@ Kungi
For me, a virtue is something that leads to a value. For Aristotle, the ultimate value (that which is not just instrumental, leading to another, higher value) was eudaimonia – a life of happy well-being. A virtue is anything that leads to that goal (telos).
But if the goal (value) is to, say, split wood well, a proper and well-honed axe is a virtuous axe. The Greek term, arete ("excellence"), included but was not limited to moral virtue.
The Stoics seem to have generally equated a set of specific moral virtues with eudaimonia itself: If you were sufficiently wise, courageous, just and temperate – then you must have had a eudaimonic life. (This is not to suggest that the Stoics were a monolithic group, without variations – nor that they did not recognize eupathe: good feelings, as opposed to the more general pathe, for which they recommend apatheia). As one modern Stoic, Massimo Pigliucci, suggested in a blog I read, eudaimonia thus becomes a value judgment: “Have I done well enough?” (Again, there are variations among Stoics, old and new.)
For Epicureans, eudaimonia is a life pleasantly lived. A life pleasantly lived means one in which natural pleasures (mental and physical) outweigh pain and suffering (mental and physical).
And that goal (telos) requires certain social, as well as strictly personal virtues. To live justly, for example (which Epicurus thought was necessary to live such a life), means actively making due allowance for others to also have what they need to live such a life. None of the virtues are abstract (or Platonic) ideals worthy in themselves per se (or eudaimonic in themselves per se) – but are instrumental. An Epicurean view of socially virtuous behavior – for me – is grounded more in natural sympathy/empathy (which can be cultivated, but not demanded) than in any simple, dictated “should.”
That is my simplified interpretive summary. (But there are others here who are better versed than I – including those who have posted here before me.)