Posts by Rolf

Perhaps a forum-wide poll on the topic of prolepsis could be interesting? It seems there are many different ways of interpreting the concept, which may be leading to some confusion when discussing it.

Quote from Don

In light of this excerpt above and others' reactions to my post, I feel I need to define my position a little more.

Very well said Don, and this echoes approximately where I’m at as well. Without a doubt, I think it’s important to combat radical skepticism and find solid ground to stand on that reality exists and behaves in a certain way. What I’m iffy on is the specific theory of prolepsis.

Quote from Cassius

But the faculty of prolepsis is the assembly process, not any particular pattern that is detected or assembled.

This is a helpful analogy, thank you. So to be clear, prolepses are unequivocally not innate ideas?

Quote from Cassius

And so Velleius does not really reference, to my understanding, "a prolepsis of a god." Rather, he is saying that we have a proleptic faculty which disposes us to thoughts which leads to the idea of a god, just as we have a nose which functions in a way that gives us input into a final conception of a flower.

Hmm, I think I get where you’re coming from. A bee is not born knowing what a flower is and how to make honey, but they have the proleptic faculty to do these things without having to learn them from scratch through experience. Am I on the right track?

Welcome to the forum Ulfilas!

If I’m understanding correctly, Epicurus says that prolepsis is a universal guide or criterion that leads us to the knowledge that (among other things) the gods are blessed and incorruptible.

However, many gods that were and are worshipped are violent, jealous etc. Zeus, for example. To this, Epicurus writes:

Quote

For the sayings of the multitude about the gods are not true preconceptions but false assumptions.

Isn’t this essentially the same as saying, “prolepsis is a universal criterion, except when it isn’t”? On what basis is he able to dismiss these exceptions to his claim as errors?

Cassius, could you perhaps give some more everyday examples of prolepsis? I seem to be misunderstanding what it is at a basic level. Is it incorrect, for instance, that the idea of god itself is a prolepsis, and instead that the capability of believing gods exist is a prolepsis? I feel it would be helpful for me to go back to the “ground floor” and define what prolepsis actually is.

Going off of what Dave said, would it be reasonable to equate prolepsis with instinct?

Actually, could somebody take a crack at explaining fundamentally what prolepsis is? Is it innate knowledge that we’re born it? I’m more confused than I thought!

Much appreciated! I’ll be reading and re-reading your response a few times before fully grasping the ideas I’m sure.

In the meantime, a follow-up question:

How does prolepsis help to disprove that “all this - including our thought processes - have been supernaturally created”? From what I understand, prolepsis just describes instances of in-built knowledge, right? But not where those preconceptions come from? Couldn’t a supernatural believer still just respond, “well those preconceptions come from god”?

On second thoughts, I see what you mean by “Epicurus was a philosopher first” in this context: Something like prolepsis is an important concept within the overarching philosophy even if it doesn’t directly relate to happiness or maximising pleasure. I agree with you on this, and my example of “I know that I want to feel good” was just an example of how I don’t need to know about something fully in order to enquire about it - it was not me saying that Epicurus’ philosophy is only about “the means of happiness”!

The rest, however, I am still unsure about.

Thanks for your response Cassius. Your point about Epicurus being a philosopher first is an important one for sure, though I’ll admit I’m a little confused on how it all relates back to prolepsis and Meno’s paradox. I do see what you’re saying about how a theory of knowledge and an understanding that we can truly know something is importantly, however.

Let me ask you this: How does prolepsis help defend against skepticism and allow us to be confident in our knowledge?

Additionally, why is prolepsis necessary for us to know certain things? Isn’t it possible that we simply learn them from experience? I get that Epicurus had to respond to Meno’s paradox, but why didn’t he simply disagree with the whole premise that we need to have some foreknowledge of something in order to know it?

Please let me know if I’m misunderstanding something!

Welcome Noah! Love the Snufkin avatar - very Epicurean!

I’ve got to be honest, I don’t really understand Meno’s paradox and how it’s helpful in the context of Epicurean philosophy. I just watched Matthew Lampert’s video, and while it was helpful in understanding what Socrates/Plato believed, I disagree fundamentally with the premises of the paradox and I don’t see why it’s something that needs to be solved to move forward.

I can know a bit about something (for instance, I know that I want to feel good), but not know anything about how to accomplish that, but still find out about Epicurean philosophy through online research for instance. I can be completely unaware of something but find out about it from a friend and then go on to study it. It really feels like sophistry detached from real life.

Even when Epicurus takes the solution to prolepsis (which makes a lot more sense than Socrates’ solution obviously), I still don’t see why I would need some kind of preconception of something in order to learn about it. I can learn about the concept of a god from somebody else, and maybe the first person to believe in a god did so because they thought it wad a reasonable conclusion as to why natural phenomena behave the way they do. I also don’t see how “knowing” something means we have no need to “enquire” about it. It’s not like knowing and unknowing is some binary state.

Independent of Meno’s paradox, I feel I have some grasp of prolepsis now. I keep going back to the honeybee example: Bees aren’t just pleasure-pursuing machines, they have some built-in “rules” they follow. They collect pollen, they live in a hive. On the same token, humans have patterns that they’re naturally drawn to, and the human-animal thus has different things that are necessary for happiness than other animals. It’s clear to me that we’re not just born as blank-slates left to pursue pleasure with no guidelines.

Beyond this though, and assuming my understanding here is correct, I’m very much lost on this topic.

Quote from Cassius

But if the "prolepsis" of justice or gods did not exist, we would never begin considering or discussing those concepts in the first place.

Why doesn’t this argument apply to things we don’t have a prolepsis of, such as atoms? If we don’t have a prolepsis of atoms (which I agree we don’t), how could we begin considering or discussing the concept? And why doesn’t the answer to that question also work for gods or justice?

Quote from Kalosyni

How much work should be put into pursuing what is hedonicly pleasurable and how much work should go into pursuing human needs.

I would argue that “what is pleasurable” and “human needs” are one and the same. I’m not sure if Epicurus himself said this, but personally I find it most prudent to focus my efforts first on needs (that is, necessary desires), since their absence tends to result in pain.

Once I have those secured, I am free to pursue unnecessary pleasures (what I assume you mean by “what is hedonicly pleasurable”). I don’t see it as “work” though. If the work I put into attaining something pleasurable causes an more pain than the resulting pleasure, it’s not something I want to be pursuing anyway.

Quote from Don

There's also the prolepsis of justice which doesn't physically exist but "we know it when we *see* it." That one, I've taken to be akin to the innate sense of fairness exhibited by various animals, ex.

Hmm, the concept of an innate justice feels a bit iffy to me, too close to objective morality. Didn’t Epicurus say something about how justice is only a social contract in which we agree to neither harm nor be harmed? How does this mesh with the idea of a prolepsis of justice? Perhaps I’m misunderstanding something.

After our discussion last Sunday, I’ve been thinking about prolepsis and the epicurean gods. I’m currently listening to a podcast episode on the topic, and it was mentioned that that prolepsis of the gods perhaps unique in that it’s a prolepsis on something that is intelligible but not sensible. This made me think about how this could be.

Perhaps it’s not about the gods actually existing, but merely the fact that when humans have a telos (pleasure, in this case), it is a natural feature of our minds to consider the pinnacle of that telos; in this case, a perfectly incorruptible and tranquil being, that is to say, a god.

Quote from Don

A more productive way to think about pursuing pleasure is to get out of its way, to recognize the pleasure that's already present in our lives and to which we stubbornly refuse to admit into our lives.

I was interested in Taoism for some time before my discovery of Epicurean philosophy, and this reminds me of a common Taoist adage about “getting out of one’s own way”.

I don’t love relating the philosophy to religious and spiritual doctrines, but I find this particular idea rather helpful.

Quote from Kalosyni

Is there such a thing as not enough effort or too much effort when working to remove pain?

Speaking for myself here: I’m not putting in enough effort to remove pain if I’m still experiencing an abundance of (removable) pain. I’m putting too much effort into removing pain if the effort itself is increasing the level of pain I’m experiencing.