I finished reading the chapter in which Guyau says “The good then is serenity.” The preceding pages of the chapter contrast Aristippus’ notion that there exists an indeterminate state between pleasure and pain – and Epicurus’ rejection of such a state. For Epicurus, hedone/aponia/atarxia (and eudaimonia) congeal, as it were – sometimes subsumed under the heading of just hedone (or perhaps eudaimonia*).
In this schema, so-called kinetic pleasure is the active (and enjoyable) response to some pone – such as hunger. Pleasure comes from both satisfaction of the hunger and from the sensual taste of the food (however simple). The afterward feeling of satisfaction and contentment is also pleasure (so-called katastemic?).
In rejecting Aristippus’ neutral state, Guyau uses the word “serenity” to refer to the ability to generally sustain that state of hedone/aponia/ataraxia/eudaimonia. That is, for him, the ultimate hedonic telos – even if perfectly achievable only by an archetypal Epicurean “sage.” (Though Guyau also seems to affirm that – with attention to a due natural frugality/simplicity – such an ideal is within the grasp of most of us, which Epicurus intended.)
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* I do not see hedone/aponia/ataraxia as instrumental virtues aiming at eudaimonia – as if that were some other value-in-itself. I rather see a eudaimonic life as constitutive of the most pleasurable/pleasant life I can put together. Eudaimonia is not separable from hedone.