Posts by Pacatus

I want to add that, for much of my life, I let the (unattainable) “perfect” both keep me from progressing from simple good to good – and be the condemnatory judge of wherever I happened to be in my life’s course. Never “good enough” – in the kind of Puritan/Kantian/Stoical milieu I had absorbed.

I had “good” programming for that in my early and formative years. And I compulsively (co-dependently) attached myself to people who would re-enforce/abuse/manipulate that tendency.

It was only in my 40s that (with the help of new friends) I was able to begin the process of extricating myself from that psychological morass. But it still lurks in my subconscious, rearing its head on occasion (especially in occasional nightmares).

Epicurus – after long searching in various spiritual and philosophical traditions (some helpful along the way) – gives me a sturdy base from which to examine and pragmatically address those tendencies. And that is why I am grateful to everyone on this site (even as I stumble along).

Maybe some of the newcomers here will not have to endure the years that I did.

Quote from Don

You can FEEL The Good. It's right here, now, in our bodies and our minds.

Ah! That dovetails with Cassius’ response to my post in the Pleasure vs Pain thread.

Aristotle, as I recall, said that the highest good is eudaimonia (which I render as happy well-being). But what is a eudaimonic life but one that is the most pleasurable/pleasant (including ataraxia)? Eudaimonia is just that – not some additional state to which pleasure and pleasantness lead (contra Aristotle, I think).

And it is an affair of pathe …

Quote from Don

It is of paramount importance to *always* adhere to VS71: Ask this question of every desire: what will happen to me if the object of desire is achieved, and what if not?

This is the kind of talk that always makes me tense up.  

“Stop calculating, Boss,” Zorba continued. “Forget numbers, break those disgusting scales, close the grocer’s shop.” (Nikos Kazantzakis, Zorba the Greek – I am, perhaps helpfully, far more the introvert than Zorba.)

Now, I would not advocate for an “unaware life” – quite the contrary. But neither do I want to be continually working an abacus in my head to calculate, calculate, calculate (nor a set of scales to weigh, and weigh and weigh) – or even to think, think, think.

I admit (unapologetically) that I have some Cyrenaic tendencies (while recognizing errors in Aristippus’ philosophy that I think Epicurus corrects). And, between the Scilla of ascetism and the Charybdis of tranquillism – as tendencies toward a shipwreck of possible error – I am unlikely to err toward asceticism (though I do value a certain simplictas in how I live).

With that said: although it might be “a bit early,” I’m going to enjoy an afternoon martini (even if it leads to an unplanned nap ).

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Apologies Don if I am misinterpreting/misrepresenting you here.

Quote from Cassius

However the imagery of how the best life involves action, rather than being simply a floating disembodied mind, is useful for our purposes, I think.

I will add, though, that "living full measure" also includes (for me at least) a lively imagination (to which memory is also related): "At its most basic, every memory recall is imagination, because memories are reconstructed every time they are retrieved." [Davies, Jim. Imagination: The Science of Your Mind's Greatest Power (p. 19). Pegasus Books. Kindle Edition.]

Quote from Cassius

(not to spoil the plot, but the lead character ends up dead)

Quote from Cassius

Epicurus was into "pleasure" and that can come in many ways, simple and luxurious, and the trick is to maneuveur through your personal context to focus on pleasures that do not cause you more pain than you are willing to experience for the sake of those pleasures.

Quote from Pacatus

I like what the translator says about Guyau taking an evolutionary view of any philosophical system – while recognizing the importance of trying to identify the associated germinal ideas at the foundation. I would add: a dialectical-evolutionary approach, taking into account multiple perspectives (a kind of dialectical perspectivism).

I wanted to add to my comment about Guyau’s evolutionary approach …

Here’s what I mean by “dialectical perspectivism”* (which is not the simple thesis-antithesis-synthesis):

There is no “view from nowhere – or from everywhere” (the so-called “God’s-eye view”): there are only multiple perspectives. A metaphor –

First you look through this window into the room; then another window, etc. Maybe you get in through an open door. Even if you get to stand in the center of the room, your view as you turn around changes. No one of those views is the sole “right one.” But false perspectives (e.g. manipulated with mirrors, in this visual metaphor) are possible.

My perspectivism is more that of the Spanish existential philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset than of Nietzsche – but the idea is that the best we can really do is to allow ourselves as many perspectives as possible, sort through them, form the best picture for ourselves (which will itself be a personal, existential perspective), and be willing to change our “view” as new views come to fore for us.

In terms of Epicurus and the evolution of Epicureanism, I think we need to approach it the same way, as we each personalize our application. And always read critically, every source. I might find a given viewpoint or quote personally helpful: but that doesn’t mean it is some definitive summation – just a helpful perspective. (I don’t know yet how Guyau presents his evolutionary analysis; have to keep reading … 😊 )

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* The method is how I recall one writer describing Marx’s dialectical approach in Capital: analyzing from such conceptual viewpoints as use-value, labour-value, exchange-vale and value.

Quote from Cassius

but I continue to think there is something missing when someone seems to be seeking to wrap up in a single word

Especially in a translation. But I do recall Luther's "solas": sola gratia, sola fide, sola scriptura -- grace alone, faith alone, scripture alone.

Epicurean version: sola hedone, sola aponia, sola ataraxia.   Don: apologies for mixing Latin and Greek.

Twenty-odd years ago, a philosopher friend of mine suggested that I read Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (though my friend was thoroughly Aristotelian). In the attempt, I had such a strong, negative emotional reaction that I kept throwing the book on the floor and (literally) kicking it across the room. I never got close to finishing it.

Kant claimed a kind of axiomatic “self-evidence” for duty as the basis for all morality and moral agency. The book hit me in the face with the very "Pavlovian" social programming that informed my childhood and formative years – and remained locked in my subconscious, to be triggered (most often with anguishing guilt, sometimes nightmares) by whatever “post-hypnotic” triggers were embedded. (Some therapy helped alleviate that – but, likely due to my own failings on follow-through, did not eliminate it.)

Even after discovering Epicurus, I have not been adept at putting together all the “clues” to complete the puzzle in a therapeutic way (again, my failings). But Guyau takes on that debilitating Stoic/Kantian virtue/duty driven morality (calling Kantianism a “new Stoicism) mano y mano – in a way that just toggled all the right switches in my slow-to-learn brain.

I can honestly say that, had I read Guyau 20 years ago, I would have become an Epicurean 20 years ago. (This is not to in any way deprecate all that I have read on Epicureanism in recent years – including the wonderful stuff on here: Guyau simply hits me directly where I have lived.) Fortunately, as Epicurus said (in other words), it is never too late.

So, Godfrey, I am profoundly grateful! 😊

I finished reading the chapter in which Guyau says “The good then is serenity.” The preceding pages of the chapter contrast Aristippus’ notion that there exists an indeterminate state between pleasure and pain – and Epicurus’ rejection of such a state. For Epicurus, hedone/aponia/atarxia (and eudaimonia) congeal, as it were – sometimes subsumed under the heading of just hedone (or perhaps eudaimonia*).

In this schema, so-called kinetic pleasure is the active (and enjoyable) response to some pone – such as hunger. Pleasure comes from both satisfaction of the hunger and from the sensual taste of the food (however simple). The afterward feeling of satisfaction and contentment is also pleasure (so-called katastemic?).

In rejecting Aristippus’ neutral state, Guyau uses the word “serenity” to refer to the ability to generally sustain that state of hedone/aponia/ataraxia/eudaimonia. That is, for him, the ultimate hedonic telos – even if perfectly achievable only by an archetypal Epicurean “sage.” (Though Guyau also seems to affirm that – with attention to a due natural frugality/simplicity – such an ideal is within the grasp of most of us, which Epicurus intended.)

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* I do not see hedone/aponia/ataraxia as instrumental virtues aiming at eudaimonia – as if that were some other value-in-itself. I rather see a eudaimonic life as constitutive of the most pleasurable/pleasant life I can put together. Eudaimonia is not separable from hedone.

I like what the translator says about Guyau taking an evolutionary view of any philosophical system – while recognizing the importance of trying to identify the associated germinal ideas at the foundation. I would add: a dialectical-evolutionary approach, taking into account multiple perspectives (a kind of dialectical perspectivism).

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Okay Godfrey! You got me: I had to buy the book! 😊

Added note:

I also think that we do well to understand that pleasures do not (necessarily, or even usually) come “single file” as it were – but can (and maybe mostly do) combine in ways to enhance each other in an overall experience. Then it would seem generally to be a misguided reductionism to try to separate and isolate each individual pleasure in some “utilitarian” quest to identify how many “utils” each one contributes.*

I can be serene while robustly cheering on my favorite NBA team, while enjoying a quiet martini on our deck overlooking the lake, while enjoying a good meal or congenial conversation (even friendly debate). Each of those pleasurable experiences is made up of any number of pleasures – and ataraxia/serenity.

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* This is not say that contemplating those individual pleasures might not be useful sometimes – but not, for me, as some kind of abacus-like hedonic “calculus."

Quote from Cassius

Again - presuming "serenity" means what most people interpret it to m\be, as largely denoting mental and physical inactivity. No one generally says "I want to live a serene life" and expects the listener to understand a normal healthy active life.

Just a brief interjection as I work more through this discussion (and am reading the Kindle free sample of the book):

Personally, I have never thought that's what serenity means – and I'm not convinced that most people do. I think it would be an extremely narrow (mis)interpretation.

Apparently, it was originally related to weather: clear, calm, bright. Figuratively, the Latin serenitas was also used to mean “cheerful, glad or joyous.”

serene | Search Online Etymology Dictionary

The online etymology dictionary (etymonline) is the internet's go-to source for quick and reliable accounts of the origin and history of English words,…

www.etymonline.com

serenitas - Wiktionary

serenus - Wiktionary

In any event, I suspect that Guyau (knowledgeable in philology I think) would have had the notions outlined in etymonline in mind. Nevertheless, if he left it at “The good then is serenity” – without qualification – even in French, I think we would all agree that that is a one-sidedness of the kind sometimes applied directly to the Greek ataraxia (and which has been discussed often on here).

Quote from Godfrey

By virtue of being originally written in French, it has a slightly different linguistic approach to ours which will potentially depth to our understanding.

This, I think, is an oft-overlooked principle. I corresponded online for years with a guy whose 1st language was Portuguese; he was also fluent in Spanish and English (and, as I recall, had a good grasp of French). His English was impeccable, better than a great many native-English speakers we also corresponded with – in fact, he wrote his PhD dissertation (economics) in English.

I once asked him if changing languages changed his thinking. His response: Absolutely. In fact, he would often switch languages (at least in his mind) to evoke new perspectives/insights to whatever he was thinking about.

I am sure that translation from, e.g. Greek, through different languages also adds to insight.

[Sadly, I am mostly restricted to English; used to know a bit of Hebrew and a much-impoverished Spanish. All lost in the mists of Lethe.]

Kalosyni

Oh, thank you so very much!

Given my use of the word “prolepsis” here, I revisited a paper by David K. Glidden. The following are just brief – but I think relevant – excerpts:

“Given Epicurean epistemic realism, these claims on the character of some thing or state must be seen as claims on the world, so that prolepsis, like aisthesis for a realist, is ambiguous between the psychological act of apprehension and the content discerned, some feature of the world. In the case of prolepsis what is discerned should be some abiding character in things, as opposed to some temporary appearance. …

“Such recognitions are part of the evidence, not part of our inferences· And prolepsis, it seems, constitutes such recognitions.” [My emphasis]

https://orb.binghamton.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1108&context=sagp

There is a link and some discussion of Dr. Gliddens’ longer paper as well, here:

Thread

Dr. David Glidden's "Epicurean Prolepsis"

Thanks to Don's hard work and to the generosity of Dr. Glidden himself, we have obtained a copy of Dr. Glidden's 1985 paper "Epicurean Prolepsis."

As many of you know we have been discussing Anticipations in our two most recent podcast episodes, and Dr. Glidden came to our attention through a shorter work which we found very interesting. Dr. Glidden developed that shorter work into the longer article which was published in 1985 in the Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy.

While we decide the…

Cassius

March 3, 2023 at 7:34 PM

EDIT to my last post: I am implicitly, in my exploration, treating that "natural divine reality" as having the kind of ideal characteristics that Epicurus had in mind -- e.g. harmony and blissfulness -- that we can tap into, as it were, by recognizing it.

Sorry for the late edit.

Cassius

Yes, the term “idealism” can be confusing – in that some claim, under that label, that the gods are at best mental fabrications to represent (archetypally) certain ideals.

I am exploring the possibility that there:

1) can be a natural (not supernatural) “divine” (for lack of a better word) reality; that

2) is proleptically grasped (but I should not have excluded logical inference from that); but that

3)even a proleptic apprehension requires some contact; and that

4) recognition of a natural divine reality makes more sense if it is not removed from our own natural world.

I find it difficult to relate to something that may be the result of logical inference, but is not part of my life (like, say, quantum mechanics) – even if I think it is likely true. If that is the case, then I think there is some justification in the criticism I mentioned of Epicurean piety and prayer. And, as I said, I don’t see how that “realist” position differs, practically, from the “abstract idealist” position. At that point, practices of piety and prayer have no more meaning than, say, backgammon. A game I play because I enjoy it. Or a jigsaw puzzle perhaps (which I do not enjoy, however).

With that said, meditation and contemplation might still be philosophically relevant – as is simply contemplating the beauties of nature, and feeling awe.

Anyway, I am trying to explore a third position between the options of real gods thoroughly removed from our everyday natural reality, and gods that are solely ideal mental fabrications.

Thanks for the reply!

I was recently thinking of the debates on Epicurean gods (whether real or archetypes of some sort – e.g. Don -v- Cassius?). I thought it best to read back through some earlier threads, so I can avoid just repeating.

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I have always been in the idealist camp. But I am trying to flesh out in my own mind the possibility of a naturalist realism that does not essentially “remove” the gods to distant, inaccessible intermundia in such a way as to make “theistic” realism – in practical terms – indistinguishable from an idealist view.

A first question might be: If there is no communication (no information passed) between/among various mundi (including their interstices), how can one have a proleptic intuition of their existence? (I want to note that I agree with Elayne’s affirmation of imagination: can that also be, in terms of brain function, related in some way to prolepsis? I am reading, in my piecemeal way, a scientific treatise on imagination that seems to support the possibility.* )

Second: If the gods are beings of nature, part of nature, why should their natural characteristics not be perceivable (again, perhaps proleptically) in nature as we perceive it – i.e., also in our world. [I am not thinking of an animist view, such as “The tree – or the wind, or the sun, whatever – is a god; or inhabited by some god-being.]

Third: If one grants the possibility raised in the second question, then it seems reasonable to say that we – in some way – relate to the divine when we relate to nature around us. This need not entail the kind of transactional reciprocity that Epicurus rejected.

Fourth: If, e.g. using our imagination, we can assign archetypal personalistic features to an idealized divinity (e.g. Lucretius with Venus, under the idealistic view), why should that be beyond the pale in the context of a thoroughly naturalized theistic realism? In that sense, it would seem to be a useful way of relating – according to the nature of our own minds – to a proleptically apprehended reality. It would also support (non-transactional) Epicurean piety and prayer, without any implied pretense of putting imaginary flesh on a projected abstraction – which I seem to recall was an accusation levelled at Epicurus by Stoics and Skeptics (Cicero?).

At bottom, it would mean imaging (or borrowing from ancient imagery) a naturalized real divine nature (proleptically apprehended) according to our individual proclivities, in order to enhance our ability to relate.

Note: I realize I am using the concept of “naturized real divinity” in a very general – itself somewhat abstract sense. That is something that might be sensed, but difficult to relate to. Hence the need for personal, imaginal** renderings (e.g. Zeus, Apollo, Athena).

A (very) rough analogy might be that Hinduism – with its 33 million gods – in which followers are encouraged to choose their own Ishtadevata (preferred god), which might not be any of the major god-figures (such as Vishnu, Krishna, Parvati, Lakshmi, etc.).

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* Jim Davies, Imagination: The Science of Your Mind’s Greatest Power.

** I am using the word “imaginal” here roughly in the sense of Henry Corbin (who coined the term): an aspect of reality that can only be grasped by the imagination – which, again, as I see it, could relate to prolepsis.

Quote from Cassius

So to repeat the main point of this post, I find the term "spiritual experiences" without further definition to be an obstacle to further clarity here.

I recall that the outspoken atheist and neuroscientist Sam Harris, in his book Waking Up: A Guide to Spirituality Without Religion, insisted that we do not have a better term that "spirituality" at hand -- and he went to some lengths to provide a coherent definition. Unfortunately, I don't recall it offhand.