Posts by Todd

I think there is one non-semantic disagreement between Nate and I.

That is use of the term "highest good". I'm not calling pleasure any sort of good. Nate is calling it The Good, but by that he means something in a different category than "goods". Fine by me, I just think his word choice is confusing.

But then he goes on to say that the highest good is prudence. It seems that Epicurus said this, so he's on solid ground there.

Nevertheless, I think it is useless and counter-productive to even discuss a "highest good" once you have established that pleasure is not it.

The problem I have is that whatever good would provide the most pleasure to one person is probably not the same for another person. If I'm already a very prudent person, being even more prudent would probably not provide me much additional pleasure. Going to a casino might, though. More prudence might even be a bad in that situation, rather than a good (you could argue that excessive prudence is something other than prudence. Fine, (Aristotle?) but I think the point is valid. I can come up with examples all day long.)

And providing the most pleasure is the only criteria we have to consider a good "highest", right?

And even if you could find one "highest good", so what? Are there some important goods that almost everyone will want to have? Sure. And Epicurean ethics should talk about those. But there is no need for a universal ranking to apply to everyone in all circumstances.

Quote from Nate

Pleasure is The End, and the virtues are means by which to acquire that end.

This is what I was moving toward (pun intended), but I wanted to focus on pleasure and goods/The Good before dragging the Telos in. (They're my rules, and I can break them if I choose.)

In the context of an action, pleasure is always the ultimate end. Never the immediate end, because there is no way to just go get some pleasure. But The End, if you like - the motivation. I think I'm fully on board with you there.

Also with your most recent post. As long as all those distinctions are kept in mind, that is exactly what I'm saying. It's just not the words I would use.

I guess there does have to be a balance though, because it would also be awkward to translate between the Epicurean texts and the "modern, plain English" meanings.

But don't you think all these different meanings of "good" is contributing to the problem?

Of course, we do need to untangle all that and understand what Epicurus was actually saying. Definitely.

But I think we need better terminology if we're planning to make any kind of outreach.

Quote from Don

I've found it instructive to always go back to the source texts and the words used

If your goal is to understand someone else, what choice do you have?

But I'm not trying to understand someone else right now (mostly), I'm trying to clarify my own ideas. Introducing foreign words with different shades meaning doesn't seem helpful.

To me, "good" is a simple word. Whether you say "some goods", "very good," "good job," "a good,", "the good," "the highest good." To me, those all have nearly identical meanings and connotations. (They are things that provide pleasure.) I'm happy to throw all those forms around without having to make fine distinctions and endless clarifications about what kind of "good" I'm talking about in a given context.

Edit: I feel like I'm taking the Epicurean approach here.

That why pleasure needs to be separate. Otherwise it would be a circular definition.

Now, if you are saying there is something in Aristotle that I need to understand that will help me, that is another thing. Is that what you are saying?

Quote from Todd

In other words, if they are held up as an IDEAL, then that is a problem

It's a problem for the same reason I don't want to think of pleasure as a good.

By what standard have you chosen to single out this one part of nature to use as a norm? Nature is everything.

See, you must have a standard when you're doing that. And you do have one. You're just not thinking about what it is. The standard you are using is that nature in its original state is superior to nature as it has been changed by humans. Now, you may well be right in the case of any particular change. But to elevate that to the level of a principle is a philosophy of poverty and death.

And sure, you can try to save the argument by saying you only look to babies as an ideal in this one particular respect, which maybe I will agree that you are right about. But we're relying on a lot of reasoning to get to this point. Is this really the best way to establish a foundational principle of Epicurean philosophy?

Last edit, I promise: when I keep saying "you" there, especially wrt not thinking, I don't mean you, Cassius, or anyone else here. In genenal, when people are making these kind of arguments.

Quote from Don

What would you call it then? And that's not meant as sarcasm! I'm just wanting to see what word you'd use to describe it.

I would call pleasure a feeling, first and foremost.

Then, for the purpose of this discussion, I would go on to say that pleasure (the feeling) is nature's standard for judging what is good.

Quote from Cassius

And I have one more thing to say about babies.

I feel like the cradle argument is now sort of a distraction from a more important issue. But since you brought it up, I will summarize my current view on that too.

The concept of the argument appears to be fine. I'm a bit hesitant to fully endorse it, because someone hearing the argument might make some inferences that I would not approve of.

The issue to me is WHY are we looking at babies? If the answer is because they're a simple, easy-to-understand, real-life example that we can extrapolate to more advanced humans, then that is perfectly fine.

If the answer starts hinting at purity, uncorruption, unbias, superiority, etc. In other words, if they are held up as an IDEAL, then that is a problem. I see this as another example of idealism being snuck in via the back door.

But I don't think it is merely semantic. I think it's also procedural, as the Aristotle example illustrates.

You don't just have a bunch of things lying around that you call goods, one of which happens to be pleasure. And you start classifying them.

You have to START with identifying pleasure as something special, and work from there.

Aristotle seems to be putting the cart before the horse. He just takes for granted that all these different things are goods, and sets about investigating, in Aristotle fashion, which is the ultimate one.

I don't think I'm going to budge on this. Pleasure isn't just a good. You can't even talk about goods until you have a standard to determine what is a good anyway.

Maybe this is just a semantic disagreement, but I think the clarity of the terminology is important when we want to make further claims. Treating pleasure as a good isn't going to be helpful there.

Quote from Don

I was with you up until the end but let me try to at least explain why I don't *fully* embrace your post there.

I'm not exactly clear where we part ways.

If you're with me up to "pleasure is a standard, not a good"...but you still want to talk about pleasure as if it's a good?

Your metaphor seems unobjectionable to me, as metaphors are imprecise by nature. It makes a nice visual. But I'd still say the thing you find at the summit is not of the same category as the things along the way. And I think it confuses things (ref. this thread) to talk about them as if they are similars. For me at least, that realization clarified many things.

From a historical perspective, I think the highest good idea was a relic of idealism (probably can't even blame Plato for that one) that crept in unnoticed. Maybe an example of "you become what you fight".

Also, I'm not endorsing DeWitt on this topic (yet, at least). Need to read that too.

(Haven't read your commentary yet either...will do so now.)

As per the title, of this thread, I think I have reached a final conclusion:

PLEASURE IS NOT THE HIGHEST GOOD! (click-bait, but bear with me)

Pleasure is not a good at all.

Pleasure is the standard by which all other things are judged to be good.

Nature knows nothing of good or bad. Nature gave us only pleasure and pain as standards.

To ask if pleasure is the highest good is making a category error - like asking if a horse is faster than time.

To say pleasure is the highest good is not to advocate hedonism, it is to undermine it. It is demoting pleasure to the realm of goods, where it is merely one of many. Maybe the highest or greatest, but still one of many.

Epicurean philosophy should reject the entire concept of the highest good.

Note: DeWittt has a section titled "The Summum Bonum Fallacy", which I have probably read dozens of times, but I never got the impression that this was what he was talking about. Will have to re-read with this in mind and see.

Thanks, Charles. I did scan through DL a few minutes ago, but I didn't catch that line.

I actually have no problem with that formulation either. He's stating it as a simple data point, like Don was.

Maybe I just have an issue with the the Torquatus language, and the implication that we should only look at newborns and animals because mature humans are too corrupt.

Quote from Cassius

It's interesting that you seem not to have read the full or main part of the Torquatus dialog. Probably you'll have much more to say when you do!

I have not read Torquatus in a long time, maybe never. If I once did, it was before I had any interest in Epicurus. I guess I will have to remedy this deficiency before I take up more of your time.

Quote from Cassius

And how do YOU arrive at the conclusion that pleasure is the highest good?

Well, I haven't been thinking about it in terms of the highest good, but that's a good idea.

Off the top of my head, I'd say pleasure is the highest good because for any other good, you can always ask why is it good, and you should get an answer. When you get to "because it gives me pleasure", that's the end of the line.

Hmm...maybe that's all that's necessary?

Quote from Cassius

Todd can you clarify for me what your own current views are as to whether "pleasure" is the highest good, and the role of "reason" in the establishment of truth?

Easy.

1) Pleasure is the highest good.

2) The role of reason is to interpret the data provided by the senses.

"Interpret" might be doing a lot of work there, I would include making judgements of value as part of that - deciding what pleasures are to be chosen or avoided, for example.

Quote from Cassius

Others again, with whom I agree, finding that many arguments are alleged by philosophers to prove that pleasure is not to be reckoned among things good nor pain among things evil, judge that we ought not to be too condent about our case, and think that we should lead proof and argue carefully and carry on the debate about pleasure and pain by using the most elaborate reasonings

"I" here, I presume is Torquatus. He hardly even sounds like an Epicurean. They're talking about pleasure, and he's like, well, I agree with the people who think there are good arguments on both sides, blah, blah, blah. So we shouldn't be overconfident. Oh, but we need to be sure to use the most elaborate reasonings! (At least he wants to use them carefully!)

This guy is a joke. Next.

If this is the best evidence we have for the cradle argument, then I'm getting ready to declare victory. I bet Epicurus never used any such argument. Maybe he said something like, "Its pleasure. Not open for discussion." But maybe he didn't try to drag the babies into it after all.

Hey, this may seem like a big oversight, but I just realized those quotes above were from Cicero. I had assumed they were from Epicurus.

So maybe I've conceded too much.

I don't see any references to babies or animals in either the PD or the Letter to Menoeceus. Of course that doesn't prove Epicurus didn't use the cradle argument. But the case remains open!

Doesn't change anything in my positions, but it sure was disappointing to read a full-throated endorsement of the cradle argument and think it was coming from Epicurus!

Furthermore, FWIW, the second paragraph sounds like some inter-Epicurean debates around this. In the time of Cicero(?) so I'll take that with a big grain of salt...but there may be more support for my anti-cradle argument than I first thought.

Quote from Don

I could see that formulation, but I'd push back on "infants are better."

They're not better. They're a data point. Animals are another data point. These demonstrate through observation that this is a natural inclination to seek pleasure and avoid pain.

Adults not seeking pleasure but are another data point demonstrating what happens when we don't skillfully seem pleasure.

Pain and pleasure don't tell us what to act upon but themselves. They are a guide. We use our reasoning ability to weigh outcomes and seek that which will lead to a maximally pleasurable life.

I'm not saying infants are better, but that seems to be exactly what the cradle argument is saying. It holds up infants (and animals) as an ideal.

If it only said, "infants are simple, and therefore easy to understand," I would be all for it.

But it doesn't say that. And I suspect the reason it doesn't is because that form of argument came from somewhere else (definitely true), and it was adopted a bit uncritically (my own, slightly heretical idea).

I agree that they are all data points.

Quote from Don

Quote from Todd

Maybe this will be clarifying: In your opinion, is the cradle argument an example of "reasoning"?

I would call it observation, seeing things the way they are.

Sorry to bring this up Don, after you just handed me a solution.

I can't accept the idea that anyone is capable of observing data and understanding it directly. You need a theory to make sense of the data, which requires reasoning. And if you don't think you do, then you really do.

Aside from the risks of having a theory and not knowing it, there's also the practical problem that "just observing" doesn't provide any way to discuss, disagree, or improve. You need something to talk about. Unless you disagree on the bare facts of what you actually experienced, the thing you talk about is a theory.

It's maybe beside the point now, but I have a hard time letting this kind of thing slide without remark.