Part of the Ethics section of the outline of Epicurean philosophy. Updated October 24, 2026.
1. Virtue Is Not Absolute Or An End In Itself - All Good And Evil Consists In Sensation
Epicurus held a position on virtue that was among the sharpest departures from the mainstream of ancient philosophy: virtue is not absolute, not an end in itself, and not the same for all people in all circumstances. This stands in direct contrast to Plato, Aristotle, and especially the Stoics, all of whom held virtue to be either the highest good, the constitutive element of happiness, or a good independent of its consequences. For Epicurus, there is no good but pleasure and no evil but pain. Virtues -- prudence, courage, temperance, justice -- are genuinely important, but they are instrumentally important: they are the means by which a wise person reliably achieves a pleasurable life and avoids a painful one. Virtue that did not in practice produce pleasure or prevent pain would have no claim on us.
The qualifier "not absolute" is also important in the sense that what counts as virtuous conduct varies with circumstances, persons, and societies. Since virtue is defined by its relationship to the goal of pleasure, and since circumstances differ, what is virtuous in one situation may not be in another. This is a form of context-sensitive ethics rather than a code of fixed commandments. The Epicurean is not bound to keep rules for their own sake but to reason carefully about what choices, in the actual circumstances of their life, lead to the greatest predominance of pleasure over pain -- and to act accordingly. Virtuous behavior is thus not the result of following a moral code but the expression of practical wisdom applied to the goal of living well.
No pleasure is bad in itself, but the means used to procure some pleasures can bring pains many times greater than the pleasures gained; in the rare case where they genuinely did not -- where a profligate's actions truly dispelled fear of the gods and of death, taught the limits of desire, and produced a life of pleasure -- there would be no grounds to blame the person who pursued them. This same logic is why justice matters: complete pleasure requires security from other men, which is why we must have the power to protect ourselves from those who would harm us, and whatever is genuinely necessary to secure that protection is naturally good -- not because security is good in itself, but because of the pleasure it makes possible.
Become accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us. _For all good and evil consists in sensation,_ but death is deprivation of sensation. And therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds to it an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality." (tr. Long & Sedley)
[Book I, chapter XII in Rackham's chapter numbering = section 42.]
Pleasure and pain moreover supply the motives of desire and of avoidance, and the springs of conduct generally. This being so, it clearly follows that actions are right and praiseworthy only as being a means to the attainment of a life of pleasure. But that which is not itself a means to anything else, but to which all else is a means, is what the Greeks term the Telos, the highest, ultimate or final Good. It must therefore be admitted that the Chief Good is to live agreeably.
[Epicurus On The End] 'For my part I cannot conceive of anything as the good if I remove the pleasures perceived by means of taste and sex and listening to music, and the pleasant motions felt by the eyes through beautiful sights, or any other pleasures which some sensation generates in a man as a whole. Certainly it is impossible to say that mental delight is the only good. For a delighted mind, as I understand it, consists in the expectation of all the things I just mentioned - to be of a nature able to acquire them without pain... ' A little later he adds: 'I have often asked men who were called wise what they could retain as the content of goods if they removed those things, unless they wanted to pour out empty words. I could learn nothing from them; and if they want to babble on about virtues and wisdoms, /they will be speaking of nothing except the way in which those pleasures I mentioned are produced.'/ (Long & Sedley - Hellenistic Philosophers)
Of all this the beginning and the greatest good is prudence. Therefore prudence is even more precious than philosophy, and it is the natural source of all the remaining virtues; it teaches the impossibility of living pleasurably without living prudently, honorably and justly, and the impossibility of living prudently, honorably and justly without living pleasurably. For the virtues are naturally linked with living pleasurably, and living pleasurably is inseparable from them. (Bailey)
It is impossible to live pleasantly without living prudently, honorably and justly; nor is it possible to live prudently, honorably and justly without living pleasantly. And whoever lacks this cannot live pleasantly. (tr. Long & Sedley)
[Epicurus's own words, addressed directly to a critic, stating in the plainest possible terms that virtue is not the summons -- pleasure is. "Empty virtues" here means virtue pursued as an end in itself, detached from the pleasure it is supposed to secure.]
"But I, for my part, summon you to sustained pleasures and not to empty virtues, which fill us with vain expectations that destroy peace of mind."
If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into 'what is the means of happiness?' and they wanted to say 'the virtues' (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not 'what is the means of happiness?' but 'what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?', I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end. Let us therefore now state that this is true, making it our starting-point. (Smith)
Every creature, as soon as it is born, seeks after pleasure and delights therein as in its supreme good, while it recoils from pain as its supreme evil. Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. (Reid)
[Diogenes Laertius offers the same natural-impulse argument as Torquatus above -- pleasure sought and pain resisted from birth, before any teaching -- independently, in his own biographical account, and illustrates the involuntary, pre-rational avoidance of pain with a vivid mythological example.]
As proof that pleasure is the end, he points out that all living creatures as soon as they are born take delight in pleasure, but resist pain by a natural impulse apart from reason. Therefore we avoid pain by instinct, just as Heracles, when he is being devoured by the shirt of Nessus, cries aloud: "With tears and groans: the rocks re-echoed far, from Locris' mountain peaks, Euboea's hills."
- Page scan: Diogenes Laertius X.137-138 (tr. Bailey) -- NOTE: the header's locus "X.6" is incorrect; this passage actually falls between DL X.137 and X.138 in Bailey's translation (no separate section number is printed for it there), not near the start of Book X
- Online text: Diogenes Laertius X.6 -- Perseus Digital Library (Diogenes Laertius X, tr. Hicks, Loeb)
The truth of the position that pleasure is the ultimate good will most readily appear from the following illustration. Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable? Pleasure and pain moreover supply the motives of desire and of avoidance. It must therefore be admitted that the Chief Good is to live agreeably. (Rackham)
Those who place the Chief Good in virtue alone are beguiled by the glamour of a name, and do not understand the true demands of nature. Your school dilates on the transcendent beauty of the virtues; but were they not productive of pleasure, who would deem them either praiseworthy or desirable? We esteem the art of medicine not for its interest as a science, but for its conduciveness to health. So also Wisdom, which must be considered as the art of living, if it effected no result would not be desired; but as it is, it is desired, because it is the artificer that procures and produces pleasure. (Rackham)
If then we observe that ignorance and error reduce the whole of life to confusion, while Wisdom alone is able to protect us from the onslaughts of appetite and the menaces of fear, teaching us to bear even the affronts of fortune with moderation, and showing us all the paths that lead to calmness and to peace, why should we hesitate to avow that Wisdom is to be desired for the sake of the pleasures it brings and Folly to be avoided because of its injurious consequences? (Rackham)
The same account will be found to hold good of Courage. The performance of labors, the undergoing of pains, are not in themselves attractive; but we aim at these virtues in order to live without anxiety and fear. It makes light of death, for the dead are only as they were before they were born. These considerations prove that timidity and cowardice are not blamed, nor courage and endurance praised, on their own account; the former are rejected because they beget pain, the latter coveted because they beget pleasure. (Rackham)
But that I may make plain to you the source of all the mistakes made by those who inveigh against pleasure and eulogize pain, I will unfold the whole system and will set before you the very language held by that great discoverer of truth and that master-builder of the life of happiness. Surely no one recoils from or dislikes or avoids pleasure in itself because it is pleasure, but because great pains come upon those who do not know how to follow pleasure rationally. Who again would have any right to reproach either a man who desires to be surrounded by pleasure unaccompanied by any annoyance, or another man who shrinks from any pain which is not productive of pleasure? (Reid)
In truth we do blame and deem most deserving of righteous hatred the men who, enervated and depraved by the fascination of momentary pleasures, do not foresee the pains and troubles which are sure to befall them, because they are blinded by desire. So in such cases the principle of selection adopted by the wise man is that he should either by refusing certain pleasures attain to other and greater pleasures or by enduring pains should ward off pains still more severe. (Reid)
Holding as I do this theory, what reason should I have for fearing that I may not be able to bring our Torquati into accord with it? Do you believe that they attacked the armed foe, or practiced such cruelty towards their own children and their own flesh and blood, absolutely without giving a thought to their own interest or their own advantage? He sentenced his own son to death. If from no motive, I am sorry to be the descendant of anyone so savage and inhuman; but if his purpose was by inflicting pain upon himself to establish his authority as a commander, then his action aimed at ensuring the safety of his fellow citizens, upon which he knew his own depended. (Reid)
[Locus corrected from a prior "2.14" mislabel: this passage is On Ends 2.45 (chapter XIV), confirmed on the clipped page below.]
It is however my opinion that if I show there is something moral, which is essentially desirable by reason of its inherent qualities and for its own sake, all the doctrines of your school are overthrown. Well, by what is moral we understand something of such a nature that, even if absolutely deprived of utility, it may with justice be eulogized for its own qualities, apart from all rewards or advantages. (Reid)
For if Morality be the standard to which all things are referred, while yet they will not allow that pleasure forms any part of it, he declares that they are uttering sounds devoid of sense (those are his actual words), and that he has no notion or perception whatever of any meaning that this term Morality can have attached to it. Here is a famous philosopher, whose influence has spread not only over Greece and Italy but throughout all barbarian lands as well, protesting that he cannot understand what Moral Worth is, if it does not consist in pleasure.
[Locus corrected from a prior "3.3" mislabel: this passage is On Ends 3.10-11, confirmed on the clipped page below.]
'How I wish,' said he, 'that you had felt a bent towards the Stoic school! Our principles are very far from being at one,' said he, 'for whatever that thing may be over and above morality, which you declare to be desirable, and reckon among things good, you thereby quench morality itself, which we may liken to the light cast by virtue, and virtue too you utterly overthrow.' (Reid)
Epicurus says that virtue is preferred for the sake of pleasure, and not for its own sake, just as the doctor's art is employed for the sake of health. Epicurus says also that virtue alone is inseparable from pleasure, but that other things may be separated, such as things to eat. (Bailey)
Shortly I will speak about imprudence, but for the present about the virtues and pleasure. Now if the question at issue between these people [the Stoics] and ourselves involved examining 'what is the means of happiness?' and they wanted to say the virtues, as is in fact true, there would be no need to do anything except to agree with them. But since the issue is not 'what is the means of happiness?' but what being happy is and what our nature ultimately desires, I affirm now and always, with a great shout to all Greeks and foreigners, pleasure is the end of the best lifestyle, while the virtues which are now being inappropriately fussed about by them are in no way the end, but the means to the end. (tr. Long & Sedley)
2. Friendship, Society, and Justice
Epicurus held that friendship is among the most important tools for living happily, and his Principal Doctrines state this more strongly than almost any other single claim: "Of all the things wisdom acquires for the blessedness of life as a whole, far the greatest is the possession of friendship" (PD 27). Epicurus not only taught this but lived it: the Garden community he founded was built on friendship and mutual support among philosophers, and his will demonstrates extraordinary care for the members of his community, including its enslaved members.
The Epicurean account of justice treats it not as a transcendent moral law or a Platonic form but as a natural and practical compact among human beings for mutual benefit: justice is the agreement not to harm one another and not to be harmed, entered into because such agreement serves the happiness and security of all parties. There is nothing arbitrary about this: the agreement tracks real human needs for security. But justice has no existence apart from these agreements and their consequences; it is not absolute, not the same in all times and places, and not an end in itself. What gives justice its force is that living justly -- keeping the compact, not harming others, not exposing oneself to the anxiety of living as a wrongdoer -- genuinely contributes to the pleasurable life, while injustice produces chronic anxiety that undermines happiness even when the unjust person escapes punishment. The connection between justice and pleasure is real and reliable, not merely conventional.
Certain people wanted to become famous and admired, thinking that they would thus acquire security from other men. Consequently, if such people's life was secure, they did obtain nature's good; but if it was not secure, they are not in possession of the objective which they originally sought after on the basis of nature's affinity. (tr. Long & Sedley)
The just < life > is most free from disturbance, but the unjust life is full of the greatest disturbance. (tr. Long & Sedley)
Of the things wisdom acquires for the blessedness of life as a whole, far the greatest is the possession of friendship. (tr. Long & Sedley)
Confidence that nothing terrible lasts for ever or even for a long time is produced by the same judgment that also achieves the insight that friendship's security within those very limitations is perfectly complete. (tr. Long & Sedley)
Nature's justice is a guarantee of utility with a view to not harming one another and not being harmed. (tr. Long & Sedley)
Nothing is just or unjust in relation to those creatures which were unable to make contracts over not harming one another and not being harmed: so too with all peoples which were unable or unwilling to make contracts over not harming and not being harmed. (tr. Long & Sedley)
Justice was never anything per se, but a contract, regularly arising at some place or other in people's dealings with one another, over not harming or being harmed. (tr. Long & Sedley)
Injustice is something bad not per se but in the fear that arises from the suspicion that one will not escape the notice of those who have the authority to punish such things. (tr. Long & Sedley)
No one who secretly infringes any of the terms of a mutual contract made with a view to not harming and not being harmed can be confident that he will escape detection even if he does so countless times. For right up to his death it is unclear whether he will actually escape. (tr. Long & Sedley)
Taken generally, justice is the same for all, since it is something useful in people's social relationships. But in the light of what is peculiar to a region and to the whole range of determinants, the same thing does not turn out to be just for all. (tr. Long & Sedley)
To secure protection from men anything is a natural good, by which you may be able to attain this end. (Bailey)
Where, provided the circumstances have not been altered, actions which were considered just, have been shown not to accord with the general concept in actual practice, then they were not just actions. But where, when circumstances have changed, the same actions which were sanctioned as just no longer lead to advantage, there they were just at the time when they were of advantage for the dealings of fellow-citizens with one another; but subsequently they are no longer just, when no longer of advantage. (Bailey)
The man who has best ordered the element of disquiet arising from external circumstances has made those things that he could akin to himself and the rest at least not alien: but with all to which he could not do even this he has refrained from mixing, and has expelled from his life all which it was of advantage to treat thus. (Bailey)
What is legally deemed to be just has its existence in the domain of justice when ever it is attested to be useful in the requirements of social relationships, whether or not it turns out to be the same for all. But if someone makes a law and it does not happen to accord with the utility of social relationships, it no longer has the nature of justice. And even if what is useful in the sphere of justice changes but fits the preconception for some time, it was no less just throughout that time for those who do not confuse themselves with empty utterances but simply look at the facts. (tr. Long & Sedley)
(38) When, without any change in circumstances, things held to be just are shown in practice not to be consistent with the concept, then those things were not just. And when circumstances change and the same things which were just are no longer beneficial, then those things were just so long as they were beneficial for the mutual relationships of fellow-citizens; but later when they were not beneficial they were no longer just. (tr. Long & Sedley)
40] Those who had the power to eliminate all fear of their neighbors lived together accordingly in the most pleasurable way, through having the firmest pledge of security, and after enjoying the fullest intimacy, they did not grieve over someone's untimely death as if it called for commiseration. (tr. Long & Sedley)
All friendship is an intrinsic virtue, but it originates from benefiting. (tr. Long & Sedley)
Neither those who are over-eager for friendship nor those who are hesitant should be approved, but it is also necessary to take risks for the sake of friendship. (tr. Long & Sedley)
It is not our friends' help that we need so much as the confidence of their help. (tr. Long & Sedley)
One who is always looking for help is not a friend, nor is one who never associates help with friendship. For the former trades sentiment for recompense, while the latter cuts off confident expectation in regard to the future. (tr. Long & Sedley)
Friendship dances round the world announcing to us all that we should wake up and felicitate one another. (tr. Long & Sedley)
We must liberate ourselves from the prison of routine business and politics. (tr. Long & Sedley)
Let us feel for our friends not by mourning but by thinking of them. (tr. Long & Sedley)
Let nothing be done in your life which will bring you fear if it should be known to your neighbor. (tr. Long & Sedley)
The man of noble character is chiefly concerned with wisdom and friendship. Of these the former is a mortal good, but the latter is immortal. (tr. Long & Sedley)
The undisturbed man causes no stress to himself or to anyone else. (tr. Long & Sedley)
But the human race at that time was much hardier on the land, as was fitting for creatures engendered by the hard earth. Supported from within on larger and more solid bones, they were fitted all over their flesh with powerful sinews, and were not easily capable of being harmed by heat or cold or unusual food or any damage to the body. And for many of the sun's cycles through the sky they dragged out their life in the roving manner of wild beasts. There was no sturdy director of the rounded plough, no one who knew how to work the land with iron or to dig young shoots into the soil or to cut down the old branches of tall trees with pruning knives. What sun and rain had given, what earth had created of its own accord, was gift sufficient to satisfy their hearts. As yet they did not know how to manipulate things with fire, nor how to use skins and clothe their bodies in the spoils of wild beasts. They dwelt in woods and mountain caves and forests, and used to hide their rough limbs amid shrubs when forced to take shelter from the lash of winds and rains. Nor could they have the common good in view, nor did they know how to make mutual use of any customs or laws. Whatever prize fortune had provided to each man, he carried off, taught to apply his strength and live on his own account just for himself. (tr. Long & Sedley)
[Above: Long & Sedley excerpt. Below: the same passage in Bailey's translation.]
Then after they obtained huts and skins and fire, and woman united with man with drew into a single marriage, and they saw offspring engendered from themselves, then the human race first began to soften. For fire saw to it that their chilly bodies could not now bear cold so well under the covering of the sky; sex sapped their strength, and children by their charm easily broke their parents' stern demeanor. Then too neighbors began to form friendships, eager not to harm one another and not to be harmed; and they gained protection for children and for the female sex, when with babyish noises and gestures they indicated that it is right for everyone to pity the weak. Yet harmony could not entirely be created; but a good and substantial number preserved their contracts honorably. Otherwise the human race would even then have been totally destroyed, and reproduction could not have maintained the generations down to the present day. (tr. Long & Sedley)
[Above: Long & Sedley excerpt. Below: the same passage in Bailey's translation.]
Day by day those of outstanding intellect and strength of mind would give increasing demonstrations of how to change the earlier mode of life by innovations and by fire. Kings began to found cities and to establish citadels for their own protection and refuge. They distributed cattle and lands, giving them to each man on the basis of his looks and strength and intellect; for good looks counted for much and strength was at a premium. Later came the invention of private property and the discovery of gold, which easily robbed the strong and handsome of their status; for in general people follow the wealthier man's party, however vigorous and handsome they may be by birth. But if someone should govern his life by true reasoning, a man's great wealth is to live sparingly with a tranquil mind; for there is never a shortage of little. But men wished to be famous and powerful, to secure a stable foundation for their fortune and the means of living out a peaceful life with wealth. To no purpose - in struggling to climb up to the pinnacle of status, they made their journey perilous. Even from the summit, resentment in a while, like a thunderbolt, strikes and hurls them down with ignominy into a foul abyss. For resentment, like a thunderbolt, generally scorches the heights and everything that is much higher than the rest. It is far better, then, to be obedient and quiet than to want imperial rule and the occupation of kingdoms. Let them accordingly toil in vain and sweat out their blood, as they fight along the narrow road of ambition. For the wisdom they savor is from another's mouth and they seek things from hearsay rather than from their own sensations. This was as much the case in the past as it is now and will be. And so the kings were killed; the ancient majesty of thrones and proud sceptres lay overturned, and the illustrious badge of the sovereign head was stained with blood, mourning its great rank under the feet of the mob. For things are avidly stamped upon when they have previously roused extreme terror. Thus affairs were returning to the dregs of disorder, with each man seeking supreme power for himself. Then some people taught how to institute magistrates and constitutional rights, with a view to the voluntary employment of laws. For the human race, worn out by its violent way of life, was enfeebled by feuds; all the more, then, of its own volition it submitted to laws and constraining rights. Each man had been ready out of passion to avenge himself more fiercely than is now permitted by equitable laws, and therefore people were nauseated by their violent way of life. Since then, fear of punishment spoils the prizes of life, violence and wrongdoing entrap each person and generally recoil on their originator. It is not easy for one who infringes the common contracts of peace by his deeds to lead a calm and tranquil life. For even if he escapes notice by the race of gods and men, he must lack confidence that it will stay hidden forever. (tr. Long & Sedley)
[Above: Long & Sedley excerpt. Below: the same passage in Bailey's translation.]
Then truly the life of the gods will pass to men. For everything will be full of justice and mutual friendship, and there will come to be no need of city walls or laws and all the things we manufacture on account of one another. As for the necessities derived from agriculture, such activities will, to the extent that need requires, interrupt the continuity of philosophizing; for the farming operations will provide us with what our nature desires. (tr. Long & Sedley)
- Page scan: Diogenes of Oinoanda, Fr. 56 (tr. Smith)
In relation to each segment of the earth different people have different native lands. But in relation to the whole circuit of this world the entire earth is a single native land for everyone, and the world a single home. (tr. Long & Sedley)
[Above: Long & Sedley excerpt. Below: the same passage in Bailey's translation.]
The motives for one man harming another are enmity, resentment and disparagement, which the wise man masters by reason. Once he has become wise, he no longer adopts the opposite character and does not intentionally feign it either; rather, he will be affected by feelings but without having his wisdom impeded. However, not every bodily condition nor every people makes the occurrence of a wise man possible. Even if he is put on the rack, the wise man is happy, but when he is on the rack, he shrieks and groans. He will have no sexual intercourse with a woman whom the laws forbid. Nor will he punish his slaves, but will rather pity them and forgive any who are of good character. The Epicureans do not think that the wise man will fall in love, nor will he care about his funeral... or make fine public speeches... He will marry and have children . . . but he will not engage in politics . . . or rule as a tyrant or live as a Cynic... or a beggar. Even if he is robbed of his eyes, he will keep his share in life... He will feel grief... and bring lawsuits, and leave writings when he dies. But he will not make ceremonial speeches. He will be concerned about his property and the future, enjoy the countryside, be equipped against fortune, and never give up a friend. He will be concerned about his reputation, up to the point of ensuring that he will not be disparaged. He will take more delight than other men in theatrical events. He will set up statues but be indifferent about having one. Only he could discourse correctly about music and poetry, but he would not actually write poems. One wise man is not wiser than another. He will make money, but only by his wisdom, if he is hard up. He will on occasion pay court to a king. He will take pleasure in someone's being put straight. He will set up a school, but not one which results in courting the mob. He will give public lectures, but not at his own wish. He will hold firm doctrines and not be a skeptic. In sleep he will be just the same. And he will on occasion die for a friend. (tr. Long & Sedley)
(Torquatus speaking) I notice that friendship has been discussed by our school in three ways. Some have said that the pleasures which belong to friends are not as desirable per se as those we desire as our own. This position is thought by certain people to make friendship unstable, though in my opinion its proponents are successful and easily defend themselves. They say that friendship is no more separable from pleasure than are the virtues we discussed previously. A lonely life without friends is packed with risks and anxieties. Therefore reason itself advises the formation of friendships; their acquisition strengthens the mind and gives it the absolutely secure expectation of generating pleasures. Moreover, just as enmities, resentments and disparagements are opposed to pleasures, so friendships are creators of pleasures, as well as being their most reliable protectors, for friends and for ourselves alike. The pleasures they enjoy are not only of the present, but they are also elated by the hope of the near and distant future. Without friendship we are quite unable to secure a joy in life which is steady and lasting, nor can we preserve friendship itself unless we love our friends as much as ourselves. Therefore friendship involves both this latter and the link with pleasure. For we rejoice in our friends' joy as much as in our own and are equally pained by their distress. The wise man, therefore, will have just the same feelings towards his friend that he has for himself, and he will work as much for his friend's pleasure as he would for his own. Some Epicureans, however, though intelligent enough, are a little more timid in facing the criticisms from you (Academics); they are afraid that if we regard friendship as desirable just for our own pleasure, it will seem to be completely crippled, as it were. In their view, then, the first associations and unions and wishes to form relationships occur for the sake of pleasure; but when advancing familiarity has produced intimacy, affection blossoms to such an extent that friends come to be loved just for their own sake even if no advantage accrues from the friendship. If, at any rate, familiarity with places, temples, cities, gymnasia, playing-fields, dogs, horses, hunting and other sports, gets us in the habit of loving them, how much more easily and rightly could this happen in human relationships! There are also some w h o say that wise men have a sort of contract to love their friends no less than themselves. We understand the possibility of this, and often observe it too. It is self-evident that no better means of living joyously can be found than such a relationship. All of these points serve to settle not just the absence of any problem in accounting for friendship, if the highest good is located in pleasure, but the impossibility without this thesis of finding any basis at all for friendship. (tr. Long & Sedley)
They themselves (Epicureans) in fact say that it is more pleasurable to confer a benefit than to receive one. (tr. Long & Sedley)
[Above: tr. Goodwin (1874), Against Epicurean Happiness ("Pleasure Not Attainable"), full surrounding context. Below: the same passage as excerpted by Long & Sedley.]
- Page scan: Plutarch, Against Epicurean Happiness 1097A (tr. Goodwin, 1874)
- Page scan: Plutarch, Against Epicurean Happiness 1097A (tr. Long & Sedley)
- Online text: Plutarch, That Epicurus Actually Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible (tr. Goodwin, 1874) -- Perseus Digital Library (same translation used for this project's citation clips; search page for exact passage)
Friendship dances around the world, summoning us all to awaken to the recognition of happiness. (Bailey)
The wise man is not more pained when tortured than when his friend is tortured; and will die on his behalf. For if he betrays a friend, his whole life will be confounded by distrust and utterly upset. (Bailey)
He [Epicurus] says you should be more concerned at inspecting whom you eat and drink with than what you eat and drink. For feeding without a friend is the life of a lion and a wolf. (tr. Long & Sedley)
Those who possess the power to obtain complete security from their neighbors, these also live together with one another most pleasantly, having the firmest guarantee of security; and when they have enjoyed the fullest intimacy, they do not treat the premature death of a friend as though it called for mourning. (Bailey)
Though choosing friendship for the sake of pleasure, he (Epicurus) says he takes on the greatest pains on behalf of his friends. (tr. Long & Sedley)
[Above: tr. Goodwin (1874), Against Colotes the Epicurean, full surrounding context. Below: the same passage as excerpted by Long & Sedley.]
Right at the end of the book he (Colotes) says that 'those who drew up laws and customs and established monarchical and other forms of government brought life into a state of much security and tranquility and banished turmoil; and if anyone should remove these things, we would live a life of beasts, and one man on meeting another will all but devour him. (tr. Long & Sedley)
[Above: tr. Goodwin (1874), Against Colotes the Epicurean, full surrounding context (note: this 1874 rendering paraphrases the passage rather than quoting Colotes as directly as the Loeb/L&S excerpt does). Below: the same theme (life without law reduced to beasts devouring one another) as excerpted by Long & Sedley.]
He (Epicurus) says you should be more concerned at inspecting whom you eat and drink with, than what you eat and drink. For feeding without a friend is the life of a lion and a wolf. (tr. Long & Sedley)
(Reporting the Epicurean Hermarchus) The Epicureans ... say that the ancient legislators, after studying men's social life and their dealings with one another, pronounced murder a sacrilege and attached special penalties to it. Another factor may have been the existence of a certain natural affinity between man and man, deriving from their likeness in body and soul, which inhibited the destruction of this kind of creature as readily as that of others whom it is permitted to kill. But the principal reason for their refusal to tolerate murder and for pronouncing it sacrilegious was the belief that it is not useful to the general structure of human life. Thereafter, those who understood the utility of the law had no need of any further reason to restrain them from this act; the others, who were unable to take sufficient cognizance of this, refrained from readily killing one another through fear of the magnitude of the punishment. It is evident that each of these inhibitions is still operative today... Originally no law, whether written or unwritten, among those that persist today and are naturally transmitted, was established by force, but only by agreement of the users themselves. For what distinguished the men w h o popularized such practices from the masses was not their physical strength and totalitarian power but their prudence. They established a rational calculation of utility in those whose previous perception of this was irrational and often forgetful, while terrifying others by the magnitude of the penalties. For the only remedy against the ignorance of utility was fear of the punishment fixed by the law. Today too this Is the only check and deterrent on ordinary people from acting against public or private interest. But if everyone were equally able to observe and be mindful of utility, they would have n o need of laws in addition; of their own volition, they would steer clear of what is forbidden and do what is prescribed. For the observation of what is useful and harmful is sufficient to secure avoidance of some things and choice of others. The threat of punishment is addressed to those who fail to take note of utility. For hanging over them, it compels them to master impulses which lead to inexpedient actions that are contrary to utility, and forcibly helps to constrain them to do what they should. This explains too why the legislators did not exempt unintentional killing from all punishment; they wanted to avoid giving any pretext to people who might intentionally choose to imitate acts done unintentionally, and also to ensure that such matters should not be approached with a carelessness or casualness which would have many genuinely unintentional consequences. For unintentional killing was also incompatible with utility, and for the same reasons as people's intentional destruction of one another. Consequently, since some unintentional acts arise from causes that are indeterminable and beyond man's nature to forestall, while others are due to our own negligence and inattention to what matters, they wished to restrain the carelessness which does harm to a man's neighbors. Hence they did not exempt unintentional action from all penalty, but through holding out the fear of punishments succeeded in removing most of this kind of offence. In my own opinion, moreover, the reason why murders excused by the law are subject to the practice of expiation through purifications, as intended by those who initiated this excellent custom, was to deter people as far as possible from the intentional action. For ordinary people everywhere needed a check on their readiness to act contrary to utility. Therefore those who were first aware of this not only drew up punishments but also held out the threat of a different and irrational fear, with the pronouncement that those guilty of any kind of homicide were impure until they had experienced purification. For the irrational part of the soul, by various forms of education, has arrived at the present condition of civility as a result of the civilizing devices applied to the irrational motion of desire by those who originally set the masses in order; and these include the prohibition of indiscriminately killing one another. (tr. Long & Sedley)
It is hard for an evil-doer to escape detection, but to obtain security for escaping is impossible. (Bailey)
We value our characters as something peculiar to ourselves, whether they are good and we are esteemed by men, or not; so ought we to value the characters of others, if they are well-disposed to us. (Bailey)
Most beautiful too is the sight of those near and dear to us, when our original kinship makes us of one mind; for such sight is a great incitement to this end. (Bailey)
[Reporting on Hermarchus] In determining what we should and should not do, the first legislators had good reason for not setting any ban on the destruction of other creatures. For in regard to these utility results from the opposite action: man would not have been able to survive without taking steps to defend himself against animals by living a social life. Some of the most talented men of the time remembered that they themselves abstained from murder because that was useful for their preservation; and they reminded the rest of what they gained from their social life, that by keeping their hands off their own kind they might safeguard the community which contributed to the individual preservation of each person. Existing as a separate community and doing no harm to their fellow residents were useful for expelling creatures of other species; and also as a protection against men intent on doing harm. This is the reason why for a while people kept their hands off their own kind, in as much as the latter were entering into the same community of needs. But as time passed, the population expanded; creatures of other kinds were expelled, and some people acquired a rational calculation of what was useful in their social life, not just an irrational memory. Accordingly they attempted to impose stronger restraints on those who were ready to kill one another and were weakening internal security by their forgetfulness of the past. In their efforts to do this, they introduced the legislation which still exists today among cities and peoples. The masses complied with their legislators voluntarily, as a result of now having a better grasp of what was useful in their social grouping. For their absence of fear was promoted equally by the merciless killing of everything harmful and the preservation of every means to its destruction. Hence, with good reason, one of the above mentioned [killings] was forbidden, the other permitted. It is irrelevant to point out that the law permits us to kill certain animals that are not destructive to man or harmful to our lives in any other way. For practically none of the animals we are permitted by law to kill would fail to be harmful to us if they were allowed to proliferate to excess. Yet by being preserved in their present numbers they satisfy certain of our life's needs... Hence we completely destroy some animals [lions, wolves, etc.], but in the case of other animals [sheep, cattle etc.] we only get rid of the excess. We must suppose that reasons similar to what has been mentioned influenced those who originally made laws concerning the regulation of eating living beings. In the case of the inedible, the reason was utility and its opposite. Hence it is a mark of gross stupidity for some people to say that everything excellent and just in the sphere of legislation is determined by individual judgments. This is not the case; rather it is just like other matters of utility, such as health and thousands of others. In many cases, however, they miss what is universal as well as what is individual. For it is the case both that some people fail to see those laws which fit everyone alike, either ignoring them in the belief that they are indifferent or taking the opposite view about them, and that some people think things which are not universally useful to be useful everywhere. Accordingly, they attach themselves to measures which do not fit, even if in some cases they do discover what is profitable to themselves and what is universally beneficial. Such laws include ones concerned with the eating and destruction of living things. Among most peoples these laws are formulated on account of the particular nature of the country, and we do not have to observe them since we do not live in the same place. If, then, it were possible to make a kind of contract with the other animals, or with men, over their nor killing us or being killed by us indiscriminately, it would have been good to push justice up to this point; for it would have extended our security. But since it was impossible to associate creatures that lack reason with law, it was not possible to use such an instrument as the means of providing for utility in our security from other living beings any more than from lifeless things. All that can assure our security is the option that we now have of killing them. (tr. Long & Sedley)
[Philodemus's treatise on frank speech among friends extends the school's distinction between honest correction (which strengthens a friendship) and flattery or a hostile break (which destroys it) into the specific context of teacher-student relationships within the Garden -- treating candid criticism, offered out of genuine goodwill, as itself an expression of friendship rather than a threat to it.]
Fr. 74-75: "...whether he is well-disposed toward us; whether he is intense in his goodwill; whether he has jettisoned some of the things charged against him... [Fr. 75] that the reproaches occur, but not those administered by the teachers. Their fellow-students know the multitude of good things that we have and they too present themselves for correction, nor in the case of these does frank criticism occur..."