An Epicurean Understanding of Pleasure

  • So, my contention is that a desire need not be grand. It need not be capital-D Desire. Just like pleasure doesn't need to be capital-P Pleasure. There are things that we desire because they're necessary for living, and only the living can experience pleasure.

    Yes I think we all agree on that (I am not saying "Why did you bother to repeat it?" but rather. "Yes that is one of our fundamental presumptions.")


    The next step though is significantly harder, which is the analysis of "ranking" pleasures not only on a necessary scale, but on some other scale, such as (1) natural, but also (2 ad infinitum) with words such as "intensity" or "depth of feeling" or "importance to 'us' as individuals, rather than just "us as human beings who have to eat, sleep, etc."


    We can probably start with the "natural" because that is in Menoeceus and Torquatus, but I have always found that term significantly harder to apply than "necessary." I don't think the key either is "whether it has a limit" because necessary pleasures too have a limit (air, food, water, etc) so there must be some other factor than "having a limit" which distinguishes "natural." So one place to start is to try to get a grip on "natural."


    But I don't think even those two give us the subjective element of "intensity" or "depth of feeling" or "importance to 'us' as individuals, rather than just 'us' as human beings" and I surely think that Epicurus did not deprecate those other than perhaps to the "necessary" in the sense that "pleasure has no meaning except to the living" and if we don't get the necessary pleasures we don't remain living very long.

  • Our target, here, I think - at the end of the day - will include that we have a cogent and potent response to criticism that Epicureans would limit our ambition in life to "grazing in the grass" -- otherwise known as the "animality objection" - from Cicero and Aristotle and of course others:


  • The next step though is significantly harder, which is the analysis of "ranking" pleasures

    Please don't take this as some kind of ad hominem, because it's not meant that way...


    But why?


    Why do you want or need to rank pleasures?


    I thought the "All pleasure is good" precluded the ranking of pleasure.


    Maybe ranking desires for specific pleasures is possible (Epicurus did do that after a fashion with necessary, natural, etc.), but by definition pleasure is good.


    I might even amend my post above to say the pleasure of breathing, eating, are both natural and necessary. The desire to eat shrimp instead of bread is natural but not necessary.

  • We cross posted -- much of the answer to your question is in the "animality objection" in post 82 above.


    I thought the "All pleasure is good" precluded the ranking of pleasure.

    That would be correct if we considered all pleasure is good" to mean "all pleasure is THE highest good" but it is by no means clear (at least to me) that Epicurus was considering "good" here in that absolute sense, rather than in the relative sense in which there are many goods, some better than others. That's the reason for the SUMMUM in the "summum bonum" I think.



    Another way of stating the question is that if he had been consistent, as soon as Epicurus formulated his philosophy he should have retired to his cave and lived a subsistence existence totally apart from the crowd. But he did not -- he lived a life of relative material luxury and devoted much of his time to philosophical controversy. Why - one naturally would ask? And I think the answer has to be in part that he valued the pleasures that he chose to pursue more highly - much more highly - than the pleasures he would have achieved had he retired to the cave on bread and water.


    He chose - not the life of a cow - but the life of a supreme philosophical warrior and veritable "savior" of mankind! ;)


    And I would say that what seems like the obvious answer to me is that he chose the pleasures derived from the life of philosophical study and writing and controversy as much more pleasant to him than the life of "grazing in the grass."

  • As usual our opponent is Cicero, but also as usual he does us the favor of both preserving Epicurean texts and pointing out for us the salvos we must deflect and return fire against.


    From Book 6:


    Quote

    He therefore cleansed men’s breasts with truth-telling precepts and fixed a limit to lust and fear and explained what was the chief good which we all strive to reach, and pointed out the road along which by a short cross-track we might arrive at it in a straightforward course; he showed too what evils existed in mortal affairs throughout, rising up and manifoldly flying about by a natural –call it chance or force, because nature had so brought it about – and from what gates you must sally out duly to encounter each; and he proved that mankind mostly without cause arouse in their breast the melancholy tumbling billows of cares.

  • I agree with Don in post #83. And I would add that to me the only point in ranking pleasures is to argue with opponents of Epicurus. The end result of that is comparable to having a fourth leg of the Canon: it's an interpretation that tries to accommodate someone who isn't necessarily interested in understanding EP but rather in undermining it. So I think at some point we reach a limit to the value of studying Cicero if our goal is to live the philosophy. I realize though that there are two agendas here: living the philosophy and promoting/defending the philosophy.


    Quote

    PD 9: If every pleasure were condensed and were present at the same time and in the whole of one's nature or its primary parts, then the pleasures would never differ from one another.

    I would paraphrase this as "it's silly to rank pleasures" 8o


    "The most pleasant", to me, refers to a life, not to a pleasure. And the most pleasant life would be one that has been fully aware of available pleasures and has worked to maintain those pleasures through prudent management of desires.

  • I realize though that there are two agendas here: living the philosophy and promoting/defending the philosophy.

    Yes, that's legitimate.


    But in other words, Godfrey, you're refusing to argue with Cicero that you're not a cow? ;)

  • I would argue that Cicero is a cow :D


    At first blush my bovine rebuttal is that it's true that all organic life possesses the faculty of Feelings to some degree. What distinguishes you and I, but not Cicero (partly because he's dead) from a cow is our degree of awareness of our Feelings.

  • Returning to my obsession with pleasure v desire, I'd add the thought that perhaps when you are fully aware of your pleasure, you aren't experiencing desire. This doesn't mean that desire is opposed to pleasure, only that it can result in pleasure and is different from pleasure. If pleasure and desire were equivalent then you would experience maximum desire at the same time as maximum pleasure. I find that that isn't the case. Therefore it doesn't make sense to rank or categorize pleasures, at least not in the same way as desires. I think that this begins to separate the idea of absence of pain from the categories of desire, and might prove to be a rebuttal to the ascetic argument upon further development.... :/

  • Returning to my obsession with pleasure v desire,

    Godfrey the thread is getting long and I don't remember - did you suggest a definition of those two words. I remember I think that Don did but I am not sure I remember yours.

  • Desire, Wikipedia excerpt from post #74:

    "Desires are states of mind that are expressed by terms like "wanting", "wishing", "longing" or "craving". A great variety of features is commonly associated with desires. They are seen as propositional attitudes towards conceivable states of affairs. They aim to change the world by representing how the world should be, unlike beliefs, which aim to represent how the world actually is. Desires are closely related to agency: they motivate the agent to realize them. For this to be possible, a desire has to be combined with a belief about which action would realize it. Desires present their objects in a favorable light, as something that appears to be good. Their fulfillment is normally experienced as pleasurable in contrast to the negative experience of failing to do so. Conscious desires are usually accompanied by some form of emotional response. While many researchers roughly agree on these general features, there is significant disagreement about how to define desires, i.e. which of these features are essential and which ones are merely accidental. Action-based theories define desires as structures that incline us toward actions. Pleasure-based theories focus on the tendency of desires to cause pleasure when fulfilled. Value-based theories identify desires with attitudes toward values, like judging or having an appearance that something is good."


    Pleasure: I can't remember if I posted a specific definition other than to describe pleasure as a perception which is one of the two aspects of the faculty of Feelings.

  • We cross posted -- much of the answer to your question is in the "animality objection" in post 82 above.


    I thought the "All pleasure is good" precluded the ranking of pleasure.

    That would be correct if we considered all pleasure is good" to mean "all pleasure is THE highest good" but it is by no means clear (at least to me) that Epicurus was considering "good" here in that absolute sense, rather than in the relative sense in which there are many goods, some better than others. That's the reason for the SUMMUM in the "summum bonum" I think.

    Okay, let me finally return to my "Oh, my"...


    Pleasure is "THE highest good" not because it is the "Best Bestest Good Out Of All The Other Goods."

    It is "The Good" because it is the good thing to which all other possible candidates for "The Good Thing" leads. It is The Good, the Tagathon, the Goal, the Telos at the End of every action or desire. It is NOT "good" relative to other goods. It is THE GOOD. There are no rivals.

    Virtue cannot be The Good because ultimately we act virtuously because it is instrumental to pleasure.

    Wisdom cannot be The Good because we act wisely ultimately because it is instrumental to feelings of pleasure.

    Philosophy cannot be The Good because we follow a philosophy because it will lead us to pleasure.

    EVERYTHING points to pleasure. Pleasure sits at the top of the heap of possible candidates for The Good BECAUSE it is the final destination, The Goal, the Telos, the End. That is why it's the SUMMUM bonum. It is at the summit of goods. All paths up the mountain pass virtue, wisdom, etc., along the way and what sits at the end of the path at the top... why do we do the things we do? ... To achieve pleasure! The SUMMUM denotes the top or the summit. It is literally the highest good. It is the good "at the utmost, at farthest." Every path, followed to its end, leads ultimately to pleasure. Pleasure is literally The End at the end of the path.

    This is also an argument against viewing some pleasures being "higher" than others. PLEASURE writ large is the telos, the goal, the end, the highest good. We chase pleasure in all its myriad and varied forms.

    Aristotle didn't accept pleasure as The Good because (according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) "pleasure cannot be our ultimate target, because what counts as pleasant must be judged by some standard other than pleasure itself, namely the judgment of the virtuous person." That's circular reasoning it seems to me. Pleasure can't be the ultimate good because there needs to be a standard of pleasure judged by some virtuous person?? That's one reason why Epicurus said Pleasure IS The Standard for our choices. There is no other "authority" - no virtuous person - judging our actions except does this choice lead to pleasure.

    Now, this didn't deter Epicurus from saying, "Yes, all pleasure is good, but that pleasure you're thinking about choosing... Experience has shown that leads ultimately to pain, not the most pleasant life. Okaaay, you do the drugs all night, drink til dawn if you choose to. BUT you're going to pay a hefty price tomorrow and even more if you keep it up. But I will not argue that you aren't feeling pleasure in the moment. I'll let the Cyrenaics know you'll be knocking at their door."

    Another way of stating the question is that if he had been consistent, as soon as Epicurus formulated his philosophy he should have retired to his cave and lived a subsistence existence totally apart from the crowd. But he did not -- he lived a life of relative material luxury and devoted much of his time to philosophical controversy. Why - one naturally would ask? And I think the answer has to be in part that he valued the pleasures that he chose to pursue more highly - much more highly - than the pleasures he would have achieved had he retired to the cave on bread and water.

    I'm not sure what you're getting at here. Epicurus talked the talk and walked the walk. He aimed to live the most pleasant life. Living an ascetic life in a cave open to the elements, alone, away from friends, on the edge of starvation, would not be pleasant. He knew that obviously. He set up shop right outside the walls of the city on the road to the Academy in relative affluence for the day. It has nothing to do with "higher" or "lower" pleasures. The life he led was the most pleasant for him and he chose that.

    And I would say that what seems like the obvious answer to me is that he chose the pleasures derived from the life of philosophical study and writing and controversy as much more pleasant to him than the life of "grazing in the grass."

    Epicurus chose "the pleasures derived from the life of philosophical study and writing" precisely because he found it pleasurable. He obviously enjoyed teaching, writing diatribes against rival schools, welcoming friends into the Garden. I don't think he weighed living like a cow or a pig AGAINST a life of teaching and writing. He knew what would bring him pleasure and pursued that.

  • I don't think any of us are all that far apart, but I need to take a break before responding further to edit the latest podcast, and to get the video of Martin's presentation on propositional logic finalized, so I will use that break to reformulate my thoughts and return here as soon as I can.

  • Just realized there are a lot of CAPITAL LETTERS in my post #94. I did not mean to yell that much ;) Passions can get the best of you when you post later at night. I agree with everything I wrote... Just maybe need to dial back the expression of it.

  • Ha as you know I use capitals a lot as a shorthand for bold rather than to imply shouting. This software though has a very easy way to do both bold and italics and I need to break that habit myself!