Posts by DaveT

Cassius  Kalosyni I'm glad for the questions since it helps me clarify my own thinking.

Quote from Cassius

could you restate your ultimate conclusion or question?

I guess it is my inclination to look for clarity for modernity’s application of the ancient wisdoms that engendered my post. My tentative conclusion/question is: Why can’t we clearly state and attribute Epicurus’ teaching to his synthesis of the Greek culture he was raised in with his process of taking that culture of the ancient Virtues to the next level of WHY and HOW we attain happiness via minimizing pain and maximizing pleasure?

As Kalosyni pointed out in the Principal Doctrine she cited, there is no conflict in recognizing the Virtues of the ancients (and any virtues recognized by ourselves) and adhering to the Epicurean WHYs and HOWs to be happy.

You both do a wonderful job of clarifying the distinctions between the schools, full stop! Your work on the podcasts with Joshua illuminates so much for me and most likely many others. There’s so much there to learn about.

It bothers me somewhat to hear criticism of the other schools with a broad brush in response to their attacks on Epicurean thought. It might sound odd coming from a retired lawyer, but resolving one dispute needn’t solely focus on the misstatements and accusations of the opponents. That leads to arguments that never end (except in courtrooms where judgements can be final!)

So, my conclusion/question is the hope that we can sharpen the incorporation of virtues as described by the ancient Greeks with Epicurus’ concepts; how he took their ideas to the next step in the universally shared search for happiness for mankind. This, I hope, can happen by acknowledging how we simply can’t fully pursue pleasure unless we learn and incorporate the virtues of the society we choose to live in (or adapt for ourselves).

Wisdom (Prudence), Courage, Temperance, and Justice are ESSENTIAL root-tools for us to regulate our desires. We can recognize this and reject that they are eternal forms existing outside of the material world. That recognition is the genius of Epicurus, as he synthesized the earlier schools, taking what he agreed with and discarding the rest.

Cassius This closing item in the post seems so important to me. I'd like to pose questions on it BUT since you asked for comments on your summary, perhaps my reply ought to be somewhere else. Please move it if you think appropriate

Quote from Cassius

Understanding that the goal of life is happiness through pleasure allows us to see that virtue is necessary for happiness, but that understanding what virtue means is essential, in that virtue is not a set of absolute that is the same for all people in all places and at all times, but that virtue is contextual and is in fact whatever conduct that in practice leads to living happily.

Understanding that the goal of life is happiness through pleasure allows us to see that virtue is necessary for happiness, but that understanding what virtue means is essential, in that virtue is not a set of absolute that is the same for all people in all places and at all times, but that virtue is contextual and is in fact whatever conduct that in practice leads to living happily.

As I read the Summary, I looked for some sort of amalgam or a way to build Cicero’s Virtues into the above quote. For example, let me pose this question: What were Academic/Stoic Virtues? The Internet tells me they were Wisdom (prudence), Courage, Temperance, and Justice. I agree these virtues can change with cultures. Yet, in our school, we certainly must look to the culture we are actually living in for the definition of OUR virtues. A person won’t get far using deeply personal antisocial interpretations of virtues for himself and still find happiness via acquiring pleasure. More likely that person will end up incarcerated by the larger community.

So, given our Western Industrialized Educated Rich Democratic culture, which sets the guidelines for our behavior, assume that the four virtues are uniformly agreed upon. Now, can we not agree that those four virtues are the necessary, and I mean necessary, virtues we each need to pursue in order to find happiness as Epicurus defined it?

This gives us each an indispensable mechanism to pursue pleasure. It uses the virtues to help us define and use to acquisition of pleasure. Epicurus, as far as I understand him, has no problem acknowledging the usefulness of the virtue of Prudence to achieve his definition of happiness. So would he not object to the following statement?

As a practical matter, the Epicurean pursuit of pleasure DEPENDS on each of us gaining some measure of the four virtues in our private lives in order to experience pleasure.

Cassius I understand what you are saying and completely agree with your statements. Can I conclude that Prof Nail's essay under consideration here is not relevant to whether Lucretius ignored Epicurus' atomism? I think the answer is that it is not.

P.S. I think it was Degrasse-Tyson who said something like: our universe does not need God in order to exist.

PPS Also, I recently read that Karl Marx's doctoral dissertation some time in the 1840s was a comparison of Democritus' and Epicurus' atomism, finding Epicurus' teaching was consistent with the Young Hegalians philosophical views which he favored.

I’ve read all the posts above. And I have a question that I’d like clarification from any/all among us.

First my question, and then my reasons for asking it.

Question: Why should anyone dwell on whether Lucretius accurately interpreted Epicurus’ book Nature?

Reasons for the question: Neither Epicurus nor Lucretius had data understandable to the senses about the components of atoms and their sub-atomic particles. Neither understood that photons (light) are both particles with mass (matter), and waves (energy) with no mass. I don’t see why one must believe Epicurus was right about atoms and their movement to be adherents to his ethics, canonics, etc.

Einstein’s theory has demonstrated that matter and energy are interchangeable, rendering Epicurus’ belief in eternally unchanging elemental particles unnecessary. Indeed, what we ought to depend upon is his mode of discovering nature by our senses and power of deduction. I think he, as well as every formal scientist today, shares a willingness to be proven wrong in the advancement of additional evidence of how the world works.

So, back to the thrust of my question above: Why should anyone dwell on whether Lucretius interpreted Epicurus wrongly or indeed intentionally declined to include Epicurus’ atomism?

I enjoy these kinds of topics. It seems to me the wonders of nature always seem to be one step ahead of us as we consciously think about ourselves and our relations to nature and to each other. We can catch up on our perceptions and predictions to some degree that satisfies us individually. On a micro level, I need to adjust my relationships with my loved ones and friends to keep myself and the relationship on a smooth course. On a macro level, and I'm not sure this is relevant, but on a macro level, our astronomers see stars etc. millions of light years away but we can only perceive what they looked like millions of years ago, and we can make predictions of their changes over time.

Quote from Kalosyni

Now what do you do when when the quanties of food available are so great, and eating becomes a desire for experiencing various tasty things... "just one more bite" or "just one more taste of this or that"...

One of the great attractions of Epicurus’ teaching for me is that it seems so grounded in common sense. He clearly was not an ascetic, denying himself even simple pleasures, even acknowledging the “pleasure” of enjoying unnecessary pleasures. Of course, we all know this. I don’t understand the complexity of the mind/body process that tells us we need to eat to live. I understand that even a single bite of that barely nutritious but wildly sweet or savory food can satisfy me. So, rather than “just one more bite,” perhaps just one bite (or what the heck—two or three) can be the answer while enjoying friendship and family during the holidays.

Quote from Kalosyni

Likely some aspects of the paper will be used more "lightly" and other aspects more "deeply", so my goal is not to only approach it from an "academic" aspect, but also from human life and feeling.

Yes, that seems to be a very reasonable way to springboard a conversation. I, as one closer to death than most of our friends, I "try" to not fear death, and while seeking support for that in Epicurus, I submit to it's inevitability. No big issue there, certainly. At the same time, I might worry in a small way that there might be something I might lose an opportunity before a sudden death, to say, or do, or mend a fence before I get around to it. And this, I think is the lighter approach, the common sense that we all possess, whether Epicureans or not, to address the fear of dying unexpectedly. And I don't think the deep treatment of that issue was needed in Austin's paper, written as a dialogue among professional philosophers.

I'd like to add that for me, overcoming the fear of death, is less than overcoming a feared cessation of living. It is more a confident denial that there will be some consequence for me after death when my sins are weighed against the rest of my life with a thumb up or down and it is too late to make amends.

Quote from Cassius

I interpret that as being on he same page with most everyone. Since you Dave are one of our most recent additions, I'd be particularly interested in what you get out of the article if you get a chance to read it.

I had already begun the article before commenting earlier. However I decided it wasn't worth my brain buster skills to follow along and I stopped without finishing it. If I was asked by Emily Austin what I thought about it, I'd ask her in turn, why she bothered to address that issue and publish it. (The same could be asked of her interlocutors)

If I knew her and could be frank, I'd say it was not exactly sophistry in the negative connotation, though it was an argument for the sake of argument in order to prove an opinion. Could there be a nugget later on that made it useful to me? Perhaps, but overall the paper didn't make me care enough to find out.

Perhaps reminding ourselves that Epicureans believe he meant what he said, and he said what he meant. Fear of Death is definite. If he didn't say fear of dying, then he didn't mean to infer it within the concept of fear of Death. Sometimes I think academics who are subject to publish or perish search for distinctions between themselves and others academics so they have something to write about. Sure, I'm not as knowledgeable as the experts, but I try to remind myself to "Keep it simple, sugar!"

I'll have to miss the Zoom this Sunday.

During this week, I was thinking this paragraph by paragraph review of De Rerum Natura has been and promises to be rewarding, while it has illustrated some possible inconsistencies in the surviving original Epicurean writings.

Do you think it might be helpful to us, to compare the reviewed paragraphs of Lucretius' poetry each week against specific Principal Doctrines, Letters, and some of the Vatican Sayings? It might illuminate where Lucretius is being interpretive or appears to be inconsistent with what we believe are actually Epicurus' thoughts and writings.

Admin Note: This thread was split off from an earlier thread regarding the Role of Reason vs the Senses.

Quote from Don

These practices seem well-attested by the author of On Piety (it could have been Phaedrus or Philodemus, but now traditionally attributed to the latter) but they seem at odds with Lucretius in his scorn for religious practices in book V: 1198-1203: "It is no piety to show oneself / Bowing with veiled head towards a stone, Nor to be seen frequenting every altar, Nor to fall prostrate on the ground, with palms outspread ..." It seems Epicurus himself would have done these and encouraged his school to do so. I'm certain Epicurus ascribed different motivations for bowing, sacrificing, etc than would the hoi polloi but he seems to have taken part in all that.

So, clarify for me, please. Am I correct that neither author above was a true fan of Epicurus? If yes, then Lucretius is more correct? Or is Lucretius off base attributing to Epicurus, and imploring the reader toward either agnosticism or atheism?

Cassius It looks good. Please indicate how I would get to that page from the home page.

Here's an interesting recent paper out of Germany on three different levels or degrees of consciousness in humans and some animals. The discussion deals with some Epicurean concepts as it posits the physical capabilities of consciousness that humans have developed by the process of evolution. As for the ability of humans to replicate and transfer the consciousness of one person to another being, I have to chuckle. Respectfully, aside from the use of vast computing power that virtually no one will be able to use even if it became possible, the hubris of those who create such a capability is laughable. What does it matter anyway to the universe? Are we, flesh and blood and all the components of living humans so important to a universe destined to swallow itself one way or another? I think not. The sooner we accept that death means nothing to us, the more satisfying everyone's life will be, as limited at it is.

Here's the link to the study:

Examining why some species developed consciousness while others remained non-conscious

What is the evolutionary advantage of our consciousness? And what can we learn about this from observing birds? Researchers at Ruhr University Bochum published…

phys.org

My advice to anyone enduring extended suffering mentally, or experiencing ongoing significant physical pain is to share it. By this I mean, tell someone you love or trust about your situation. For those of us who have the means in WEIRD societies (western educated industrialized rich and democratic) or who have state provided care, "get professional help" can ease the burden sometimes. But for them, and most of the rest of the world; loved ones and trusted ones may help too, in the absence of professional care.

For me, the realistic goal is to experience living with more contentment (read as pleasure by the Epicurean) than pain/suffering. To try to attain the former permanently, or to banish the latter completely is unrealistic, perhaps a further cause of suffering, yet completely Epicurean, when you think about it.

How one might do it for themselves, during self talk, is a more individualized task, and if one technique works for a while, and then doesn't, my advice is keep exploring alternatives until you improve and can enjoy life better.

Cassius I appreciate your effort to provide citations that you hope will clarify my understanding of the doctrines. But on this topic of pain/pleasure in the Tetrapharmakon, they are not persuasive. Since I've survived more than 3/4 of a century, my past experiences tell me that generalized doctrines expressed in the language of absolutes don't always hold up as universal truths.

I know personally, and have seen innumerable times that the following assertion is not true. "4) pain when lasting is usually slight," it is not usually slight. Sometimes it is, but not usually.

And further, the quote that [pain] "when oppressive is of short duration, so that its temporariness reconciles us to its intensity,..." Again, sometimes, but as a premise to further doctrinal beliefs, it can't believably be stated as a universal truth.

And, I have to say that the earlier quote that when pain is oppressive: "4) he does not hesitate to depart from life, if that would better his condition." Really? Being dead betters one's condition? Sure, it stops the pain, but you're dead!

I don't object to a person making a rational, competent decision to end their life, even absent pain or suffering. However, those quoted thoughts, as a proof that there is a good alternative for one pursuing happiness if their severe pain lasts beyond a short time and it is "oppressive", seems to me to be a superficial and dismissive attitude by those speakers. This, I think, is especially so to someone who tries to bear chronic pain, or to cope with ongoing knowledge that their unstoppable progressive disease is making them less and less able to live like they used to live, someone who tries to find some modicum of daily joy, but doesn't want to call it quits. That suffering person, seems to me to be far more common than someone who is willing to take the needle and end it all. So, Epicureans must speak to this person, too, rather than offering them the choice to commit suicide if you are struggling to find pleasure.

Does this appear to be disdainful of the entire tetrapharmikos? Perhaps to some, but not to me.

Eikadistes Thank you for taking the time to address my questions in detail.

Quote from Don

I'm not sure what you mean by "hard to measure."

I was thinking it is hard to restrain yourself, the temptation is always "just a little bit more"

Quote from Don

Again, I don't think a stereotypical Epicurean is going to cheat on their taxes or lie for lying's sake because the Epicurean is going to have that nagging doubt about getting caught.

Here, respectfully, perhaps we are both so deep in our opinions neither can offer a generalized proof. I only speak from my experience, and aside from major antisocial actions that overwhelmingly will be discovered immediately, or sooner or later, the fear of being caught is by and large written off as "who will know?" And those kinds of secretive actions, are ones that are pervasive, and corrosive on an interpersonal or communal level. After all, the major Abrahamic religions to my knowledge rely on an all seeing god, who never misses a thing you think or do to enforce societal norms punishable in eternity. And even then, people cheat, or lie when they judge that the consequences to them outweigh the negative effects on other individuals, family, or community.

A true Epicurean to me is a worthy idea to try to emulate, but even one such as they (a rarity in a real world) must sometimes make zero sum decisions where there are "winners" and "losers".

Don For me, as I learn more about Epicureanism, I identify with most of the tetrapharmikos.

There is nothing to fear from gods or natural phenomenon, yes.

There is no afterlife of which to be suspicious, yes.

And Pleasure is easy to obtain, yes, but it's hard to measure.

while Pain can be easily endured, no, I'm not willing to acknowledge that this is a universal truth.

With respect, your reference to PD 31 doesn't address my question. It says: "The justice which arises from nature is a pledge of mutual advantage, to restrain men from harming one another, and save them from being harmed." So, for example: Divorce may be a good for each party, yet it just as easily can be a disaster for the other one. That is either an intended or unintended consequence.

Furthermore when looking at the communal impact of an individual pursuing pleasure/good, "justice" in PD31 doesn't address the small things in life that impact us and others, sometimes in a big way. The agreed upon "crimes", PD 31 applies. Kill and you go to jail. But cheat, or lie in mostly undetectable ways, say on income tax returns, and Epicureanism seems to fail the reality test of bad communal consequences of those seeking the pleasure of more after tax income (justified because the rich get away with it all the time). If enough people do the small stuff that society can't touch or punish, you have everyone out for themselves in one way or another. Could it be that a weakness in Epicurus' teaching is that it can't apply to any community larger than the Garden?

Eikadistes Yes, thank you. I understand your reply, but can you address my use of the Internet description of divine simulacra:

Quote from DaveT

"Ancient Philosophy (Epicureanism): In Epicurean philosophy, "divine simulacra" (or eidola) were believed to be fine atomic emanations that constantly stream from the "quasi-bodies" of the gods and strike human perception. Perceiving these simulacra was a way for humans to form a concept (prolepsis) of the gods, who were seen as models of perfect happiness and imperturbability, but who did not actively intervene in human affairs."

And then can you address my question earlier, if divine simulacra stream from those "quasi-bodies" of the gods (in the quote above) does Epicurus consider that the simulacra comes from the gods.?

And if Epicurus does consider it so, if the gods are indeed influencing mankind's actions in a passive sort of way, isn't this opposite from being indifferent, as I thought Epicurus declared?

Cassius Thank you for the deep dive above. I read all of the selections until Cicero, when I got tired and skimmed his take.

My take away from the selections is kind of like: Epicurus: What's good for me is good and what's bad for me is bad with proportions of each depending on prudence. And if everyone does it that way; "what a wonderful world it would be." (to borrow a phrase from a popular tune.)

While contrarily, Cicero is saying: Sure, I get that, sort of; but let's get real here. Everyone in the world can't be allowed to judge on their own, we'll have chaos. We need clear standards of right and wrong.

And then, I start to remember that when we do act for our own good, whether judged by pleasure, or by adhering to Virtues, there sometimes are unintended bad or evil consequences for others. And that leaves me wondering how to reconcile both Stoic and Epicurean real world consequences of individual as well as communal actions.