Quote from Don

I am taking pleasure in this discussion, and hope I've engaged in a respectful manner.

Of course, I have thoughts ...

As am I. You have definitely been respectful. I know I have a tendency to sarcasm, so thank you for being patient. I was hoping you would have thoughts.

Quote from Don

from the human perspective, there are good things and bad things in nature with respect to their effect on humans

But it seems like we can only know which things are good things, and which are bad things, by reference to pleasure or pain. Not sure if you are heading somewhere with this. I don't disagree though.

Quote from Don

I found the LSJ definition of αγαθός instructive in that it used words like benefit to define the word. A "good thing" provides a benefit of service. That's why other schools can say virtue or reason are "good things."

"Ben-" is just the latin root for good, though, right? That seems circular, unless you now want to define benefit...

Quote from Don

pleasure is the ultimate motivation underpinning all....

You said this didn't seem right, but you could meet my criteria by saying goods are things that are pursued/sought/desired. Pleasure certainly qualifies there, as do the instrumental goods. I still prefer my way of putting it, because it seems simpler, but if you needed a definition of good that non-Epicurean would accept without immediately giving away the game, this might be it.

I guess the TL;DR version of that is:

If you say pleasure is a good, you have to provide a definition of good that doesn't use pleasure.

And because we're Epicureans, you have to do it without introducing new concepts that don't exist in nature. Or you at least have to provide definitions for your new concepts that meet that criteria.

If anyone still cares to take this up, I will re-state my proposition that pleasure is not a good. And I'll take it all the way back to the physics and canon, so the whole thing is laid out to be picked apart.

1) There is no such thing as a good (or a bad) in nature. The concept of a good is a product of human reason. So first we need to define what a good is (or stop talking about them).

2) How would we define a good, using only the tools nature gave us? Pleasure and pain seem like the obvious tools for the job.

Aside: maybe you would like to use anticipations for this job. I can't say that is wrong, exactly, but it does not seem like an approach that is likely to be persuasive to others (because how could you ever falsify an anticipation)? Also, last I checked, we didn't even have a solid understanding of what Epicurus meant by anticipations. But I would have no problem if anyone wanted to say that anticipations point us in the same general direction.

3) A good, then, is something that produces pleasure. Producing pleasure is not just a property that goods happen to have. It is the very standard by which we are able to say they are goods at all. It is the ONLY property of a good, as such. Everything that has this property is a good. Nothing that lacks this property is a good.

4) So is pleasure a good? Does it produce pleasure? No, it IS pleasure. Therefore, it is not a good.

That's the main point.

If you want to continue into the weeds...

Don suggested an idea earlier, that there is a category called Goods that includes pleasure and a sub-category called Instrumental Goods. (A Venn diagram would be handy here.)

That seems internally consistent, in that Instrumental Goods and pleasure are clearly differentiated. But I would still reject it, because the meaning of the super-category Goods has been left undefined. How would you define it? It seems like an unnecessary concept.

Pleasure and goods do not share any properties, in my view (see #3 above). They are of course closely related. But they are different things, and should not be treated as similars.

To belabor the point (no one is obligated to keep reading). It's like you have a category "Yellow" that includes both the color yellow, and Things that are Yellow. Those are not similar things. Related, obviously. Not the same.

One more point I should have added regarding language:

I'm not saying we can just ignore the Greek, if I gave anyone that impression. We certainly do need to know what Epicurus actually said, not just how somebody translated it. And we need to know what Epicurus meant by those words too.

For myself at least, I care more about the consistency of the ideas than of the words. I am fine with not reading too much into some words, if it makes more sense of the ideas. I'm sure not everyone will agree, and that's fine.

I'm ultimately concerned with reality and truth. I study Epicurus because I think he had a better grasp of those things than anyone we know of before him, and better than the vast majority after him too. I'll cut him some slack if he made a few mistakes, or occasionally said some things that were not consistent. (That is, rather than assuming there is some meaning that we have yet to grasp that will make everything consisent.)

Quote from Cassius

You may not have seen this quote from a review written by Norman Dewitt:

Cicero's Presentation of Epicurean Ethics. New York, The Columbia University Press, 1938. Pp. 127. Columbia Diss.

Interesting. I think I have seen that before, but had forgotten about it.

Still, I wonder if the "crafty old lawyer" wasn't just letting the Epicureans hang themselves.

Quote from Godfrey

1. This seems like exactly the type of rabbit hole that Cicero cleverly led to in his discussion of Epicurus.

After reading Torquatus (I will admit that I didn't get all the way through), I didn't get the impression that Cicero was cleverly misleading his readers. OTOH, maybe he was just very good at it!

Rather, I felt that he was trying to give an accurate impression of contemporary Epicurean views...and the Epicureans were still not clear on all these things themselves.

Quote from Godfrey

2. Todd you have mentioned repeatedly that in this thread you are only discussing ethics. I think that that's a mistake, because there's no Epicurean ethics without the physics. To me, separating the two is in this instance an error of dialectics, which can be useful for winning arguments but not terribly useful in gaining a complete understanding of a subject.

I knew someone would bring this up.

1. I completely understand that the ethics depends on the physics.
2. I assume that all of us here more or less agree on the physics, to the extent that they are relevant to this discussion.
3. We are already trying to discuss too many things at the same time in this thread, as you yourself point out.
4. My point about limiting the discussion to ethics (and further to a very specific part of ethics) is not to ignore things that are relevant, but to keep the conversation sufficiently focused that we might establish some things that we agree on and can refer back to in the future, or at least figure out precisely what our disagreements are.
5. I feel like as we work our way through the issues, if we are disagreeing due to a different ideas about the physics, then that will become apparent, and then of course it would be highly relevant to discuss.
6. At a higher level, I don't think (this is only my opinion) there is some bright line where physics stops and ethics starts (for Epicureans). It is not just dependent, it is inextricable. But that doesn't mean every conversation has to start from very first principles.

Quote from Godfrey

3. In light of 2, I think that we all agree that pleasure is the positive/attractive part of the faculty of Feelings. As such, a prudent understanding of one's feelings and desires is the core of Epicurean ethics.

Yes, of course.

However, saying things in such a general way that no one could possibly disagree and still call themselves an Epicurean is not interesting to me (possibly a personal failing).

Quote from Godfrey

4. Pleasure is good. It's a good. It's The Good. It feels good. It's everything described in the previous 138 posts.

for the clever way of putting that.

But this strikes me as a rather bland, (somewhat) non-controversial flavor of Epicureanism. I would like to be able to make stronger claims, and to do that, you have to be very clear on what words actually mean and how concepts relate. Again, this is possibly a personal failing of mine.

I really do appreciate the way you phrased that though.

Quote from Godfrey

5. From my perspective, there seem to be three things being discussed in this thread: a) parsing the concept "good," b) trying to gain a clear grasp of Epicurean philosophy, and c) coming to a way of presenting the philosophy to others. If I'm correct in this, it might be helpful to put a) into one thread and b) and c) into another thread. Combining them all, at least for me, is creating a lot of confusion. If new terminology is necessary, I think it would best derive from a discussion of the intent of the philosophy, from general to specific. Parsing the meaning of specific ancient words is important, but needs to be done in a very specific context. And, at least for me, the specificity of that context seems uncertain in this thread.

a) concept of "good"

This is what I wanted to focus on in this thread. More specifically, the relationship of good(s) and pleasure.

=====

b) clear grasp of Epicurean philosophy:

c) presenting philosophy

Either of those things would be a tall order for a single thread!

I mentioned those things for context, to explain why I was trying to focus on certain things, and especially to explain why I said in a few places that I did NOT want to get into certain subjects.

I'm happy to discuss other topics elsewhere, but I had a sense of where I was trying to get to with this thread, and I felt that introducing other concepts would just open up entirely new areas of disagreement when there was a very specific disagreement that I wanted to get to the bottom of.

New terminology is actually something I want to avoid. But also I want words to mean what people expect them to mean in a given context.

Refuting an argument of Plato or commenting on Aristotle is one thing. Finding out that Highest Good and highest good might not mean the same thing - that is something else! Language should be an aid to understanding, not a hindrance.

Quote from Don

Quote from Todd

it just has the special property of not referring to any other good?

Yes, I think that's my position.

This is a little surprising to me, because you seemed adamant earlier that prudence was the highest good most cardinal, chief, greatest good thing. (Sorry, it was Nate who said it was highest.)

But now I understand that you mean "[first?] in a category that also includes pleasure"! How do you reconcile these things?

Are you doing this in an effort to maintain the consistency of everything Epicurus ever said?

Quote from Don

From your perspective, what would that category be?

I'm not sure it matters to me right now, as long as it is different from goods. It's just a label, until you want to start putting other things in the category.

But I can identify wrong categories! For example, a category that included the senses, feelings & anticipations would be wrong. I'm only dealing with ethics here.

My best guess at this moment would be to call it The End. But I don't want to prematurely name something and regret it later.

In fact, I will resist labeling anything on principle until it becomes necessary.

Quote from Don

Within the context of Epicureanism, "goods" are instrumental to producing pleasure. Agreed. In other philosophies, the goods are ends in and out themselves. In Stoicism, virtue is "the highest good." That's what leads me to insisting that pleasure is not only "a good" but "the good" among "goods."

I'm trying to only work within the context of Epicureanism.

What I want for myself is just the concepts needed to understand Epicurean philosophy. I don't need the ability to engage with every error of the last 2500 years right now. Once I have a firm grasp of the truth, I feel like can handle the rest as-needed.

So, I would like to keep the concepts to a minimum, and the definitions simple. But I anticipate that will be a challenge, because people will want to retain the more general Greek meanings.

¯\_(ツ)_/¯

Quote from Don

Is our hangup then seeing "the good" (ταγαθον < το "the" + αγατθον "good") as being one of these "goods" but being special in that it is the only "good thing" that does not point to any other "good thing"?

I'm still not certain if we agree or disagree, but yes, that would be the issue.

I'm saying that pleasure, as The Good, does not belong in the category of goods. It is different category.

Is that your view, or does pleasure belong in the category of goods, it just has the special property of not referring to any other good?

Quote from Todd

I started wading through that thread, but so much of it is just arguments about words. It seems like we all agree on the basic concepts.

There are 2 relevant concepts:

• Pleasure (aka The Good, The End, Telos)
• goods

I have not seen anyone arguing that there is overlap between those 2 categories - that pleasure is also a type of good. Is that correct?

Some people (including Epicurus) want to say there is also a highest good among the goods. There is disagreement about whether that is legtimate, and also whether that is useful.

There are some other meanings often attached to good that I don't think are of the same level of importance to this discussion.

Does that seem like an accurate summation of where we stand?

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If we can get general agreement on the above, or at least for whatever lonely subset does agree, I would then suggest the following 2 items for further agreement/disagreement:

1. goods (as referenced above) are things that produce pleasure. That is our definition of a good in this context.
2. We agree to stop referring to pleasure as a good. The Good, if you really must. Never a good. Please?

If it seemed like I was making a distinction there, that was not my intent.

"lower-case goods" == "goods"

I was being too clever for my own good.

Wait! Maybe I just don't understand.

Quote from Todd

Quote from Don

Unfortunately, I don't think I'm onboard with that.

There are no "lower case" goods. From what I read, there are "goods" (αγαθός) as a category and there is "the good" (ταγαθον < το "the" + αγατθον "good")

When I say "lower-case goods", I mean "goods" as a category. What distinction are you making there?

Quote from Don

Unfortunately, I don't think I'm onboard with that.

There are no "lower case" goods. From what I read, there are "goods" (αγαθός) as a category and there is "the good" (ταγαθον < το "the" + αγατθον "good").

Dammit, Don !

I could have sworn I saw you say that in the other thread. But that's fine. Can't force agreement.

Quote from Cassius

Your current division concerns me in that "feeling" strikes me as a faculty, as a result of which I gather that it was included in the standard of truth along with the five senses and anticipations.

I'm thinking about ethics right now. And just the very basic ethical concepts. I have 2 more suggestions that I want to propose next, but I'd like to make sure there is some agreement on the these first, and that I'm not misstating or overlooking any viewpoints.

Not trying to list all the concepts involved in ethics, much less the entire philosophy!

Quote from Cassius

"The Good / End/ Telos" appears to me to designate a destination or a concept describing an overall assessment.

Don't care (right now) how these terms were used in ancient Greece generally. I care how we would understand them as Epicureans. And I think to us they are just other words that describe pleasure.

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Todd

There are 2 relevant concepts:

Pleasure (aka The Good, The End, Telos)
goods

If at all, where do you include the term "guide" in that division? Because I think Dia voluptas, dux vitae is sound basis for considering guide/leader as a key concept that may not clearly be included in either of those two, and meaning something more than lower-case good as one among many instrumentalities.

I'm not entirely clear what you mean by "guide". If you mean "pleasure is the guide", I can add that under the akas for pleasure.

If you mean something else, I don't think I would add it at all.

But where would you add it?

I want to keep concepts to a minimum. In general, but especially until we have agreement on these.

I started wading through that thread, but so much of it is just arguments about words. It seems like we all agree on the basic concepts.

There are 2 relevant concepts:

• Pleasure (aka The Good, The End, Telos)
• goods

I have not seen anyone arguing that there is overlap between those 2 categories - that pleasure is also a type of good. Is that correct?

Some people (including Epicurus) want to say there is also a highest good among the goods. There is disagreement about whether that is legtimate, and also whether that is useful.

There are some other meanings often attached to good that I don't think are of the same level of importance to this discussion.

Does that seem like an accurate summation of where we stand?

Quote from Cassius

launching off in a Platonic-style dialog on "what is the highest good" before answering all sorts of other questions first.

Quote from Todd

From a historical perspective, I think the highest good idea was a relic of idealism

Quote from Todd

Epicurean philosophy should reject the entire concept of the highest good.

I won't presume you are endorsing my quotes, but that was one of my very first points! (this morning)

Don To try to put that into the terms you are using, I would say the following:

Pleasure is the highest good. (I disagree, but I'll set this aside this for the sake of getting to the other things.)

If I accept that pleasure is the highest good, then of course I can't say that producing the most pleasure is the only criteria for a thing to be the highest good. That would be nonsense.

Then there is the slope. My understanding is the goods are arranged in a sort of "telos" order, not "magnitude of pleasure produced" - that would also make no sense. How could pleasure be at the top then? By "telos" order, I mean the next highest good is the "motivation" for the good below, until you get to pleasure, and then you can't continue because it is The End. Is that more or less correct?

My disagreement on prudence is probably more straightforward, but I'd like to straighten out the other stuff first (by that I mean understand where we disagree).

@Don...can we back up a second.

According to Nate (and I), pleasure is NOT the highest good or a lower-case good at all.

It is in that context that I went on to say the things you are disagreeing with.

Perhaps that was not clear? I'm surprised by all the disagreement.

I understand that you don't even agree on the first point, so I would not address the things I said there to you.