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Is your experience full to the brim when you have a little water and air and water? Mine is not, and I hope to live a significant number of additional time and experience more pleasures that I can reasonably hope to experience.
Epicurus did NOT live a life from which singing and dancing and joy and delight had been banished.
Principal Doctrine 5 - An Epicurean sees virtue as important for a happy and pleasurable life because it is the means to a happy and pleasurable life - virtue is itself not the end goal but is the way that leads to a pleasurable life.
In addition to PD5, there is also this --
Letter to Menoiceus 132: “Of all this the beginning and the greatest good is prudence. Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy: for from prudence are sprung all the other virtues, and it teaches us that it is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honorably and justly, (nor, again, to live a life of prudence, honor, and justice) without living pleasantly. For the virtues are by nature bound up with the pleasant life, and the pleasant life is inseparable from them.”
Here is a Wiki article on Virtue Ethics: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtue_ethics
“Some modern versions of virtue ethics do not define virtues in terms of well being or flourishing, and some go so far as to define virtues as traits that tend to promote some other good that is defined independently of the virtues, thereby subsuming virtue ethics under (or somehow merging it with) consequentialist ethics.”
This seems to be the move made by Lawrence Becker (sort of the “founding father” in academic circles of modern Stoicism) in his A New Stoicism. He essentially defines virtue as something necessary to enhance and sustain “effective agency” toward some (any) endeavor. Effective agency is necessary (though not sufficient) to the successful outcome of any endeavor. He makes some other (to me very questionable, to say the least) moves to try and salvage a Stoic virtue ethics from being a thoroughgoing consequentialism. I think he fails – and once again reminds of Emily Austin’s essay suggesting that modern Stoics are really disguised Epicureaans. (Becker also dismisses any notion of an intelligent, providential universe. And he seems to hedge on eudaimonia as telos.)
Aretḗ
This does at least remove “virtue” from any particular “moralism”. And I think that moves it closer to the original Greek term aretḗ (ἀρετή) – as "excellence" of any kind – especially a person or thing's "full realization of potential or inherent function." (Which may include, but does not strictly refer to, “moral virtue”).
And: “The ancient Greeks applied the term arete (ἀρετή) to anything: for example, the excellence of a chimney, the excellence of a bull for breeding, and the excellence of a man.” Since this view seems focussed on functional values, it seems closer to consequentialism to me.
I’m sure that Don can contribute more on this …
I'm not that familiar with Russell either. I just vaguely recalled his defense of universals.
Words like "heap" and "good" are useful even though they have no mathematical precision, but it needs to be understood that these words lack not only mathematical precision but any intrinsic meaning of their own absent reference to the individual items that are being described in summary.
Epicurus is arguing that "pleasure" as a concept has no meaning apart from the individual instances of pleasure which are contained within the summary term. Of course the concept is very useful as a way to communicate ideas, but Plato and the others are asserting that there is an absolute realm of ideas where there is a "perfect" or "form" of pleasure, and that pleasures are pleasures because they somehow mystically partake in this form or idea.
These ideas are overlapping in two threads -- but, here again, I think you nailed it.
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Admin Edit Note 8/11/2025: the other thread referred to, is here.
I would presume that what this means is that abstractions such as "color" or "good" do not have an independent existence apart from the things that we are describing as colored or good. Nor do "happiness" or "pleasure" as concepts have any independent meaning apart from individual instances of real people experiencing real feelings.
On the other hand, words such as "color" and "good" are useful, and so everyone - including Epicurus - uses them.
I think that is about as good a summary argument against the actual existence of such universals as “redness” or “goodness” – while retaining their semantic usefulness – as one could expect.
As one process philosopher that I once read put it: it is the error of assuming that for every “substantive” that we have in our language, there must be an actual “substance” (existent). Once you abandon Platonic idealism, such universals also fall away (Bertrand Russell notwithstanding).
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LATE EDIT: And, as you point out in another thread, those concepts can have meaning only in terms of contextualized actual individual experience.
Clearly just because something can be imagined does not make it possible
Agreed, of course. But, the so-called “sorites problem” (where I agree with TauPhi* ) aside, I recall that in modal logic there is a principle that would lead to something like this:
If it is logically necessarily possible that X exists in some (possible) world, then – in a model of infinite (logically) possible worlds – X will (necessarily) exist in at least one of them.
[My italics and underlines.]
Of course, it’s not logically necessarily possible that I have really understood all of that … 
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[This type of thinking has been offered as a “proof” of “God.” But if a “god” so defined is not logically possible (e.g. is defined incoherently) – let alone logically necessarily possible – then such a god cannot exist even within a model of infinite possible worlds.]
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* I am reminded of a similar language issue in the later Wittgenstein. We, in ordinary discourse, generally have sufficient understanding of what someone says when they use a phrase like “a heap of sand” (or even “a heap of love”) without needing an arithmetical rule.
I'm a big fan of this poem, but I feel it's acutely anti-Epicurean. "Raging against the dying of the light" brings to mind a bitter and agonising response to dying.
I agree that it's not Epicurean. However, I have always read "rage, rage against the dying of the light" as defiance (perhaps even a kind of "heroic" defiance), rather than bitterness. Remember, it is Dylan speaking to his father, not his father speaking ...
Dylan Thomas is perhaps the most inspirational poet (though not the only one) for me – in terms of his creative and unique use of language (less in this villanelle, I think, than others – such as “Fern Hill” *). I discovered him by accident in me undergraduate years, pulling his Collected Poems off a shelf in the library stacks: I ended up cutting all my afternoon classes to read him. 
If I were marooned on a desert island, and could have only one book of poetry, this would be it. [Emily Dickinson’s Collected Poems would be the other, if I could have two – which might point to a certain poetic schizophrenia! 
]
With that said, I think neither this poem nor Dylan generally can be considered Epicurean.
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* https://poets.org/poem/fern-hill. I would love to hear Sheen recite this one! (I used to have a recording of another Welsh actor, Richard Burton, reading Thomas.)
In looking up Tsouna’s essays cited above by Patrikios, I stumbled on this paper (a master’s thesis) on an “Epicurean Theory of the Mind.” I have not yet read it (and likely will do so in my usual slow, piecemeal fashion 
). But I thought it might be interesting …
Didn’t know the proper place to put it, so just stuck it here …
Dogmatic doesn't mean keeping to strict orthodoxy, it means being willing to take a position as opposed to remaining skeptical of everything, or as the word used means, "to be at a loss, be in doubt, be puzzled."
One's occupation doesn't define them as a living breathing human being.
Thanks for the thorough reply, Don .
I just want to say that, lest anyone think I was being elitist with my reference to factory workers et al – I spent pretty much all of my second decade, and some of the third, as pure “blue-collar” labor: washing dishes in a restaurant basement kitchen, a few years in a couple of canneries, and eight years of seven-day rotating shift work in a paper mill. So, of course, I know your comment here is right on.
But it's a key issue to remember that variation is pleasure too, and Epicurus is not saying "and variation is not desirable."
My perspective veers more toward seeing Epicurus as an observational researcher of the natural world and synthesizing those observations into workable practical applications for real people.
How do you think this might relate to past discussions on here about the “practical Epicurean” and the “philosophical Epicurean” (my shortcut terms, the latter referring to folks who have the ability and inclination to delve more deeply into the texts and scholarly – which is not to say “academic” – analyses)? My sense of the general sentiment on here is that the former are predicted to fall away from Epicurean practice if not sufficiently philosophically educated.
Or: how to offer a helpful (“therapeutic”) Epicurean practice toward daily life to the former group without undue simplification (my emphasis)? Or is that not possible? (If not, then Epicureanism seems destined to remain an option only for a fairly narrow segment of the general populace.) What can we offer to the factory worker who labors overtime hours, or the farmworker bending her back to harvest our fruits and vegetables, or … ? Anything? If so … how? (If not ... then not.)
Just some questions for thought … (Since you've already risked muddying the waters ... 
)
Not trying to pick nits here
I didn't notice any nits ...
A main theme of Nehamas’ essay is that φιλιά for the ancient Greeks had a public dimension that modern notions of friendship do not. Epicurus would surely have been aware of that and, although he might not have rejected it out of hand, may have treated his social-compact view of “natural justice” as more applicable to the public sphere … ? [That’s intended as a question.]
From page 219 of the Nehamas essay: “Although relationships based on benefit or pleasure are not ideal, they would still be friendships as long as they, too, involved mutual affection and, more important, wishing good things for each other’s own sake: that seems the least we should ask of them.”
For Aristotle, only friendship based on mutual appreciation of virtue is perfect or ideal. From page 220: “Aristotle’s conclusion is that only friendship that involves reciprocated love based on the virtues of another is a friendship in the proper sense of the term. He is half-tempted to say that no other relationship should even be called friendship, but, as a concession to ordinary usage, and by way of uncovering what is right about that usage, he concedes that any other relation may be counted as a friendship, to a greater or lesser degree, to the extent that it resembles this ideal.”
It seems to me that Epicurus would accept friendship based on mutual appreciation of virtue – but not as the “only friendship … in the proper sense of the term.” And, after all, such appreciation is itself surely a source of pleasure.
And there is, for example, VS23: “Every friendship is worth choosing for its own sake, though it takes its origin from the benefits.”
The basic problem here is that “freedom from pain” is made to sound like something different from pleasure, when in fact everything that is not painful is pleasurable when there are only two alternatives, and tasty food is as legitimate a part of the set of total pleasures as is poetry or literature or friendship or anything else. Epicureans don’t narrow the definition of pleasure to an ambiguous state of “absence of XXX” - they expand the definition of pleasure to include all experiences of life that are desirable – and life itself is desirable, with the only undesirable experience falling under the name of “pain.”
When you get past superficial readings of the letter to Menoeceus, there’s plenty of textual evidence that explains that Epicurus held there to be only two feelings, and that means - just as stated in Principal Doctrine 3, that when pain is absent then pleasure is present, and the reverse also.
This seems to me to point up what I consider to be the major error of the Cyrenaics (as articulated by Aristippus the Younger): that there is a third “neutral” condition that is neither pleasure nor pain. The Epicurean category of katastematic pleasure – in addition to the kinetic pleasures that seem to be the only ones the Cyrenaics recognized – corrects this error.
Just as an aside (tearing myself briefly from my reading assignment – as my hypertexting brain asserts itself 
).
AxA said: “The philosophy encourages applying "common sense" and using "basic meanings" of words, but that can lead to projecting back an imaginary "English Epicurus" when we apply all the connotations of English translation words back to the original philosophy. "Edward Curris" lol.” on that.
I just want to add that I don’t think that even the plainest of plain speech can be reduced to some one-meaning-for-one-word-for-all-cases – in any non-artificial language at least. Or even for a phrase that includes, say, adjectival or adverbial modifiers and that may recur in varying contexts. All speech (and writing) is semantically dependent on context, which is the basis for Wittgenstein’s dictum: “Don't look for the meaning, look for the use.”
And, as AxA points out, that can be even more tricksy in translation, where the context is not immediate, but needs itself to be searched out – as well as carrying the risk of “projecting back an imaginary ‘English Epicurus’."
From Don: “I always feel the need in these threads to bring up that Epicurus didn't use the words "friendship/friend." His usual term was φιλιά (philia) which can, of course, be translated into English as "friendship." But both "friendship/friends" and φιλιά/φίλοι have their own semantic baggage they carry with them that often goes unquestioned.” And: “I don't expect anyone to read every word …”
Well, now that has become my reading assignment for the day … 
