Part of the Physics section of the outline of Epicurean philosophy. Updated October 24, 2026.
1. The Universe Is Infinite In Size And Eternal In Time And Has No Gods Over It.
The universe -- meaning the totality of everything that exists, all atoms and all void -- is infinite in spatial extent and eternal in time. It has no outer edge, no outside, and no point of creation. Individual bodies and worlds come together and eventually dissolve through the natural movement of atoms, but the sum of all things has always existed and will always exist, since there is nothing outside of it into which it could change and nothing from which a new totality could arise. This is not a theological claim but a deductive consequence of the principles that nothing comes from nothing and nothing goes to nothing.
The practical importance of this conclusion is immense. If the universe is infinite and eternal and entirely self-sufficient, then there is no role left for a creator god or for any supernatural overseer of the whole. No god stands outside nature directing its operations. This does not mean Epicurus denied the existence of divine beings -- he did not -- but those beings, whatever their nature, exist within the universe and are subject to its natural conditions. The removal of a supernatural creator and governor from the framework of nature is one of the essential steps Epicurean physics takes toward freeing human beings from the fears that destroy happy living.
The Epicureans did not rest the case against a creator on the size and age of the universe alone. They pressed a series of direct questions against the creation story of Plato's /Timaeus/, which was the leading account of creation in Epicurus's day. The Stoics soon took up the same conviction that the world is the work of a divine intelligence for the sake of gods and men, differing from Plato mainly on how the making took place, so in answering Plato the Epicureans were answering the Stoics as well. Where would the gods have found the model of a world, or even the notion of a human being, before any such thing existed to be seen? Why would beings who had lived happily for endless ages suddenly want something new? Whom would creation benefit, when no one who does not yet exist is harmed by never being born? How could any one god govern the innumerable worlds of an infinite universe? And if the world was made for man, why is so much of it hostile to him? In place of design the Epicureans put the power of infinity. The kinds of atoms are limited in number, though too many to imagine, while the worlds are unlimited, so worlds like ours must form again and again without any planner. Among living things, only the kinds equipped to feed, defend themselves, and breed have survived, and the organs of the body existed before their uses were found.
(1) Moreover, the totality is infinite. For what is limited has an extremity, and the extremity of something is viewed in contrast to something else. Consequently, since it has no extremity, it has no limit; and since it has no limit, it must be infinite and not limited. (2) Moreover, the totality is infinite both in the number of bodies and in the size of the void. (3) For if the void were infinite and the bodies limited, the bodies would not remain stationary anywhere, but would be moving scattered through the infinite void, lacking any support or impediment from collision. (4) And if the void were limited, the infinite bodies would not have room to occupy. (tr. Long & Sedley)
Moreover in speaking of the infinite we must not use ' up ' or ' down ' with the implication that they are top or bottom, but with the implication that from wherever we stand it is possible to protract the line above our heads to infinity without the danger of this ever seeming so to us, or likewise the line below us (in what is conceived to stretch to infinity simultaneously both upwards and downwards in relation to the same point). For this (i. e. that there should be a top and bottom) is unthinkable. Therefore it is possible to take as one motion that which is conceived as upwards to infinity, and as one motion that which is conceived as downwards to infinity, even if that which moves from where we are towards the places above our heads arrives ten thousand times at the feet of those above, or at the heads of those below, in the case of that which moves downwards from where we are. For each of the two mutually opposed motions is nonetheless, as a whole, conceived as being to infinity. (tr. Long & Sedley)
- Page scan: Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus 60 (tr. Bailey) -- opening of sec. 60 shown (same page also carries secs. 58-59); the section continues on the following page, not separately clipped here
- Online text: Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus 60 -- Perseus Digital Library (Diogenes Laertius X, tr. Hicks, Loeb)
The totality of things is not limited in any direction. For if it were, it would have to have an extremity. Now it is a visible fact that nothing can have an extremity unless there is something beyond it to limit it -- so that the same can be seen to be true beyond the reach of this kind of perception. But since, as it is, it must be admitted that there is nothing outside the totality of things, it has no extremity and hence no limit or boundary. Nor does it make any difference what part of it you stand so true is it that wherever someone goes to take up position, he is leaving the universe just as infinite in all directions. Besides, supposing tor the moment that the totality of room is finite, if someone at the very edge ran up to its outermost frontier and hurled a flying javelin, do you prefer that after being hurled with great force the javelin should g o in the direction in which it was aimed and fly far, or do you think that something can obstruct and block it? You must concede and choose one of the two answers, and either one cuts off your escape and forces you to admit that the universe stretches without end. For whether there is something to obstruct it, to prevent it traveling in the direction of aim, and to station itself as a limit, or whether it is earned outside, what it started from was not the limit. I shall pursue you in this way, and wherever you place the outermost frontier I shall ask what is the outcome for the javelin. It will turn out that a limit cannot exist anywhere, and that the availability of flight will delay escape for ever. Besides, if the totality of room in the whole universe were enclosed by a fixed frontier on all sides, and were finite, by now the whole stock of matter would through its solid weight have accumulated from everywhere all the way to the bottom, and nothing could happen beneath the sky's canopy, nor indeed could the sky or sunlight exist at all, since all matter would be lying in a heap, having been sinking since infinite time past. But as it is, the primary bodies are clearly never allowed to come to rest, because there is no absolute bottom at which they might be able to accumulate and take up residence. At all times all things are going on in constant motion everywhere, and underneath there is a supply of particles of matter which have been traveling from infinity. (tr. Long & Sedley)
First, that nothing comes into being out of what is not - for in that case everything would come into being out of everything, with no need for seeds. (tr. Long & Sedley)
A world is a certain envelopment of a heaven. It envelops celestial bodies, an earth, and the whole range of phenomena. It is cut off from the infinite, and terminates in a limit which is either rare or dense, on whose dissolution all its contents will undergo a collapse. It has its terminus either in something revolving or in something stationary, which has its outer perimeter round, triangular, or of whatever other shape. All are possible; for they are contested by none of the things evident in this world, in which we cannot discover a terminus. (tr. Long & Sedley)
In addition to what was said earlier, we must suppose that the worlds, and every limited compound which bears a close resemblance to the things we see, has come into being from the infinite: all these things, the larger and the smaller alike, have been separated off from it as a result of individual entanglements. And all disintegrate again, some faster and some slower, and through differing kinds of causes. (tr. Long & Sedley)
Now it is not to be thought at all likely, when there is an infinity of empty space in every direction and countless seeds flying through the depths of the universe with their varied, everlasting and restless motion, that this is the one world and heaven to have been created, and that all those particles of matter outside it do nothing. Moreover, nothing in the universe is the only one of its kind to be born and to grow, as opposed to belonging to some species, with many members of the same kind. Focus your mind first on animals. You will find that the wild beasts of the mountains, the human race, the speechless swarms of scaly fish, and all flying creatures, have such an origin. Therefore we must likewise admit that heaven, earth, sun, moon, sea, and all other existing things, are not unique but, rather, countless in number. (tr. Long & Sedley)
Now turn your mind, I pray, to a true reasoning. For a truth wondrously new is struggling to fall upon your ears, and a new face of things to reveal itself. Yet no truth is so easy that at first it does not seem more hard to credit, and likewise nothing is so great or so marvellous but that all men little by little abate their wonder at it. For our mind now seeks to reason, since the sum of space is boundless out beyond the walls of this world, what there is far out there, whither the spirit desires always to look forward, and whither the unfettered projection of our mind flies on unchecked. (Bailey)
So, as I was saying, having had my appetite most keenly whetted by all the advantage of the voyage, I shall try to meet you as soon as winter has ended, sailing first either to Athens or to Chalcis and Boeotia. But, since this is uncertain, both on account of the changeability and inconstancy of our fortunes and on account of my old age besides, I am sending you, in accordance with your request, the arguments concerning an infinite number of worlds.
[Note: header corrected from "2.167-83" -- that locus is the sunbeam-motes passage, not this content; verified against the rendered page, this "not by design" refrain is Book II's version of a passage Lucretius repeats near the ends of Books I, II, and V.]
(1) And not by design did the primary bodies of things station themselves each in their right place, guided by keen intelligence, nor indeed did they make contracts about the movements each was to perform; (2) but because many primary bodies of things in many ways, struck with blows and carried along by their own weight from infinite time up to the present, have been accustomed to move and meet in every way and to try everything that they could produce by coming together, on this account it happens that, scattered abroad through a vast time and trying every kind of combination and motion, at length those come together which, being suddenly brought together, often become the beginnings of great things - of earth, sea, and sky, and the generation of living creatures. (tr. Long & Sedley)
[Note: header locus refined from "4:823-857" to the full passage's real range, verified against the rendered page.]
One mistake in this context, which I am determined you should shun and take precautions to avoid, is that of supposing the clear lights of the eyes to have been created in order that we might see; that it is in order that we might be able to take lengthy strides that the knees and hips can be flexed above their base of feet; and again that the forearms were jointed to the powerful upper arms, and hands supplied on either side, as our servants, in order that we could perform whatever acts were needed for living. All other explanations of this type which they offer are back to front, due to distorted reasoning. For nothing has been engendered in our body in order that we might be able to use it. It is the fact of its being engendered that creates its use. Seeing did not exist before the lights of the eyes were engendered, nor was there pleading with words before the tongue was created. Rather, the origin of the tongue came long before speech, ears were created long before sound was heard, and all our limbs, in my view, existed in advance of their use. Therefore they cannot have grown for the sake of their use. By contrast, fighting out battles with bare hands, mutilating limbs, and staining bodies with blood, existed long before shining weapons began to fly. Nature compelled men to avoid wounds before the time when, thanks to craftsmanship, the left arm held up the obstructing shield. Presumably too the practice of resting the tired body is much more ancient than the spreading of soft beds; and the quenching of thirst came into being before cups. Hence it is credible that these were devised for the sake of their use, for they were invented as a result of life's experiences. Quite different from these are all the things which were first actually engendered and gave rise to the preconception of their usefulness subsequently. Primary in this class are, we can see, the senses and the limbs. Hence, I repeat, there is no way you can believe that they were created for their function of utility. (tr. Long & Sedley)
[Note: header locus refined from "5:156-234" to the real range, verified against the rendered page.]
Now to say that they [the gods] conceived the wish to create a world wonderful in nature for the sake of men, and that tor that reason the gods' work is praiseworthy, so that it is proper for us to sing its praises and consider that it will be everlasting and imperishable, and that it is wrong that what was built by an ancient plan of the gods for the sake of mankind, in perpetuity, should ever be disturbed from its foundations by any force, or assailed with words and turned upside down -- to elaborate such a fiction, Memmius, is folly. For what profit could imperishable and blessed beings gain from our gratitude, to induce them to take on any task for our sake? What novelty could have tempted hitherto tranquil beings, at so late a stage, to desire a change in their earlier lifestyle? For it is plainly those who are troubled by the old that are obliged to delight in the new. But where someone had had no ill befall him up to now, because he had led his life well, what could have ignited a passion for novelty in such a person? Or again, what harm would it have done us never to have been born? Did our life lie in darkness and misery until the world's beginning dawned? Although anyone who has been born must wish to remain in life so long as the caresses of pleasure hold him there, if someone has really never tasted the passion for life and has never been an individual, what harm does it do him not to have been created? Also, from where did the gods get a model for the creation of the world, and from where was the preconception of men first ingrained in them, to enable them to know and see in their mind what they wished to create, or how did they come to know the power of the primary particles and what they were capable of when their arrangement was altered, if nature itself not supply a blueprint of creation? For so many primary particles have for an infinity of time past been propelled in manifold ways by impacts and by their own weight, and have habitually traveled, combined in all possible ways, and tried out everything that their union could create, that it is not surprising if they have also fallen into arrangements, and arrived at patterns of motion, like those repeatedly enacted by this present world. On the other hand, even if I were ignorant what the primary constituents of the world are, I would still dare to assert, from the very working of the heavens, and to prove from many other things, that the world's nature is certainly not a divine gift to us: it is so deeply flawed. First, of all that is covered by the heaven's vast expanse, mountains and beast-infested forests have appropriated a greedy share. It is occupied by rocks, vast swamps, and sea, which keeps the coastlines of the lands far apart. Of nearly two-thirds of it mortals are robbed by scorching heat and constant falls of frost. What farmland is left nature would use its force to smother with brambles, but for the resistance of human force. Besides, why does nature sustain and multiply on land and sea the dreadful hordes of wild beasts? Why do the seasons bring diseases with them? Why is untimely death rife? A child, when nature has first spilt him forth with throes from his mother's womb into the realm of light, lies like a sailor cast ashore from the cruel waves - naked on the ground, without speech, helpless for life's tasks. And he fills the place with his miserable wailing, not without justification, in view of the quantity of troubles that lie ahead for him in life! On the other hand, the various domestic and wild animals grow without the need for rattles, for the smiles and broken speech of a nurse, and for different clothes to fit the different seasons. Nor, moreover, do they need weapons and high walls to protect their possessions, since the earth itself and creative nature supply all their wants in plenty. (tr. Long & Sedley)
[Note: header corrected from "5.195-234" -- this passage is Book II, verified against the rendered page (the Neptune/Ceres/Bacchus material and the Great Mother of the gods material a little earlier in Book II are Lucretius's two treatments of the same theme; this quote is the former).]
(1) For certainly the nature of the gods must enjoy immortal life in supreme tranquility, far removed and separated from our affairs; free from all pain, free from dangers, itself mighty by its own resources, needing nothing from us, it is neither propitiated by services nor touched by wrath. (2) And the earth, in her own nature, has no sensation, but because she receives into herself the atoms of many things in many ways through vast ages, she brings forth everything. (3) And he who has decided that we should call the sea Neptune and corn Ceres, and has preferred to misuse the name Bacchus rather than utter the name appropriate to that liquor - let us grant him to proclaim that the earth is Mother of the gods, provided only that he does in fact forbear to taint his mind with base superstition. (4) Often the fleecy flocks and the martial breed of horses and horned cattle, cropping the grass under the same canopy of sky, slake their thirst from the same stream of water, yet live lives dissimilar, preserving the nature of their parents and each imitating their ways according to their kind; so great is the variety of matter in any kind of grass you please, so great in every stream. (tr. Long & Sedley)
[Note: verified against the rendered page -- this is the same underlying Latin passage as the "Lucretius 5.149-239" entry above (Bailey pp.191-192, ll.149-180), quoted here in a different translation.]
(1) To think that the gods designed to set up the glorious nature of the world for the sake of humankind, and that therefore this work of the gods is something to be praised and believed to be eternal and immortal, and that it is sacrilege to shake by any force from its established seat what was set up in ancient plan by the gods for everlasting for the human race, and to assail it with words and overturn it from top to bottom - to invent and add these and other ideas of this kind, Memmius, is folly. (2) For what advantage could our gratitude confer on the immortal and blessed beings, that they should attempt to do anything for our sake? And what novel factor could have provoked them so long afterward, after they had been at rest before, to desire to change their former life? (3) For it appears that he should rejoice in a new state of affairs who is pained by the old; but he who has experienced no ill in times past, when he was leading a pleasant life, what could have inflamed such a being with love of innovation? (tr. Long & Sedley)
[Note: header corrected from "5.837-77" -- verified against the rendered page, the "not by design" argument in sub-points (2)-(4) is Book V's version of a refrain Lucretius repeats near the ends of Books I, II, and V (Bailey p.200, ll.413-444). Sub-point (1) (the "before agriculture, wild animals occupied the earth" framing) could not be pinned to this same page and may be a paraphrased lead-in rather than a direct quotation from this locus.]
(1) And before the human race began to lay out fields and to cut down forests with iron, and before the light of the sun shone forth, wild animals occupied the entire face of the earth and the whole of the sea. (2) And you should not suppose that someone began to arrange all this, planning it with keen intelligence and assigning to each its station - knowing which combinations to institute, which to keep separate - (3) but because many atoms of things in many ways struck together and carried along by their own weight from infinite time up till now have been in the habit of moving and meeting in all manner of ways and trying out all the combinations that they might create by their coming together, (4) for this reason it comes about that scattered abroad through vast time, trying every kind of motion and congregation, at length those atoms come together which, being suddenly combined, often become the origins of great things - of earth and sea and sky and the races of living creatures. (tr. Long & Sedley)
(1) And many monsters too earth then essayed to create, born with strange faces and strange limbs, the man-woman, between the two, yet not either, sundered from both sexes, some things bereft of feet, or in turn robbed of hands, things too found dumb without mouths, or blind without eyes, or locked through the whole body by the clinging of the limbs, so that they could not do anything or move towards any side or avoid calamity or take what they needed. All other monsters and prodigies of this sort she would create; all in vain, since nature forbade their increase, nor could they reach the coveted bloom of age nor find food nor join in the work of Venus. (2) And it must needs be that many races of living things then perished and could not beget and propagate their offspring. For whatever animals you see feeding on the breath of life, either their craft or bravery, aye or their swiftness has protected and preserved their kind from the beginning of their being. And many there are, which by their usefulness are commended to us, and so abide, trusted to our tutelage. (3) But those to whom nature granted none of these things, neither that they might live on by themselves of their own might, nor do us any useful service, for which we might suffer their kind to feed and be kept safe under our defence, you may know that these fell a prey and spoil to others, all entangled in the fateful trammels of their own being, until nature brought their kind to destruction. (Bailey)
Velleius: Listen to no ungrounded and fictitious doctrines: no creator and builder of the world like the god from Plato's Timaeus; no prophetic hag like the Stoics' Providence, no world which is itself an animate, sentient, spherical, glowing, rotating god. These prodigies and marvels are the work of philosophers who dream, not argue. By what kind of mental vision could your Plato have envisaged that great building enterprise by which he has god construct the world? What were the building techniques, the tools, the levers, the machines, the laborers, for such an enterprise? How were the air, fire, water and earth capable of complying with and obeying the architect's wishes?... To crown it all, having introduced a world which was not merely born but virtually hand-made as well, he said that it would be everlasting. Do you suppose that this man had so much as sipped at the cup of natural philosophy - that is, of the rationale of nature -- when he thinks that something with an origin can be everlasting? What compound is not capable of dissolution? What is there that has a beginning and no end? As for your [the Stoics'] providence, Lucilius, if it is the same thing as this, I repeat my earlier question about the laborers, the machines, and the entire planning and execution of the project. If it is something different, why did it make the world perishable, and not everlasting, as the Platonic god did? A question for both of you [Plato and Stoics] is why the world-builders suddenly appeared on the scene, after sleeping for countless centuries. For if there was no world, it does not follow that there were no centuries. By 'centuries' here I don't mean the ones which are made up by the number of days and nights as a result of the annual orbits. Those, I concede, could not have been produced without the world's rotation. But there has been a certain eternity from infinite time past, which was not measured by any bounding of times, but whose extent can be understood, because it is unthinkable that there should have been sometime at which there was no time. Was it for the sake of men, as you [the Stoics] are in the habit of saying, that all this world was assembled by god? For wise men? In that case this massive fear of world-building was accomplished for just a handful of people. For foolish men? But, first, god had no reason to do the bad a favor. And second, what did he achieve, seeing that all fools are beyond doubt utterly wretched, above all because they are fools (for what can be called more wretched than folly?), but also because there are so many disadvantages in life that, whereas the wise mitigate them with compensating advantages, fools can neither evade those still to come nor bear those which are present. (tr. Long & Sedley)
Then in what a maze of error is Democritus involved, who at one moment ranks as gods his roving "images," at another the substance that emits and radiates these images, and at another again the scientific intelligence of man! At the same time his denial of immutability, and therefore of eternity, to everything whatsoever surely involves a repudiation of deity so absolute as to leave no conception of a divine being remaining! (Rackham)
[Velleius] Those on the other hand who said that the world is itself endowed with life and with wisdom failed entirely to discern what shape the nature of an intelligent living being could conceivably possess... I will confine myself to expressing my surprise at their stupidity in holding that a being who is immortal and also blessed is of a spherical shape, merely on the ground that Plato pronounces a sphere to be the most beautiful of all figures... Now clearly the earth, being a part of the world, is also a part of god. Yet we see that vast portions of the earth's surface are uninhabitable deserts, being either scorched by the sun's proximity, or frost-bound and covered with snow owing to its extreme remoteness. But if the world is god, these, being parts of the world, must be regarded as limbs of god, undergoing the extremes of heat and cold respectively. (Rackham)
[Velleius] Zeno's view is that the law of nature is divine, and that its function is to command what is right and to forbid the opposite. How he makes out this law to be alive passes our comprehension; yet we undoubtedly expect god to be a living being. In another passage, however, Zeno declares that the aether is god... And in other books again he holds the view that a 'reason' which pervades all nature is possessed of divine power... Again, in his interpretation of Hesiod's Theogony... he does away with the customary and received ideas of the gods altogether, for he does not reckon either Jupiter, Juno, or Vesta gods, or any being that bears a personal name, but teaches that these names have been assigned allegorically to dumb and lifeless things. Zeno's pupil Aristo holds equally mistaken views... The result is that the god whom we apprehend by our intelligence, and desire to make to correspond with a mental concept as a seal tallies with its impression, has utterly and entirely vanished. (Rackham)
[Velleius] I have given a rough account of what are more like the dreams of madmen than the considered opinions of philosophers. For they are little less absurd than the outpourings of the poets, harmful as these have been owing to the mere charm of their style. The poets have represented the gods as inflamed by anger and maddened by lust, and have displayed to our gaze their wars and battles, their fights and wounds, their hatreds, enmities and quarrels, their births and deaths, their complaints and lamentations, the utter and unbridled license of their passions, their adulteries and imprisonments, their unions with human beings and the birth of mortal progeny from an immortal parent. With the errors of the poets may be classed the monstrous doctrines of the magi and the insane mythology of Egypt, and also the popular beliefs, which are a mere mass of inconsistencies sprung from ignorance. (Rackham)
[Velleius] We can rightly call this god of ours blessed, and yours [the Stoics'] extremely overworked. For if the world itself is god, what can be less tranquil than rotating about an axis without a moment's break at the heaven's amazing speed? And yet nothing is blessed if it is not tranquil. Or if god is some being within the world, there to rule, to control, to maintain the orbits of the heavenly bodies, the succession of seasons, and the variations and regularities of things, to watch over land and sea and guard men's well-being and lives, he is surely involved in a troublesome and laborious job. We, on the other hand, place the blessed life in peace of mind and in freedom from all duties. man to whom we owe all our other teaching taught us too that and has made infinitely many worlds. Just because you don't see how nature can do this without some mind, finding yourselves unable to work out the denouement of the argument, you resort, like the tragedians, to a deus ex machina. (tr. Long & Sedley)
Thus Empedocles says that under the rule of Love parts of animals first came into being at random - heads, hands, feet, and so on - and then came into combination: There sprang up ox progeny, man-limbed, and the reverse. And those which combined in a way which enabled them to preserve themselves became animals, and survived, because they fulfilled each other's needs -- the teeth cutting and grinding the food, the stomach digesting it, the liver converting it into blood. And the human head, by combining with the human body, brings about the preservation of the whole, but by combining with the ox's body fails to cohere with it and perishes. For those which did not combine on proper principles perished. And things still happen in the same way nowadays. This doctrine seems to be shared by all those early natural philosophers who make material necessity the cause of things' becoming, and, among later philosophers, by the Epicureans. Their mistake, according to Alexander, springs from the supposition that all things that come into being for some end come into being through decision and reasoning, coupled with the observation that natural things do not come into being in that way. (tr. Long & Sedley)
And if you learn this surely, and cling to it, nature is seen, free at once, and quit of her proud rulers, doing all things of her own accord alone, without control of gods. (Bailey)
Holding this knowledge, you can't help but see, / That nature has no tyrants over her, / But always acts of her own will; she has no part of any godhead whatsoever. (Humphries)
These things, if you rightly apprehend, Nature will appear free in her operations, wholly from under the power of domineering deities, and to act all things voluntarily, and of herself, without the assistance of gods. (Brown, 1743)
If you well apprehend and keep in mind these things, nature free at once and rid of her haughty lords is seen to do all things spontaneously of herself without the meddling of the gods. (Munro)
So nature is her own mistress and is exempt from the oppression of arrogant despots, accomplishing everything by herself spontaneously and independently and free from the jurisdiction of the gods. (tr. Long & Sedley)
[Above: Long & Sedley excerpt. Below: the same line in Bailey's translation.]
Next the regularity of the periods of the heavenly bodies must be understood in the same way as such regularity is seen in some of the events that happen on earth. And do not let the divine nature be introduced at any point into these considerations, but let it be preserved free from burdensome duties and in entire blessedness. (Bailey)
These discoveries of Epicurus are so acute in themselves and so subtly expressed that not everyone would be capable of appreciating them. Epicurus teaches that the substance and nature of the gods is such that, in the first place, it is perceived not by the senses but by the mind, but by our perceiving images owing to their similarity and succession, because an endless train of precisely similar images arises from the innumerable atoms and streams towards the gods, our mind with the keenest feelings of pleasure fixes its gaze on these images, and so attains an understanding of the nature of a being both blessed and eternal. Moreover there is the supremely potent principle of infinity, which claims the closest and most careful study; we must understand that it has the following property, that in the sum of things everything has its exact match and counterpart. This property is termed by Epicurus isonomia, or the principle of uniform distribution. From this principle it follows that if the whole number of mortals be so many, there must exist no less a number of immortals. (Yonge)
[Sextus does not name Epicurus here. This is the same will-and-power dilemma that Lactantius later attributes to Epicurus (On the Anger of God 13), the so-called "Epicurean Paradox."]
He who affirms that God exists either declares that he has, or that he has not, forethought for the things in the universe, and in the former case that such forethought is for all things or for some things. But if he had forethought for all, there would have been nothing bad and no badness in the world; yet all things, they say, are full of badness; hence it shall not be said that God forethinks all things. If, again, he forethinks some, why does he forethink these things and not those? For either he has both the will and the power to forethink all things, or else he has the will but not the power, or the power but not the will, or neither the will nor the power. But if he had had both the will and the power he would have had forethought for all things; but for the reasons stated above he does not forethink all; therefore he has not both the will and the power to forethink all. And if he has the will but not the power, he is less strong than the cause which renders him unable to forethink what he does not forethink: but it is contrary to our notion of God that he should be weaker than anything. And if, again, he has the power but not the will to have forethought for all, he will be held to be malignant; while if he has neither the will nor the power, he is both malignant and weak -- an impious thing to say about God. Therefore God has no forethought for the things in the universe. (Bury)
2. There Is Life Elsewhere In The Universe
The processes that led to their being life on earth are not unique to earth. Just as here on earth Nature never creates a single thing of a kind, we deduce that there are other planets in varying degrees similar to our own on which life also exists. Given that the universe as a whole is eternal in time this process of life has been continuing for eternity, and will continue eternally, so human life on earth is neither the only nor the most advanced location of intelligent life in the universe.
Now it is not to be thought at all likely, when there is an infinity of empty space in every direction and countless seeds flying through the depths of the universe with their varied, everlasting and restless motion, that this is the one world and heaven to have been created, and that all those particles of matter outside it do nothing. Moreover, nothing in the universe is the only one of its kind to be born and to grow, as opposed to belonging to some species, with many members of the same kind. Focus your mind first on animals. You will find that the wild beasts of the mountains, the human race, the speechless swarms of scaly fish, and all flying creatures, have such an origin. Therefore we must likewise admit that heaven, earth, sun, moon, sea, and all other existing things, are not unique but, rather, countless in number. After all, these are just as much products of birth, just as much awaited by the deep-set boundary stone of life, as any of the prolifically reproducing species in our world. Provided you fully understand this, nature is at once revealed as rid of haughty overlords, the free autonomous agent of everything, without the gods' participation. For I appeal to the holy hearts of the gods, in their tranquil peace, leading their life of calm serenity. Who is capable of ruling the totality of the measureless, of holding in his hands and controlling the mighty reins of its depths? Who could run all those heavens at the same rime? Who could warm all those bountiful earths with celestial fires? Or be present everywhere at all times to darken the earth with clouds, to shake the calm sky with thunder, to despatch thunderbolts (often rocking his own abodes with them!) and to withdraw to the wilds and furiously hurl his weapon (which often misses the guilty and wipes out the innocent!)? (tr. Long & Sedley)