Episode Ninety-Three: Torquatus Leads Us Forward Into Conflict Over Epicurean Ethics

The pleasures are not identical, and that’s where so much confusion can be sown by devious minds I'm thinking that that is a big reason why Epicurus kept pointing out that pleasure is pleasure, a faculty. Rather than argue with Platonists and Academics about what type of pleasure is good, or better or greatest, he made the distinction between pleasure and desire. This was one of his great innovations! "Everyone knows what pleasure is and pursues it, even babies and Cows. If you want to talk to me about what's greater or good-er, talk to me about desires."

Cassius, I'm suggesting that this is where the opponents won the war, in focusing on ranking pleasures instead of desires. As you know, this separation has been tickling me for a while... I'm not sure if I'm reading it correctly but it seems promising. Plus like so many of Epicurus' ideas, it seems to relate favorably to modern science. Just an added bonus

Referring to post #61, that's why I think it's interesting to compare PD03 and PD09.

PD3 The limit of enjoyment is the removal of all pains. Wherever and for however long pleasure is present, there is neither bodily pain nor mental distress.

I think we agree that the first sentence is a refutation of the argument that pleasures have no limits. To me, the second sentence is adding specificity: if you have pleasure in your belly there is no pain in your belly. Same for your foot, and perhaps for your mind. So if all pains, throughout your body and mind, are removed, you've reached the limit of pleasure.

PD9 If every pleasure were condensed and were present at the same time and in the whole of one's nature or its primary parts, then the pleasures would never differ from one another.

I'm reading this as building on the second sentence of PD03. These acknowledge that you can have pleasure in your stomach, or your foot or your mind or wherever. If the pleasure in your foot filled your whole body and mind for one minute, it would be no different than if the pleasure in your belly filled your body and mind for one minute. So, pleasure is pleasure, which is part of a faculty of pathe.

I actually prefer the Hicks 1925 translation of PD09 as it uses "accumulate" rather than "condense". I'm not sure which is more accurate, but I find accumulate to be more illustrative.

Quote from Cassius

I do think that pleasures have to be ranked so that we can intelligently choose between them. I guess I would say much the same thing about "desires." Ranking "pleasures" seems to make more sense to me because that is the method by which I would rank my "desires'' if I even thought in terms of ranking desires. My desires flow directly from my evaluation of the possible pleasures and pain, so I am not sure I see the path forward you are suggesting.

Keeping in mind that much of what we have of Epicurus comes from sources that are to some undetermined degree hostile, I'm doing the exercise of looking more closely at the texts that are generally agreed to be by Epicurus himself. And also keeping in mind that he stated that we need to be clear on what we mean by particular words. (I think I'm channeling Scalia, god forbid!)

Now I'm cross-posting... usually I'm 2 or 3 hours behind in the discussion

Quote from Cassius

Does Nature herself create a concept called "pleasure" by which we should understand ALL pleasures to be included? What would you say is the intersection between human nature and the words we use to describe it?

Nature does not create a concept called "pleasure". The end of the cascade for this question, though, leads to Scepticism. All philosophies are mental models. Epicurus proposed a mental model to describe how he perceived and understood the world, and I find that model to be the best that I've come across. His model relies on faculties of sensation, feeling and anticipations and has been built upon to form the basis of modern science. The combination of Epicurus' model and modern science, to me, is the best description that we have of the universe in which we live and how to live in this universe. The persistent lack of evidence of a providential universe indicates, to me, that "Nature" has no mental models. With this in mind, pleasure is an observed, emergent phenomenon of organic life.

It's my understanding that for clarity of discussion Epicurus was very explicit, in Greek, of the meaning of "pleasure". Over the millennia and through various languages and various intentions, that word "pleasure" has taken on a life of its own. Kind of like the word "Epicurean"

Quote from Cassius

My comments are based on a presumption that Epicurus is going back and forth, as the occasion demands, using the word "pleasure" in both a high-level conceptual sense at times, but also at other times strictly as a feelings, with times when his usage almost is intersecting.

I'm not sure about Epicurus, but his opponents definitely were and eventually his followers had to. Hence our quandary.

Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus:

Quote

37... First, Herodotus, we need to have grasped what is denoted by our words, [1] so that by referring to what they denote we can make decisions about the objects of opinion, investigation, or puzzlement and [2] so that all of these things will not remain undecided, [as they would] if we tried to give an infinitely long demonstration, and [3] so that our words will not be empty. 38. For it is necessary that we look to the primary conception corresponding to each word and that it stand in no need of demonstration, if, that is, we are going to have something to which we can refer the object of search or puzzlement and opinion.

This doesn't refer specifically to "pleasure" but to his use of words. "Pleasure" being such a central idea, however, could be understood to be covered by this passage.

Quote from Cassius

I do think that pleasures have to be ranked so that we can intelligently choose between them.

No, no, no. I thought we had agreed on this one. We choose by applying whether a specific pleasurable activity leads to a more pleasurable life. We don't need to consult a list or ranking or hierarchy. We should not "rank" pleasurable activities in the abstract. There is no absolute hierarchy for all time of pleasures even for the individual.

All we can say is right here, right now, this activity option before me would lead to a more pleasurable life, therefore, at this time, I will choose to engage in this. This activity which I desire to engage in in the future may be pleasurable in that future moment, but will in the end bring more pain into my life. Therefore, I reject it. I reject that anyone can sit down, go through a list of let's say 100 pleasures and rank them and adhere to that list for all time at every moment throughout their life. What is choice-worthy is contextual, dependent on circumstances, and what is choice-worthy now may not be when circumstances are similar in the future.

Quote from Cassius

I would say that this is one of those areas where once we identify an absurdity (the assertion that all pleasures are identical in every respect) we immediately reject it as having possibly been Epicurus' position and we immediately go elsewhere looking for a proper understanding of his assertions.

That was my point in an earlier post. Epicurus is saying in PD09 "If X were the case, then Y" but he's asserting a counterfactual. PD09 has to do with the impossibility of equating all the possible pleasureable activities in which humans can engage. They're all distinct, but similar in that they bring pleasure. They can't be condensed etc however. There are many pleasures which we can desire and these desires must be chosen or rejected based on measuring them against the criteria of whether those desires fulfilled will lead to a more pleasurable life or not. Not measured against a hierarchy somewhere.

I've also come to think that PD09 is directly related to PD10. That's another counterfactual "If X were the case, then Y." PD09 establishes there are myriad pleasures. PD10 established those pleasures enjoyed by the profligate ARE pleasurable but not necessarily choice-worthy because they don't dispel fears of death, etc., and do not lead to a more pleasureable life.

PD03, PD09 and PD10 are all interesting in that they are providing counterfactual arguments (I think "absurdities" is too strong of a word) while at the same time adding clarity and details to those looking for it.

Quote from Cassius

It is very interesting to me how when we spoke on the podcast we seemed to more easily agree that we were on the same page, but in putting the positions down in writing we seem to find agreement harder.

Honestly, the time delay in writing and the inability to actually have a conversation might be part of it.

Plus I let my passions get the better of me on that post. I'm gonna give a little mea culpa on that one.

Quote from Cassius

Maybe you would prefer to use another word than "ranking" because you think all rankings require an outside standard, but that would again be a definitional choice on which to be clear and it's not my understanding that the word "ranking" and the "process of ranking' must require an absolute standard - it seems to me the word can be used properly referring only to our own individual standard that is in fact contextual, as you say, and changes even within us over time and circumstance.

Okay, yes yes. I think we are understanding the word "rank" in two different senses. That's seems to be the crux of my issue. Not that rank doesn't have the two senses but we're let's say talking past each other. That's the issue with posting rather than talking! That could have been resolved in a back and forth in two minutes rather than multiple posts over a week.

To me the word "rank" is a fixed order. I got no problem with "comparing" two or more options on the fly with the caveat of comparing them again later. So if you use "rank" I'm going to substitute "compare."

So, with reading your thoughtful, methodical post above it seems we ARE in agreement. Whew! LOL! Thank you for your patience!!

Quote from Godfrey

Over the millennia and through various languages and various intentions, that word "pleasure" has taken on a life of its own. Kind of like the word "Epicurean"

I would agree. Pleasure, especially in Christian theology, seems to have become equated with sin and vice. Suffering and pain would be rewarded in the afterlife, unless you ended up in the Bad Place or even Purgatory where you had to be purged and purified of your sin. Did/do they use the word "pleasure" even to refer to the Good Place? Or talk around it with words like bliss or rejoicing or something?

Quote from Godfrey

PD03, PD09 and PD10 are all interesting in that they are providing counterfactual arguments (I think "absurdities" is too strong of a word) while at the same time adding clarity and details to those looking for it.

Hmm. I not sure PD03 is counterfactual as much as it is an unattainable goal (unless you're a god!). If a person was exclusively experiencing no pain in their body or mind anywhere, they would, by definition, be experiencing nothing but pleasure. Once that state (again only attainable by a god) is reached, pleasure cannot be "increased" but simply varied.

I freely admit I may be using "unattainable goal" to mean the same thing as Godfrey's "counterfactual" like the rank/compare debate I just had with Cassius.

I'm using Nathan's compilation again for reference here:

ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις. ὅπου δʼἂν τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐνῇ, καθʼὃν ἂν χρόνον ᾖ, ουκ ἔστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἢ λυπούμενον ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον.

“The limit of great pleasures is the removal of everything which can give pain. And where pleasure is, as long as it lasts, that which gives pain, or that which feels pain, or both of them, are absent.” Yonge (1853)

“The magnitude of pleasures is limited by the removal of all pain. Wherever there is pleasure, so long as it is present, there is no pain either of body or of mind or both.” Hicks (1910)

“The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all pain. When pleasure is present, so long as it is uninterrupted, there is no pain either of body or of mind or of both together.” (Hicks 1925)

“The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body nor of mind, nor of both at once.” Bailey (1926)

“The removal of all pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. And wherever the experience of pleasure is present, so long as it prevails, there is no pain or distress or acombination of them.” (De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 226, 241; 1954)

“The removal of all that causes pain marks the boundary of pleasure. Wherever pleasure is present and as long as it continues, there is neither suffering nor grieving nor both togethers.” Geer (1964)

“The removal of all pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, pain or distress or their combination is absent.” (Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115; 1987)

“The limit of the extent of pleasure is the removal of all pain. Wherever pleasure is present, for however long a time, there can be no pain or grief, or both of these.” O'Connor (1993)

“The removal of all feeling of pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. Wherever a pleasurable feeling is present, for as long as it is present, there is neither a feeling of pain nor a feeling of distress, nor both together.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Pleasure reaches its maximum limit at the removal of all sources of pain. When such pleasure is present, for as long as it lasts, there is no cause of physical nor mental pain present – nor of both together.” Anderson (2004)

“Pleasure has its <upper> limit in the removal of everything that produces pain. For, wherever that which produces pleasure resides, for as long as it abides, there can be nothing that produces pain, grief, or both.” Makridis (2005)

“The limit of enjoyment is the removal of all pains. Wherever and for however long pleasure is present, there is neither bodily pain nor mental distress.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“The quantitative limit of pleasure is the elimination of all feelings of pain. Wherever the pleasurable state exists, there is neither bodily pain nor mental pain nor both together, so long as the state continues.” Strodach (2012)

“The limit of pleasure is reached with the removal of all pain. Whenever pleasure is present, and for however long, there is neither pain nor grief nor any combination of the two.” Mensch (2018)