Posts by wbernys

Quote from Cassius

But the general point is the happiness and predominance of pleasure do require total absence of pain,

Are you missing a "does not" in the middle here?

Gonna be honest, I don't really see how we disagree, now I'm just kinda confused and want the conversation to be over, since I worry we're just talking past each other.

Final post on topic. Then I'm done.

My understanding is Epicurus thought removal of pain was important since it didn't allow height of pleasure, BUT even if you didn't reach the height of pleasure (no pain in mind or body) you could still have predominance of pleasure over pain thanks to mental pleasures understanding limits of pain and gratitude for past goods, etc. Especially as mental pleasures are more important than physical ones.

As far as the whole explain Epicurus to normal people thing, I would broadly stress how to enjoy as much pleasure with as little pain as possible as the goal of life by his philosophy by understanding nature needs little, but doesn't shun more as long as they are not outweighed by pains, and that limits of pain make physical pain negligible to our happiness, with the mind being completely within our own control and more important, with the mind alone we can have more pleasure than pain at any moment, but we should still get rid of or avoid pain in the flesh, if able, as it is still bad and prevents the height of pleasure, like those of the gods.

Quote from Cassius

And yet on the last day of his life Epicurus considered himself happy / and/or considered it to be among his happiest days despite his excruciating pain.

How would you reconcile that?

He never says it is among the happiest days of his life, he simply says it's a blissful/happy day and that he sets gladness of the mind towards past conversations, this allows him to have more pleasure than pain with the mind offsetting the pains of the flesh.

The lesson is that he has joy more often than not despite the pain, whereas others would be constituently miserable the entire time, not that he's in the best possible state he could be in and always experiences joy.

Quote from Cassius

And I don't think it's true, or helpful to imply even if it sounds good to some people, that either (1) or (2) are what Epicurus taught.

I do agree that 1 is indefensible and needlessly asetic. I don't mind 2 as much but i sympathize with your points. I definitely think Epicurus thought removal of pain was centrally important, because we can't experience the height of pleasure while in pain, and oftentimes pain doesn't allow pleasure as the two are opposites, so I don't mind commentators emphasizing that with caveats.

I mainly think the main point to be made is that Joy or Delight from sex, fine dining, or theme parks are not "baser" or inferior pleasures to tranquility or absence of pain. My reading of Epicurus is that he thinks they're all equal, as all pleasure is a unity and naturally good. Joy and Delight being a equal value variation of tranquility, not a "baser" pleasure/version, like John Stuart Mill may think. I think Epicurus explitlictly rejected that as the talk of Plato's academy taling about geometry and musical theory being higher pleasures.

Agree?

Yeah. We're just agree to disagree I guess. Nice conversation though. This is an interesting topic I wanted a thread on.

Quote from Cassius

Help me understand why it seems attractive to talk about "psychological hedonism" rather than just "hedonism."

Is it because "psychological hedonism" implies you can't help it so you are defending hedonism on the grounds that "you can't help it"?

Mostly, though I would rephrase it, a main problem I see with a lack of psychological hedonism is that without it, you get groundless ideas that you can "rise above pleasure", as if pleasure, because it's natural and for animals means it's something to rise above, and be "greater than your base nature", this is why just saying pleasure is the goal of nature isn't sufficient in my view since people can just vainly respond that they "rise above nature" to which an effective counter is "No you don't, you're just delusional"

This is similar to how Cicero argued against hedonism. This is also why Nietzsche called Epicurus a decadent, since he thought we had to rise above pleasure, despite occasional praise.

Psychological hedonism helps to dispel this vanity, there is no rising above pleasure or pain, there are only correct and incorrect views on how to achieve it. So it helps to both "knock down our opponents who say they are mighty and rise above pleasure, generally removes stigma around hedonism, and offers a therapy that we all pursue the same goal, so let's find out how to achieve it.

Hi Keith Happy to have you. That was also the main reason i joined as well. We also have a few youtube videos as well. If you're getting into digging deeper may i recommend Torquatus speech as a seminal work on ethics.

https://youtu.be/1t1wOqLHzOw?si=enUESHChDZAkZV2Z

Thankfully you have Emily A. Austin's books, the best in my view, Norm DeWitt's Epicurus and his philosophy has a open access PDF on Google by Agathon library i think, easy to find just by googling.

Happy to have you hear and check around.

I always like this passage from Frances Wright as a good example of how seeing humans having a shared goal can be an important thereuptic element.

"‘My sons! do you seek pleasure? I seek her also. Let us make the search together. You have tried wine, you have tried love; you have sought amusement in revelling, and forgetfulness in indolence. You tell me you are disappointed: that your passions grew, even while you gratified them; your weariness increased even while you slept. Let us try again. Let us quiet our passions, not by gratifying, but subduing them; let us conquer our weariness, not by rest, but by exertion.’ Thus do I win their ears and their confidence. Step by step I lead them on. I lay open the mysteries of science; I expose the beauties of art; I call the graces and the muses to my aid; the song, the lyre, and the dance. Temperance presides at the repast; innocence, at the festival; disgust is changed to satisfaction; listlessness, to curiosity; brutality, to elegance; lust gives place to love; Bacchanalian hilarity to friendship."

Quote from Cassius

But maybe it would help me understand where you are coming from wbernys if I understood:

What do you think it gains someone to make the point "Epicurus was a psychological hedonist" ?

That's the point I really don't understand. I feel like someone is thinking that this is a profound insight that leads to some really important conclusions or living a better life, but I just don't see the direction or the benefit in arguing for the label.

Great question, let me say a few things then!

First off, Psychological Hedonism is not exactly a huge issue to me, i certainly don't think it needs to be on any pamphlets as a major point or something. However, i think it may be helpful for two reasons.

Secondly, If this is Epicurus' position (which i believe it is) than it is important to know how to defend it from others like the Stoics and Religious who will say that this an evil doctrine, taught by a nihilistic and crude man, and both he and we are just projecting our own vile natures onto good people (something I've seen a few times). Like Paul says, we should be "not ashamed of the gospel" (Romans 1:16) of our sage and an important part of that is sticking with Epicurus when he says something, and knowing how to defend it, as the ancient Epicureans all did, or at least defending him from the charges of idiocy if he made a small error. Being unafraid to defend Epicurus himself as a model i consider an essential part of the Epicurean mission. Main reason i like you guys so much, even when i think you overdo it.

Thirdly, similarly to how people underestimate how important the gods were to Epicurean therapy i think the therapeutic element of Psychological Hedonism is something you may overlook in it's importance in Epicureanism.

A lack of clear end goal of all human behavior, i worry makes ethical discussion veer into something like the kind of skepticism i think Epicurus really despised as so vile, where the main goal humans should pursue is an ever elusive and unclear question, since people can just choose different goals with different criteria and come to different answers. Whereas if we push deep and realize nature's goal binds everyone, whether they admit it or not, we can both help them realize they are actually pursuing nature's goal (removing the stigma around pleasure and pain as vile, impious, or effeminate) and help them better achieve it.

Don Good to know.

Hmm..It seems my senses were all true by interpretation was wrong and i thought we disagreed.

Someone should really make an epistemology about a distinction between senses and opinion.

Quote from Don

Could you say one more time what is "this interpretation"?

The interpretation of PD25 is what I'm referring to.

I think it's an affirmation of psychological hedonism, that you will always pursue nature's end, freedom from pain and pleasure, and if you say your doing something different, your words and your actions will be in conflict, like the actions of the skeptic's daily life conflicting his words that he knows nothing.

You can say you are not turning to nature's goal of pleasure, but your actions say otherwise.

Don just to be clear. Do you and i agree on this inerpreation. I thought you disagreed but now it seems like you and have the same idea. Just wanna be sure.

Quote from Cassius

Yeah the very fact that you are fleeing/escaping or pursuing/chasing indicates to me that what you're doing is exercising free will, and I don't see how that is compatible with implying that everything everyone does is "necessarily' because they see it as leading to greater pleasure for them.

Epicurus does explicitly say that "some things happen by necessity", and i think a necessary aversion to pain or pursuit of pleasure might just be a necessary thing for Epicurus. This was part of his "cradle argument" is that we, by nature, delight in pleasure and hate pain, it is therefore something of necessity, like not controlling who our parents are.

I think this is overall compatible with Epicurus defense of free will. We can have free will to believe absurd things, like the mythic gods or death being an evil, we have freedom to make extreme miscalculations, but not maybe not in deciding that we like pleasure and dislike pain, and that this always play a role in our decisions.

Quote from Don

PD25: If at all critical times you do not connect each of your actions to the natural goal of life, but instead turn too soon to some other kind of goal in thinking whether to avoid or pursue something, then your thoughts and your actions will not be in harmony.

The main with this translation (and interpretation) that Woolf points out, and i find convincing, is that the Greek apparently says "our words" (λόγοις), and under this interpretation why would "your thoughts and your actions will not be harmony. After all if we can choose to have a different principles aside from pleasure, like virtue, or sensual pleasure, why would their be a lack of harmony between actions and our words?

As Woolf says in Pg. 18.

"Certainly, there is something quite puzzling about what Epicurus seems to envisage here. Given that he is speaking of someone who turns aside from one goal to another, why should there be any issue at all about conflict between deeds and words?...

"A short answer will emphasize that it is indeed nature's goal that one is turning aside from. Under this description, it might seem more plausible that at some level it will continue to exert its grip even as one wrenches oneself away from it. Exert its grip on what, though? Surely not on what we say (our logoi). There is nothing to prevent us from averring, when asked, that our goal is now virtue, or maximisation of intense felt pleasure (or whatever it may be). But these will be mere words (so that it is somewhat misleading to translate logoi as "principles") (Commentary: Cooper does this). Given that Epicurus elsewhere (Letter to Herodotus, 37-8) shows an aversion to "empty words" and a preference for "the things that "underlie them", it would be very much in his spirit to be disparaging logoi here, and (in a case of conflict) taking what one actually does as the true measure of one's motivations"

Quote from Cassius

Do you have a link to what you are referring to here? I would like to see the argument he is advocating.

Sure this comes from Cooper's 1999 book called Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and is in the chapter on Pleasure and Desire in Epicurus.

Unfortunately i was able to access it only as a student through my school's library and can't share it. But i'll share a relevant portion.

"This Principal Doctrine (25) is warning Epicureans to beware of drifting off in their day-by-day practical thinking into the snares of these other—rationalist— philosophers' ethical doctrines. Epicurus is insisting strongly that the whole range of ideas about nobility of action and about the supreme value of simply having a mind constituted in a certain way which produces actions in accord with itself, which lie at the center of this philosophical tradition in ethics, is totally at odds with the "empiricist" approach to human life for which Epicureanism stands. And of course, in insisting on this, he is presupposing that it is psychologically possible for a human being, even an educated and committed Epicurean, to act in pursuit of other goals than pleasure as the ultimate object of their action—goals other than any pleasure, goals other than pleasure according to any construal of the form or circumstance of pleasure that is the right one to take as one's ultimate guide in life. This shows that Epicurus cannot, consistently with this Doctrine, at any rate, have been a hedonist in the psychological theory of human decision and action" Pg. 491

Woolf directly responds to these in his article "What kind of Hedonist was Epicurus" (2004), you can get a Jstor (i think free with 100 article a month) account to read it.

Hi all. Principal Doctrine 25 is a notoriously hard doctrine to understand. This is really only the Principal Doctrine i have trouble understanding and as a good Epicurean i want to understand it.

Cooper (1999) thinks it is evidence that Epicurus is not a psychologist hedonist, however there is Woolf's (2004) idea that this is actually an affirmation of psychological Hedonism, which i find convincing and wanted to share.

He translates it as follows: "If you shall not on every occasion ascribe [or: refer, ἐπανοίσεις] each of your actions to the goal (τέλος;) of nature, but tum prematurely (προκαταστρέψεις)29 when making pursuit or avoidance to some other [goal] (εἰς ἄλλο τι), your actions will not correspond with your words". (Pg.17)

He explains this by saying. "What Principal Doctrine XXV teaches is that, never mind what you say your goals are, and that your words indicate a turning away from nature's goal to some other: your actions will belie your words. You will still be acting in such a way as to maximise your freedom from pain and distress nonetheless. Reference to any other motive than this on a given occasion is premature. Of the agent who turns aside, Epicurus says literally "your deeds will not follow your words" (οὐκ ἔσονταί σοι τοῖς λόγοις αἱ πράξεις ἀκόλουθοι.). Your words, that is, may have switched allegiance; but your deeds will not accompany them. You will remain, in your actions, a seeker after nature's goal" (Pg. 19)

Basically it says that "no matter how much the Stoics like to talk about virtue in of itself", there actions are still ultimately motivated by a fear of pain and desire to remove mental disturbance, even if they don't admit it. Kind of like how the Skeptic says that nothing can be known and those who deny free will say all choices are predetermined but does not actually live like this, their actions do not follow their words. Curious if others agree with this.

A happy hog in the herd of Epicurus.

Thx again to Bryan for his gift.

Yeah you all have convinced me, I was already a little unsure about posting this.

But yeah I'm probably letting the societal praise of virtue ethics cloud my view of these texts. To be honest the main reason I liked Epicurus was that I felt he was the only one who could ground virtue in anything real, unlike Stoics and Aristotle who I liked but couldn't accept their view of virtue in of itself, and probably letting that overemphasize how important virtue is for Epicurus.

If any of you have seen the PhilSurvey, it asks a question about whether your normative ethics is consequentialist or virtue ethics or deontology. I think it's fair to say he's surely not deontology. But i struggle between putting him as a consequentialist or virtue ethicist.

Obviously i know these are modern categories which may not fit Epicurus entirely but i personally think of him more as a Virtue ethicist rather than a strict consequentialist in large part because of the Letter to Menoceus.

He says "And he considers it better to be rationally unfortunate than irrationally fortunate, since it is better for a beautiful choice to have the wrong results than for an ugly choice to have the right results just by chance." (Peter Saint-Andre). This seem to pain the picture of personal intentions mattering more than actual consequences.

Along with Diogenes of Oenoanda saying "The sum of happiness consists in our disposition, of which we are master."

I'm obviously not trying to say he is part of the Stoic "virtue in of itself" but he seems to stress personal character so much, even to the point of disregarding external consequences as seen above, that it feels wrong to consider him just a consequentialist, and perhaps listed as both a virtue ethicist and consequentialist together. Curious for other people's thoughts.

However he is noticeably critical about how much the modern self helped overplays the whole idea of eudaimonia versus Enjoyment or pleasure tho, which is nice.

Quote from Don

I see the guest is coming out with a new book:

I saw too. Nice to hear. All around a pretty good interview. Got off topic a lot though but I love how he pointed out how the Stoic worldview of virtue in of itself being good makes no sense without the logos despite modern Stoics saying otherwise.

He does still tread on the idea of the highest pleasure being the absence of pain, which is a shame, I can already hear Cassius blood pressure rising from that. Still, if Stoics have to deal with Andrew Tate, we can deal with a (very sympathetic) misunderstandings.