Posts by Pacatus

I read the sample on Amazon: his writing style is pleasantly light-fingered, nondogmatic (in the modern conventional, generally pejorative, sense) and humorous.

When reading his comments on, e.g., Plato’s error in thinking that the propositions of a model (at least if internally coherent) must represent some idealized reality, I was reminded of a comment I read sometime back by a process philosopher about the silliness of many metaphysicians in acting as if every substantive (noun) in our language must represent some actual (even if idealized) substance (thing). Or that every existent must posess some innate real essence (e.g., “redness” must be a real substance, not just a color description on the spectrum).

It's a bit pricey for me now, but I put it in my Amazon wishlist for future consideration.

I posted this elsewhere, but since Godfrey seems on the same track, I'll repost here (re the Austin article posted above):

She argues cogently from the source material to the following conclusion – which she sums up thusly: “I have argued that Epicurus does not believe all forms of the fear of death are irrational and eliminable. At least one fear – the fear of violent death caused by others – is brute and must be managed politically.” And: “In sum, I argue that Epicurus believes there is a fear of death that does not disappear, which we can control with due care and with close attention to the social environs.”

My thought is that, from a modern point of view, we might distinguish between that “brute fear” – which is likely part of the evolutionarily inherited “survival response,” which is a natural response, of physiological/neurological nature, to an immediate perceived threat – versus “maladapted” fears (which I’ll call “anxiety”), which are both unnatural and irrational (e.g., that I won’t be able to afford that trip to Rome, or that my girlfriend will break up with me … .)

Welcome!

The more I think about (and we talk about) kinetic and katastematic pleasure, the more I am convinced that they are best described by example than by attempts at formulaic definition – and that descriptive definition ought to be treated only as aids to eliciting such experience in our personal lives (rather like the Zen concept of words as “fingers pointing to the moon”: let’s not get caught up worrying over the “fingers” – they are a useful, perhaps even necessary, pedagogical ploy, that’s all -- and enough).

A couple of illustrations:

1. I enjoy the kinetic pleasure of preparing and eating a meal (in terms of the aesthetic pleasure of preparing, the removal of hunger, and the gustatory pleasure of the taste – all of that). Afterward, I enjoy the lingering katastematic pleasure of satisfaction and contentment.

2. I enjoy the kinetic pleasure of a climactic sexual experience. Afterward, I bask in the lingering katastematic pleasure of contentment (often called “the afterglow”).

3. I enjoy the kinetic pleasure of a certain mental activity – such as playing a game of chess – and afterward enjoy the lingering memory (without necessarily trying to activate that memory: just letting it be).

Other than specific instances, I’d add a general feeling of good health and wellbeing as katãstema – as a lingering (more or less stable) background pathe of pleasure, no doubt the result of various kinetic pursuits of various pleasures.

At bottom, I think that hardline distinctions are not necessary – rather they can blend, one into the other. Anyway, that is the way I have come to think of it.

The print arrived today. It is more impressive than the pictures, with a fine visual texture. We took it to have it framed.

Onenski and Don :

This rendering -- clearly based on the Greek text -- is dramatically different from our received English translations (which seem to command continual spouting of philosophical dicta)! And I think Martin is right in terms of contradictions. All in all, I think, a much more congenial understanding -- as well as, apparently, more true to the original.

Thank you, Fernando! And Don, for your confirmation.

Similar to comments above by Cassius and Kalosyni , I question the relevance of "pity" here -- especially with regard to the deceased. Grief (sadness) for the loss, and compassion for other grievers -- absolutely. But I don't know how "pity" comes into it (and I agree with Kalosyni's take on pity, generally).

On listening to Part 1 of the Emily Austin podcast interview, I looked up and read her paper “Epicurus on the Politics of Fearing Death,” which she referenced. (It can be found here: https://www.academia.edu/14801045/Epicu…f_Fearing_Death.)

She argues cogently from the source material to the following conclusion – which she sums up thusly: “I have argued that Epicurus does not believe all forms of the fear of death are irrational and eliminable. At least one fear – the fear of violent death caused by others – is brute and must be managed politically.” And: “In sum, I argue that Epicurus believes there is a fear of death that does not disappear, which we can control with due care and with close attention to the social environs.”

My thought is that, from a modern point of view, we might distinguish between that “brute fear” – which is likely part of the evolutionarily inherited “survival response,” which is a natural response, of physiological/neurological nature, to an immediate perceived threat – versus “maladapted” fears (which I’ll call “anxiety”), which are both unnatural and irrational (e.g., that I won’t be able to afford that trip to Rome, or that my girlfriend will break up with me … .)

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With that said, I thought that discussion of Dr. Austin’s views in this paper might just be interesting.

Confession: I’m generally not a podcast kind of guy – unlike many people, I find it harder to absorb information aurally. But, after listening to the Lucretius Today interview with Dr. Boeri, I decided to listen to the ones with Dr. Emily Austin. (And will likely do more.)

I had to pause briefly because Cassius just gave me my laugh-out-oud line of the day (in the context of how our culture seems to affirm pain rather than pleasure as virtuous/good) with his tongue-in-cheek: “Thank you, Puritans, for establishing what we call American culture!”

To which Dr. Austin responded: “Those people were weird!”

Quote from Don

So, it appears Democritus uses terpsis, not Epicurus.

By Ἡδονή! I think you've got it!

(And I agree with your better wording for the thread title. )

“There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that 'my ignorance is just as good as your knowledge’.” Isaac Asimov

“Question with boldness even the existence of a god; because, if there be one, he must more approve the homage of reason, than that of blindfolded fear.” Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr, August 10, 1787

“The way to see by faith is to shut the eye of reason.” Benjamin Franklin

“We keep on being told that religion, whatever its imperfections, at least instills morality. On every side, there is conclusive evidence that the contrary is the case and that faith causes people to be more mean, more selfish, and perhaps above all, more stupid.” Christopher Hitchens

“If there are any gods whose chief concern is man, they can’t be very important gods.” Arthur C. Clarke

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That last (Clarke) quote seems quite in the Epicurean spirit.

Came across this headline in the Washington Post today: “A plurality of Americans believe God created humans without evolution.”

I’ll provide the link for those that want to read the political analysis pertaining to this, but won’t comment on that – only adding this more specific quote from the article: “Polling released this week by Suffolk University for USA Today indicates that this comports with the views of nearly 4 in 10 Americans – more than say either that human evolution was steered by God or that humans evolved without any divine intervention.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/…evolution-poll/

Maybe I shouldn’t be surprised, but my initial reaction was a dismayed “Oh my!”

The Wikipedia article gives this as the source for terpsis: Warren, James (2002). Epicurus and Democritean Ethics: An Archaeology of Ataraxia. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University. Warren is also the editor for The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism. I'm going through some of his articles on academia.edu -- but that will take awhile.

Calling Don (Our linguistic El Greco!)

The following is a quote from the Wikipedia article on Hedone:

“In the philosophy of Epicurus, hēdonē is described as a pleasure that may or may not derive from actions that are virtuous, whereas another form of pleasure, terpsis, is always virtuous. Another Epicurean reading, which distinguished hēdonē from terpsis, referred to it as a feeling of pleasure that is episodic and might or might not be beneficial. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Epicurus uses hēdonē in reference to only physical pleasures.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hedone

Wiktionary has terpsis (τέρψις) as “full enjoyment, delight, gladness, pleasure” from a proto-Indo-European term meaning “fulfillment, satisfaction.” https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%CF%84%CE…2#Ancient_Greek

In the cited Stanford Encyclopedia, there is no reference to terpsis, rather to khara (χᾰρᾱ́) – joy or exultation: “There are also positive states of mind, which Epicurus identifies by the special term khara (joy), as opposed to hêdonê (pleasure, i.e., physical pleasure).” [There follows a commentary on kinetic versus katasematic pleasures, the latter being (according to the author) associated with the pleasure of well-being (eudaimonia) as such.] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epicurus/#PsycEthi

Are there sources in the Greek, among the Epicurean corpus, for τέρψις and/or χᾰρᾱ́? And a distinction from Ἡδονή?

(If this has already been the subject of previous threads, just send me there. On a very cursory skim of some other threads on pleasure, I didn't see anything. )

I said "No" -- though it's a mixed bag. I was never on Twitter or Instagram; I weaned myself from Facebook, deleted my account. In the end there was more stress than pleasure, even though I restricted my account to family and friends. I'm on the internet a lot, though I try to limit my exposure to a few news sites (especially market-related news)-- and don't find a forum like this one to be obtrusive.

LATE EDIT: I also play some chess online.

@Nate This is beautiful (the other one also)! I just ordered the large one from Etsy. There is a big blank white wall in front of my desk, where it will hang!

It seems to me that discussions of katastematic pleasures in terms of relative stability or relative duration run into a kind of sorites question: how many grains of sand do you have to have before you can call them “a heap”? (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sorites_paradox) How stable for how long does a pleasure have to last to become katastematic?

I found it interesting that the Wiki article made the point that “Vagueness alone does not necessarily imply invalidity.”

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Sunday night, I was watching a football game and cheering for my team: a pleasurable activity that I would call kinetic. During breaks in the action, I would allow my awareness to go to my bodily feeling of continued satisfaction and contentment from the light dinner I had eaten sometime before. Is that more katastematic? I initially thought so. Or does the iteration of my awareness itself imply kinetic activity that determines how the pleasure would get labelled?

Quote from Cassius

"Justified to whom?"

Whilst I agree that context and circumstance are critical, I just want to say that I think we ought to be careful not to totally relativize the question: the most atrocious act against another human being you can think of can likely be justified by “someone” somehow (especially, perhaps, the perpetrator).

With that said: (a) it seems almost universal across cultures (historical and present) that justification is called for with regard to acts of harm (whether we might think whatever justification is valid or not), while acts of kindness and compassion generally do not require such justification. And (b) justification and justice (in terms of a just act), despite their etymological relation, are not the same thing. The question of justice would seem to be what circumstances might justify (in Epicurean thought) violation of the compact to neither harm nor be harmed.

Yes, it’s a tough nut. I think Don gave two good examples.

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I want to add that there are different concepts of justice generally: e.g., restorative or redemptive/rehabilitating as opposed to merely retributive/punitive.

Quote from Kalosyni

And are there challenges to living an Epicurean life in today's society?

Daily bombardment across the media aimed at stimulating (often likely subliminally) not only unnecessary but also unnatural desires.

I was just re-reading Emily Austin’s chapter on “Living Unnoticed: Politics and Power.” I think it gives a good, and moderate, analysis of the basis for an Epicurean politics. I will refrain from my penchant for reproducing all the quotes that I particularly like.

But this one hit me personally:

“An Epicurean’s political activity must operate within the bounds of their own tranquility.” [And I would add: health and well-being.]

Most of my social activism violated those bounds: I was far too often stressed, developed chronic stomach problems, had anxiety nightmares, etc. My father, in his idealistic neo-Kantian zeal, died at a young age from chronic stress and the addictive behaviors (most notably chain smoking) that he used to try to damp it down. (We disagreed politically, and there were some issues we had to agree not to discuss.)

I am also reminded of a story about North American volunteers against the political oppression in El Salvador at the time. The local people were joyously preparing for a religious feast and fiesta. The volunteers asked how they (the locals) could have such cheerfulness in the face of terrible, day-after-day oppression and suffering. The response (in so many words): “You speak like people who will not live here. You come to help because of your kind-heartedness and compassion – but then you will return home. We must remain. How could we endure without occasions for happy celebration?”

If one cannot be active without self-inflicted τᾰρᾰχή and πόνος (which you will also likely inflict on those around you), best, all round, to refrain.