Posts by Pacatus

I don’t know if this belongs here, or ought to be transferred elsewhere (e.g., a continuation of the discussion at Anticipations - Justice & Divine Nature).

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I don’t like the word “anticipations” as a rendering of prolepsis. To get at what I said in post #16 here about “moral noncognitivism” (a phrase I think may not be helpful either) and “feeling”, I’m going to suggest borrowing a neologism coined by philosopher/psychologist Eugene Gendlin: “felt-sense.”

For example, I have a felt-sense of disgust and revulsion and outrage at the abuse of a child – a mental disturbance (τᾰρᾰχή ) accompanied by πόνος in the body (e.g. trembling, muscle-tightening, etc.). I don’t need to take account of what the perpetrator thinks/feels in order to act. Nor do I need a set of philosophical or moral principles in order to act. Nor do I need to really think it out at all (hence the “noncognitivism” relative to an ethical response; the felt-sense may be an innately arising response to the situation).

I would not call that a felt-sense of justice – closer to the example in the above-mentioned thread of a child exclaiming “That’s not fair!”

But, in order to advocate socially and politically for a compact to prevent and punish child abuse, I do need some defensible concepts/principles of justice – e.g. the compact to neither harm nor be harmed. I would consider that to be realpolitick, and a natural ethical extension of that felt-sense – and quite in line with Epicurean justice. (And maybe the word prolepsis could just be retained as is.)

Question (I am likely to have only questions for now): Prolepsis was also briefly mentioned in the podcast. Can there be a proleptic (or quasi-proleptic) concept of justice? That is not easily expressed in determinative theoretic terms? But that the latter can best be understood as supporting rational arguments?

This would possibly remove idealism from a kind of “moral noncognitivism” (broadly defined) – which, personally, would comport well with my experience (and frustration) with moral idealisms such as those proffered by the Stoics, Kant, and religious divine-command idealisms, and finding more reasonable philosophical grounding – and testing – for my “feelings” of what appears just or unjust via Epicurean philosophy.

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Now, I need to attend to my Phillies in today’s National League Championship game; if they win, they win the pennant and move to the World Series! (Keeping my pleasure priorities straight, Cassius !)

Quote from Don

I got the impression he was referring to Realpolitik:

I would guess then that "contingent," in this case, means something like political/social activity for aims that are not pragmatic (say, to sustain beneficially secure social contracts, laws and norms), but based on some other "contingent" considerations: such as personal power or enforcement of some ideology. (Think of that as a question ...)

I finished the podcast. Wonderful! Thank you so much Cassius and Fernando for presenting this, and your fine moderation -- and of course gratitude to Dr. Boeri.

What has initially piqued my interest is the distinction between "contingent politics" versus "everyday/real politics." I need to take some time to explore and mull over that., and where the contextual/circumstantial lines might be.

Once again, kudos on a fine presentation! Much appreciated!

Thank you, Cassius! I'll catch it tomorrow -- now I have to watch my Philadelphia Eagles play the Miami Dolphins. ("Fly, Eagles, fly!"). Old Pennsylvania boy, here!

The more I read of Frances Wright, the more I admire her!

Frances Wright

www.monticello.org

In my perusal of past threads, I came on this post by Cassius – which I reproduce in full:

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Here's my answer: By no means did the classical Epicureans take the position that we should "never" be involved in politics. Look at the example of Cassius Longinus, and there are others as well.

The caution I always make is that people are individuals and have different programming for pleasure and pain, and by no means do everyone take pleasure and pain in the same things.

Given that difference, I do not think it is possible to take a *Philosophic* position that one view of pleasure or pain is *philosophically* approved by nature for everyone. That is also in my view the clear meaning of the last ten of so, principal doctrines as to justice, which are all about pointing out that there is no "absolute" justice.

I think Epicurean philosophy is hugely helpful in deciding how to evaluate politics and how to take political positions, but I also think that just like in the Roman Civil War it is possible for Epicureans to be on opposite sides of many important issues, so we should be careful not to overstep our bounds and say that Epicurus would endorse only one set of political positions. The clear (to me) import of the doctrines on Justice tells us to expect that people are going to take different positions about how they want to live, so applications of Epicurean philosophy to politics needs to take that into account.

So in my view too the prohibition here on discussing politics is no so much because there are not Epicurean implications, but because here, and at this stage of trying to organize people to discuss and promote the basics of Epicurean philosophy, we really don't want to be drawn into day-to-day disputes that would demoralize and divide and weaken us before we even get started.

No doubt in the future such divisions will occur, as you can already see them on other websites and commentators, some of which are overtly "leftist" and some of which are not (and quite the opposite in fact). But for now, and for here, we want to focus as a group on learning the basics before we go off as individuals pursuing our individual views of pleasure and pain, much as we would, if we were at a convention, divide up into groups to go to restaurants of various types.

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While I agree with this wonderful post completely, I will add just this caveat:

Under the rubric of “the agreement to neither harm nor be harmed” as the root of Epicurean natural justice, I do not think that one can assent to ideologies or political movements (or parties) that embrace causing harm as a means of securing their own social/political power, without violating Epicurean philosophy on that score. And I think that Epicureanism stands on stronger ground ethically all around than idealist philosophies such as the Stoics or Kantians (or religious/theological “divine command” theories).

LATE EDIT: I should have said "expansion" perhaps, instead of "caveat" given this clear statement by Cassius : "I think Epicurean philosophy is hugely helpful in deciding how to evaluate politics and how to take political positions."

I couldn't find much (and I'm not a chart-maker), but here's a limited one:

“Humanism” is such a broad concept, with many – often conflicting (e.g. theistic and nontheistic) – strands, that I find it pretty meaningless as a catch-all philosophical term in itself. Better, perhaps, to speak of “humanisms” of different sorts.

With that said, if one considers the following definitions (from https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/humanism) as valid, then I would think of Epicurean philosophy as a humanism (not necessarily – or perhaps even often – compatible with others):

2: devotion to human welfare : HUMANITARIANISM

"renowned for his humanism"

3: a doctrine, attitude, or way of life centered on human interests or values

Quote from Eoghan Gardiner

assuming I return to myself after this week

Ah, yes! That is an important consideration for this hypothetical! (One which I did not think of in my response. )

Quote from Kalosyni

--Don't get involved in politics (political activites or political debates)

I remain unconvinced that Epicurus thought that being a good Epicurean meant always refraining from political activity, or that he did not recognize the dependency of a society (the polis; Latin civitas) in which the Garden could flourish on politics. Although, Kalosyni's cautions on the matter are well-taken.

Though the book Theory and Practice in Epicurean Political Philosophy. Security, justice and tranquility by Javier Aoiz & Marcelo Boeri remains, sadly beyond my budget (maybe I need to set up a targeted savings plan), I have read their “Cicero and his Clamorous Silences” (https://www.academia.edu/82815606/CICER…MOROUS_SILENCES). A few excerpts below:

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The opponents of Epicureanism in antiquity successfully established a cliché that has remained to this day: the theoretical and practical disinterest of Epicurus and the Epicureans in political communities. The best proof of their success is the transformation of the expressions «live unnoticed» (λάθε βιώσας) and «do not participate in politics» (μὴ πολιτεύσεσθαι) into famous Epicurean slogans.

Nevertheless, Philodemus, like Lucretius and in accordance with Epicurus’ views, in no way condemns the activity of any politician.

The normative or regulative function of the Epicurean political model is embodied in the preconception of the just.

Nor did Epicurus’ conception of justice and law alienate him from his city. Epicurus shares in the rejection of two figures who represent contempt for the laws of the polis: the tyrant and the Cynics.

Indeed, among Epicurus’ friends there were politicians who were influential and close (even very close) to Epicureanism, such as Idomeneus, a prominent politician of Lampsacus, and Mithres, Lysimachus’ minister of finance, who provided financial aid to the Garden.

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The bottom line seems to be that Epicurus supported and relied on the norms and institutions of the Athenian polis – and they necessarily derive from political activity, even if Epicurus himself did not actively participate in politics – at least formally. Today, we also so depend and rely – and so may need to respond politically when necessary if those societal laws, contracts and norms are threatened.

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I also found a Google translation of their essay “¿Cuán apolíticos fueron Epicuro y los epicúreos? La polis griega y sus ilustres ciudadanos epicúreos” (https://www.academia.edu/77829847/_Cu%C…_epic%C3%BAreos) – “How Apolitical were Epicurus and the Epicureans?: the Greek Polis and their Illustrious Epicurean Citizens”. (https://www.scielo.br/j/trans/a/nSSz…qNMPQb/?lang=es)

A few excerpts from that translation:

“In this article we argue that the fact that there were prominent citizens of different Greek cities who adhered to Epicureanism, felt themselves Epicureans and were recognized as such, shows that slogans such as “live hidden” and “do not participate in politics”, which suggest a complete apoliticism on the part of Epicurus and the Epicureans, distort the true meaning of staying away from contingent politics.”

“If, as the title of this article somewhat rhetorically describes, there were prominent citizens of different Greek cities who adhered to Epicurean doctrines, who felt themselves Epicureans and who were recognized as such by their fellow citizens, it does not seem reasonable to infer (from the slogans mostly present in the indirect tradition) a complete apoliticism on the part of Epicurus and the Epicureans nor a “hidden living”. We maintain that there are reasons to suppose that these slogans do not adequately describe the character of Epicurus himself and his practical life (committed to relations of kinship and friendship, philanthropy, the rites of the city, and its legal provisions in the purchase, sale and inheritance of property, etc.), nor that of his followers.”

“It is natural to think that the way of life of those who adhered to Epicureanism over several centuries did not follow a single pattern. Social class, gender, political community and historical context must have led to different modalities of belonging or adhering to Epicureanism.”

“Nor did Epicurus' conception of justice and laws separate him from his city. Epicurus shares the rejection of two figures who represent contempt for the laws of the polis: the tyrant and the cynics (DL X 119).”

“The wise Epicurean, unlike the cynic, is concerned with property and the future; He considers that the property and security of the polis constitute a legitimate means of reinforcing tranquility and minimizing fear.”

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In sum, it may be a necessity of prudent choice – at least under some circumstances – to forgo the “close” pleasures, and endure some unpleasantness – in order to secure the political environment (laws, contracts, regulations, civic norms) that allows for there to be continued pleasant life at all, where one has at least some hope of neither promoting harm nor being harmed. Just as one might endure the pain of surgery and subsequent physical therapy in order to thereafter enjoy a continued pleasant life. This is the way that I look at my own occasions of political and social activism over the years: I did not particularly enjoy those activities – and they were often both mentally and physically stressful – but they seemed, in the broader view and longer run, to be the prudent choice; and now seem to me to be the prudent Epicurean choice.

Quote from Kalosyni

Greek dancing (from "Zorba" yet likely has some basis in ancient Greek dance, especially the circle dance, which I think illustrates well the following Vatican Saying:

VS 52: "Friendship dances around the world, announcing to each of us that we must awaken to happiness".

What I like about this is that it gives a better sense of Epicurus (and the Garden) as celebrating the robust, pleasurable exuberance of life – rather than succumbing to a quiescent contemplative philosophy. To laugh and to dance (perhaps especially inside) is part and parcel of an Epicurean philosophy aimed at fulfilling pleasure and enjoyment in the tides of everyday life. (To draw on Nietschze’s formulation, cited by Hnaraki, the Dionysian is not simply sublimated into the more sedate Apollonian.) [And I always thought that Frances Wright captured this robustness better than many of the academic philosophers.] * / **

As Professor Hnaraki put it: “Greeks act life; indeed, as Zorba, their kinsman, they dance it as well. By doing so, Greeks subconsciously and creatively use dancing as a therapeutic means of self- and psychoanalysis, as they manage to liberate themselves by healing their egos. After all, the world of Greece is a world of culture, always with the human being centered.”

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* As an aside, I think this also goes to Don's objection to a word like “static” to translate katastematic pleasure, and (if I recall correctly) treating ataraxia as some kind of “tranquilized” state (as opposed to an active imperturbableness).

** A second aside: it also opposes any tendency to regard katastematic pleasures (and ataraxia) as somehow superior to kinetic pleasure, which sometimes seems to raise its head in the academic literature.

Thank you, Kalosyni.

Here, for anyone interested, is a paper by Maria Hnaraki – professor of anthropology, Greek culture, folklore and ethnomusicology at Drexel University – titled “Speaking Without Words: Zorba’s Dance.” (Academia.edu did not have a copy of this paper, but the author kindly provided a copy on request.)

https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2742/debb72b0b…NzQ3Mi41OS4wLjA.

Cassius

Yes, I enjoyed some kinetic pleasure at engaging that kind of formulaic logic (despite my discomfort with the notion of "calculus" when it comes to hedonic choice-making ).

But I agree with your reservations.

Kalosyni Quote "As for processed fish, such as preserved tuna and anchovies, they were widely consumed by all social classes and were the product of a very flourishing trade throughout the Mediterranean and the adjacent seas."

My only guess is that there was a societal norm aimed at preventing the very wealthy from negatively impacting that wide consumption.

Onenski: Thank you for bringing this to our attention. The book is unfortunately beyond my budget for now. I have read their essay "Cicero and his Clamorous Silences" (which can be accessed via the Academia.edu page linked by Cassius above).

“ … in Classical Era Athens, the purchase of all fish by a wealthy citizen was considered an undemocratic act since he left nothing for the rest of the people.” https://greekreporter.com/2022/08/04/anc…rence-for-fish/ cited by Kalosyni in post #43 above.

After reading “Cicero and His Clamorous Silences” by Aoiz and Boeri (https://www.academia.edu/82815606/CICER…MOROUS_SILENCES), I am convinced this criticism would be endorsed by Epicurus and the Garden.

Don: I love the syllogistic (deductive) analysis! Let me see if I can offer a possible solution to your closing “impasse” –

Both A1 and A2 can contain physical and mental components: as you put it, “neither A1 nor A2 map neatly onto mind and body since memories can be a kinetic pleasure.” Let’s call A1p physical kinetic pleasure, and A1m mental kinetic pleasure. Similarly, A2p is katastematic physical pleasure; and A2m is katastematic mental pleasure. So –

A = A1 + A2 = [(A1p + A1m) + (A2p + A2m)].

With that expansion, there seems to be no need to include B2 on the left-hand side. A sum-state of pleasure becomes simply:

(A1 + A2) = [A1p + A1m) + (A2p + A2m)] – (B1 + B2) > 0.

LATE EDIT: And there seems no need to to specify that physical pleasure itself outweighs physical pain, or that mental pleasure outweighs mental pain -- especially since we already know that mental pleasure can potentially mitigate physical pain.

And the daily goal – choice by choice – is to max A – B (with attention to those internal components). And that is how one maximizes A(C) – which we could call eudaimonia?

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Question: Can B1 and B2 also have katastematic qualities? For example, chronic physical pain or clinical depression?

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Okay, my brain is cracked.

Quote from Kalosyni

How often is the sum of our experience just what we decide to tell ourselves (or label things as being either "good" or "bad")?

Essentially Epicurus' strategy in his physically painful dying days.

Quote from Don

So, yes, there could have been more than one philosophy at play in this letter.

My recollection is that the Greek definite article was also used for emphasis, and not just distinction – as in τὸν Θεόν in John 1:1.

In the Colossians case, it could mean all philosophy in general -- as opposed to proper faith.