What would you call it then? And that's not meant as sarcasm! I'm just wanting to see what word you'd use to describe it.
I would call pleasure a feeling, first and foremost.
Then, for the purpose of this discussion, I would go on to say that pleasure (the feeling) is nature's standard for judging what is good.
And I have one more thing to say about babies.
I feel like the cradle argument is now sort of a distraction from a more important issue. But since you brought it up, I will summarize my current view on that too.
The concept of the argument appears to be fine. I'm a bit hesitant to fully endorse it, because someone hearing the argument might make some inferences that I would not approve of.
The issue to me is WHY are we looking at babies? If the answer is because they're a simple, easy-to-understand, real-life example that we can extrapolate to more advanced humans, then that is perfectly fine.
If the answer starts hinting at purity, uncorruption, unbias, superiority, etc. In other words, if they are held up as an IDEAL, then that is a problem. I see this as another example of idealism being snuck in via the back door.
But I don't think it is merely semantic. I think it's also procedural, as the Aristotle example illustrates.
You don't just have a bunch of things lying around that you call goods, one of which happens to be pleasure. And you start classifying them.
You have to START with identifying pleasure as something special, and work from there.
Aristotle seems to be putting the cart before the horse. He just takes for granted that all these different things are goods, and sets about investigating, in Aristotle fashion, which is the ultimate one.
I don't think I'm going to budge on this. Pleasure isn't just a good. You can't even talk about goods until you have a standard to determine what is a good anyway.
Maybe this is just a semantic disagreement, but I think the clarity of the terminology is important when we want to make further claims. Treating pleasure as a good isn't going to be helpful there.
I was with you up until the end but let me try to at least explain why I don't *fully* embrace your post there.
I'm not exactly clear where we part ways.
If you're with me up to "pleasure is a standard, not a good"...but you still want to talk about pleasure as if it's a good?
Your metaphor seems unobjectionable to me, as metaphors are imprecise by nature. It makes a nice visual. But I'd still say the thing you find at the summit is not of the same category as the things along the way. And I think it confuses things (ref. this thread) to talk about them as if they are similars. For me at least, that realization clarified many things.
From a historical perspective, I think the highest good idea was a relic of idealism (probably can't even blame Plato for that one) that crept in unnoticed. Maybe an example of "you become what you fight".
Also, I'm not endorsing DeWitt on this topic (yet, at least). Need to read that too.
(Haven't read your commentary yet either...will do so now.)
As per the title, of this thread, I think I have reached a final conclusion:
PLEASURE IS NOT THE HIGHEST GOOD! (click-bait, but bear with me)
Pleasure is not a good at all.
Pleasure is the standard by which all other things are judged to be good.
Nature knows nothing of good or bad. Nature gave us only pleasure and pain as standards.
To ask if pleasure is the highest good is making a category error - like asking if a horse is faster than time.
To say pleasure is the highest good is not to advocate hedonism, it is to undermine it. It is demoting pleasure to the realm of goods, where it is merely one of many. Maybe the highest or greatest, but still one of many.
Epicurean philosophy should reject the entire concept of the highest good.
Note: DeWittt has a section titled "The Summum Bonum Fallacy", which I have probably read dozens of times, but I never got the impression that this was what he was talking about. Will have to re-read with this in mind and see.
Thanks, Charles. I did scan through DL a few minutes ago, but I didn't catch that line.
I actually have no problem with that formulation either. He's stating it as a simple data point, like Don was.
Maybe I just have an issue with the the Torquatus language, and the implication that we should only look at newborns and animals because mature humans are too corrupt.
It's interesting that you seem not to have read the full or main part of the Torquatus dialog. Probably you'll have much more to say when you do!
I have not read Torquatus in a long time, maybe never. If I once did, it was before I had any interest in Epicurus. I guess I will have to remedy this deficiency before I take up more of your time.
And how do YOU arrive at the conclusion that pleasure is the highest good?
Well, I haven't been thinking about it in terms of the highest good, but that's a good idea.
Off the top of my head, I'd say pleasure is the highest good because for any other good, you can always ask why is it good, and you should get an answer. When you get to "because it gives me pleasure", that's the end of the line.
Hmm...maybe that's all that's necessary?
Todd can you clarify for me what your own current views are as to whether "pleasure" is the highest good, and the role of "reason" in the establishment of truth?
Easy.
1) Pleasure is the highest good.
2) The role of reason is to interpret the data provided by the senses.
"Interpret" might be doing a lot of work there, I would include making judgements of value as part of that - deciding what pleasures are to be chosen or avoided, for example.
Others again, with whom I agree, finding that many arguments are alleged by philosophers to prove that pleasure is not to be reckoned among things good nor pain among things evil, judge that we ought not to be too condent about our case, and think that we should lead proof and argue carefully and carry on the debate about pleasure and pain by using the most elaborate reasonings
"I" here, I presume is Torquatus. He hardly even sounds like an Epicurean. They're talking about pleasure, and he's like, well, I agree with the people who think there are good arguments on both sides, blah, blah, blah. So we shouldn't be overconfident. Oh, but we need to be sure to use the most elaborate reasonings! (At least he wants to use them carefully!)
This guy is a joke. Next.
If this is the best evidence we have for the cradle argument, then I'm getting ready to declare victory. I bet Epicurus never used any such argument. Maybe he said something like, "Its pleasure. Not open for discussion." But maybe he didn't try to drag the babies into it after all.
Hey, this may seem like a big oversight, but I just realized those quotes above were from Cicero. I had assumed they were from Epicurus.
So maybe I've conceded too much.
I don't see any references to babies or animals in either the PD or the Letter to Menoeceus. Of course that doesn't prove Epicurus didn't use the cradle argument. But the case remains open!
Doesn't change anything in my positions, but it sure was disappointing to read a full-throated endorsement of the cradle argument and think it was coming from Epicurus!
Furthermore, FWIW, the second paragraph sounds like some inter-Epicurean debates around this. In the time of Cicero(?) so I'll take that with a big grain of salt...but there may be more support for my anti-cradle argument than I first thought.
I could see that formulation, but I'd push back on "infants are better."
They're not better. They're a data point. Animals are another data point. These demonstrate through observation that this is a natural inclination to seek pleasure and avoid pain.
Adults not seeking pleasure but are another data point demonstrating what happens when we don't skillfully seem pleasure.
Pain and pleasure don't tell us what to act upon but themselves. They are a guide. We use our reasoning ability to weigh outcomes and seek that which will lead to a maximally pleasurable life.
I'm not saying infants are better, but that seems to be exactly what the cradle argument is saying. It holds up infants (and animals) as an ideal.
If it only said, "infants are simple, and therefore easy to understand," I would be all for it.
But it doesn't say that. And I suspect the reason it doesn't is because that form of argument came from somewhere else (definitely true), and it was adopted a bit uncritically (my own, slightly heretical idea).
I agree that they are all data points.
Maybe this will be clarifying: In your opinion, is the cradle argument an example of "reasoning"?
I would call it observation, seeing things the way they are.
Sorry to bring this up Don, after you just handed me a solution.
I can't accept the idea that anyone is capable of observing data and understanding it directly. You need a theory to make sense of the data, which requires reasoning. And if you don't think you do, then you really do.
Aside from the risks of having a theory and not knowing it, there's also the practical problem that "just observing" doesn't provide any way to discuss, disagree, or improve. You need something to talk about. Unless you disagree on the bare facts of what you actually experienced, the thing you talk about is a theory.
It's maybe beside the point now, but I have a hard time letting this kind of thing slide without remark.
I guess the fundamental problem I have is the idea that living things start good, and then get worse.
Oh, I don't necessarily think good/bad is the way to go. We as humans are observed (especially as children) to instinctively gravitate towards what gives us pleasure (in the widest sense) and to recoil from that which gives us pain. It's not good or bad. That's just what happens. As adults, we should learn - per Epicurus - how to do that skillfully to provide ourselves with a maximally pleasurable life. Some adults find other motivations and stop listening to their pain/pleasure guide.
Yes. I agree with this, and that's what I think makes the cradle argument unnecessary. We all do it, not just infants. I'm perfectly fine with saying, "See, it's easy to see how infants seek pleasure and avoid pain. They have simple goals." You could then say, "Older people are more complicated. They seek pleasure in more advanced ways, and they often appear to seek pain in the short-term. But they hope that will bring them even greater pleasure later."
I think that is a great formulation. It avoids the "infants are just better" problems.
It's looking to the newborn as the pinnacle of humanity, and everything else is corrupt.
It reeks of Plato to me
I take it your ultimate question is probably "Why" should we look to nature at all
No! Emphatically no! I'm all in favor of nature (i.e., the universe, reality). I just think the particular way nature is used in the cradle argument was sort of inherited from other philsophers and not closely examined. I think it deserves some close examination at the very least.
I guess the fundamental problem I have is the idea that living things start good, and then get worse.
Actually, a lot of the time they start good, and get better. Not always. But sometimes. I would even venture to say most of the time.
I hate the idea that such a wonderfully positive philosophy has to be founded on that rotten, pessimistic core assumption.
Hmm...well, I see that Epicurus is solidly in favor of the cradle non-argument.
And since he refuses to even allow it to be an argument, I guess I can only say I disagree.
I guess I could even go further and say that since it isn't an "argument", and no reasoning was used to arrive at it, then it can't possibly have any other implications. That addresses my original concern with the cradle argument. It's not an argument. Solved.
Seems like it would make it difficult to engage with others though. Not sure? Want to discuss? Nah. Come back when you agree.
And I'm not even saying I disagree with the conclusion. I just think there is a better way of getting to it. Or should be - not to say I have one ready to go.
So how would you restate your concern Todd, that looking to examples of people who have not had the time or exposure to ground their actions on "abstract reasoning" is a poor idea for getting at examples of the calling of Nature?
Why is that a poor way of looking at the question? Because they are not "educated" in some goal other than the one they were born with?
I would state my concern more or less the way I did above. Looking to a supposedly uncorrupted state of nature is problematic.
If you want to be more specific about what is corrupted and why, as you seem to be with the idea of "uneducated", I would be on board with that, although I personally don't think the solution is in that direction, because the reasoning is going to be even more involved. That is a very different thing than just pointing at babies though.
Maybe this will be clarifying: In your opinion, is the cradle argument an example of "reasoning"?
If yes, then I would expect an Epicurean to be suspicious, and proceed with caution. We can't be slaves to authority, even if the authority is Epicurus. (Edit: that sounds like something Epicurus might have actually said.)
If no, then what do you call it? I think further discussion is not likely to be fruitful in this case.
I feel like this is going in circles.
My reading of DeWitt is that reason is actually very important to Epicurus, it just can't be allowed to run rampant over the data of reality the way Plato used it. (Hope that's a decent summary.)
But that's what I'm trying to say! Reason is essential. It's not "bad". It's unavoidable. It just has to be used appropriately. And the cradle argument is an example of reasoning that is NOT being used carefully.
You sort of said above that reason is a corrupter of children. And now you are quoting DeWitt back at me. This is getting confusing.
LOL - Tranquility Now! Tranquility Now!
