Tranquility v Pleasure

Excellent questions Godfrey. I know it is commonly discussed that Epicurus diverged from Democritus on free will / the swerve, but this is a topic that I've read much less about.

I agree with the drift of your direction, but I'll have to pull out Diogenes Laertius to scrutinize that passage. Is it possible that the part you quoted is intended to only apply to "painful" emotion, or does it mean ALL emotion?

Right -- and I suppose that another ambiguity is the "untroubled." It might not be possible to say that a pleasant emotion is "troubling."

But regardless of that, it's not easy at all to square that with Diogenes Laertius saying that Epicurus held that "He [the wise man] will be more deeply moved by feelings, but this will not prove an obstacle to wisdom" so it does seem clear that Epicurus diverged significantly from Democritus on this.

I'm not sure what Democritus held on whether the soul could be eternal even in an atomistic world, but it seems clear that if you start with Epicurus' position that "For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation" from the letter to Menoeceus. Presuming that we take "emotions" as being very closely related, and/or essential to, sensations, then it seems impossible to think that Epicurus would wind up with absence of emotion as being the goal of life or the definition of happiness.

I am sure that some people will try to go in the direction that this is explained by "ataraxia" which they hold to be some type of happiness totally divorced from sensation and normal emotions, but for reasons we discuss regularly that seems to me to be a very unpersuasive argument.

Yes exactly the same issue in play over the course of multiple philosophers, with the position opposite of Epicurus taken by Hieronymus:

Are You Epicurean Or Hieronymian?

I don't remember the source but I remember reading that Nausiphanes and Epicurus once encountered Pyrrho, who had traveled to INDIA and met the gymnosophists (yogis) there.

Pyrrho's Buddhist influence has been the subject of books linking this to the Gandara Indo-Buddhist culture.

Either way, in this encounter Epicurus was so affected by Pyrrho's tranquil demeanor that he replaced Democritus' cheerfulness ideal with the ataraxia ideal. If Nausiphanes was with him, we have to assume that

1. Epicurus was young

2. He was still earning atomism from Nausiphanes and forming his own doctrines

However Epicurus rejected the skepticism of Pyrrho. His ataraxia did not come from not having opinions, but from having doctrines that were aligned with nature and abolished superstitious fears.

I'm beginning to lose my tranquility once again. If tranqulity as a goal were true, another question is whether such tranquility is Buddhist tranquility which is based on minimalism or Taoist tranqulity which is based on moderation. So the question would become: "Is Epicurus more Buddhist or Taoist?

I don't know now whether Epicurus is mimimalist or moderate. If none of them were true, I also couldn't imagine him to be an extreme hedonist like Aristippus. And if not any of them were true, who exactly is Epicurus then since he is not a minimalist, not a moderate, and not even an extreme hedonist?

Quote from Mike Anyayahan

And if not any of them were true, who exactly is Epicurus then since he is not a minimalist, not a moderate, and not even an extreme hedonist?

I think he was someone who first and foremost knew that he had only one life to live, and that in a world in which there is no divine or ideal standard with which to comply, the best he or anyone else can do is to make the most out of life by experiencing as much pleasure, while at the same time experiencing as little "unnecessary" pain, as possible.

The trick seems to be that some people want to say that pain is so bad that it must be eliminated at all costs, including at the cost of pleasure. What is "necessary" in the estimation of one person is "unnecessary" in the estimation of another.

I think Epicurus was realistic in recognizing that a certain amount of pain is required in order to achieve pleasure. That calculation/estimate/feeling however is going to differ from individual to individual, as is the amount of pain involved in any particular activity. Some people are going to choose to accept less pleasure in order to suffer less pain, but some are going to deem that more pain is worth it if greater pleasure can be obtained, and the activities in which they choose to pursue and accept pain are going to differ too.

I am thinking that the real problem here is that people are looking for a "rule" that tells them how much pleasure is worth how much pain, and which activities they should choose to pursue. However it is the nature of an atomistic universe that such a rule does not and cannot exist.

Also, of the three terms you chose, I definitely do not believe that moderation or minimalism describes Epicurus. The problem with the third term, "extreme hedonism," is that the term "hedonism" is so polluted as to be unacceptable, but it is the closest of the three you gave. Part of the problem here too is that Epicurus' view is so foreign to us that we aren't used to describing in common words what we are talking about when we say that "pleasure" is the goal, even at the cost of some pain. Pleasure is an extremely wide term, covering every physical and mental experience in life, but we have been browbeaten into equating it with sex drugs and rock'n'roll so long that we are ashamed of the word, and that is a crime that has to be fought back against.

Quote from Cassius

Some people are going to choose to accept less pleasure in order to suffer less pain, but some are going to deem that more pain is worth it if greater pleasure can be obtained, and the activities in which they choose to pursue and accept pain are going to differ too.

Does it mean that there always has to be pain to achieve any type of pleasure?

I don't think that's necessarily the case, but it often is. [Restated: It is not necessarily the case that all pleasure requires some pain, but it is often the case that achieving certain pleasures requires some amount of pain.]

Should I anticipate that you are thinking that pleasures which cost nothing in pain are somehow superior than those which require pain? I don't think that there is any reason to say that at all. There is no objective ranking of pleasures by any outside factor -- and i think that that is where DeWitt is going with his "Unity of pleasure" chapter.

There is no way to say absolutely that one pleasure is greater than another. The pleasure of smelling a rose has no objective sanction to be greater, or lesser, than the pleasure of standing on top of Mount Everest. In a universe in which there is no center or no creater telling us that a single perspective is the correct one, it is in the nature of things that every being gets to make its own estimation of what is, to it, the pleasures worth striving for.

Also - if there WERE an "outside ranking" that would tell us how to rank pleasures, then the knowledge of that ranking system would supersede pleasure as the ultimate test. That is pretty much the trap that Plato set in "Philebus" -- because if you accept that premises that there is something outside of the generic term "pleasure" by which pleasure must be judged, then that outside standard becomes the rule of life.

Quote from Cassius

There is no way to say absolutely that one pleasure is greater than another. The pleasure of smelling a rose has no objective sanction to be greater, or lesser, than the pleasure of standing on top of Mount Everest.

Therefore, it is wrong to use the phrases "greater pleasure" or "greatest pleasure" for they do not exist?

Quote from Mike Anyayahan

Therefore, it is wrong to use the phrases "greater pleasure" or "greatest pleasure" for they do not exist?

No, clearly from the individual subjective perspective some pleasures ARE greater than others. What is incorrect is to imply that the gradation from lesser to greater are the same for everyone - it clearly is not.

I realize that my answers seem so flatly stated that I must come across like Moses handing down tablets from Mt. Sinai. But really, isn't all this very obvious? I think the problem is what Godfrey is referencing, but in more stark terms:

"Pleasure" has been so demonized that we are afraid to use the term. I do agree that it is more accurate to saying something like "feeling" so as to encompass both pleasure and pain in the analysis, but I think we all see the issue.

This was being pointed out to me earlier today in regard to some of the presentations at the recent Athens symposium -- the word PLEASURE is almost never used. And that's a pattern we see repeated in so many different presentations.

We have been browbeaten into submission, but I see no way back but to charge directly into the center lines of the opposition and start explaining the heart of the matter, rather than continuing to run from it,

I am all in favor of explaining things in terms that people can understand, and maybe at times that means first being diplomatic. But if we never get around to stating the heart of the issue; if our diplomacy never gets to the point of clarity, then we are wasting our time.

And I personally am more aware of that every day. Every day I get older, and I see how much time has been wasted dancing around the real issue - -which is what we are discussing here now.

Godfrey and Mike, we three here in this conversation are wrestling with the same issue, I think.

One thing I can add to the conversation as a result of having been involved in discussing this for close to ten years now is this:

It never seems to get easier to confront this, but it does get HARDER. As time goes by, everyone who is initially drawn to the picture that Epicurus painted have to confront the issue of whether they are willing to charge forward under the real issue (the feeling of pleasure) or whether to water it down with "happiness" or "ataraxia."

What I can tell you is that so many people who confront this issue end up falling away. They get tired; they just can't face the implication of being clear on this issue -- because it means being almost alone against the multitudes in academia AND religion. They burn up or burn out, stop fighting, and drift away.

I don't think it is possible to move forward in Epicurean thinking without being "faithful" to Epicurus on this point. I think it explains the downfall of the ancient Epicureans (much more so than the rise of Christianity) that the later Epicureans weren't able to keep Epicurus' focus on this key central issue.

This ('the feeling of pleasure") is the hill to die on for anyone who is really convinced that Epicurean philosophy is something special.

Quote from Cassius

No, clearly from the individual subjective perspective some pleasures ARE greater than others. What is incorrect is to imply that the gradation from lesser to greater are the same for everyone - it clearly is not.

I realize that my answers seem so flatly stated that I must come across like Moses handing down tablets from Mt. Sinai.

Ok Cassius. This one is clearer. Thanks.

Quote from Godfrey

Hiram, I find this DL quote interesting for a couple of reasons:

1) It states that tranquility (not cheerfulness) is the goal and opposes that to pleasure

However there's a lot to sort out, and this particular topic is new to me. Can you recommend any sources where I could pursue this further?

I do not think ataraxia is opposed to pleasure. Diogenes Of Oenoanda explains that when the perturbations leave the mind, pleasure can enter. A-Taraxia means no-perturbations. So Epicurean ataraxia is linked to the process of healing the mind so that we may experience greater pleasure, or to use the Lucretius parable of the broken jar, ataraxia helps fix the cracks in the jar of the mind so that it may receive pleasures.

https://theautarkist.wordpress…es-wall-on-the-pleasures/

Here is the fragment:

Let us now [investigate] how life is to be made pleasant for us both in states and in actions.

Let us first discuss states, keeping an eye on the point that, when the emotions which disturb the soul are removed, those which produce pleasure enter into it to take their place.

Well, what are the disturbing emotions? [They are] fears —of the gods, of death, and of [pains]— and, besides [these], desires that [outrun] the limits fixed by nature. These are the roots of all evils, and, [unless] we cut them off, [a multitude] of evils will grow [upon] us