**ΚATA ΜEΝ [TΟ] ΚΟΙΝΟΝ ΠAΣΙ ****TΟ ΔΙΚAΙΟΝ ****TΟ AΥTΟ**
**ΣΥΜΦEΡΟΝ ****ΓAΡ TΙ ΗΝ EΝ Tῌ ΠΡΟΣ AΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙᾼ·**
**ΚATA ΔE TΟ ΙΔΙΟΝ ΧΩΡAΣ ****ΚAΙ ΟΣΩΝ ΔΗ ΠΟTE AΙTΙΩΝ ****ΟΥ**
**ΠAΣΙ ΣΥΝEΠETAΙ ****TΟ AΥTΟ ΔΙΚAΙΟΝ ****EΙΝAΙ. **
“In a general point of view, justice is the same thing to every one; for there is something advantageous in mutual society. Nevertheless, the difference of place, and diverse other circumstances, make justice vary.” Yonge (1853)
“Taken generally, justice is the same for all, but in its application to particular cases of territory or the like, it varies under different circumstances.” Hicks (1910)
“Taken generally, justice is the same for all, to wit, something found expedient in mutual intercourse; but in its application to particular cases of locality or conditions of whatever kind, it varies under different circumstances.” Hicks (1925)
“In its general aspect justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another: but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a country or any other circumstances the same things does not turn out to be just for all.” Bailey (1926)
“So far as the universal concept is concerned, Justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of advantage in the life they share with one another, but in respect of the particulars of place and all affecting circumstances whatsoever it does not follow that the same thing is just for all.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 296 (1954)
“In general, justice is the same for all, a thing found useful by men in their relations with each other; but it does not follow that it is the same for all in each individual place and circumstance.” Geer (1964)
“Taken generally, justice is the same for all, since it is something useful in people's social relationships. But in the light of what is peculiar to a region and to the whole range of determinants, the same thing does not turn out to be just for all.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 125 (1987)
“Broadly considered, justice is the same for all, because it is a kind of mutual benefit in men's interactions with one another. But in individual countries and circumstances, justice turns out not to be the same for all.” O'Connor (1993)
“In general outline justice is the same for everyone; for it was something useful in mutual associations. But with respect to the peculiarities of a region or of other [relevant] causes, it does not follow that the same thing is just for everyone.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)
“Justice is essentially the same for all peoples insofar as it benefits human interaction. But the details of how justice is applied in particular countries or circumstances may vary.” Anderson (2004)
“Generally speaking, justice is one and the same for all: i.e., justice is something or other that is to one's interest in mutual intercourse. But, speaking on a case-by-case basis, justice is not the same for all as it depends on [specific] regions and factors.” Makridis (2005)
“In general, justice is the same for all: what is mutually advantageous among companions. But with respect to the particulars of a place or other causes, it does not follow that the same thing is just for all.” Saint-Andre (2008)
“In its general meaning, justice is the same for all because of its utility in the relations of men to each other, but in its specifc application to countries and various other circumstances it does not follow that the same thing is just for all.” Strodach (2012)
“In general, justice is the same for everyone, namely something that facilitates mutual intercourse; but in light of the peculiarities of a region and all sorts of other causes, it does not follow that the same thing is just for everyone.” Mensch (2018)
“In general, what is just is the same for all: it was something that promotes relations within a community. But by differences in territory and any number of other causes, the same thing does not turn out just for all.” White (2021)
