard to procure or are thought to do harm.” Mensch (2018)
“Any desires that do not lead to bodily pain if they are not fulfilled are not necessary; rather, the motivation they supply is readily dispelled whenever we believe they are difficult to satisfy or liable to result in harm.” White (2021)
