Posts by Pacatus

Quote from Cassius

The basic problem here is that “freedom from pain” is made to sound like something different from pleasure, when in fact everything that is not painful is pleasurable when there are only two alternatives, and tasty food is as legitimate a part of the set of total pleasures as is poetry or literature or friendship or anything else. Epicureans don’t narrow the definition of pleasure to an ambiguous state of “absence of XXX” - they expand the definition of pleasure to include all experiences of life that are desirable – and life itself is desirable, with the only undesirable experience falling under the name of “pain.”

Quote from Cassius

When you get past superficial readings of the letter to Menoeceus, there’s plenty of textual evidence that explains that Epicurus held there to be only two feelings, and that means - just as stated in Principal Doctrine 3, that when pain is absent then pleasure is present, and the reverse also.

This seems to me to point up what I consider to be the major error of the Cyrenaics (as articulated by Aristippus the Younger): that there is a third “neutral” condition that is neither pleasure nor pain. The Epicurean category of katastematic pleasure – in addition to the kinetic pleasures that seem to be the only ones the Cyrenaics recognized – corrects this error.

Just as an aside (tearing myself briefly from my reading assignment – as my hypertexting brain asserts itself ).

AxA said: “The philosophy encourages applying "common sense" and using "basic meanings" of words, but that can lead to projecting back an imaginary "English Epicurus" when we apply all the connotations of English translation words back to the original philosophy. "Edward Curris" lol.” on that.

I just want to add that I don’t think that even the plainest of plain speech can be reduced to some one-meaning-for-one-word-for-all-cases – in any non-artificial language at least. Or even for a phrase that includes, say, adjectival or adverbial modifiers and that may recur in varying contexts. All speech (and writing) is semantically dependent on context, which is the basis for Wittgenstein’s dictum: “Don't look for the meaning, look for the use.”

And, as AxA points out, that can be even more tricksy in translation, where the context is not immediate, but needs itself to be searched out – as well as carrying the risk of “projecting back an imaginary ‘English Epicurus’."

From Don: “I always feel the need in these threads to bring up that Epicurus didn't use the words "friendship/friend." His usual term was φιλιά (philia) which can, of course, be translated into English as "friendship." But both "friendship/friends" and φιλιά/φίλοι have their own semantic baggage they carry with them that often goes unquestioned.” And: “I don't expect anyone to read every word …”

Well, now that has become my reading assignment for the day …

From the article linked by Kalosyni: "In every German village there is the corner bar, and in the corner is a table. It's reserved for the sort of elders or other regulars. And they sit in the corner and they drink their beer and smoke their cigarettes and pontificate on the town and all of its craziness."

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Reminded me of this from Daniel Klein, Travels with Epicurus: A Journey to a Greek Island in Search of a Fulfilled Life; excerpts from the Prologue: “The Table at Dimitri’s Taverna” –

“I eavesdrop on Tasso and his companions. As is their habit, they sit side by side and speak loudly to one another, so I have no difficulty hearing them. Although my Greek is rudimentary, I can catch the drift of their talk, a conversation that began before I arrived and will continue until the sun begins to drop behind the Peloponnese, just across the sea. It is aimless, cheerful chat, for the most part mundane. They talk about the sunlight, which is unusually hazy today, the new owner of a cheese stall in the port market, their children and grandchildren, the state of political affairs in Athens. Occasionally one tells a story from his past—usually one his companions have heard before. The talk is punctuated by leisurely, comfortable silences as they gaze out at the Peloponnesian straits.” . . .

“One of Tasso’s companions signals Dimitri to bring another bottle of retsina and a few plates of mezes—some olives, stuffed grape leaves, and a yogurt, cucumber, and garlic dip. They now arrange themselves around the table so all are in reach of the food. I have yet to see Dimitri present them with a bill, and I believe he never does; the men will simply place a few coins on the table when they leave—“old man” rates. Tasso pulls a deck of cards from his pocket, and they begin to play prefa, their preferred card game, with one of the four sitting out each hand and taking up any slack in the conversation.

“And I turn back to my book about Epicurus.”

Happy birthday, Patrikios!

Another “interesting take” on Don ‘s position above (which was a game-changer for me), that I came across in my reading. The quote is about the Aristippian Cyrenaics, but seemed to me to be relevant here: some pleasures may not be contingently choiceworthy because they would lead to greater pains – but pleasure itself, in se, is intrinsically choiceworthy.

“In [the example cases, a particular] pleasure is not choiceworthy given the circumstances, since its acquisition involves more than countervailing pains. But it remains choiceworthy for itself and in itself. In other words, its intrinsic ability to motivate choosing is a matter of its self-evident phenomenal character, which is not altered by prudential circumstances.”

– Kurt Lampe, The Birth of Hedonism: the Cyrenaic Philosophers and Pleasure as a Way of Life. [My generalizing edits in brackets.]

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Note: Lampe seems generally to think that some of the differences between the Cyrenaics and the Epicureans (while real and worthy of note) have been perhaps overstated – to the detriment of the Cyrenaics as philosophers. [At least in terms of what Lampe calls “mainstream Cyrenaicism” – e.g. of Aristippus and Aristippus the Younger (the “Metrodidact”), and presumably Arete, the Younger’s mother who inherited the role of teacher from her father, Aristippus the Elder (and who might be one of the unsung women philosophers of antiquity)].

Quote from Don

From my perspective, Epicurus was not positing a philosophical position in that "pleasure is the telos." He was identifying a universal trait of human beings - in fact, a trait of all living beings.

Once again, I come back to this.

I came across the following while reading Tim O’Keefe’s treatise on Epicureanism. I’m not sure that O’Keefe takes it all the way to the logical conclusion that you do (so well) here, but it did remind me –

“So we do not need to discern our inherent telos in order to discover the purpose of life. Instead, in order to find the highest good we simply have to observe what, as a matter of fact, people desire and pursue for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else.”

– Timothy O’Keefe, Epicureanism

In other words, it’s an empirical question – not some “second order” philosophical one, as in, say, Plato.

Quote from Don

From my perspective, Epicurus was not positing a philosophical position in that "pleasure is the telos." He was identifying a universal trait of human beings - in fact, a trait of all living beings.

Quote from Don

As I stated and from my perspective, "Pleasure is the telos" a fact of the natural world - like gravity or evolution - that Epicurus discovered and articulated through his philosophy. It's the way living beings work and how they interact with the world and each other.

I keep coming back to this in my mind, and it cements a lot of stuff for me. Thank you.

Quote from Cassius

To what extent would it be appropriate to conclude that Epicurus is considering "happiness" to be an "emergent quality"

At one time, I might have considered that – and perhaps need to again. But now (and partly following Don regarding hedone as the natural telos) I would regard happiness as just an alternative word to describe the experience (feeling) of pleasure: both in the kinetic and katastematic senses. And I think it is a useful word (especially for a state of ataraxia, or any state in which the feelings of pleasure sufficiently outweigh any pain – e.g., as you note, Epicurus on his death bed). That is, I think – in the everyday discourse of “ordinary language” – we understand what someone means when they say they are happy.

In the longer-term sense, eudaimonia represents a life of sufficient pleasure (again, both physical and psychological) to outweigh whatever pain (either pone or tarache ) a life characterized by more well-being than ill-being – as perceived by the individual. I have no problem calling that a happy life – for me (and, for all the pain and mental suffering, I do).

Again, as long as it is associated with the experience of pleasure, I find it to be an unproblematic description: “happy.” But I don’t see it as anything distinct from pleasure – even as an emergent quality.

With that said, I do recognize that – in philosophical as opposed to “ordinary language” discourse* – more rigor may be required. In which case: pleasure.

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* Wittgenstein (in his Philosophical Investigations) tended to focus on how academic philosophical discourse could go astray from perfectly good “ordinary” understanding; but everyday discourse might also fail to convey a true understanding in specific cases.

Quote from Cassius

Ok read it. No need to soften my comments.

The scathing “vox” of this critique – of a casual newspaper information piece, essentially for not being a thoroughgoing treatise that checks all the “appropriate” boxes – smacks of philosophical puritanism. The notion that any reader of this article might somehow be put off from ever exploring Epicurean philosophy (e.g., because the article did not mention “pleasure”) – and that, therefore the article does some grave disservice – is, frankly, ludicrous.

Obviously, my view does not fit with some version of Epicurean “orthodoxy.” (And that has been clear for some time.) Be well all.

Quote from Eikadistes

I think we're doing good as long as we stay away from partisanship and campaign ads.

Well, I am partisan on some issues -- but I am also a pragmatist (I hope).

An interesting recent article on Stoicism in El Pais:

Why Stoicism will always be in vogue

The popularity of books on Stoicism reflects a widespread search for values in a world where we often feel powerless. However, its philosophical ideas have…

english.elpais.com

The author has some positive commentary on Epicureanism, and questions why Stoicism has had a better survival:

“Stoicism is not the only school of thought that offers practical wisdom for navigating a changing world. Yet, it has proven to be the most popular, even more so than Epicureanism, despite the influence it also had. The French philosopher Michel Onfray wrote in EL PAÍS that “without Epicurus, there would have been no Renaissance, no Montaigne, no libertine thought of the 17th century, no philosophy of the Enlightenment, no French Revolution, no atheism, no philosophies of social liberation.”

"However, during the early centuries of Christianity, followers of Epicureanism were often misrepresented as people who organized banquets and orgies. This was a not true. In reality, the Epicureans advocated for a life centered around friendship and the thoughtful consideration of the consequences of everyday choices. They favored present moderation — such as having just one glass of wine — to avoid greater misfortunes in the future, like a hangover. But they proposed a life far removed from politics, which harmed the school’s influence, as Méndez Lloret points out.”

And: “Sellars points out another key factor contributing to Stoicism’s success: the texts of its leading thinkers are well-preserved and easy to read. Works like The Enchiridion of Epictetus, the letters and treatises of Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations are both accessible and engaging. In contrast, Diogenes left no written records, only fragments of Epicurus remain, and On the Nature of Things by the Epicurean Lucretius is more of a scientific treatise than an ethical or political one.”

[The comment about “far removed from politics” might be a bit overly strong – especially considering the adaptations of Roman Epicureans; viz. the essay “Caesar the Epicurean? A Matter of Life and Death” by Katharina Volk, recently shared by Cassius.]

My wife eats little meat, and would likely be completely vegan except that her doctor (following a heart attack) cautioned her against totally excluding any macronutrient from her diet; so she occasionally has a bit of fish or meat.

I basically eat anything. I do have a bit of a gluten issue, and so try to do more to minimize refined grains (bread, pasta)* in favor of intact grains (brown rice). But I am not very disciplined – and that is the main reason I am a bit overweight.** Following my wife, I try to eat more “beans and greens.”

With age, I find that eggs have become problematic. The old three-egg omelet is out: one egg, whether poached or scrambled, is usually all I can tolerate.

I still eat for pleasure – but try to balance the immediate “kinetic” pleasure with predictable “katastematic” feelings after. In terms of cultural cuisine, I have a motto in Latin: Sapores mundi gusta … de domo. (“Taste the flavors of the world … from home.” ) Tonight we are having some vegan minestrone soup, with added garlic, rice and some finely chopped kale. (I will have a bit of leftover pork tenderloin in mine.)

I do “intermittent fasting” – that is, three or four days a week I fast for 12 to 15 hours, and break my fast with some light “tapas” in mid-afternoon.

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* Even “whole grains” refined into flour.

** Based on personal observation.

Quote from Cassius

So those who wish to can save this post and use it against me in the future,

Quote from Don

For ancient languages, consider how hard it is to get the jokes in a translated play by Aristophanes or to understand the "oldest joke" - “A dog walks into a bar and says, ‘I cannot see a thing. I’ll open this one.’"

Maybe not just ancient languages:

“A serious and good philosophical work could be written consisting entirely of jokes." Ludwig Wittgenstein

I’ll let it there – except to say that Wittgenstein was a serious philosopher of language, so I’m not sure if he was joking!

Another article on the importance of friendship, from El Pais:

Robin Dunbar, anthropologist: ‘A good network of friends increases your life expectancy’

The British researcher defends the validity of his most famous theory, 30 years after formulating it. Despite social media, he explains that humans can only…

english.elpais.com

Quote from Don

While the "then's" could be taken as hierarchical, they could also just be identifying three co-equal kinds of desires: for eudaimonia, for freedom of disturbance for the body, and for life.

That seems reasonable. But still: is there a hierarchy of necessary desires? The Stoics would, e.g., dismiss those necessary for survival (let alone bodily comfort), in favor of their emphasis on virtue as the only thing necessary for eudaimonia (although they did allow for “preferred indifferents”). But if I am not first able to satisfy those desires necessary for survival, how am I to pursue [further] pleasure?

Quote from Don

So, this category should catch those between eudaimonia and those necessary for life. This is an interesting category.

For sure. For example, while some minimal amount of clothing and shelter may be necessary for survival (Maslow’s “base”), that may not be sufficient for “freedom from disturbance for the body” – i.e., some minimal comfort? (Very much a question mark there.)

“And of the natural ones [i.e., desires], on the one hand, are the necessary ones; on the other, the ones which are only natural; then, of the necessary ones: on the one hand, those necessary for eudaimonia; then, those necessary for the freedom from disturbance for the body; then those necessary for life itself.” Letter to Menoikeus, 127; Don Boozer translation. [https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/filebase/download/97/]

On the one hand, it is clear here that “necessary” does not mean strictly required for survival, but for eudaimonia (the proper translation of which is oft-argued – e.g. well-being / the feeling of well-being / happiness / a well and happy life …).

With that said, I find the order here interesting: one might normally think that “for life itself”, being the most basic, would be the first one to consider in an ascending order (viz. Don ‘s reference in his notes to Maslow’s hierarchy). But the first one brought to mind by Epicurus is eudaimonia; then a body free from disturbance; and only then “life itself.”

I suspect this is not accidental, Epicurus being a careful writer. Thoughts?

[Note: I skimmed the other thread here, and didn't see anything on this particular -- overly pedantic? -- question.]

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Peter St. Andre translation, for comparison:

“ … among the necessary desires some are necessary for happiness, some for physical health, and some for life itself.” With this note, re “physical health”: “[5] Literally the Greek text says ‘to keep the body untroubled’ (in fact ‘for the untroubledness of the body’), which might mean keeping the body healthy or perhaps even relaxed or stress-free.”

Letter to Menoikos, by Epicurus

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BTW: Wishing a well and happy holiday season to all!

Quote from Cassius

At risk of getting drawn in too far when I should be doing other things (which I suspect is the real objection), what are "issues 1 and 2 in Section 2".....?

On a quick look-back, I think it is here:

“For example, when someone proves that the number √ 2 is irrational, i.e., that it is not a fraction, this particular piece of knowledge, as well as the methods that produced it, lead to two important conclusions, one general and one specific: (1) Mathematics does not in principle depend on sensory experience. (2) Incommensurability gives support to the idea of infinite divisibility of line segments.”

[My brain is becoming creamed corn at this point. Never great even at the maths that I had to know and apply in economics. ]

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Note: I used the example of π rather than the √ 2. Both are irrational numbers (as is e). The reason I latched onto π is that I think it is useful to be able to estimate the circumference of a circle, even if there is no "perfect" circle.

Quote from Cassius

What I will say is that my gut tells me that people who go down the rabbit whole too far in mathematical theory are never going to accept that no matter how internally consistent their systems might be

I remember years ago wading through a book – The Mystery of the Aleph: Mathematics, the Kabbalah, and the Search for Infinity, by Amir D. Aczel – in which it was suggested that single-minded pursuit down that very “rabbit hole” contributed to the mental collapse of mathematicians Georg Cantor and Kurt Gödel. (It was a difficult but engaging read, as I recall.)