Posts by Pacatus
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I’ll just add that some of us are “slow learners” when it comes to social conditioning, and it takes us longer to (even try to) unravel the “slow, piece-by-piece hypnosis” that was imposed on us in our formative years. I’m at the start of my seventh decade and I’m still working at it … 😉
And sometimes it takes some traumatic event to kick-start us (mine in my fourth decade).
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If you're trying to apply Epicurus's teachings to better your life, that makes you an Epicurean as opposed to a Christian or Stoic or something else.
And if we could stop there, we’d be in perfect agreement. But – 😉
I'd ask what "Epicurean teachings" are you trying to apply to better your life.
Do you have an “acceptable” list? (Otherwise, why would you ask?) And why should I accept (in toto) whatever list you (or anyone else) might have?
That whole “TM” thing comes out of engagement with Christians (when I thought of myself as a Christian) who claimed that – because there were certain tenets of theirs that I did not accept – I really could not be a “True Christian™” (the “TM” was not, of course, theirs – but my own snarky reaction). Today, whether I was or wasn’t a “True Christian™” is of no consequence to me – except as a point of sincerity. And that is not a trivial point …
I generally think of myself as a neo-Epicurean (though I don’t fit any of Cassius’ differentiating points in his chart – so maybe I’m not so “neo”) just because I subscribe to updating the knowledge base that was available to Epicurus (and the Stoics and the Pyrrhonians) in light of advancements in things like logic, epistemology and science.
So, at bottom, I think that word “sincerity” might hold some gravitas in the matter. I’m sure (sincerely) that when you were a Buddhist you were very honest and sincere about that. You found a different path – does that mean you were never a “True Buddhist™”? 😉 Or that you were not honest and sincere? Of course not.
EDIT: If at some point I decide that I am not fundamentally Epicurean, for whatever reason, I will be honest enough to simply say so. And, just as honestly, wish all my Epicurean friends well -- and gratitude. I don't envision that, but a lot of things have happened in my life that I never envisioned ...
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There have to be some Epicurean criteria or some "essential" (I don't like the word but I'll use it) doctrines by which one lives their life to be considered an Epicurean. Otherwise the word has no meaning.
The problem here, Don, is that there is no "one" – no generalized person. There is me, and you, as we try to apply Epicurean teachings to better our lives – not in adherence to some exogenous “truth” (no matter wherefrom derived) whether it is personally helpful or not.
So, yes, it’s possible (maybe probable) that I don’t measure up to some criteria required to be a “True Epicurean™” in someone’s eyes, or some "authoritative" version. Okay. Not a problem for me.
I really don’t think we can get beyond that, much as it might be tempting to try.

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There are not really any Ideal forms or essences of "Epicureans," only individual people who claim to more or less apply Epicurean views in their lives - and no matter how many doctrines we add or subtract from a person there is no essence or ideal form of an Epicurean for us to justify our labelling, or any moment when an Epicurean ceases to be an Epicurean due to a loss of sufficient Epicurean elements.
Thank you!

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That's something I think Epicurus was trying to be clear about: There ultimately is no "final arbiter" of right and wrong. There is no center of the universe to stand in and say that this perspective alone is the "right" perspective. There is no divine god or anyone else who knows everything and can say "this alone" is right. There is no realm of forms or essences -- no "true world" outside of our own to which to look to as authority. This is not reason for despair but reason to saddle up and get back on the horse and ride life as aggressively as you can to manage all the evidence and all the decisions available to you.
Spot on!
I want to add that, in modern terms, deductive (“abstract”?) logic does not yield empirical truth – only coherency. (The opposite of “logical” in the deductive sense is not “false” but incoherent.)
Inductive logic (to my mind) yields no absolute empirical truths – but reliable probabilities (some of which may veer toward certainty in a subjective sense, even if not in terms of some strict objective “absolutism”).
We live in the empirical (experiential) world, and we have to rely on the evidence of our senses and reasoned induction therefrom – even informally, which is how we mostly go about it. That’s not a “problem” – certainly not one that can be “solved” by unquestioning “faith”. Or abstract logic.
In more metaphorical terms: we lay our bets as best we can. And keep going – as Cassius said: “saddle up and get back on the horse and ride life as aggressively as you can to manage all the evidence and all the decisions available to you.”
And that is my basis for agreeing with Joshua 's “hard no” (with his reference to Hume) as well. And is the only way I use that word “faith” – the best effective confidence I can muster in order to act in a real world where “abstract certainty” is not forthcoming. But absence of “abstract absolute certainty” is not the same as absence of reliable evidence.
And if someone thinks their evidence is more reliable than what now have, then “Show me.” I'll look.
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Besides there are *plenty* of other obscure details that I want to sink my research teeth into
I understand, my friend! I understand!
I am slogging (pleasurably) through the dissertation you cited on Greek gardens -- and might actually have a new poem inspired thereby (whether or not it's worth anything will take time to tell). 
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I thoroughly enjoyed reading through this thread (although I barely skimmed some of the more esoteric scholarship: especially Don @Nate
).What I really appreciate is that – even with the sincere investigation and really trying to come up with a meaningful date – it is all more in the nature of fun, rather than fundamentalism. (No mention of an Epicurean hell for getting it wrong – unlike some religious disagreements over calendar issues!
)I do have a prophecy, however. This will not be the last year of discussion on the matter – whatever date you hit upon: you all would just miss the sheer pleasure of it too much!

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Thanks again, Don.
BTW, I got 17 out of 20 "true" on her quiz -- and two of the three "falses" were really borderline. Now I am going quiet.

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Thanks for that. I find that in a group -- with mostly extroverts -- I sometimes talk compulsively, like I need to "fit in." When being quiet, and in a quiet mind, is what I want. So, I'm going to be quiet now, and check out Susan Cain.

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And I don't mean to be demeaning even to the people who talk about being washed in the blood of the lamb.
Yes. Understood (and important).
I spent some months in a 12-Step program where many people identified their “higher power” in supernatural God terms. I would never express doubt (especially to them) that such a belief may have helped them achieve sobriety and serenity. There were also agnostic/atheist folks who might identify their “higher power” with something like Nature. In the group I was in, they just didn’t engage in argument about such things – it wasn’t the purpose.
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I think you're saying this yourself and therefore you won't take offense to note that this kind of approach is just totally beyond the reach of the "average man" who has need of guidance for living today - in the moment - and who will never be able to appreciate half of where you are coming from.
There is a segment of people who are into such calculations as you are discussing who will take the position: "Well the masses will never understand what I am talking about so they just need to listen to ME!:
That's an attitude that I think well describes most "priestly classes."Agreed entirely!
So that leads back to the question of how to understand and appreciate Epicurus' perspective on this, which was apprently understood by the people of his time to be a combination of skeptical questioning of all claims of authority combined with a common sense attitude that certain decisions do have to be made with confidence, and that we do the best we can to make the best decisions we can without holding ourselves up to unrealistic expectations. What I perceive, and what I think Epicurus was also perceiving and saying, is that the pendulum can swing too far in the direction of skepticism leading to nihilism, and that it is necessary to articulate a common sense and usable approach to knowledge formation which allows for happy living.
And with this as well!
So that seems to me to be the direction that these discussions need to proceed. By all means we take the input from all of the complicated abstractions to which we can gain access and on which we can draw upon, but that in the end we articulate an understandable technique for trusting the senses and making the everyday decisions with confidence that allow us to live happily -- rather than take the position of a Socrates and play games with the idea that we know nothing except that we know nothing.
Yes.
With regard to the Lucretius quote (and with the hope that Don might help with translations), I think maybe we would be well advised (today) to replace "certainty" with "reliance." What can we -- must we -- rely upon? And that, I think, Epicurus nailed (and, again, something that I suspect Sextus just misunderstood).
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I realize I might have been veering into Pyrrhonian territory here, and maybe should clarify –
The Pyrrhonians did not deny evidentiary or logical criteria for agency (decision/action) but for “truth.” Again, I suspect that they – like the other Hellenists – took “truth” to mean objective (infallible?) certainty; and, for the Pyrrhonians, specifically truth about what was “non-evident” (non-observable).
Adrian Kuzminski (in his book Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism – the best comprehensive introduction to Pyrrhonism I’ve found) argues that reasonable inference from sense experience and observations (appearances) would also be perfectly acceptable from a Pyrrhonian perspective.
Unfortunately, I think that the Pyrrhonians (i.e., Sextus Empiricus) simply misunderstood Epicurus. But none of them had modern understandings of, say, inductive logic – and maybe Kuzminski’s conclusion on inference is therefore a bit neo-Pyrrhonian. Epicurus, it seems to me, had a better grasp. But his expression is still (if often intuitively prescient) necessarily limited by the knowledge base available in his time.
Note: Although Sextus can be all over the place, it seems to me that a dyed-in-the-wool Pyrrhonian can’t really deny the possibility of knowledge (that would be more in the bailiwick of the Academic Sceptics) – but would have to maintain agnosticism on the question.
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To follow up (and maybe simplify), here is what I call the “generalized empirical formula” –
y = f (x1, x2, … , xn ; u) : p
where:
y is the dependent variable.
f is some defined function.
xn are the observed independent variables.
u represents unobserved/unconsidered variables (which may be unknown or unknowable).
p is some probability (e.g. a statistical confidence level).
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As long as there is any u – or f is uncertain (e.g., there is more than one possible function describing the relationships) – p must be < 1. Further, to know that p = 1.0, one would also have to know that there are no u – and that f is perfectly specified. I might call that an “infallibility condition.”
This is drawn from statistics, but I think is not confined to statistical analysis.
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I will take objective certainty as knowing some hypothesis to the probability of P = 1.0: it is logically or mathematically impossible to be wrong.
In deductive logic and pure mathematics I believe this is possible. But not in the empirical world.
The most an empirical investigator (say, a scientist) can achieve is to fail to disprove a given hypothesis to some probability (objective confidence) < 1.0.
Now, in our everyday walk-a-bout affairs – where we might question the shape of a distant tower, etc. – this doesn’t matter much. Who cares? But if, say, you’re doing medical research or calculating the safe orbit of a satellite – or trying to determine if the substratum of the universe is particles and space, or energy, or vibrating strings of some kind – then I think it does matter.
So, I would have to say, at bottom, empirical knowledge is fundamentally probabilistic – but that, like Newtonian physics versus quantum mechanics, it doesn’t matter at certain levels of reality: i.e., the one we routinely live in. (Wittgenstein thought that we need to be able to take certain things as certain in order to rationally navigate our world.)
When someone says they are certain of something that they cannot objectively prove to a P = 1.0 (whether by observation or logical reasoning), what they are really saying is that they are so sure that they see no reasonable possibility of doubt. That is not the same as saying there is no – let alone can be no – such possibility.
For me, the question then becomes: Why would anyone suffer any anxiety or agitation about any of this?
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After all that, my brain is creamed corn.
I go with “knowledge is possible.” My guess is that infallible knowledge is logically possible – but I don’t claim to have any.And I refuse to be anxious about it. (Chuckling as I say that.)

EDIT: I may have overshot your question, Cassius. I am using certainty in an objective empirical sense, not how "sure" someone is or feels subjectively. Confidence can include a subjective level of surety, or some objective statistical measure. I'm really using it in the former sense. (Don't know if that helps.)
Now, my brain really is creamed corn ...
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Knowledge is usually defined as “justified, true belief.” That is, you 1) believe something (think it is so); 2) have good reason to think it is so(otherwise you're just guessing); and 3) it turns out to be true (factually confirmed).
Now, suppose I point and say: “That’s a maple tree.”
You ask: “Are you sure?”
Well, am I? Objectively? I’d say it depends on how close we are and how well we examine it.
[This is akin to the oft-cited “square tower / round tower” example.]
At some evidentiary point, I think it’s reasonable to claim certainty in such a case. My point about anxiety comes in when someone has some fear of being wrong – or even uncertain. I’ve encountered that, for example, among some Christians. [And I should add that there is some controversy among epistemologists about fallibilism versus infallibilism. I think the ancient Greeks thought of actual knowledge as being infallible. I tend to as well. But the question becomes, not is knowledge possible, per se, but is infallibility possible -- to know something infallibly (and a perhaps a stronger version?) do I infallibly know that my knowledge of some proposition is infallible? That is, am I infallibly certain about my own capacity for having infallibly certain knowledge? (That would border on a claim of omniscience, it seems to me).]

But that means that if (contrary to all expectation) it was somehow shown that there are gods that intervene in some way in our world, I would not be anxious about it (partly because I see most claims about supernatural gods to be logically absurd – so any such gods would have to be part of the nature of the cosmos, etc.). Just as I have no anxiety about idealism versus realism for the Epicurean view of the gods.
But we need to be careful about thinking the sheer number of observations can confirm to a probability of 1.0 the truth of a hypothesis – it only takes one (as yet unobserved) counter-observation to disconfirm it. (The “Black Swan” event.)
So, I guess my general viewpoint is to rest easy about such things – and don’t cling to a need for certainty: that does not always relieve anxiety. (I think sometimes we can cling to a need for too much precision as well.)