Posts by Pacatus

Another practical consideration: health care. We are in our 70s, and my wife has had a heart attack and has some other health issues that make us thankful for a top-notch medical community and (university affiliated) hospital. So, a smaller university town might be a good alternative to a large urban setting, in the U.S. or elsewhere.

My wife and I did 15 years of life simplification in the country: growing most of our own vegetables, some fruit trees, etc. It was wonderful – but it is hard work, and after 15 years the axes and the pick and the chainsaw were 15 years heavier; and my bad back from a youthful injury would no longer take it. (For about the first 10 years we had no TV, no cell phone and minimal, at best, dial-up internet service.) We moved to a small apartment in a quasi-urban, fairly liberal university town, where we have lived happily for the past 9 years; still simple living. I am still a bit of a recluse most days.

I once looked at Uruguay. From Wikipedia:

“Uruguay is ranked first in Latin America in democracy, peace, low perception of corruption,[13] and e-government.[14][15] It is the lowest ranking South American nation in the Global Terrorism Index, and ranks second in the continent on economic freedom, income equality, per-capita income, and inflows of FDI.[13] Uruguay is the third-best country on the continent in terms of Human Development Index, GDP growth,[16] innovation, and infrastructure.[13] Uruguay is regarded as one of the most socially progressive countries in Latin America.[17] It ranks high on global measures of personal rights, tolerance, and inclusion issues,[18] including its acceptance of the LGBT community.[19] The country has legalized cannabis, same-sex marriage, prostitution and abortion. Uruguay is a founding member of the United Nations, OAS, and Mercosur.”

Uruguay - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Quote from Godfrey

I'll use this opportunity to get back on my desire soapbox.

"A Soapbox Named Desire"?

(Apologies to Tennessee Williams)

Pacatus

Quote from Cassius

Please do not take this Pacatus as critical of you personally -- and if you would like to in fact defend that position, please do, as that would help the discussion move forward too.

No, I think your correction is spot on. Thank you for making it. (And no cave with bread and water, please!)

LATE EDIT: I think I've walked into this error before; I am reading the thread "Differences Between Epicureanism and Cyrenaicsm" -- because I think my mistake might stem, at least in part, from an erroneous (or at lest a sloppy) understanding of the distinctions there; and I think I should probably re-read Nikolsky.

To me, the notion of (substantive) universals always conjures some Platonic notion of, say, “redness” as some essence/substance that imbues those things that we see as red – as opposed to some generalization about things that we just see as "red". And as opposed to the fact that experiencing things as "being red" in color simply enables us to generalize to the idea of redness (really a certain wavelength range in the color spectrum, to which we apply the word “red”).

If, as Nate points out, “the only real existences are atoms and void [i.e., the universe is strictly physical in nature], it follows that no abstractions exist” – then, to the extent that they are (and I think they are) abstractions, universals such as “redness” are not themselves any kind of existent.

I wonder if this generalizing aptitude is related to Epicurean prolepsis? If I say I saw a red rose, you have (based on your own memoried experience) an immediate, general grasp of what I mean – without actually seeing the particular rose?

@ Kungi

For me, a virtue is something that leads to a value. For Aristotle, the ultimate value (that which is not just instrumental, leading to another, higher value) was eudaimonia – a life of happy well-being. A virtue is anything that leads to that goal (telos).

But if the goal (value) is to, say, split wood well, a proper and well-honed axe is a virtuous axe. The Greek term, arete ("excellence"), included but was not limited to moral virtue.

The Stoics seem to have generally equated a set of specific moral virtues with eudaimonia itself: If you were sufficiently wise, courageous, just and temperate – then you must have had a eudaimonic life. (This is not to suggest that the Stoics were a monolithic group, without variations – nor that they did not recognize eupathe: good feelings, as opposed to the more general pathe, for which they recommend apatheia). As one modern Stoic, Massimo Pigliucci, suggested in a blog I read, eudaimonia thus becomes a value judgment: “Have I done well enough?” (Again, there are variations among Stoics, old and new.)

For Epicureans, eudaimonia is a life pleasantly lived. A life pleasantly lived means one in which natural pleasures (mental and physical) outweigh pain and suffering (mental and physical).

And that goal (telos) requires certain social, as well as strictly personal virtues. To live justly, for example (which Epicurus thought was necessary to live such a life), means actively making due allowance for others to also have what they need to live such a life. None of the virtues are abstract (or Platonic) ideals worthy in themselves per se (or eudaimonic in themselves per se) – but are instrumental. An Epicurean view of socially virtuous behavior – for me – is grounded more in natural sympathy/empathy (which can be cultivated, but not demanded) than in any simple, dictated “should.”

That is my simplified interpretive summary. (But there are others here who are better versed than I – including those who have posted here before me.)

Cassius

Yes, "deviant" certainly is a weird word here. I'd suggest that what he's after is the oikonomia that requires a techne because it goes beyond (deviates from) the natural (Epicurean) bounds, i.e. with its maximizing aim. That kind of oikonomia seems to match that last line of the Tsouna quote: "On the other hand, 'more' corresponds somehow to 'the measure of wealth' but never amounts to the open-ended goal of traditional οἰκονομία, namely, to amass as many riches as possible through decent and lawful means."

Still, a strange word choice.

Now I have to go watch some baseball.

Welcome to a safe and wise place.

I have finished reading the Philodemus essay, and also found this interpretation by Tim O’Keefe: “The Epicureans on happiness, wealth, and the deviant craft of property management” (Tim O’Keefe, Georgia State University) It is downloadable free as a Word doc here: https://www.academia.edu/9994257/The_Ep…card=view-paper

O’Keefe sees Philodemus’ objection to the oikonomia of Theophrastus and Xenophon as a techne is that that is an expertise aimed at both preserving and maximizing wealth. He contrasts this with simply attaining “’natural wealth’ that is needed to satisfy our natural and necessary desires [and] is limited and easy to obtain.” For the Epicurean, then, property management does not require some special expertise (techne), but simple practical knowledge.

In his conclusion, O’Keefe employs modern economic terms, describing the oikonomia of Theophrastus and Xenophon as “maximizing” behavior, and describes the Epicurean as following “satisficing” behavior: “When it comes to wealth, then, the Epicurean Sage is a satisficer and not a maximizer: she will not spend a lot of time worrying about finding the option that gets her the best financial return, but will go ahead and act once she’s found an option that’s good enough. And given the Epicurean conception of what we need in order to satisfy our natural and necessary desires, ‘good enough’ is easy to achieve.”

In economics, "satisficing" is a behavior which attempts to achieve at least some minimum (satisfactory) level of a particular variable, but which does not necessarily maximize its value. [Herbert Simon, 1978 Nobel laureate in economics]

O’Keefe also notes that, in modern economic terms, oikonomia would fall under heading of microeconomics, as opposed to macroeconomics – dealing with such things as inflation, unemployment, income distribution, government fiscal policy, etc. – which would be considered part of politike.

Don

This really may go at the heart of (neoclassical) microeconomics, where economic agents are assumed to continually strive to maximize (personal) utility (at the margin – i.e. in the immediate present) in the face of income/resource constraints (scarcity) – and to try to expand the current bounds of those constraints (even at the expense, say, of future environmental costs). Traditional (neoclassical) economics recognizes no natural constraints on utility (pleasure/satisfaction) or potential wealth.

Any suggestion of natural bounds on utility maximization – which would mean a rational frugality in the face of the bounds of “natural wealth” (based on a hedonic calculus) – would be anathema to mainstream economics* (at least as I learned it). And that, it seems to me, might be the nub of an Epicurean alternative.

I haven’t finished reading the essay on Philodemus yet, but it might also be related to his criticisms of Xenophon and Theophrastus?

EDIT: I like your translation of "natural treasures" -- which I would take to be a better understanding of natural resources than the word "wealth." Modifications to what I just wrote might thereby be warranted, but I am too tired to make them just now.

_____________________________

* For a scholarly debunking of that economics, anyone interested should read Steve Keen’s Debunking Economics (by which he means that neoclassical mainstream). It can be a tough read for those unfamiliar with the nitty-gritty of marginal analysis (or even for those who, like me, once were). Keen is an economist from Australia, who is one of those behind a blog-journal called Real-World Economics – which I still get and peruse from time to time.

Welcome to a safe, wise place.

Kalosyni

They were wiser about bees than we are. I recently read an article about Canadian blueberry farmers, who are seeing diminished yields because of the lack of bees for pollination (even with travelling beekeepers). Where we live now (in town), when we take a walk, we see plenty of white clover and areas where wildflowers have been planted – but hardly any bees (likely due to pesticides).

When we lived at Terrapin Branch, I used to sit under a large, blooming Hawthorn tree – near our small blooming cherry orchard – and you could literally feel the hum of the thousands of bees. (We also seeded our yard space with clover.)

The lowly honey bee would be an appropriate symbol for the Epicurean Garden.

By the way, this whole discussion has reminded me of a book I read years and years ago by British economist E.F. Schumacher, called Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered. He advocated building self-reliant economies at the community level -- using mostly local resources to meet local needs (e.g. community gardens), and using appropriately-scaled technology that is user-friendly and ecologically sustainable.

Cassius

From an ethical economics (oikonomia) point of view:

On the investment side of things, I would suggest productive/unproductive in supplying people’s needs.

On the consumption side, I would suggest that (1) Epicurus’ formulation on the naturalness & necessity of desires, and (2) the pleasure/pain hedonic calculus (toward eudaimonia – which I think of as sustainable happy well-being) would work.

Savings versus consumption decisions might connect the two (how much do I spend to meet my needs, and how much do I save – both to meet future consumption needs and to go toward productive investment?).

With regard to income/wealth distribution, I think one needs to define the concepts of just and unjust (in Epicurean terms). Maybe some synthesis of the utilitarian “the greatest good for the greatest number” and Rawls’ theory of justice that any inequality in social and economic arrangements should give greater benefit to the least advantaged, each idea being modified by the other. And I wouldn’t think we need to get much more complex than that, with regard to either theory. (Though Rawls included a personal liberty principle and an equal opportunity principle, all three principles needing to be balanced.) I’m not sure either one can stand on its own, but its been a long time since I really looked at them.

That’s still pretty conceptual, as opposed to practical. (And I have just begun Philodemus). And I’m a bit tired today, so maybe not having a lot of clarity.

Interesting paper. (My academic background is economics – particularly labor economics; though my subsequent professional work was pension economics, first for a labor union and later for a pension trust. But all that was 20+ years ago.)

I do remember well that (neoclassical) economics eschewed any ethical viewpoint (e.g., the Robbins quote in the article). But that was (is) really a kind of deceit, since the single acceptable goal was “economic efficiency” (defined in terms of “Pareto optimality”). That put a real restraint on any discussion of income distribution, for example – or concern about people whose resource constraints kept them out of the market at all (think poverty-stricken households and healthcare). Proposals were often met with the objection: “But that wouldn’t be efficient!”

So, economic rationality was defined as efficient utility maximizing behavior via constrained choice (in the face of resource scarcity).This, of course, contrasts with the ancient Greek view of economic behavior “as rational when it was frugal in its use of means towards what they deemed as worthwhile ends.”

Bottom line: I don’t think that economics really can escape from ethical considerations.

I found it interesting (as a smalltime trader ) that Aristotle classed market trading as an “unnatural” wealth activity – apparently because it does not produce any productive, physical (in economic terms “real”) capital (I would include “technological capital”) – as opposed to merely “financial capital”, the accumulation of which may or may not be turned to productive use (“supplying people’s needs”).

As you can see, this paper stimulated some old memories. I have yet to read Philodemus, but hope to get to it soon.

Godfrey

Logical inductive inference from the observable? With willingness to correct if the observables change?

Joshua

I just took the time to enjoy an afternoon martini on our shaded deck. This time, I left my smart-phone behind -- so that I could not compulsively check the news, etc. Just watched the breeze in the trees, listened to birdsong, and enjoyed the sight of a red-tailed hawk flashing her colors in the sun. Even in our towny setting, a "Walden moment." Thank you.

I’m pretty much a clunk on this, but it seems to me that unnatural desires would be ones that do not lead to any (natural) health in body or mind – and hence to no natural pleasure (or ataraxia, or eudaimonia – which I would render as something like happy well-being). Fame, extreme wealth, any kind of braggadocio one-upmanship. I might include some Stoic (quasi-Kantian?) admonitions to duty, and a self-righteous pat on one’s own back.

I would think that “getting high” – by which I mean certain pleasurable “altered states of consciousness” is natural – but one where the means might end up causing more harm (pain) than sustainable pleasure. As will excess. [I just enjoyed an afternoon martini, relaxing on our shaded deck – and I enjoy the pleasurable “afterglow.” But I know that a 2nd martini now will dull everything, and undo the pleasure.]

Quote from Don

At the risk of self-horn-tooting, here's my translation and commentary on the desires from my Letter to Menoikeus. Apologies for the length.

I don't think your tooting. I think everyone here appreciates your efforts at translation.

Quote from Don

Quote from Pacatus

I do not believe I can “hide” in an Epicurean Garden (not that I think that was what Epicurus advocated – even with his recommendation to, insofar as possible, live an obscure life)

We had an interesting, in-depth discussion on "live unknown" a couple years ago:

Post

What "Live Unknown" means to me (Lathe Biosas)

Fragment 551 famously reads λάθε βιώσας and is usually translated as "Live unknown." It could also be translated as "Live hidden," "Live unnoticed," or "Live while escaping notice."

But how do we square this coming from Epicurus who is known two thousand years after he died. Did he live by this maxim? We can't say Epicurus was even unknown during his life. So how are we to understand láthe biōsas as it pertains to him and ourselves?

Epicurus encouraged people to shun the world of politics and the…

Don

March 7, 2020 at 11:12 PM

You might need interested in what was said in that thread.

Yes, that thread is helpful. I especially liked this quote by you: "One may say he lived, let's say at most, unobtrusively but was NOT disengaged from society, his friends, and those that sought him out." Also, Cassius' point about Cassius Longinus.