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To my mind, "feeling romantic" and "feeling sexual passion" convey two similar but distinct feelings.
I think sexual passion (in English now) can be felt in the context of a loving, romantic relationship, as well as in other (nonromantic) contexts. But I cannot say that what I sometimes feel toward my beloved should not be called sexual passion, shared in a loving relationship. That seems to me to be an unnecessary parsing.
The verb ἔραμαι (of which ἐρασθήσεσθαι is a form) does mean "desire passionately, lust after; desire eagerly" so there's a connotation of over the top sexual desire and lust.
Well, here I go: leaping out where I should probably fear to tread—
First, it doesn’t seem to me that either the LSJ or Wiki entries for ἔρᾰμαι necessitate that connotation, except for regard to things (as opposed to persons); similarly for ἔρος. (I don’t know if it usually carries that connotation across the ancient literature, but it strikes me as something that is likely context-dependent.)
Even less so in other lexicons –
Slater: a. fall in love with, love c. gen. … b. desire.
Autenrieth: enamoured of, in love with.
Etymonline has this for “erotic”: 1650s, from French érotique (16c.), from Greek erotikos "caused by passionate love, referring to love," from eros (genitive erotos) "sexual love" (see Eros). Earlier form was erotical (1620s) –
And under the entry for eros, notes: "Ancient Greek distinguished four ways of love: erao "to be in love with, to desire passionately or sexually;" phileo "have affection for;" agapao "have regard for, be contented with;" and stergo, used especially of the love of parents and children or a ruler and his subjects."
Second, in order for sexual desire to have any per se negative connotation vis-à-vis Epicurus, it would have to fall into the category of unnatural desires, not a natural (albeit unnecessary) desire.
Third, a form of the same word, ἔρᾰμαι, is used in the DL quote affirming sexual pleasures as among those apart from which Epicurus would not know “how to conceive the good.”
“I know not how to conceive the good, apart from the pleasures of taste, sexual pleasures, the pleasures of sound, and the pleasures of beautiful form.”
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At bottom, I do not see Epicurus denigrating sexual pleasures at all, simply cautioning care. The denigrating connotations – whilst they might be apropos (or even predominant) in other cultural, philosophical and religious contexts – seem to me the kind of thing that Epicurus might have tried to rectify, as he did for hēdone itself vis-à-vis, say, the Stoics.
Just to react generally and off-handedly thus far: there would seem to be a wide gulf between being "overwhelmed by sexual passions" and "selective sexual prudence." (Similarly between pederasty, which Joshua's posts are referencing, and any consensual adult homosexual relations.) But I'll wait on further elucidation ...
EDIT: Does eros necessarily imply being overwhelmed or carried away? Or just feeling romantic/sexual passion?
Some time ago, I came upon the following quote by Catherine Wilson (in an interview; I’m not sure if it’s also in her book):
“Epicurus himself liked women and had a series of affairs with women who were uncharacteristically allowed into the school.” https://medium.com/perennial/how-…ll-ec69bf6c7d5b
I hasten to say that I have no moral qualms or objections whatsoever. I would suspect that friendship was also part of any such relationships. But I have not been able to find any confirming sources. Has anyone else?
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In addition to the cautions against the dangers of imprudence and profligacy (PD08, VS51 and the letter to Menoceus), there seems to be one thoroughly affirming statement on sexual pleasure (which I think has been quoted here often), from Diogenes Laertius:
“I know not how to conceive the good, apart from the pleasures of taste, sexual pleasures, the pleasures of sound, and the pleasures of beautiful form.” (On the Ethical End, quoted in DL, x, 6)*
Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, BOOK X, EPICURUS (341-271 B.C.)
The Greek word here translated as “sexual pleasures” is ἐρασθῆναι, and inflection of ἔραμαι which is also rendered as love (as it is in Bailey) – but with the connotation of romantic/sexual passion. It seems etymologically related to ἔρως.
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἔρα^μαι
This is where I cry out to Don for help! 
There seems to be a fairly large body of thought that Epicurus was celibate. But that seems to fall into something like the “bread and water in a cave” asceticism (possibly influenced by Stoicism?) that Cassius oft rebukes. Personally, I prefer a full-blooded, full-bodied Epicurus – including the pleasures of sex.
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I’m sure a lot of this has been covered before (and I skimmed the threads a bit), but I’d enjoy hearing other’s thoughts (even though it may all be speculative) on the subject – especially with regard to Wilson’s claim and the proponents of the idea that Epicurus was (must have been?!) celibate. Thanks in advance.
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* There is an expanded version in Cicero:
“For my part I cannot conceive of anything as the good if I remove the pleasures perceived by means of taste and sex and listening to music, and the pleasant motions felt by the eyes through beautiful sights, or any other pleasures which some sensation generates in a man as a whole. Certainly it is impossible to say that mental delight is the only good. For a delighted mind, as I understand it, consists in the expectation of all the things I just mentioned––to be of a nature able to acquire them without pain. . .” (Epicurus, On the End; Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 3.42-3.)
being judged as "not good enough"
I would add under this one (and likely with application to others as well) understanding and accepting – and even celebrating – who you are, regardless of where you fall on the “spectrum” or other’s judgments or perceived judgments.
When I discovered late in life (in my mid-to-late 50s) that I have ADHD, it was really a relief: “Oh, that’s what I’ve been struggling with all these years!” I read into some literature about it, and decided to reject the “disability” D. It’s just how my brain works, with advantages and drawbacks just like anyone else – even as it puts me outside the mainstream “normal.”
Similarly with my pronounced introversion (which I’ve always been aware of). I suspect that it influenced my active imagination (even as that often got me into trouble in grade school).
Just the realizations – and contemplating them – was therapeutic, relieving a great deal of τᾰρᾰχή in my life (far less struggle than in my young and midlife years).
Being “different” I think has given me a certain sense of empathy for others: each individual is “different” – even when they try to squeeze themselves into this or that box labeled “normalcy” or “acceptability.” That might be the primary “communication skill” that allowed me to function with others in an extroverted world, both socially and in terms of work. (Although, as an introvert, I don’t always “play well with others”. 
) Even as the ADHD tends to make my communication efforts as non-linear and catawampus as my thinking.
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In reference to @Kalosyni’s suggestion about counseling, I might suggest Codependents Anonymous (CODA) as one possibility, even just reading up on it.
Epicurus is not mentioned in Rucker's book, although I find his text even more Epicurean then "The Art of Frugal Hedonism."
Am reminded of the early post-apostolic Christian Justin Martyr: "Those, therefore, who lived according to reason (logos) were really Christians, even though they were thought to be atheists, such as, among the Greeks, Socrates, Heraclitus and others like them."
Well, I wouldn't want to push that too far, but still:
“What’s in a name? That which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet.”
(William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet)
Forgive this over-long, rambling post. This is all a general synopsis of past studies (of which much is forgotten) –
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Years ago I spent a good deal of time studying (in my own schlocky way) various renditions and interpretations of the perennial philosophy (taken broadly). There really are versions of it within most religions (Advaita Vedanta in Hinduism; Kabbalistic theology, as partially reflected in the Talmuds and Midrash, as well as the Zohar, in Judaism; the Laoist mainstream of Taoism, etc.) – albeit with different expressions (ice cream with different flavors: who wants to argue over whether chocolate or vanilla is “the right one”™?). Those versions are not necessarily considered “orthodox” to religious or philosophical sectarians.
A general perennialist would argue that emphasizing the differences is ultimately delusional (sectarianism is illusion). The “orthodox” sectarians would call the perennialists heretics.
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The foundation (again broadly) is that there is some universal “ground of being” or “field of being” (supernatural or natural) from which every individual manifestation arises, of which they are, and to which they all return – generally relinquishing whatever existential individualism one might have enjoyed during the journey.*
I don’t know if Advaita Vedanta is the oldest expression, but the “mahavakyas” of the Upanishads are probably generally representative (where “Brahman” is that underlying universal ground/field):
Sarvam khalvidam brahma – All this is Brahman.
Ayam atma brahma – This very self (that I am) is Brahman.
Tat tvam asi – That (Brahman) thou art.
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With that, I’ll truncate this brief recollection with a possible Epicurean spin (that hopefully does not stray into any Platonic idealism or Stoicism): If the whole field of our existence is defined by atoms and void, then we are formed of those atoms, and when we die, they are simply dispersed into that field. And we – as individual existences – are simply gone: nothing to fear.
And if the “field” is just atoms and void (or whatever analogues might be dominant in current physics), does the notion of a universal field (or ground) become just a metaphor** that might well be useful – as long as it is not reified into some “thing-in-itself” substance? [I think that would be my position.]
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* I once wrote a brief poem on this:
How tragic for the single flame to fear
annihilation in the larger fire
or water-drop to be afraid to fall
again into the vastness of the sea.
** Years ago I read a book that I no longer have, called The Metaphors We Live By. The thesis was that we often – likely unreflectively – allow our behavior to be guided by metaphors at least as much as reasoned analysis. Metaphors such as: tempus fugit; carpe diem; a stitch in time, etc.
Sort of gives a whole deeper context to "Pluck the day" Carpe diem.
"pluck the frux"? 
The Wiktionary entry for the Latin “frux” traces it to the PIE *bʰruHg-:
Etymology[edit]
From Proto-Italic *frūks, from Proto-Indo-European *bʰruHg- (“fruit”).
frūx f (genitive frūgis); third declension
(figuratively) fruit, result, success
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The Wiktionary entry for *bʰruHg also gives this definition: “to make use of; have enjoyment of”. Which agrees with Etymonline.
For myself, I take the word frugal in a practical sense, not in any sense of a moral virtue in itself. (I have known people who are pretty severe “frugalists” and seem to take great self-righteous satisfaction in their “virtue” – though, of course, not all moral-virtue frugalists do that.) I am occasionally extravagant, but not so much as in my youth. And I can find (even relish) elegance in simplicity.
With that said, I found this, which I thought might add a small nuance to the discussion:
"economical in use," 1590s, from French frugal, from Latin frugalis, from undeclined adjective frugi "useful, proper, worthy, honest; temperate, economical," originally dative of frux (plural fruges) "fruit, produce," figuratively "value, result, success," from PIE root *bhrug- "to enjoy," with derivatives referring to agricultural products. Sense evolved in Latin from "useful" to "profitable" to "economical." Related: Frugally.
Don How would you, personally, render V63 in English? Maybe taking a stab at both formal equivalence and a more dynamic rendering?
On a cursory search, I found a couple of other versions, which I thought might lend some nuance, even if they’re not the best renderings –
63. There is also a limit in simple living, and he who fails to understand this falls into an error as great as that of the man who gives way to extravagance. (This from a Kindle book, with no translator named – also here: https://epicurus.net/en/vatican.html. Maybe someone here is familiar with it.)
63. There is an elegance in simplicity, and one who is thoughtless resembles one whose feelings run to excess. (Trans. Peter Saint-Andre, Monadnock Valley Press; this one seems to be somewhat in contradiction to the others.)
(Now an NBA game is calling …)
Hmmm … Maybe continue as a thread for brief, fortune-cookie-like snippets and humorisms that might relate to Epicureanism?
I’ll toss this in, since I just stumbled on it:
“Sometimes I think the surest sign of intelligent life elsewhere in the universe is that none of it has tried to contact us.” Bill Watterson
(My immediate weird thought was of the Epicurean gods living in bliss “elsewhere in the universe” – with neither need nor desire to interfere with our affairs.)
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William Boyd Watterson II (born July 5, 1958) is a retired American cartoonist and the author of the comic strip Calvin and Hobbes, which was syndicated from 1985 to 1995. (Wikipedia)
But at the very least I think it is safe to say philosophically that when you think you have a divine sanction, or a categorical imperative that everyone should follow the same rules all the time and everywhere, then you have a strong tendency to plant seeds that will likely grow into a major conflict that will violate all sorts of otherwise ethical norms.
Thank you, Joshua!
The hexameter is difficult and unyielding. If he can't make this one line work, he'll have to backtrack, and rework the preceding 3 or 4 lines. It is a devilishly intricate art, sometimes more like playing chess than writing--you have to be able to see a few moves ahead, or you write yourself into a corner.
I suspect that Lucretius was more fastidious about his hexameter than Stallings is with her “fourteeners”: her rhythm is often awkward, even though she is consistent with the final iambic foot. (I think of Robert Frost, who wiggled his blank verse sometimes – but in order, it seemed, to make it read more smoothly without using the apostrophe for elision.)
I get myself into a corner all the time -- in chess, too! 
(unless there was a trend ancient poets adopted of heavily employing repetition as a rhetorical technique
In her translator’s notes, Stallings mentions the repetition:
“Writing in the epic tradition of Homer, Lucretius occasionally repeats phrases, lines and even passages verbatim. Within the constraints of a rhymed translation, this effect was not always possible to replicate, and so I sometimes make use of variation where Lucretius uses repetition.”
Lucretius. The Nature of Things (Penguin Classics) (p. 238). Penguin Books Ltd. Kindle Edition.
So, she seems to think it was a poetic device in the Homerian epic tradition ...
Don Wow! Impressive work, to say the least! 
Don Wow! Impressive work, to say the least!
Cassius: I want to just note that, in that thread, I found Elayne's understanding of prolepsis as "pattern recognition" (as an innate human function) to really clarify that for me. When I get a chance, I will update my "Epicurean Outline" thingy to reflect that.
