Issues In The Meaning And Definition of Logic

The page in Delacy I return to time and again is this one: https://archive.org/details/philod…ter&q=syllogism

I believe we are going to find that the concept of syllogisms is critical to this discussion, and that Aristotle (and even more so Plato and the Stoics) were invested in "syllogistic logic" as the ultimate standard of truth, and that that is something Epicurus firmly rejected. And what's the definition of syllogistic logic? As Godfrey says, "film at eleven," but I think that if that term means anything it refers to a formal symbolic kind of process in which you convert particular observations into "concepts" or "universals" or some other term denoting a symbol taking the place of a sensation (or any data from the canonical faculties). And of course the problem is as stated in our recent conversations to the effect that "the map is not the terrain," etc.

Which is of course not to say that symbolic / syllogistic logic cannot be valuable at times, but is to say that symbolic / syllogistic logic should never be (but often is, by its advocates) confused with reality itself. Our only real connections with reality are the data we get from the canonical faculties, and that's what makes THEM (and not symbolic/syllogistic logic) the ultimate standard of truth. We don't consider maps necessary to our being able day-to-day to navigate in reality, and we shouldn't consider syllogistic logic to be a requirement of our being confident in our day-to-day thinking either.

syllogism (noun):

- an instance of a form of reasoning in which a conclusion is drawn (whether validly or not) from two given or assumed propositions (premises), each of which shares a term with the conclusion, and shares a common or middle term not present in the conclusion (e.g., all dogs are animals; all animals have four legs; therefore all dogs have four legs ).

- deductive reasoning as distinct from induction. "this school of epistemology is highly advanced in syllogism and logical reasoning"

(from Oxford Languages online)

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"We don't consider maps necessary to our being able day-to-day to navigate in reality, and we shouldn't consider syllogistic logic to be a requirement of our being confident in our day-to-day thinking either."

No.

We don't consider maps necessary to our being able day-to-day to navigate in reality because we have internalized them and use them intuitively without realizing it.

Similarly, we have internalized "syllogistic" logic such that we use it in our day-to-day thinking when fully awake without realizing it.

Interestingly, when I am very tired but still awake, logic does no more work but the results from the associative thinking which continues are often lousy because no logic has been applied as a sanity check.

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"if the premises are false, the conclusion is going to be false."

No.

If the premises are false, the conclusion is not necessarily false.

Otherwise, you could "refute" a true statement by presenting it as the conclusion of false premises.

The truth table of a syllogism looks like this (you can verify by thinking it through line by line):

You can see from this table that the conclusion may be true if any or both of the premises are false.

Quote from camotero

"How do we know something is true? I can feel when something is true". I don't think this is true, but I'm open to be corrected. I'm pretty sure the person who said this didn't mean it and said it rhetorically or lightly as no one objected it. But as I said, I don't think you can feel truth. You may have true feelings. But the truth about something has to be established (and agreed upon to be able to move forward) logically, albeit after the senses gave us content to reason about, and after we've tested out reasoning with those same senses.

Your quote here Mathitis Kipouros reminded of this thread that I had started awhile ago: Facts don't care about your feelings

When (binary) logic is taught, it is usually exemplified by combining statements which are obviously true.

Logic works only with crisp (100% true) and timeless statements (or statements on events of the past or present). If any of the premises is not 100% true but only with some probability, the conclusion is not reliably true.

In fuzzy logic as applied technically in designing control loops, you can still get a conclusion with a high probability of truth if the examined system is linear.

In (practical or philosophical) cases which are not obvious, the premises are typically not crisp, their probabilities of truth are not known and it it is not known whether the probabilities of truth of the premises are linearly connected with the probability of truth of the statement to be proven.

Epicurus knew that proponents of dialectics misrepresent the reasoning as crisp while it is actually not, was aware that logic may not fully apply to future events and saw that rhetors can confuse an untrained audience with paradoxons.

Therefore, it makes perfectly sense that he excluded logic from the canon of truth regarding daily life and philosophical discussion.

Nevertheless, he did use logic in his syllogisms and in what he called "true reasoning".

Thank you, Martin! What Martin is saying was my impression as well. Epicurus was fully against using logic and rhetoric and argument to obfuscate the truth or to mislead people. People "gifted" with the ability to make fine speeches or craft elaborate but empty arguments can convince unsuspecting or uncritical people of anything.

Quote from Don

What Martin is saying was my impression as well. Epicurus was fully against using logic and rhetoric and argument to obfuscate the truth or to mislead people.

I think "poetry" probably goes in that list as well.

On Martin's posts, I agree that post 46 is a very good summary of the proper conclusions.

On post 44 I am not sure where that quote is coming from, but I do think that in common usage that position stated is correct, as something very similar occurs in the Torquatus narrative:

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You are pleased to think him uneducated. The reason is that he refused to consider any education worth the name that did not help to school us in happiness. Was he to spend his time, as you encourage Triarius and me to do, in perusing poets, who give us nothing solid and useful, but merely childish amusement? Was he to occupy himself like Plato with music and geometry, arithmetic and astronomy, which starting from false premises cannot be true, and which moreover if they were true would contribute nothing to make our lives pleasanter and therefore better? Was he, I say, to study arts like these, and neglect the master art, so difficult and correspondingly so fruitful, the art of living?

On post 43 I think we are also probably disagreeing only in details. When I refer to "map" there I refer to the kind that those of us old enough used to know before google - the large fold-up paper variety that we used to carry in our car gloveboxes. I would say that we never need a paper map to navigate our local neighborhoods, and what we internalize after learning our way around it is our experience - we have not committed a paper map to memory. And a paper map and a physical compass with spinning pointer are what I think we are referring to in making the analogies we are making.

To repeat I think Martin's post 46 is very well stated and a good summary of the proper conclusions to draw. The main thing i would add to that is to go back to Delacy's point and reassert that Aristotle and Plato were insisting that nothing be considered fully true unless it could be stated as a syllogism, and in pointing out the differences between true and false logic and reasoning, we need to be sure that the full significance of their position - their error - sinks in. they were not just inaccurate in their expressions, they were concsiously embracing a highly damaging point of view of life.

Quote from camotero

Ok, I see what you mean. But what if we're not able to go closer to the tower? (or the atoms) wouldn't it be nice to have some certainty that perhaps you have an alternative (which we do) to go to the tower? Like, with reason, formulate an indirect way of determining it's shape and testing it. Again, the testing wil involve the sensations, (so I'm not disregarding those as essential), but can you see here how reason comes as a very good thing for us. I guess no one has disputed reason that works this way, to our pleasure.

on this point I think this is the point Laertius emphasized Epicurus held to be an example of the need to "wait" before forming a firm opinion. And this situation ("we are not able to go closer to the tower) occurs many times in life, with the primary example being that of the stars, which we cannot reach to confirm our thoughts, and that is where the "multiple explanations' viewpoint comes in.

Quote from camotero

You don't have to go all the way to worship reason, but I'm arguing that recognizing the important place it evidently and materially has in our lives, is of the essence not to over simplify Epicurean Philosophy.

I agree with you in conclusion and full context, but in the context in which Epicurus was talking (which I think still applies today) the specific and important error of the general Greek philosophers essentially did amount to a "worship" of reason, which specifically and thoroughly harms the proper viewpoint expressed in the canonical principles. So I think Epicurus thought it important to stress that this isn't some minor disagreement that we can gloss over and accept that there is a difference of opinion. This is a field where an all out 'war' is necessary, and where Epicurus thought it necessary to repeatedly warn his students in the strongest of terms.

And i would say that his concern was fully justified by events, because over succeeding generations the arguments of the stoics and others playing games with logic did shake lose a significant number of Epicureans (including those who came up with the "fourth leg" of the canon, and those like Torquatus who came to believe that an elaborate logical proof or explanation of the nature of pleasure was necessary).

Quote from camotero

Quote from Godfrey

Of course this begs the question: "how do you define prudence or critical thinking?" Film at 11

I couldn't find this you're refering to Godfrey in the videos I posted; or do you mean another film?

It's an American figure of speech;

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Film_at_11#%3A%7E%3Atext%3D%22Film_at_11%22_or_%22%2Cwas_regularly_recorded_on_film.?wprov=sfla1

Mathitis Kipouros that reminds me that your native language is not English and your country of residence is not the USA, correct? If not, that's likely an advantage to you rather than a disadvantage, but it's still a relevant consideration to be sure we communicate clearly.

For example, in this thread, Martin's "No." I find to be distinctly German and it is good to know that he is German so that his directness is interpreted correctly.

It's very possible that differences in background also help explain some of our differences in perspective:

Quote from camotero

But we need not satanize concepts and abstractions, we need to agree that concepts are good

That's an example there. At this point in my study of Epicurus I prefer to try to be really specific and avoid a sweeping statement like "concepts are good" any more than I would say "concepts or bad" or "abstractions" are bad. It's probably more accurate to say "concepts can be useful" without the value judgment implied in being "good," especially without a specific statement of what concepts are being discussed.

So to say "concepts are good" comes pretty close to what I perceive Plato and the stoics to have been doing in essentially "worshipping" formal logic. (I think I'll use "formal logic" as the term for a while.)

Quote from camotero

Perhaps we're conflating the innaccuracies of language with the innaccuracies of reason.

Perhaps so, but in this way of stating the issue, my own perspective is that "reason" and "logic" are purely inventions of the human mind and it is important to stress that they are in no way divine or superior to human affairs. I think people understand that about "language" but they tend to think that "reason" is something that exists independent of humanity, floating in the air, as if the request to "be reasonable" actually means something useful and specific in common everyday life (it most of the time does not, in my view, because the "devil is in the details").

Quote from camotero

doesn't disregard reason at all, but rather reinforces it's importance.

Same point as above. Hammers are extremely important in carpentry, but in the "great scheme of things" they have a distinctly subordinate place, and if we are evaluating philosophy and comparing Epicurus to the others, then the important thing to know about "reason" may well be that the other philosophers are absolutely wrong about how important it is (depending again on definition).

Quote from camotero

I feel a bit more confident that the term "critical thinking" could the modern meaning of "true reason".

I am personally reluctant to endorse the term "critical" even more than I would endorse the term "skeptical." Yes both have good aspects, but it seems to me in common usage both terms have developed a negative connotation that is probably well deserved when they are taken to their logical conclusions. The truth of the reason of Epicurus, I would say, is not based on it being a "critique" or "skeptical" of anything, but of it being a realistic assessment of the nature of the universe and our capabilities and limits of understanding it.

There are always going to be issues in life that you aren't going to have the evidence you would like to have to be certain of what is the "truth" of the matter. In those situations, you must have a readily-accessible method for analyzing the positive assertions you are comfortable making plus the limits of those assertions. Thus the importance of the "waiting" doctrine, and the multiple possibilities viewpoint, and the nature and role of the canonical faculties, etc. None of that is adequately expressed in terms of "being logical" or "being reasonable." I don't think there is any term even close to adequate other than "being Epicurean."

Note: If I recall this thread started off entitled with the single word "Logic." I have tried to fine-tune that so that it's now "Issues In The Meaning And Definition of Logic" to make the subject easier to find in the future. If someone wants to suggest a more appropriate title that is more representative of the topic at any point, please say so.

As we go through this I would appreciate any comments on DeLacy's formulation that Aristotle had held that

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"inferences from signs are not reliable except in cases where the inferences can be converted into valid syllogisms."

I'm not so concerned that we be able to find a cite in Aristotle to that effect, as I think this is probably just DeLacy's general interpretation.

What I am concerned about is whether this sentence and formulation are useful in describing the issues between the Epicureans and proponents of the "pro-formal-logic" position. And of course in that regard it's necessary to really be able to articulate in a few words the opposite positions so that the discussion is clear.

It appears that Epicurus may have associated the position he is arguing against (and which Delacy may be right in asserting to Aristotle and probably Plato et al) with the "Megarians" ---- but "MEGARIAN" just doesn't cut it as a tag for the position we're arguing against.

We could call them "worshippers of logic" but that is too argumentative and I am sure they would deny that (the worship "god" even as they identify god with pure reason, and similar formulations).

And another example: I continue to agree with Martin's post 46 as to the details of what we are talking about. However in order to use our words clearly, we're going to want to come to some form of agreement (or at least be able to state our own words and definitions) as to what words to use to describe the opposing camps.

In order the decide which side we're on, and understand why, we need to be able to articulate a definition of both camps. I doubt at this point that any of us (including me) are comfortable in setting our what we think the "best labels" for the opposing camps would be. Yes we could call them "Stoic" and "Epicurean" but since we're not clear on the meanings that doesn't help much more than describing one or the other as "Megarian."

At the risk of posting another Wikipedia link, here is a summary of the Megarian school:

Megarian school - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

along with some external links

So it "might" be reasonable to identify "Against the Megarians" as primarily against dialectical logic... And of course what is "Dialectical logic" as opposed to "logic in general?" At the moment I'll continue to use "formal logic" which is a tip of hat to Plato's forms, but I am not so sure that "symbolic" logic or "syllogistic" logic isn't a better way to describe the opposing position (and even then Martin is probably right that you still have to parse further. "Syllogistic" suffers from being a word that most people don't have a firm grasp of the meaning of which might not advance the ball very much.

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The Megarian school of philosophy, which flourished in the 4th century BC, was founded by Euclides of Megara, one of the pupils of Socrates. Its ethical teachings were derived from Socrates, recognizing a single good, which was apparently combined with the Eleatic doctrine of Unity. Some of Euclides' successors developed logic to such an extent that they became a separate school, known as the Dialectical school. Their work on modal logic, logical conditionals, and propositional logic played an important role in the development of logic in antiquity.

The major advantage of calling these people "Megarians" is that in "American" that sounds like they are some evil nation from some faraway planet!

And that reminds me of this: "This is the voice of the Mysterons."

So who speaks for the Megarians?

Quote from Cassius

The major advantage of calling these people "Megarians" is that in "American" that sounds like they are some evil nation from some faraway planet!

Well, probably to an Athenian, those people in Megara were from some evil nation when it came to their philosophical school.