Bailey: 25. If on each occasion, instead of referring your actions to the end of nature, you turn to some other, nearer, standard, when you are making a choice or an avoidance, your actions will not be consistent with your principles.
**EΙ ΜΗ ΠAΡA ΠAΝTA ΚAΙΡΟΝ EΠAΝΟΙΣEΙΣ EΚAΣTΟΝ ****TΩΝ*
**ΠΡATTΟΜEΝΩΝ ****EΠΙ TΟ TEΛΟΣ ****TΗΣ ΦΥΣEΩΣ ****AΛΛA**
**ΠΡΟΚATAΣTΡEΨEΙΣ ****EΙTE ΦΥΓΗΝ ****EΙ TE ΔΙΩΞΙΝ**
**ΠΟΙΟΥΜEΝΟΣ ****EΙΣ AΛΛΟ TΙ ΟΥΚ EΣΟΝTAΙ ΣΟΙ TΟΙΣ ΛΟΓΟΙΣ**
**AΙ ΠΡAΞEΙΣ AΚΟΛΟΥΘΟΙ. **
“If, on every occasion, we do not refer every one of our actions to the chief end of nature, if we turn aside from that to seek or avoid some other object, there will be a want of agreement between our words and our actions.” Yonge (1853)
“If you do not on every separate occasion refer each of your actions to the chief end of nature, but if instead of this in the act of choice or avoidance you swerve aside to some other end, your acts will not be consistent with your theories.” Hicks (1910)
“If you do not on every separate occasion refer each of your actions to the end prescribed by nature, but instead of this in the act of choice or avoidance swerve aside to some other end, your acts will not be consistent with your theories.” Hicks (1925)
“If on each occasion instead of referring your actions to the end of nature, you turn to some other nearer standard when you are making a choice or an avoidance, your actions will not be consistent with your principles.” Bailey (1926)
“If you do not at all times refer each of your actions to the natural end, but fall short of this and turn aside to something else in choosing and avoiding, your deeds will not agree with your words.” Geer (1964)
“If you fail to refer each of your actions on every occasion to nature's end, and stop short at something else in choosing or avoiding, your actions will not be consequential upon your theories.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 116 (1987)
“If you do not on every occasion refer each of your actions to the end ordained by nature, but instead stop short at something else when considering whether to go after something or avoid it, your actions will not be in keeping with the principles you profess.” O'Connor (1993)
“If you do not, on every occasion, refer each of your actions to the goal of nature, but instead turn prematurely to some other [criterion] in avoiding or pursuing [things], your actions will not be consistent with your reasoning.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)
“If you do not reconcile your behavior with the goal of nature, but instead use some other criterion in matters of choice and avoidance, then there will be a confict between theory and practice.” Anderson (2004)
“If you don't judge every one of your actions by reference to the end and goal dictated by nature, in accordance also with the proper natural timing for each action, but, instead, second guessing [nature,] you veer off ahead of time attempting either to pursue or to fee [goals,] then your acts will not be turning out to be consistent with your rationalizations.” Makridis (2005)
“If at all critical times you do not connect each of your actions to the natural goal of life, but instead turn too soon to some other kind of goal in thinking whether to avoid or pursue something, then your thoughts and your actions will not be in harmony.” Saint-Andre (2008)
“If at any time you fail to refer each of your acts to nature's standard, and turn off instead in some other direction when making a choice to avoid or pursue, your actions will not be consistent with your creed.” Strodach (2012)
“If on every occasion you do not refer each of your actions to the goal of nature, but instead divert your attention in the act of choice or avoidance toward something else, your actions will not accord with your theories.” Mensch (2018)
“If you're not on every occasion referring each thing you do back to our nature's end, and if you're instead of proceeding directly to something else when you make a decision to avoid or pursue something, then your actions will not be consistent with your reasons.” White (2021)
